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Title: The Good Student, The Bad Student, and the Celtic Tiger: The Role of National 
Identity and Responses to the Troika in Europe 
 
In response to crises of unsustainable debt, which left Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal locked out of bond markets, each country received assistance from the “Troika” 
(European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF). They received loans in return 
for implementing austerity policies and liberal structural reforms. All three countries 
suffered painful cuts and massive recessions, but their citizens and leaders reacted 
differently.  
Greece experienced significant political and social resistance and ultimately 
needed a second program. The Irish rejected the government that requested the bailout 
and elected a new government that implemented the Troika program with little deviation 
from the original plan and exited its Troika program on time. Ireland also saw very little 
labor unrest, and limited protest. The Portuguese elected strong advocates of the Troika’s 
policies and saw an initial 16-month period with moderate levels of protest and strikes, 
before a more intense period ensued. Despite increased social pressure, the Portuguese 
government weathered a near collapse while maintaining its commitment to the Troika 
program and exited its Troika program on schedule.  
Many have argued that the prevalence of “neoliberal” ideas, institutional factors, 
or differences in the difficulty of the individual programs can account for these responses, 
v 
 
but all of these explanations fall short in various ways. This dissertation argues that these 
responses were influenced by particular aspects of each country’s national identity, 
especially as each relates to the European Union. In this dissertation, I show that each 
country can be seen to have very different types of national identities, with the most 
prominent features of each identity being themselves a result of the historical context of 
each country. Additionally, the most prominent aspects of each country’s identity were 
the least contested in each society. Viewed through the lens of national identity, the 
responses from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal not only reproduced central elements of the 
content of each country’s national identity, but the identities interacted in real time, with 
Ireland and Portugal highlighting their differences from Greece, and Portugal actively 
striving to be more like Ireland. The interaction between identities further reinforced each 







NAME OF AUTHOR: Kevin M. O’Hare 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 





Doctor of Philosophy, Political Science, 2021, University of Oregon 
Master of Science, Political Science, 2015, University of Oregon 
Master of Arts, Political Science (The Obstructive Power of Ideas), 2012, Ohio 
University 
Bachelor of Science, Integrated Social Studies Education, 2005, Ohio University 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
  
International Political Economy 
 Comparative Political Economy 
 Politics of Economic Adjustment  








Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2013-2017 and 2018-2020 
  
High School Teacher, Lancaster High School, Lancaster Ohio, 2007-2010 and 
2012-2013 
 
Graduate Assistant, Department of Academic Affairs, Heritage College of 
Osteopathic Medicine, Ohio University, 2010-2011 
 
High School Teacher, Sheridan High School, Thornville, Ohio, 2006 
 








GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
Thomas Hovet Award for Outstanding Graduate Teaching Fellowship Instructors, 
Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, June 2020. 
 
Institute of Cognitive & Decision Sciences Dissertation Research Award, Institute 
of Cognitive and Decision Sciences for Dissertation Research, University of 
Oregon, June 2019. 
 
Fulbright-Schuman Research Grant for the European Union, J. William Fulbright 
Foreign Scholarship Board, September 2017-June 2018. 
 
William C. Mitchell Graduate Research Scholarship, Department of Political 
Science, University of Oregon, May 2016. 
 
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of Political Science, University of 
Oregon, 2013-2017 and 2018-2020. 
 
Graduate Tuition Scholarship and Assistantship, Department of Political Science, 
Ohio University, 2011-2012. 
 
Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Ohio 
University, 2011-2012.  
 



























 There are so many people that I want to acknowledge for helping me complete 
this dissertation. So many things had to come together in ways I could have never 
predicted that contributed to this final product. It was far from an individual endeavor as I 
owe an incalculable debt to my dissertation committee, family, friends, and colleagues. 
First, I want to acknowledge and thank my advisor, Craig Parsons, who kept pushing me 
further, even when I had reservations about the direction of this dissertation. Craig’s 
advice and encouragement was invaluable, and this dissertation would not have been 
possible without his incredible guidance and support. This dissertation would also not 
have been possible without Lars Skalnes, who literally asked me, “what the hell is going 
on in Portugal?” all the way back in 2014. This one question was the initial spark for this 
dissertation and led to many productive and enjoyable conversations with Lars. Tuong 
Vu was also critical in getting me to think about my dissertation in different ways, as we 
had many conversations as my research and writing progressed.  
 This dissertation would have been nearly impossible to write if it were not for the 
Fulbright-Schuman Grant I received to conduct fieldwork in Ireland and Portugal in 
2017-18. The individuals from the Fulbright Commissions in Belgium and Luxembourg, 
Ireland, and Portugal were vital for making me feel at home while in Europe. 
Specifically, I would like to thank Elisabeth Bloxam, Erica Lutes, and Marijke Hendrickx 
from the Fulbright Commission in Belgium and Luxembourg; Dara Fitzgerald, Sonya 
McGuinness, Emma Loughney, and Paula Melvin from the Fulbright Commission in 
ix 
 
Ireland; and Ricardo Sequeira and Dora Reis Arenga from the Fulbright Commission in 
Portugal. Professors Niamh Hardiman and Aidan Regan were very helpful while I was at 
University College Dublin in Ireland, and Professor Catherine Moury was likewise 
helpful while at NOVA in Lisbon.  
 Last, I would like to thank and acknowledge my wife, Colleen O’Hare, who not 
only supported me in my decision to undertake a Ph.D. but encouraged me to pursue my 
research even though it took me to another continent. Without her love, support, and 








Dedicated to my wife, Colleen O’Hare 
xi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter              Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 
Literature Review........................................................................................ 4 
Rational/Material Explanations ............................................................ 4 
Economic Interest Explanations ..................................................... 5 
Party Politics Explanations ........................................................... 15 
Electoral Consequences of Retrenchment .................................... 16 
Why Parties Retrench ................................................................... 20 
International Pressure.................................................................... 26 
Institutional Explanations ................................................................... 28 
Ideational Explanations ....................................................................... 34 
National Identity ................................................................................. 37 
Contestation of Identities .............................................................. 43 
National Identity and the Troika ................................................... 44 
The Argument in Brief – The Good Student, The Bad Student,   
and the Celtic Tiger ....................................................................... 46 
Greece ........................................................................................... 47 
Ireland ........................................................................................... 49 
Portugal ......................................................................................... 50 
Data and Methods ............................................................................... 51 
Plan for the Rest of the Dissertation ............................................. 54 
 
II. GREECE ......................................................................................................... 55 
The Greek Economic Adjustment Program ........................................ 61 
External Pressures and Government Response From the Bailout 
through Summer 2010................................................................... 63 
Social Responses From the Bailout through Summer 2010 ......... 67 
External Pressures and Government Response September – 
December 2010 ............................................................................. 70 
Social Responses September – December 2010 ........................... 73 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 2011 ............ 75 
Social Responses Q1 2011 ............................................................ 78 
External Pressures and Policy Responses Q2 of 2011 .................. 80 
xii 
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page 
 
Social Responses Q2 of 2011 ....................................................... 86 
External Pressures and Policy Responses July -                
November 2011 ............................................................................. 89 
Social Responses July – November 2011 ................................... 100 
External Pressures and Policy Responses December 2011 –   
March 2012: From Unity Government to Second Bailout .......... 107 
Social Responses December 2011 – March 2012 ....................... 112 
Post Second Bailout .................................................................... 118 
Analysis of the Greek Case ............................................................... 120 
Greek National Identity............................................................... 123 
Foreign Occupation ..................................................................... 132 
Everything is on the Table .......................................................... 147 
Constraints? What Constraints? .................................................. 159 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 170 
 
III. IRELAND ..................................................................................................... 173 
The Irish Program ............................................................................. 183 
Political Response and External Pressures after the Bailout       
with the Troika ............................................................................ 186 
Social Responses From Troika Announcement Through the 
January of 2011 ........................................................................... 188 
External Pressure and Government Responses from the    
Campaign to the end of Q1 2011 ................................................ 190 
Social Responses February and March 2011 .............................. 193 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q2 2011 .......... 195 
Social Responses Q2 2011 .......................................................... 198 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q3 2011 .......... 200 
Social Responses Q3 2011 .......................................................... 203 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q4 2011 .......... 205 
Societal Response Q4 2011 ........................................................ 211 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 2012 .......... 214 
Social Responses Q1 2012 .......................................................... 218 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q2 2012 .......... 221 
Social Responses Q2 2012 .......................................................... 224 
xiii 
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page 
 
Social Responses Q3 2012 .......................................................... 227 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q4 2012 .......... 227 
Social Responses Q4 2012 .......................................................... 230 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 2013 .......... 231 
Social Responses Q1 2013 .......................................................... 234 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q2 2013 .......... 236 
Social Responses Q2 2013 .......................................................... 239 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q3 2013 .......... 241 
Social Responses Q3 2013 .......................................................... 243 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q4 2013 .......... 245 
Social Responses Q4 2013 .......................................................... 248 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 250 
Analysis of the Irish Case ................................................................. 251 
Irish National Identity – From Catholic Ireland to The Celtic   
Tiger ............................................................................................ 254 
Faith in Ireland’s FDI Economic Model and Free Markets ........ 265 
Ireland is not Greece ................................................................... 289 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 297 
 
IV. PORTUGAL ................................................................................................. 299 
The Portuguese Economic Adjustment Program .............................. 307 
External Pressures and Government Responses Summer 2011 .. 310 
Social Responses From Troika Agreement Through the        
Summer of 2011 .......................................................................... 313 
External Pressure and Government Responses Autumn 2011 .... 316 
Social Responses Autumn 2011.................................................. 320 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 and                
Q2 2012 ....................................................................................... 325 
Social Responses Q1 and Q2 2012 ............................................. 331 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q3 and             
Q4 2012 ....................................................................................... 338 
Social Responses Q3 and Q4 2012 ............................................. 345 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q1 2013 ....... 359 
Social Responses Q1 2013 .......................................................... 365 
xiv 
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page 
 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q2 2013 ....... 367 
Social Responses Q2 2013 .......................................................... 370 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q3 2013 ....... 373 
Social Responses Q3 2013 .......................................................... 377 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q4 2013 ....... 377 
Social Responses Q4 2013 .......................................................... 379 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q1 2014 ....... 382 
Social Responses Q1 2014 .......................................................... 385 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q2 2014 ....... 387 
Social Responses Q2 2014 .......................................................... 389 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 392 
Analysis of the Portuguese Case ....................................................... 394 
Portuguese National Identity – From Atlanticist Empire to the 
Good Student .............................................................................. 397 
The Good Student ....................................................................... 405 
Off the Table ............................................................................... 415 
Portugal is not Greece ................................................................. 435 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 443 
 
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 445 
 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure               Page 
 
Figure 1: Protests in Athens, Greece and Lisbon, Portugal ............................................ 149 
Figure 2: Irish Protests .................................................................................................... 176 
Figure 3: Irish Strikes...................................................................................................... 176 
Figure 4: Portuguese Protests.......................................................................................... 303 
Figure 5: Portuguese Strikes ........................................................................................... 303 
  
xvi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table               Page 
 
Table 1: Fiscal Measures .................................................................................................. 11 
Table 2: Greece Structural Reforms ................................................................................. 12 
Table 3: Portugal Structural Reforms ............................................................................... 13 
Table 4: Ireland Structural Reforms ................................................................................. 14 
Table 5: Ireland Banking Reforms .................................................................................... 15 
Table 6: Protests per 1 Million Inhabitants from 1990-1995 .......................................... 136 





As the global financial crisis worsened in 2008-2009, several European 
governments with debt problems were locked out of bond markets. As a result, Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal received assistance from the so-called “Troika” of international 
institutions,1 in return for implementing highly contentious austerity policies that 
included cuts to the welfare state, public wages, and public sector jobs, as well as tax 
increases and structural reforms. While all three countries implemented similar policies 
and suffered massive recessions, huge increases in unemployment, and large-scale 
emigration, each country’s response was profoundly different. Greece experienced 
significant political resistance, numerous strikes, and huge protests that frequently 
involved violence and property damage. Ultimately, the Greeks would need a second 
Troika program before finishing its first. The Irish rejected the government that requested 
the bailout by electing a new government with the largest majority in the history of the 
Irish state. But besides some pre-election bluster, the Fine Gael/Labour government 
implemented the Troika program with little deviation from the original plan and exited its 
Troika program on time. Ireland also saw very little labor unrest, and limited protest. 
Meanwhile in Portugal, despite a problem that required steeper initial fiscal consolidation 
targets than Greece and comparable structural reforms, voters elected strong advocates of 
the Troika’s policies. Portugal saw only a moderate level of protests and strikes for the 
initial sixteen months of its program. Even when social pressure increased, the 
                                                 
1 The Troika consists of the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
2 
Portuguese government weathered a near collapse and maintained its commitment to its 
Troika program while exiting on schedule. Why would three countries in relatively 
similar situations respond in such profoundly different ways? This question speaks to the 
larger question of why some countries accept and implement policies recommended and 
enforced by outside actors regarding fiscal, monetary, and structural economic policies in 
times of economic distress while other countries reject such policies. While there have 
been several cases of countries being required to implement painful austerity and 
structural reforms in exchange for funding,2 the European Debt Crisis presents an 
opportunity to directly compare countries that not only find themselves in similar 
situations but that have similar constraints. Membership in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) placed limits on the policy options available to governments in the EMU due to 
the Stability and Growth Pact limiting government spending and the European Central 
Bank controlling monetary policy. Therefore, each state lacked the full range of fiscal 
and monetary policy tools that are typically available to states when they enter an 
economic downturn. Given the similar economic situations Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
faced, as well as the common constraints, how do we explain the wide variation in 
responses to each country’s Troika program? 
This dissertation argues that the responses of all three countries were shaped and 
influenced by particular aspects of each country’s national identity, and especially as 
each relates to Europe and the European Union. National identities vary widely, and 
which aspects become prominent in an economic crisis will depend on the specific nature 
of each country’s national identity. In an economic crisis where outside help is required, 
                                                 
2 Most notably in Latin America in the 1980s and Asia in the late 1990s. 
3 
the aspects of national identity that become most prominent are shaped by a country’s 
history and its relationship with the countries and institutions offering aid. This is 
especially important when those offering aid are also demanding they implement difficult 
policies in return for their help. Building on theorizing about identity from Abdelal et al. 
(2009), I will show that my cases can be seen to have very different types of national 
identities, with the most prominent features of each identity being themselves a result of 
the historical context of each country. Additionally, the most prominent aspects of each 
country’s identity were also the least contested. Viewed through the lens of national 
identity, the responses from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal not only reproduced central 
elements of the content of each country’s national identity, but the identities interacted in 
real time, with Ireland and Portugal highlighting their differences from Greece, and 
Portugal actively striving to be more like Ireland. The interaction between identities 
further reinforced each country’s responses to their respective Troika programs. In other 
words, national identity is crucial for understanding the responses of each Troika 
program country as well as the interaction of identities between the three countries. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I will review the 
literature on why countries might accept or reject externally-imposed policies, which 
focuses on three big lines of argument: rational/material, institutional, and ideational. 
Next, I will present my approach to answering the question of why Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal responded in such different ways to their Troika programs, which builds upon 
the approach promoted by Abdelal et al., (2009). Then, I will present my specific 
argument, focusing on how national identity structured the interpretations of each 
country’s Troika program, influencing how political and social leaders, as well as the 
4 
public responded. Finally, I will discuss the methods I employed to reach my conclusions 
and will finish by summarizing the organization of the dissertation. 
Literature Review 
 There are many possible ways to try to explain the differing responses of Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal to their Troika programs, although little has been written directly on 
why states respond the way they do to externally-imposed economic policies in times of 
economic distress. The literature on compliance with IMF structural adjustment programs 
may come the closest to directly addressing question of why countries respond the way 
they do to externally-imposed economic policies, but this literature fails to reach a 
consensus. The most common explanations within this literature center on how domestic 
interest groups and domestic institution shape states’ responses to difficult economic 
policies imposed from the outside. This literature review includes and expands on interest 
group and institutional explanations to include party politics, international pressure, 
ideational, and identity explanations. First, I will explain potential rational/material 
explanations, which include interest groups, party politics, and international pressure. 
Next, I will move to institutional explanations. Then, I discuss ideational explanations 
before finishing with a discussion of national identity explanations, upon which my 
argument is built. 
Rational/Material Explanations 
The dominant approach to studying political economy questions is by employing 
rational/material explanations that focus on the economic or material incentives of 
important actors. Because austerity has distributional consequences, it appears sensible to 
start here when looking for answers to responses to Troika austerity. A rational/material 
5 
explanation need not be exclusively economic and can come in many forms. Broadly, 
these explanations argue some version of the following: the objective positioning of a 
state or actors within a state will determine their preferences, which in turn lead to the 
choices the state and other actors will make. Examples of this type of argument include 
the international positioning of a state vis-à-vis other states or the composition of 
economic sectors within an economy, but the overarching argument is that material 
factors are primarily responsible for outcomes. These explanations view individuals’ 
preferences as fixed and focused on material concerns such as economic well-being or 
winning elections. Therefore, within a rational/material type of explanation there are 
many arguments one could make to explain why states accept or reject difficult economic 
policies imposed from outside sources, but the unifying thread is that preferences can be 
determined a priori, and material incentives will define the preferences of actors, which 
in turn play a large role in determining policy outcomes. 
Economic Interest Explanations 
 Many scholars have studied how economic interests and distributional conflict 
contribute to political outcomes following financial crises. Scholars such as Peter 
Gourevitch (1986), Jeffry Frieden (1991), and Tom Pepinsky (2009), among others 
(Alesina and Drazen 1991; Hellman 1998; Martinelli and Tommasi 1997; Rodrik 1996; 
Schamis 1999) have performed various studies displaying the importance of domestic 
interests in determining economic policies and outcomes during and after financial crises. 
While Gourevitch focused on interest group coalition realignment after crises, 
Frieden was concerned with the distributional effects of foreign exchange rate policy. 
Finally, Pepinsky examined how political coalitions and the preferences of powerful 
6 
interests within Indonesia and Malaysia led to divergent responses and outcomes 
regarding the Asian Financial Crisis. The common thread throughout works such as these 
is that they expect powerful domestic interests that would gain from an economic policy 
to pressure governments to adopt the policy while the interest groups likely to be harmed 
by the policy would oppose it. As Pepinsky (2009) points out, “governments fulfill 
particularistic demands for political purposes, with the result that in countries facing 
similar needs for economic adjustment, policies enacted will vary according to the profile 
of powerful interest groups within those countries.”3 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal were all facing an external debt crisis that shut all 
three governments out of bond markets at the time that they asked the Troika for help. 
The pressure exerted by bond markets comes as interest rates increase, making borrowing 
increasingly costly, and affecting the government’s ability to finance its activities. Due to 
the reliance on bond markets to finance their government operations, the initial conflict 
was between governments and global markets as lenders.4 
Once states decide to repay creditors, they must have the money to do so. 
Accomplishing repayment generally entails a mix of cuts to the welfare state, public 
wages, public sector jobs, as well as tax increases – i.e., austerity. Some economists have 
                                                 
3 Thomas B. Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and 
Malaysia in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 5. 
4 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
 
7 
argued that high debt to GDP ratios5 have substantial negative effects on growth6 and that 
spending cuts are more likely to reduce deficits and less likely to create a recession than 
tax increases.7 Additionally, the Eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact limits 
governments to deficits of 3 percent per year. This makes the prospect of stimulus even 
less appealing as it would lead to violating the Stability and Growth Pact and result in 
closer monitoring of budgets from Brussels. Therefore, if a government wants to lower 
borrowing costs and restore growth, implementing austerity is required.8 Additionally in 
cases where countries reach out to others like the IMF, or in this case, the Troika, gaining 
access to financing typically involves structural adjustments in addition to austerity 
measures. These usually include liberalizing protected sectors of the economy, increasing 
labor flexibility, privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and reforming specific 
product markets, among others. 
According to this line of reasoning, the distributional effects of these austerity 
policies and structural reforms should lead the groups within states that will be hurt 
economically to pressure governments to avoid these painful policies. Since most cuts 
                                                 
5 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argue that a 90% debt to GDP ratio has significant effects on growth, but later 
Irons and Bivens (2010) demonstrated that the 90% threshold is inaccurate and that slow growth causes 
debt buildup and not the reverse.  
6 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American Economic Review: 
Papers and Proceedings 100, (2010). 
7 Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?” American Economic Review 81, 
(5): 1170-1188. 
8 This point of view has been challenged by economists such as Paul Krugman (2009; 2012) and Joseph 
Stiglitz (2002), as well as political economist Mark Blyth (2013). As Blyth (2013) argues, it may make 
sense for one country to try and cut spending to reign in deficits as long as their trading partners do not. 
However, if all states are cutting simultaneously as we have witnessed in Europe, the recovery is much 
more difficult as aggregate demand is depressed and incomes and profits of all countries are reduced. 
 
8 
would affect the public sector, one would expect states where the government is more 
involved in the economy to offer more resistance to austerity than states with less 
government intervention. Pepinsky (2014) points out that “opposition to external debt 
repayment during debt crises should be strongest in countries with large public sector 
wage bills, strong public sector unions, and heavy public dependence on government-
provided unemployment and poverty assistance.”9 Additionally, those likely to have their 
profession liberalized or have their labor rights reduced would also be expected to speak 
out against these policies. To summarize, economic adjustment programs that would 
cause harm to greater numbers of people should be resisted more than “easier” programs 
with fewer cuts. Therefore, if one country had a more difficult program than the others, 
where more people were harmed, or were facing wage cuts and layoffs, that country 
would be expected to offer more resistance to its Troika program than countries with an 
“easier” program. 
Conversely, this type of explanation would also argue that sectors of the economy 
in each state might expect to benefit from austerity and structural reform policies. The 
loans could be used to recapitalize banks and provide capital to businesses while 
increasing labor flexibility would lower labor costs for businesses. Furthermore, some 
consumers may support liberalizing protected industries as increased competition could 
lower prices and improve product quality. 
In summary, a domestic interest explanation of responses to austerity would 
expect the distributional effects of austerity to create clashes between groups that would 
                                                 
9 Thomas B. Pepinsky, "Financial Crises and the politics of adjustment and reform," in Handbook of the 
International Political Economy of Monetary Relations, ed. Thomas Oatley and W. Kindred Winecoff 
(Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2014), 269. 
9 
benefit from austerity measures or structural adjustments and those that would be hurt by 
these policies. Applying this logic to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, there would be 
varying responses and differing levels of resistance to each Troika program based on the 
political coalitions and economic makeup of each state as well as the overall difficulty of 
the program. Referring back to Pepinsky (2014), states with the largest public sector 
wage-bills and unions, as well as states with large public dependence on government-
provided unemployment and poverty aid would be expected to exert the most opposition 
to austerity. 
Examining the differing reactions in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece leads one to 
question the validity of explanations emphasizing domestic interests. According to this 
line of reasoning, Portugal and Greece should have responded rather similarly as they 
have comparable welfare state structures, large public sector unions, and heavy state 
involvement in the economy.10 Yet these two countries responded in very different ways 
to their Troika programs, with Greece rebelling and Portugal being much more 
acquiescent. If, as theory would predict, states with larger public sectors and public sector 
unions etc. should be more resistant to austerity, how do two states with similar domestic 
economic structures take such divergent paths when asked to implement similar policies? 
Some have argued that the size of the public sector, unions, and government 
involvement in the economy may have an effect, but the Irish and Portuguese programs 
                                                 
10 Alexandre Afonso, Sotitious Zartaloudis, and Yannis Papadopoulos, "How party linkages shape austerity 
politics: clientelism and fiscal adjustment in Greece and Portugal during the eurozone crisis." Journal of 
European Public Policy 22, no. 3 (2015): 1-20. 
 
10 
were simply not as difficult as Greece’s.11 While this is certainly true if we sum up all 
three of Greece’s Troika programs, the initial Troika programs were quite comparable. 
Including all three Greek programs in the comparison skews the economic pain 
experienced in Greece compared to Ireland and Portugal, making the comparison less 
insightful. 
Greece’s original MOU expected it to make a fiscal consolidation of 10.9 percent 
of GDP between 2010 and 2013.12 Between 2011 and 2014, Portugal was expected to 
make a fiscal consolidation of 10.6 percent of GDP.13 However, the first two years of 
Portugal’s program initially required a consolidation of 8.7 percent of GDP while 
Greece’s program initially required a consolidation of 6.5 percent of GDP. Even Ireland 
was expected to make a larger fiscal consolidation in 2011 than Greece. Ireland’s 
program required a consolidation of 3.8 percent of GDP,14 compared to Greece’s 
expected consolidation of 2.4 percent. Table 1, below, includes all three countries’ fiscal 
measures agreed to in their original MOUs as well as the fiscal consolidation 
accomplished by each country. 
                                                 
11 Catherine Moury and Adam Standring, "‘Going beyond the Troika’: Power and discourse in Portuguese 
austerity politics." European Journal of Political Research 56, no. 3 (2017): 660-679; Niamh Hardiman et 
al., "Tangling with the Troika: ‘domestic ownership’ as political and administrative engagement in Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal." Public Management Review 21, no. 9 (2019): 1-22.; Ricardo Cabral et al., 
"Austerity Measures in Crisis Countries – Results and Impact on Mid-term Development." Intereconomics 
48, no. 1 (2013): 4-32. among others. 
12 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece”, europa.eu, May 2010, 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/64c89a77-ddc4-46f4-9bb0-18d7e80f6f0c/language-
en.  
13 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal,” europa.eu, June 2011, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op79_en.htm.  
14 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland,” europa.eu, February 2011, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op76_en.htm.  
11 
What is apparent is that, while Greece had the highest total amount of fiscal 
measures to implement, they were not significantly more than Portugal, and Portugal 
agreed to much higher fiscal consolidation targets for the first two years of its program. 
This is especially puzzling given the violent opposition to Greece’s program seen just 
after the government signed its MOU, whereas serious opposition to Portugal’s Troika 
program did not manifest until nearly 16 months after signing its MOU. 
Table 1: Fiscal Measures 
Greece Fiscal Measures (% of GDP) 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Revenue 0.5 2.9 0.7 -0.3  
Expenditure 1.9 1.2 1.7 2.3  
Total (Estimate) 2.4 4.1 2.4 2 10.9 
Total Adjustment (Actual) 4.8 2.5 3.7  11 
Source: Fiscal adjustment and debt sustainability: 
Greece 2010-2016 and beyond: Page 85 
     
Portugal Fiscal Measures (% of GDP)  2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Revenue  2 0.9 0.5  
Expenditure  3.7 2.1 1.4  
Total (Estimate)  5.7 3 1.9 10.6 
Total Adjustment (Actual)  3.5 2.6 0.9 7 
Source: Eighth and Ninth Review: Page 19 & Eleventh 
Review: Page 19 
     
Ireland Fiscal Measures (% of GDP)  2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Revenue   1.3 0.9 0.6  
Expenditure  2.4 1.3 1.2  
Total Adjustment (Estimate)  3.8 2.2 1.8 7.8 
Total Adjustment (Actual)  3.5 2.25 1.75 7.5 
Source: Initial MOU and Ex post Evaluation of the 
Economic Adjustment Programme Ireland, 2010-2013: 
Page 66 
     
Yet, the fiscal targets were only one aspect of each country’s Troika program. 
There were numerous structural reforms that all three countries were required to 
implement, although somewhat fewer in Ireland, and with a large focus on restructuring 
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the banking sector. Below are tables 2-5 that compare the structural reforms each country 
agreed to in their original MOUs. 
The above tables also indicate that Greece’s initial program was not significantly 
more challenging, especially compared to Portugal. Both had numerous structural fiscal 
reforms, labor market reforms, privatizations, the liberalization of key sectors, and the 
rationalization of public administration. When combining these with the fiscal targets for 
each country, the responses do not follow the logic that more people stood to be hurt 
economically in Greece than in Portugal and that is why Greece rebelled against the 
Troika while Portugal and Ireland were more acquiescent. 
Table 2: Greece Structural Reforms 
Greece 
Structural Fiscal Reforms 
Pension Reform - Age from 60 to 65. Merge existing system into three funds. Strengthen link between 
contributions and benefits 
Important reforms to strengthen the budgeting system and fiscal framework. (i) introduction of a 
medium-term fiscal framework covering the general government based on rolling three year expenditure 
ceilings for the State, social security and local governments; (ii) strengthened budget procedures 
introducing binding expenditure ceilings for each Ministry consistent with the deficit target; (iii) 
strengthening the position of the Finance Minister in relation to the line Ministers in both budget 
preparation and execution phases,  (iv) reforming the General Accounting Office, to make it more active 
in fiscal policy making and budget planning and control; and (v) creation of a non-partisan fiscal agency 
to provide independent and expert scrutiny of government finances. 
Reforms to make Tax system more efficient and equitable - make it more progressive.  
Stronger enforcement of tax code 
Rationalization of public administration - local administration reform 
Labor Market Reforms 
Reforms to labor market by strengthening wage-setting mechanisms 
Decentralize wage-bargaining 
Sub-minima wages for young and long-term unemployed 
Revise rules on firing and costs 
Revise part-time and temporary work regulations 
Product Market Reforms 
Implement services directive (from EU) and extend it to closed shop professions like lawyers, 
pharmacists, auditors etc. 
Simplify business startup requirements - lower licensing and administrative burdens 
Liberalize energy sector 
Liberalize railway sector 
Statistics 
Improve fiscal and other public sector reporting and statistics 
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Table 3: Portugal Structural Reforms 
Portugal 
Structural Fiscal Reforms 
Strengthening fiscal framework and administrative capacity 
Spending controls and curtailing risks from wider pub sector, especially PPPs and SOEs 
Implement new budgetary framework law - sets up a multi-annual framework with expenditure and 
budget balance rules. Also establishes a fiscal council as independent advisory body. Ministry of 
Finance to start publishing quarterly reports on revenue and expenditure.  
Public administration rationalization - administrative bodies that are inefficient or redundant will be 
merged or closed 
Local government to be more closely monitored by government administration 
Health Care Reform 
Better use of IT and existing datasets, and other measures to increase efficiency  
Reduce generous markups on pharmaceuticals 
Publication of prescription guidelines, using more generic drugs, and moderating user fees 
Rationalization of the hospital network and medical staff management 
Containing risks from the wider public sector perimeter 
All PPPs to undergo a thorough review from external experts to assess financial risks 
Reduce costs of SOEs by an average of 15 percent and tighten debt ceiling on SOEs 
Privatization of parts of transportation, energy, communications, and insurance among others. Proceeds 
equaling €5bn 
Labor Market Reform 
Comprehensive labor market reform  
Reduce maximum unemployment benefits 
Revise Employment protection legislation to reduce severance payments 
Make it easier to fire employees on open-ended contracts 
Make working time arrangements more flexible to cut down on overtime and reduce labor costs 
Change criteria for extending collective agreements across the sector and make firm level negotiations 
less prohibitive 
Improve efficiency of the school system 
Reviving the Housing Market 
Easing rent controls 
Strengthening ownership rights 
Simplifying judicial procedures and construction permits and modernizing property taxes 
Improving the functioning of key sectors 
Energy - Liberalizing the sector 
Transport - Increase competition, less government dependence, parts of the sector privatized 
Services and Telecommunications - liberalizing both telecommunications and postal sector 
Liberalization of the services sector 
Improving Framework Conditions 
Judicial Reform to increase efficiency -  
Stronger enforcement of competition rules - new courts and the implementation of best practices in 
terms of independence of national regulators 
Abolish golden shares that give the state special rights in private companies in the energy and 
telecommunications sectors 
Ease the regulatory burden on business 
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Table 4: Ireland Structural Reforms 
Ireland 
Structural Fiscal Reforms 
Significant reforms to the medium-term budgetary framework are to be introduced under the 
programme. This will enhance the consolidation strategy's credibility and further strengthen the 
credibility of Ireland's fiscal stance over the medium to long term. A Fiscal Responsibility Bill will be 
introduced, including provisions for a medium-term expenditure framework with binding multi-annual 
ceilings on expenditure in each area. The Bill will take into account any revised economic governance 
reforms at EU level. Further, the government will establish a budgetary advisory council to provide an 
independent assessment of the budgetary position and the underlying forecasts. The MoU also stipulates 
that any additional unplanned revenues must be allocated to debt reduction. 
Further measures to reform the pension system should help ensure the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. In accordance with the National Pensions Framework published by the authorities in March 
2010, the age at which people qualify for State Pension will be increased from currently 65 years to 66 
years in 2014, 67 in 2021, and 68 in 2028. Pension entitlements for new entrants to the public service 
will also be reformed in 2011. Notably, pensions will be based on career average earnings, while the 
retirement age will be linked to the state pension retirement age. 
Envisaged labour market reforms cover the system of minimum wages, the unemployment benefit 
system and activation policies. 
Lower minimum wage by 12 percent 
Review sectoral wage agreements to ensure they do not hamper inter-sectoral adjustment.  
Income protection for unemployed workers needs to be set so as to eliminate unemployment and poverty 
traps, increase incentives to accept job offers and reduce the risk of long-term unemployment. 
Enhanced labour market activation policies, together with more stringent job search conditionality 
attached to unemployment benefits, will strengthen job search efforts and improve labour market 
matching at limited budgetary cost. Training should be targeted (Carcillo and Grubb, 2006) and careful 
programme evaluation will be required. 
Irish authorities undertake to introduce legislation to increase the state pension age. 
Policy measures will be taken to bolster competition in product and energy markets and other 
network industries. 
Despite Ireland's openness to global markets and generally competition-friendly business environment, 
there are still outstanding issues which have contributed to comparatively high price levels, which feed 
through to production costs. This will be tackled through the concerted implementation of still 
outstanding recommendations by the Irish Competition Authority in various areas: sheltered professional 
service sectors such as the legal and the medical profession, where prices are particularly high and 
impervious to the economic situation; the general competition environment, in particular adjusting 
incentives so as to discourage anticompetitive behavior 
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Table 5: Ireland Banking Reforms 
Reorganization and Downsizing of the Banking Sector - A radical overhaul 
An enhanced Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) for 2011, based on a thorough assessment 
of banks' asset quality and more rigorous stress testing. The design and implementation of the PCAR 
2011 will be the responsibility of the Central Bank, in co-operation with the Commission, the ECB and 
the IMF.  
A new Prudential Liquidity Assessment Review (PLAR) for 2011. The PLAR will outline measures to 
be implemented with a view to steadily deleveraging the banking system and reducing banks' reliance on 
short term market funding by the end of the programme period. To this end, the PLAR will establish 
target funding ratios for 2013 for each bank. In order to reach the targeted LTD ratios, banks have to 
increase their deposit base and/or to decrease their loan portfolios. The PLAR will identify non-core 
assets and set an adjustment path to the agreed targets. 
Ambitious target loan-to-deposit ratios will be established for each bank. These targets will be designed 
to ensure convergence to Basel III standards. Compliance with the PLAR benchmarks will be monitored 
and enforced by the Central Bank taking account of prevailing market conditions. The PLAR will be 
updated on an annual basis. 
Legislation on improved procedures for early intervention in distressed banks and a special bank 
resolution regime (SRR) has been introduced. The Credit Institutions (Stabilization) Act 2010 which was 
enacted last December provides the legislative basis for the reorganization and restructuring of the 
banking system agreed in the Programme. It is designed to deal with the urgent and pressing issues 
facing the domestic financial sector and as such provides broad but time limited-powers to the Minister 
for Finance to act on financial stability grounds to effect restructuring actions and recapitalization 
measures envisaged in the Programme.  
Legislation introducing SRR which is due to be published by end-February will include a robust set of 
powers and tools to ensure the competent authorities can promptly and effectively resolve distressed 
banks e.g. when they pose a risk to financial stability. The legislation will be consistent with both the EU 
Treaty rules and similar initiatives ongoing at EU level. 
An in-depth review of the personal debt regime will be submitted to the Irish Parliament considering 
measures to limit the distress of mortgage holders and overindebted consumers at the same time best 
serving the national and creditors' interests…The government will prepare legislative change. 
Using the above policy tools, the viable banks will be further streamlined. The banks that will be found 
viable will be required, inter alia, to (a) increase provisioning for non-performing assets as needed; (b) 
identify their non-core assets; and (c) dispose of non-core assets, using the most appropriate instruments 
(such as securitization with credit enhancement or sales of assets). The possibility of asset segregation 
(e.g. good and bad banks) will be considered. 
For non-viable banks, notably Anglo and INBS, a resolution plan will be established and submitted to 
the European Commission in accordance with EU competition rules. 
Party Politics Explanations 
 A party politics line of reasoning generally argues that political parties are 
primarily motivated by winning elections and staying in political power. Thus, their 
policies will be formulated in ways that help them achieve these ends.15 Because the 
Troika’s austerity programs required states to make cuts to the welfare state and raise 
                                                 
15 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). 
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taxes, austerity is often seen as inherently unpopular and puts political parties at odds 
with their goals of winning elections and remaining in power. Earlier research followed 
this reasoning by arguing that retrenching the welfare state would be unpopular 
regardless of which party was responsible for the reforms (Pierson, 1996; Weaver, 1986). 
Parties that nevertheless do pursue retrenchment would be expected to use blame 
avoidance techniques to minimize its costs at the polls (Pierson, 1996; Giger & Nelson, 
2010; Vis & Van Kersbergen, 2007). However, more recent research has found that some 
political parties (conservative and/or liberal) can be rewarded at the polls for advocating 
and implementing policies of retrenchment (Giger & Nelson, 2010; Schumacher, Vis, & 
Van Kersbergen, 2013). Finally, others have used prospect theory to explain why 
political parties will adopt policies that scale back the welfare state (Vis & Van 
Kersbergen, 2007; Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014). 
Electoral Consequences of Retrenchment 
 Pierson (1996) argues that the popularity of the welfare state makes it resilient to 
large-scale change as recipients of social benefits tend to be focused and relatively well 
organized. Therefore, there will always be electoral costs to retrenching the welfare state. 
If parties pursue retrenchment, they will be expected to use blame avoidance strategies to 
avoid taking blame for the policies. The major implication of Pierson’s argument is that 
political parties will face universal punishment for retrenchment. This implies that 
partisan politics will have little importance with regards to welfare state retrenchment, as 
all parties should avoid retrenchment. The issue with this argument centers on Portugal as 
all parties agreed to terms with the Troika and sought to implement austerity that required 
retrenchment. Yet, the PSD, which was advocating strict adherence to austerity and 
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exceeding the Troika’s demands for structural reforms, was elected. The PSD/CDS 
coalition also received the most votes in the 2015 but they had lost seats and could not 
form a stable government. This situation differs with the cases of Ireland16 and Greece 
during the Eurozone Crisis where opposition to the programs has been more pronounced. 
Ireland and Greece both faced situations comparable to Portugal’s but their bailouts were 
contested by the other main political parties. The parties in Ireland’s opposition wanted to 
renegotiate parts of the agreement while Greece’s main opposition party refused to 
support the MOU, eventually leading to missed targets, delayed reviews, and a second 
Troika program. 
 The belief that all parties will actively avoid welfare state retrenchment has been 
questioned as some researchers have found that not only can some political parties 
retrench without significant punishment at the polls, but also, they can be rewarded for 
retrenching.17 Giger and Nelson (2010) found that religious and market-liberal parties 
systematically win votes for retrenchment. According to Giger and Nelson, religious and 
market-liberal parties can ‘claim credit’ for scaling back social policy.18 These findings 
suggest that retrenchment is a popular policy choice for some voters and that contrary to 
the ‘new politics’ view, partisan politics is important for understanding why parties 
retrench and which parties are rewarded for retrenchment. 
                                                 
16 This is most applicable in the first few months of the program. Once the Fine Gael/Labour coalition took 
over, there was little resistance to implementing the policies in the MOU. 
17 Nathalie Giger and Moira Nelson, "The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment: Blame 
avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity?" European Journal of Political Research 
20, no. 1 (2011): 1-23; Gijs Schumacher, Barbara Vis, and Kees van Kersbergen, "Political parties’ welfare 
image, electoral punishment and welfare state retrenchment." Comparative European Politics 11, no. 1 
(2013): 1-21. 
18 Nathalie Giger and Moira Nelson, “The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment.” 
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This line of reasoning would expect the religious and market-liberal parties to be 
able to “claim credit” for retrenchment and thus win votes. However, this argument does 
not tell us why liberal and religious parties systematically win votes for retrenchment, 
which the authors admit as a shortcoming. However, this has difficulty explaining all 
three of the cases in this dissertation. In Ireland, Fine Gael is both religious and market 
liberal, but was not rewarded in the 2016 election, as it lost 16 seats in parliament. This 
argument also fails to explain the situation in Portugal, because while the PSD is a center-
right party, it is not traditionally a market-liberal party or a religious party. The PSD is 
more liberal than the PS and there is some religious influence within the party, but these 
are not their primary factors distinguishing them from the PS. The Social Democratic 
Center-People’s Party (CDS) fits this profile as it is a religious party (Christian 
Democratic) that is market liberal. However, CDS was not rewarded for its retrenchment 
policies during Portugal’s Troika program as it also lost seats in the 2015 election. In 
Greece, New Democracy, which is the main center-right party, opposed any austerity 
deal with the Troika and never considered working with PASOK to reach a deal until the 
possibility of default and being forced out of the euro were being seriously discussed. 
According to the reasoning that market liberal and religious parties can be rewarded at 
the polls for welfare retrenchment, New Democracy could have agreed to and 
implemented austerity and been rewarded. It was only after much disagreement between 
parties that a bailout package was agreed to, but both PASOK and New Democracy were 
severely punished at the polls for the austerity measures. 
 Schumacher, Vis, and van Kersbergen (2013) argue that a party’s ‘welfare image’ 
has significant effects on electoral punishment for welfare state retrenchment. A party’s 
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welfare image is a function of the party’s role in constructing the welfare state and 
whether it has a credible commitment to the support of the welfare state. The states that 
supported the construction of and maintain a credible commitment to the maintenance of 
the welfare state have a positive welfare image. Those with a negative welfare image are 
usually the parties that no longer have a credible commitment to defending the welfare 
state as all major political parties were usually responsible for the construction of 
European welfare states. The authors find that right wing governments are more 
successful than left wing governments at cutting back entitlements without punishment, 
and that left-wing governments lose votes systematically for cutting the welfare state. 
Finally, when a party with a positive welfare image retrenches the welfare state, the 
parties that gain the most electorally tend to be other parties that also have a positive 
welfare image. Therefore, conservative or market-liberal parties do not gain votes when a 
party with a positive welfare image retrenches the welfare state. 
Greece and Ireland appear to fit quite well within this framework. After much 
disagreement and turmoil, and a second program, many voters moved to SYRIZA while 
punishing PASOK in the elections in May and June of 2012. While SYRIZA did not win 
enough seats to form a government it made huge gains in parliament in both elections 
campaigning to defend the welfare state and cancel the Troika program. In Greece voters 
turned from traditional defenders of the welfare state (PASOK) that made massive cuts to 
entitlements and social spending to another party, SYRIZA, which was promising to 
defend the welfare state. The welfare image of PASOK had been tarnished with their 
previous austerity policies and voters looked to another party that would defend the 
welfare state. In Ireland, Fianna Fáil, which is a traditional defender of the welfare state, 
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lost 51 of their 71 seats in the 2011 parliamentary election, while Labour gained 17 seats. 
Voters moved from one traditional defender of the welfare state, who had lost credibility, 
to another defender of the Irish welfare state. After implementing the Troika program 
with Fine Gael, Labour was also punished in the 2016 elections, where they went from 37 
seats to 7, while Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin gained seats. 
However, for the Portuguese situation, this explanation provides very little 
insight. It was the conservative coalition of the PSD and CDS that gained a combined 
majority of votes, not the Socialists, the Communist Party, or the Block of the Left, 
which are ardent defenders of the welfare state. Yet, the PSD is a center right party with 
at worst a fuzzy classification regarding their ‘potential’ welfare image. Yet, the political 
parties in Portugal all generally defend the welfare state, and although the parties on the 
left argue for a more expansive welfare state than others, classifying the PSD as having a 
negative welfare image appears to be incorrect. If the PSD is classified as having a 
positive welfare image, the PSD vowing to “go beyond the Troika” casts doubt on the 
welfare image hypothesis as they won votes advocating retrenchment when theory would 
predict votes to go to other parties. Also, voters would be turning from one party with a 
positive welfare image (the PS) to another with a positive welfare image (the PSD) but 
was promising policies that would cast serious doubt on the PSD’s willingness to defend 
the welfare state. 
Why Parties Retrench 
The above discussion focused on the electoral consequences for retrenchment but 
failed to address why political parties want to retrench in the first place given the 
expected associated costs electorally. This is particularly important in these three cases 
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because the Troika was demanding a specific set of reforms that were bound to be 
unpopular. Various political parties in all three states agreed with these policies and 
agreed to retrench and reform the welfare state. 
Vis and van Kersbergen (2007; 2014) and Barbara Vis (2009; 2009; 2010) offer 
an explanation of why political parties would pursue unpopular reforms such as 
retrenching the welfare state by using prospect theory. One of the primary findings of 
prospect theory is that people are generally risk-averse when they are in the domain of 
gains (i.e., satisfied with their current position and would prefer it over potentially risky 
change). Therefore, if people (or political parties) find their situation tolerable or 
desirable, they will opt for continuing that position as opposed to undertaking risky 
reforms that could make them unpopular. 
Applying this logic to the politics of the welfare state, Vis (2010) argues that 
political parties have two issue areas that matter for retrenchment, and that political 
parties can be in the realm of gains or losses in either area. The first is socioeconomic and 
the second is politically, which can include where a party stands in opinion polls or where 
they stand with power in government (i.e., large majority in parliament or control of both 
houses in a bicameral system). Parties will prefer the status quo (i.e., no retrenchment) 
when they are in the domain of gains. Politically this means that the party is polling 
favorably compared to other political parties or has a large majority in the legislature. As 
long as the situation is one of gains, parties will opt for the safe certainty of the status quo 
as opposed to taking a gamble on reforms that could hurt them in elections or public 
opinion. However, when parties view their situation of one of losses, whether it is 
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electorally or socioeconomically, they will be more willing to attempt politically risky 
policies such as welfare state retrenchment.19 
Vis (2010) finds that there are two paths to unpopular reform. The first is a weak 
socioeconomic situation in combination with a rightist government. If a rightist 
government is in power when they view the current socioeconomic situation as 
unacceptable (domain of losses socioeconomically) it will increase the odds of welfare 
state retrenchment policies. Thus, a rightist government does not need to be in the realm 
of losses electorally to enact retrenchment, as they are more likely than leftist parties to 
do so regardless. Yet, Vis argues only that the odds of retrenchment increase when the 
government is a rightist government and in the realm of losses socioeconomically but 
does not find evidence that rightist governments will retrench more deeply than leftist 
governments. Conversely, Allan and Scruggs (2004) do find that rightist governments 
implement harsher retrenchment, but the reasons why are not articulated, leaving 
researchers with an observation without causal claims.20 The second path to reform is a 
weak socioeconomic situation in combination with a weak political position. In other 
words, if a party or coalition is in power when the economic situation is weak and the 
party or coalition is in a politically weak position, one can expect retrenchment of the 
welfare state to be more likely. 
In Portugal, the fact that we see the PSD and CDS wanting to retrench further 
than the PS, challenges this finding because they advocated deeper austerity than the 
                                                 
19 Barbara Vis, Politics of Risk Taking: Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies. (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2010). 
20 James P. Allan and Lyle Scruggs, "Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced 
Industrial Societies." American Journal of Political Science 48, no.3 (2004). 
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Troika was demanding. Allan and Scruggs (2004) do find that rightist governments 
implement harsher retrenchment, but the reasons why are not articulated, leaving 
researchers with an observation without causal claims. 
In Portugal, prospect theory could be used to describe the multiple austerity 
packages the PS attempted after the elections in 2009. Their political position had 
deteriorated from the previous elections, as did the socioeconomic situation. The PS 
enacted austerity measures on their own prior to the memorandum with the Troika. The 
PS also agreed to the memorandum with the Troika and agreed to implement it, but not 
pursue reforms that exceeded the mandate. However, according to Vis’s logic, the PS’s 
positions and actions are not so puzzling as the PS could be seen as in the realm of losses 
both electorally and socioeconomically because they had lost seats in parliament and the 
economy was deteriorating. Therefore, prospect theory offers some insight into the 
actions of the PS but has a more difficult time with the PSD’s decision not only to 
advocate austerity, but to advocate going beyond the mandate of the Troika. Additionally, 
prospect theory fails to explain why the PSD continued with such harsh cuts after 
winning the election. 
Yet, regardless of who won the Portuguese election in 2011 they were going to 
retrench the welfare state due to the memorandum signed with the Troika. Therefore, 
arguing that the PSD was in the realm of losses regarding the socioeconomic situation in 
Portugal appears to carry less weight in the period after Portugal went to the Troika as 
opposed to the period before because all parties would have been in the realm of losses. 
This is also further complicated by the fact that the PSD was in a favorable situation 
politically as they had closed the gap from the previous election and were either even or 
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ahead of the PS leading up to the election. Furthermore, the policies were not popular as 
the vote for the PSD was more of a vote against the performance of the PS.21 Moury and 
Freire (2013) also point out that the Passos Coelho government has been accused of 
exceeding its electoral mandate by going beyond the Troika.22 Thus, “going beyond the 
Troika” was not a popular stance to take with voters. Yet the PSD won by taking further 
gambles on austerity and structural reforms (i.e., going beyond the Troika), despite being 
in a favorable political position. Prospect theory, as described by Vis (2010), would 
predict that the PSD should have been more risk-averse because of their favorable 
political position and the unpopularity of their economic policies. Ultimately, the use of 
prospect theory does not explain why the PSD would exceed their mandate given a 
favorable political position and economic reforms that were deemed unpopular. 
Peter Starke (2008) offers a comparative look at radical welfare state 
retrenchment and states that researchers must distinguish between triggers of 
retrenchment and structuring causes. The trigger that Starke argues causes retrenchment 
is a deep economic crisis, in particular short-term economic performance. Because 
welfare states continue to have large support, the public demands very good reasons to 
scale it back. The structuring causes are a party’s welfare ‘stance.’ This is similar to 
Schumacher, Vis, and Kersbergen’s (2013) welfare image. Starke argues that parties who 
have unfavorable views of the welfare state enact more drastic cuts to the welfare state 
than parties with a more positive view of the welfare state. The other main structuring 
                                                 
21 Pedro Magalhães, “The Elections of the Great Recession in Portugal: Performance Voting under a 
Blurred Responsibility for the Economy.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties 24, no. 2 
(2014). 
22 Catherine Moury and André Freire, "Austerity Policies and Politics: The Case of Portugal." Pôle Sud 39, 
no. 2 (2013). 
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cause is the presence of a Westminster parliament. Because there is little fragmentation 
and few veto points, unpopular policies are more likely to be pushed through. Therefore, 
Starke essentially argues that three conditions are needed for radical welfare state 
retrenchment to occur. A deep economic crisis, an anti-welfare state government is 
required to be in office and Westminster style institutions.23 
While it appears that the three cases might fit these conditions for retrenchment,24 
Starke’s explanation runs into trouble with Portugal and Ireland. It does not offer insights 
into why retrenchment would be rewarded at the polls and does little to explain why the 
PSD would want to exceed the mandate of the Troika. Stating that rightist parties are 
prone to implementing harsher austerity measures reduces the explanation to partisan 
ideology and the presence of an economic crisis. However, the economic crisis aspect is 
only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition. Partisan ideology may be a central 
cause of the drive of the PSD to implement such drastic cuts, but this begs questions 
about why the PSD would move so drastically to the right and seek to exceed their 
mandate from the Troika. The PSD, normally a centrist party, made a drastic shift to the 
right from 2009-2011 but the reasons are unclear.25 
This explanation also does not fit the Irish case as the Fine Gael/Labour 
government could hardly be described as anti-welfare state. While Fine Gael alone would 
                                                 
23 Peter Starke, Radical Welfare State Retrenchment: A Comparative Analysis. (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008). 
24 In Greece, the lack of an anti-welfare state party would lead Starke to predict that Greece’s political 
parties would resist retrenchment and in Ireland Fianna Fáil was governing during the financial crisis and 
signed the agreement with the Troika. Their successor, Fine Gael, a center-right liberal party known for 
being fiscally conservative took over in 2011 and austerity continued. 
25 José Magone, "Portugal is Not Greece: Policy Responses to the Sovereign Debt Crisis." Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 15, no. 3 (2014). 
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meet the anti-welfare state conditions, Labour is arguably the most ardent defender of the 
welfare state in Ireland. Although Labour undoubtedly softened some of the policies 
agreed to in the MOU, it also helped implement very difficult budgets with cuts to the 
welfare state as well as the public sector. 
In summary, explanations based on party politics all center on the premise that 
parties want to get their members elected and stay elected. However, there are many 
potential outcomes from this one assumption that lead to different expectations. Many of 
the explanations may apply to one case and not the other two or vice versa. Explanations 
may explain behavior at one point in time, such as prospect theory expecting the PS in 
Portugal to pursue austerity prior to asking the Troika for a bailout or welfare image 
leading voters to leave PASOK for SYRIZA in Greece. However, these explanations fail 
to explain the range of outcomes across Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Ultimately, 
explanations based on party politics do not account for why all three countries responded 
to their Troika programs in the ways they did. 
International Pressure 
 Another explanation that could help our understanding of responses to austerity 
involves pressure from other countries within the EU, EU institutions, and the IMF. Since 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are periphery countries in the EU, realists in international 
relations would expect the more powerful countries in the EU or international institutions 
to be able to coerce smaller countries into following their desired policies because of 
structural positioning. Realist scholars such as Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001) 
would add that international institutions are merely tools of the powerful to further exert 
their influence. These types of arguments have been applied by scholars in reference to 
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asymmetrical power within the EMS (Greico 1995), how the world’s poorest countries 
are vulnerable to coercion from the World Trade Organization (Gowa and Kim 2005) as 
well as the International Monetary Fund (Thacker 1999; Stone 2004; Broz and Hawes 
2006). In using this type of logic to explain the three cases in this prospectus, one would 
expect the more powerful EU states such as Germany and France to get their preferred 
policies implemented over the wishes of Ireland, Greece, and Portugal. Since the debt 
crisis involving these three countries threatened the stability of the Eurozone as a whole 
and many of the debts were owed to banks in Germany and France, the governments of 
Germany and France would be expected to pressure the governments of Ireland, Greece, 
and Portugal to implement and follow the austerity policies because they were in 
structurally weaker position within the EU compared to countries like France and 
Germany that have larger and more systemically important economies. 
This line of reasoning would assume that the smaller, indebted states are virtually 
powerless against the wishes of the larger states. However, there are reasons to caution 
against this argument. First, there were well-documented reports of Germany attempting 
to coerce and influence elections as well as the outcome of the referendum in Greece. 
Yet, despite the international pressure they resisted by refusing to accept the Troika’s 
terms, politicians and the public engaged in brinksmanship, and mass public protests and 
strikes were held before reluctantly agreeing to the terms of the bailout. If the powerful 
states could exert their will on weaker states, Greece would have no option but to 
acquiesce, but instead mounted significant resistance. Second, Ireland and Portugal faced 
intense pressure from larger and more powerful states in the EU yet did not react the 
same way as Greece. The Irish and Portuguese governments were not completely 
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acquiescent but worked with the Troika to ensure they met the commitments in their 
respective MOUs. If international pressure was responsible for the different responses, 
one would expect that more pressure would result in less resistance, but the opposite 
ended up being true with Greece offering significantly more resistance politically and 
socially than Ireland or Portugal. 
Institutional Explanations 
 An institutionalist perspective could also offer insights into why these countries 
had differing responses to their Troika programs. Institutional explanations generally 
focus on the role institutions play in shaping the obstacle courses through which actors 
maneuver.26 Thus, if there are different institutional designs that policy makers must 
maneuver, these institutions can affect the options of policy makers when responding to 
the Troika’s demands. Two of the most plausible institutional explanations involve how 
institutions insulate policy makers from democratic processes and interest groups (Evans, 
1995; Kohli, 2004) and the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
In a situation where states are required to implement unpopular policies, such as 
the Troika’s austerity program, having an institutional structure that insulates policy 
makers from interest group or popular pressure can be beneficial as it allows policies to 
be implemented without significant resistance from society. While Evans (1995) and 
Kohli (2004) were discussing insulation or autonomy from domestic pressures in the 
context of the developmental state and economic modernization, the logic could apply to 
implementing austerity and the accompanying structural adjustment programs. One of the 
main points Evans and Kohli argued was that economic modernization is highly 
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disruptive to society and would likely be resisted. Thus, to successfully implement 
policies that were necessary for economic modernization, policy makers need to be 
sufficiently insulated from domestic pressures that could derail their policy aims. 
Similarly, the Troika’s policies could be expected to face fierce opposition and resistance 
from groups likely to be harmed by austerity. Therefore, states with more autonomy or 
insulation would be expected to carry out these policies more easily, as they would be 
shielded from pressures preventing the implementation of austerity policies. 
Afonso et al., (2015) have applied a variation of this argument to Portugal and 
Greece, arguing that the Greeks were less able to cooperate across parties when 
negotiating austerity measures because of the clientelistic ties that were heavily relied 
upon by Greek parties. Implementing the measures would mean undermining their 
organizational base and breaking the linkages between the patrons and the clients. As 
Alfonso et al. argue, “if the patrons’ ability to supply resources is undermined by 
austerity, there is nothing left that ties voters and parties, and clients may quickly desert 
their patron to find another one promising to supply resources.”27 Yet, the cooperation 
across parties that happened in Portugal and was absent in Greece occurred before each 
country’s Troika program. PASOK and the PSD/CDS coalition both held comfortable 
majorities in their respective parliaments as each country began its Troika program, 
meaning cross-party cooperation was not needed to implement the program. It is much 
easier to criticize policies and refuse to cooperate when doing so matters little. Whether 
New Democracy in Greece, or the PS in Portugal voted for the specific austerity policies 
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or not, the outcome would have been the same. 
Furthermore, this may help explain why political parties are willing to cooperate 
or not, but it does not explain why politicians in one country would seemingly be so 
concerned with maintaining or gaining power (Greece) while some politicians seemed to 
have little regard for their re-election prospects (Portugal). Former Portuguese Prime 
Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, not only campaigned to “go beyond the Troika,” but told 
a party meeting in 2012, “If one day we have to lose elections in Portugal in order to save 
the country, then, as they say, the hell with elections.”28 If one is going to argue that 
clientelism prevented Greek parties from reaching agreement, it appears that the presence 
of deep clientelistic ties could be a necessary and sufficient condition for a lack of 
cooperation between political parties when agreeing to austerity measures. Conversely, 
the absence of clientelistic ties could be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the cooperative implementation of austerity. Therefore, one must ask what 
other conditions or characteristics were present that allowed Portuguese parties to 
successfully cooperate to implement very difficult austerity and structural reform 
policies. 
 Hall and Soskice (2001), using the Varieties of Capitalism framework, argue that 
the structure of institutions within states that have been built up through time will affect 
the types of policies a country prefers and follows. Hall and Soskice assert that capitalism 
is classified primarily by two ideal types: liberal market economies (LME), epitomized 
by the US, and coordinated market economies (CME) best exemplified by Germany. The 
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economic policies of a country can largely be explained by the organizational structure of 
firms in conjunction with the organization of the political realm. In liberal market 
economies, economic actors tend to have “arm’s-length relationships” with each other, 
mediated by markets, and coordination occurs in response to price signals. A heavier 
reliance on markets leads to flexible labor markets, limited collective bargaining, and 
capital markets focused on short-term returns. Coordinated market economies rely much 
more on nonmarket forms of coordination such as negotiation, bargaining, and 
collaboration, which leads to power sharing within firms, more rigid labor markets, 
investment in skill development, bank-based finance, and a high degree of coordination 
between employers. 
These varying institutional structures could impact responses to Troika austerity 
in various ways, but the organization of labor, business, and finance as well as their 
corresponding relationships with government would be especially important. The 
differences in the institutional makeup of liberal market economies and coordinated 
market economies produces divergent, yet unclear expectations in how states should 
respond to austerity. On one hand, the CME model should be able to handle austerity in a 
way that more groups can agree upon and with less social disruption. Because of the 
modes of coordination such as bargaining and power sharing, where relevant groups 
come together to negotiate policies, one could expect that all groups could agree to cut 
back a little and this would allow the more painful effects of austerity to be spread 
throughout society and not concentrated in specific sectors that would likely lead to 
protest. 
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The expectations for countries in the LME model are less clear. On the one hand, 
it could be expected that the smaller, less-unionized, and thus weaker public sectors in 
LMEs would have less ability to resist cuts to wages or a reduction in public-sector jobs. 
This would imply that from the mass public side, the responses to austerity would be less 
intense than in a CME political economic structure. Because workers in an LME are 
encouraged to develop their skills and the labor market is flexible, employers can fire 
workers more easily and workers are expected to change jobs more often. However, the 
arms-length relationships and lack of coordination between employers, employees, and 
the government could lead to disruptive cuts in jobs or wages that lead those hurt by 
austerity to resist the measures. Moreover, the actual implications for how a society 
classified as an LME would react to externally-imposed austerity are far from certain. 
 Hall and Soskice acknowledge the possibility that a third type of capitalism exists 
that is a “Mediterranean” type, which has been expanded upon by other scholars. Molina 
and Rhodes (2007) present what they call a mixed market economy (MME). As the name 
implies, MMEs use market and nonmarket forms of coordination. Firms and trade unions 
have difficulty delivering collective goods in the ways that CMEs are more effective. 
Instead of negotiation and bargaining, firms and trade unions in MMEs are able to 
demand compensation for state intervention because they have veto power over the state. 
Also, the institutional complementarities found in CMEs and LMEs may be lacking or 
dysfunctional in MMEs.29 As Hassel (2014) argues, southern Europe exemplifies this 
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MME model, including Portugal and Greece. What the MME model implies regarding 
austerity is that governments will be more beholden to domestic interests that have veto 
power over policy, which would make austerity difficult to implement. Yet, the 
differences observed between the responses in Portugal and Greece challenge this line of 
reasoning. Two states classified as MMEs could be expected to act similarly in their 
responses to policies that threaten politically important groups. Greece responded this 
way, but Portugal’s response was much less intense as it adhered to the program and 
worked with the Troika to meets its deficit and structural reform targets. This variation 
casts some doubts on the ability of the Varieties of Capitalism framework to explain the 
divergent responses of Greece and Portugal. 
Others have argued30 that the institutional structure of each country and its reform 
capacity created an institutional environment with more roadblocks, making the program 
more difficult to implement (i.e., Greece and Portugal), or created a more permissible 
institutional environment where policies were easier to implement (i.e., Ireland). 
However, roadblocks are only causal factors to the extent that people try to take the road 
in question. If the Greeks were attempting to carry out the policies from the MOU by 
working with the Troika and were still incapable of implementing them because of 
capacity issues, this would point towards an institutional explanation. However, the 
brinksmanship that politicians and social actors were willing to engage in does not 
suggest that the Greeks were doing everything they could to implement the program and 
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simply could not. Rather, the Greeks direct embrace of brinkmanship indicates a 
deliberate unwillingness to follow through on the program, not an inability to do so. This 
contrasts to Portugal, which also had significant institutional roadblocks (i.e., four 
Constitutional Court rulings against austerity measures) but the government remained 
committed to the program and found ways to comply with the program despite 
institutional barriers. The institutional barriers may have shaped specific policy options, 
but it does not explain the vastly different choices of leaders in Portugal and Greece. 
Measures of reform capacity have shown Greece to have less reform capacity than 
Ireland or Portugal,31 but this also fails to explain the vastly different responses from 
those in each country. Reform capacity may have affected Greece’s ability to implement 
various reforms that required centralized data gathering and reporting or IT capabilities 
that the state lacked, but it was not responsible for the decisions of Greek political and 
social leaders to grandstand and employ brinksmanship strategies with the Troika. The 
embrace of brinksmanship points to causes outside of the Greek institutional structure for 
its difficulty in implementing its Troika program. 
Ideational Explanations 
Yet another major school of thought in political economy focuses on the role 
played by the economic ideas held by policymakers and the public.32 In this line of 
reasoning, the ideas that people hold about the proper policies to implement in a given 
situation influence their policy preferences and choices. Many scholars have written 
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specifically about economic ideas and their effects on policy choices in comparative 
political economy (Hall 1989, 1992; Blyth 2003, 2013; McNamara 1998; Jabko 2006). 
Mark Blyth (2013) specifically traces the history of austerity and why it has become the 
default policy response during an economic downturn. In general, there are two reasons. 
One is ideational and one is material. Some policy makers truly believe that austerity is 
the policy choice that will work and that there is no viable alternative. Furthermore, 
certain businesses, especially banks and creditors, will benefit from governments cutting 
costs and reducing debt. Finally, austerity can be popular because it is easier to sell to the 
public. Going further in debt to reduce debt is counterintuitive, but people generally 
understand that cutting spending reduces debt.33 
As Parsons (2007) argues, to demonstrate an ideational explanation, ideas must be 
held prior to the current situation and must have been chosen for ‘inexplicable’ reasons 
when other ideas could have just as easily been chosen. Therefore, ideas at time t affect 
decisions made at time t + 1.34 An economic ideas argument would rely on the specific 
economic ideas held by policymakers and the public in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal just 
before they entered their respective Troika programs. Those countries holding more pro-
free market views would be more likely to agree with the Troika program and 
implementing it should face much less political and social resistance. 
However, when one compares the attitudes towards the free market and 
competition in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal this explanation fails to explain the variation 
in responses. Greece is home to many socialists and communists that have contempt for 
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capitalism. Its rebellion against policies opposed by so many in power and in the public is 
unsurprising. On the other hand, Ireland is much more market oriented than many in 
Europe. Labor unions have a presence, but Ireland has a very flexible labor market. 
Socialism and communism never had much appeal in Ireland and the main political 
parties would both be described as center-right in policy orientation. The relative 
acquiescence of the Irish is also unsurprising given the ideological makeup of the 
country. If one were only comparing Greece and Ireland this explanation would appear 
very plausible. However, Portugal creates obstacles to this explanation. The Portuguese 
are not overwhelmingly in favor of free markets. While it is true that many in the 
PSD/CDS coalition strongly adhered to the “neoliberal” economic ideas contained in the 
MOU, survey data indicate that the majority of the public do not share these views. 
Eurobarometer surveys in 2006 show that Portugal had the lowest score of all EU 
countries (46 percent) in agreeing with the view that “free market competition is essential 
to economic prosperity.” In the same Eurobarometer, 57 percent of Greeks and 70 
percent of Irish agreed with the previous statement. The EU average was 64 percent.35 
Given the mismatch between the economic ideas held by those in government and the 
public, the Portuguese response is puzzling, especially the delay of 16 months before 
significant opposition to the program emerged. If the Portuguese are not overwhelmingly 
in favor of free markets, why was the resistance to a very harsh, “neoliberal,” economic 
adjustment program not more intense? 
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To summarize, rationalist/materialist and explanations centered on economic 
ideas appear to fall short in explaining the different reactions to the Troika programs in 
Ireland, Greece, and Portugal. Most of the explanations under the rational/materialist 
label may be able to explain one or even two of the cases, yet they appear unable to 
account for all three cases. Generally, these theories would expect Greece and Portugal to 
behave similarly given the similarity of their institutional and economic makeup, but we 
see Ireland and Portugal acting more similar with Greece appearing as the outlier that 
intensely resists its Troika program. Rational/material explanations are also unable to 
account for Portugal’s willingness to exceed the Troika’s demands and the public’s 
delayed and muted response. Approaches focusing on economic ideas also fail to explain 
the variation in responses between the three Troika program countries as Portugal had the 
lowest levels of faith in free markets in Europe only five years before they entered their 
Troika program, yet there was much less resistance to the program than in Greece, 
indicating the presence of other factors. Given the shortcomings of the previous 
explanations, I offer an alternative way to explain responses of Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal to their respective Troika programs. I argue that each country’s national identity, 
especially as it relates to Europe, is crucial in explaining why three countries facing 
relatively similar circumstances reacted in profoundly different ways. 
National Identity 
Studies of identity have recently gained attention in political science literature. 
Studies focused on national identity have been diverse, ranging from security 
(Katzenstein, 1996; Hopf, 2002), to ethnic war (Kaufman, 2001), to international political 
economy (Abdelal, 2001) and comparative political economy (Campbell & Hall, 2017). 
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There has been an increasing realization that identities play an important role in 
explaining political and social outcomes. Rogers Smith states that identities are “among 
the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics.”36 
However important some scholars view national identity, it has yet to be applied to the 
explanations for the responses of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal to their Troika 
programs.37 National identity helps to explain the divergent responses to each country’s 
Troika programs as it enables an understanding of how policy makers as well as citizens 
interpreted their situations and how these interpretations structured the responses. Policy 
makers and citizens remain self-interested actors and material factors are certainly 
relevant, but the differing national identities acted as a lens through which actors viewed 
and interpreted events and circumstances, leading to countries in similar material or 
structural situations to respond in different ways. 
For this dissertation, the concept of a collective identity is most appropriate when 
referring to national identity as it explores responses to the Troika at the collective 
level.38 Abdelal et al. (2009) offer a framework that summarizes the arguments of much 
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of the existing research on national identity and enables researchers to better 
conceptualize collective identity. Their framework defines collective identity “as a social 
category that varies along two dimensions – content and contestation.”39 Content refers to 
the meaning of a collective identity and can include constitutive norms, social purposes, 
relational comparisons, and cognitive models. Abdelal et al. (2009) argue that the four 
types of content an identity can contain are non-mutually exclusive, meaning a national 
identity can potentially encompass all four of the content types. Regardless of the type of 
content, a national identity exerts its causal influence by acting as a lens through which 
actors interpret their situations, interests, and preferred policies. The content of an 
identity conditions actors’ perceptions and can lead to different responses despite similar 
structural positioning. 
Constitutive norms are the “formal and informal rules that define group 
membership.”40 These are a normative set of social or legal rules that determine 
collective meanings and expectations for the members of a group. These practices and 
expectations allow those within a group to recognize others in the group and the practices 
become understood as obligations. Also, when practices resulting in recognition are 
viewed as obligations, the group may espouse these practices as virtuous. For example, 
Price and Tannenwald (1996) argue that what it means to be a “civilized state” has 
evolved to include the non-use of chemical or nuclear weapons in armed conflict. Thus, 
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“civilized states” recognize each other by their non-use of these weapons and the non-use 
of chemical and nuclear weapons can also be promoted as an ethical obligation of all 
states identifying as “civilized”.41 When states act in accordance with constitutive norms, 
these actions lead others to view an actor as having a particular identity. Moreover, 
constitutive norms do not set the goals of a state or group but define the social meaning 
by creating collective expectations and individual obligations. Preferences are not 
determined by constitutive norms, yet the norms define the boundaries and distinctive 
practices of a group.42 
Finally, Abdelal et al. (2009) argue that constitutive norms or practices can be 
internalized or habituated in three ways. First, some behaviors may be ruled out 
consciously because they conflict with the expected behaviors of a state with a particular 
identity. This could be thought of as something akin to the logic of appropriateness 
discussed by March and Olsen (1989). Second is semiconscious choice, where norms 
decrease the options consciously considered. Norms allow policies that may conflict with 
an identity to be acknowledged and then dismissed with little to no consideration. Weldes 
et al. (1999) refer to this as “commonsensible,” as policies conflicting with expected 
behaviors are given very little thought. Lastly, norms can be so deeply entrenched that 
they are acted upon habitually or unconsciously. Hopf (2002) describes this as the logic 
of habituation and if norms are operating in this way there are no considerations of other 
options as practices are simply followed. 
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The following type of content in an identity is social purpose. A social purpose 
identity is an identity that is defined by the goals shared by the members of a group. This 
can lead a group to carry out practices with group purposes and to interpret the world 
through lenses partly defined by the social purpose(s). Therefore, a social purpose 
identity defines the preferences of a group and creates obligations of members to engage 
in practices that are likely to make the group’s goals more achievable. Social purpose can 
also define the legitimate ends of policy and structure the debate about national interests 
and identity.43 For example, Abdelal (2001) argued that the various types of nationalism 
arising in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union contained specific purposes that 
influenced their political decisions. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia wanted to remove 
themselves from the Soviet sphere of influence while simultaneously “returning to 
Europe.” Thus, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the purpose of returning to 
Europe and gaining autonomy from post-Soviet Russia influenced every facet of these 
countries’ political-economic changes.44 
The next type of identity content is a relational comparison identity. This type or 
aspect of identity focuses on how one understands them self in relation to other collective 
identities. In this instance, an identity can be formulated by many different relational 
characteristics. For example, an identity may be defined by what it is not, meaning the 
holding of one social identity may exclude the holding of certain other identities. An 
identity can be constructed in opposition to another identity or one of its characteristics. 
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For example, Bell (2001) shows that the construction of French nationalism was done by 
using England’s ‘barbarianism’ as a core difference that France could use to define itself. 
This type of identity is inherently relational, and Barnett (1999) defines relational identity 
as “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others; therefore, identities may be 
contingent, dependent on the actor’s interaction with others and place within an 
institutional context.”45 According to this logic, one way to understand identity is when it 
is viewed in relation to some other identity or its characteristics. 
The final type of identity content is a cognitive model. Cognitive models can be 
thought of as worldviews or shared mental models that help members of a group make 
sense of their world. This type of content suggests a theory of interpretation, similar to a 
lens through which actors view and understand their world, which conditions how 
material or social incentives for specific actions are influenced by their identities. The 
content of this identity gives members of a group a common explanation of how the 
world works and descriptions of the social reality of the group.46 Similarly, Brubaker, et 
al. (2004) argue that identities are ways of viewing the world. “They are ways of 
identifying oneself, making sense of one’s problems and predicaments, identifying one’s 
interests, and orienting one’s action. They are ways of recognizing, identifying, and 
classifying other people, of construing sameness and difference, and of “coding” and 
making sense of their actions.”47 
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More importantly for this dissertation, Abdelal et al. (2009) argue that cognitive 
models can affect how groups understand political and economic interests. “Identities can 
affect conceptions of legitimacy, shared interests, and policy choices, as well as 
preferences for political leaders and parties.”48 Furthermore, identities can also structure 
interpretations of material conditions and economic interests. Risse et al. (1999) argue, 
“collective identities define and shape how actors view their perceived instrumental and 
material interests and which preferences are regarded as legitimate and appropriate for 
enacting given identities.”49 
Contestation of Identities 
The second part of this typology is the degree of contestation identities face. 
Contestation is the amount of agreement within a given group regarding the content of 
the shared identity. Identities become subject to change or fragmentation with greater 
contestation of an identity. As Abdelal et al. point out “the further apart the contending 
interpretations of a collective identity prove to be, the more that identity will be 
fragmented into conflicting and potentially inconsistent understanding of what the 
group’s purposes or relations should be.”50 Moreover, the model put forth by Abdelal et 
al. (2009) allows for the fluidity and contextual nature of identities, which implies that 
identities are not necessarily ephemeral but that the meanings of an identity may be more 
or less widely shared at different points in time. Thus, the less contested an identity is, the 
more unified that identity becomes and the greater its ability to influence the actions of 
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the group that hold such an identity. However, identities are constantly being contested 
and remade, meaning that describing the amount of contestation of an identity’s meaning 
at any one moment is very difficult. However, there are times when the meanings of 
identities are stable enough “that they can be treated as if fixed and can be analyzed with 
social scientific methods.51 
National Identity and the Troika 
A country’s history is crucial in the development of national identity, with 
historical experiences imprinting onto a country’s character. National identity evolves 
with collective experiences and the national identities of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are 
no different. The four types of identity content discussed above can be seen in all three 
cases in this dissertation, but the most salient features of each identity are themselves a 
product of the historical context of each country. The national identities of Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal vary widely due to different histories and experiences, especially 
the interactions with European countries and the EU, meaning that each country’s 
interpretation of its Troika program was structured by these shared previous experiences. 
For example, the difficult history Greece has with many of its European neighbors, but 
especially Germany, opened the door for those in the media and political leaders to draw 
on collective memories of the Nazi occupation of Greece that did not exist in Ireland or 
Portugal. This history is one reason many Greeks to view their Troika program as a 
foreign occupation. One of the most important parts of the Portuguese interpretation was 
that they had not lived up to being a modern, Western, European country since joining 
the EU, as they were still economically behind many in Europe. Therefore, they could 
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use the Troika program to move closer to its European neighbors, which they aspired to 
be more like. Ireland was previously in a similar situation but had already completed the 
move from being one of the poorest countries in Europe to being one of the richest and 
interpreted their Troika program as a temporary roadblock on their way back to 
prosperity. Despite a massive banking crisis that effectively bankrupted their state, the 
Irish maintained faith in its economic model as it had produced significant wealth in the 
past and it was believed that a return to similar policies would deliver again. 
The most dominant features of each national identity are also the least contested,52 
leading to a more direct causal role as the identity cross-cuts societal cleavages and 
political ideologies.53 Therefore, references to an identity or elements of its content that 
cross the political spectrum indicate that that particular aspect of national identity is more 
prominent (and less contested) than if references are only from one side of the political 
spectrum. The dominant features of each country’s national identity also foreground the 
other features. For example, if a social purpose identity is most prominent in a country, it 
will condition other aspects of the national identity, such as the constitutive norms and 
relational comparisons. Therefore, these other aspects of identity content will be 
congruous with the social purpose identity. A social purpose is defined by the goals of the 
identity. Therefore, if certain actions conflict with achieving the goals of the social 
purpose identity, those actions will be much less likely to be taken by those sharing that 
social purpose identity. For example, as I elaborate in the next section, the prominence of 
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the “good student” identity in Portugal meant that a strong rejection of the Troika 
program was largely “off the table” for a significant portion of the population. By 
strongly rejecting the Troika program and risking default and/or ejection from the euro, 
not only would Portugal be contradicting the very goals that had been motivating it for 
the past 40 years, but it would be violating the norms that modern, Western, European 
democracies don’t default on their debts or renege on their international obligations. 
The Argument in Brief – The Good Student, The Bad Student, and the Celtic Tiger 
As the Euro Crisis played out, each country’s national identity manifested in 
various ways as each country was asked to make very difficult decisions to save their 
economies. Not only did each country react in accordance with the content of its national 
identity, but instead of room for new ideas to influence policy, each country reverted to 
and reproduced central elements of these identities. Greece rebelled, as many Greeks 
viewed this as another instance of foreign meddling enabled by their treacherous elites. 
Their belief that foreigners were responsible for their failures was further reinforced. Irish 
faith in their economic model and the material gains it produced led to a quiet confidence 
that they would weather the crisis and get back to the growth they had enjoyed in the lead 
up to the crisis. The Portuguese tended to see their crisis as an opportunity to further their 
integration with Europe and make the changes they felt were necessary to fulfill their 
goals of becoming closer to a modern, Western, European country. 
The national identities of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal also interacted in 
unforeseen ways. Because the Greeks reacted so violently against their Troika program, 
leading to further social, economic, and political chaos, the Irish and Portuguese were 
able to label Greece as the “other” in relation to their own identities as well as labeling 
47 
each other as part of the “in-group” that was committed to their programs. While there 
were many criticisms of the Irish and Portuguese programs many leaders appealed to 
their citizens’ sense of “we are not that” when referring to how the Greeks responded to 
their program and how they expected their own citizens to respond. In public statements 
as well as interviews with conducted with elites in both Ireland and Portugal this message 
was hit upon multiple times. The use of Greece as the other by Irish and Portuguese 
leaders to reveals the role of identity in not only reaffirming who Irish and Portuguese 
leaders believed their countries to be but also what they believed their countries were not. 
Greece 
Since the establishment of the modern Greek state in 1832 and continuing through 
their accession into the EEC and later the EU, Greece has aspired to become a modern 
country at the core of Europe. Yet, there has been hesitancy from many Greeks about 
their journey back to Europe.54 It was not uncommon for foreign countries to meddle in 
Greek affairs and outside influences have meddled in domestic Greek affairs much more 
than in Ireland and Portugal. Powerful European countries as well as the Ottoman Empire 
had been injecting themselves into Greek politics since the modern state was formed in 
the early 19th century and this trend would continue throughout the 20th century. The 
brutal Nazi occupation of Greece further solidified Greek skepticism of Western Europe 
and imprinted a deep anti-German sentiment onto Greek national identity. The Greek 
Civil War following WWII only added to this suspicion of foreign powers injecting 
themselves in Greek affairs as the Greek Civil War was the first proxy war of the Cold 
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War with the US and UK supporting one side and the USSR supporting the other. 
Greece’s dependence on the US during the Cold War and US support for the military 
junta from 1967-74 engrained anti-Americanism further into the Greek character.55 
Following the fall of the military junta, many Greeks saw their failures as caused by 
foreign meddling, as any progress made appeared to be quashed by outside forces. 
Therefore, the Greeks sought to limit foreign meddling as a way of reaching their 
greatness.56 Even as Greece sought closer ties with Europe starting in the 1970s, the 
country was divided on forging closer ties as some thought it would leave Greece 
permanently on the periphery of Europe. Excitement for European integration only truly 
began to appear in the 2000s, but even when Greece appeared to be reaching its goals of 
modernizing and becoming a Western European democracy, there was always a sense of 
hesitation and even distrust towards the EU as well as the US.57 When Greece asked for 
financial help in early 2010, the unpopular policies required from the Troika were viewed 
as a threat to Greece as they were being imposed by Germany, which held large sway at 
the European Commission and the ECB, as well as the IMF, which was viewed as 
another American intervention. These interpretations led many Greeks to reject the 
program and rebel against the Troika and its own government, who was implementing the 
policies. Politically, there was a lack of ownership of the program, infighting among 
parties, blame cast at each other and the Troika, and grandstanding and brinksmanship 
tactics. Protests and strikes were large, numerous, intense, and long-lasting. There were 
                                                 
55 Kalyvas, Stathis Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know. 
56 Ibid  
57 Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou, Prime Ministers in Greece (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015). 
49 
significantly more strikes and protests in Greece than in Ireland or Portugal and they were 
much more violent and disruptive to the political process and society. 
Ireland 
Starting in the late 1950s Ireland made economic growth and modernization a 
nation building project as its leaders looked to leave poor, anti-materialistic Ireland 
behind.58 This goal structured many of its policies throughout the second half of the 20th 
century and joining the EU in 1973 furthered this goal by helping Ireland escape from the 
shadow of the UK.59 The move away from the UK and towards the EU resulted in the 
Irish feeling a sense of more sovereignty as they were less dependent on the UK for its 
economic destiny. After periods of growth, severe recession, and reform, the dedication 
to economic growth began to pay off and the result was the “Celtic Tiger” in the 1990s 
and into the 2000s. The success and wealth generated by Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy 
imprinted onto Irish national identity a faith in markets and in its foreign direct 
investment based economic model. Ireland became one of the richest countries in the 
world on a per capita basis and also finally felt as if it finally belonged with its ‘core’ 
European partners.60 With the success of the Celtic Tiger economy, the faith in markets 
and Ireland’s economic model became a lens through which the Irish made sense of their 
economic and social conditions. Therefore, when Ireland asked for help from the Troika 
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in late 2010 – as a direct result of catastrophic failures in their overgrown and 
overleveraged banking sector – the faith they had in markets and their economic model 
led many to view their crisis as more of a storm to be weathered as they attempted to 
revive the Celtic Tiger. While many in Ireland were justifiably upset with the 
recklessness of the banks and the mismanagement of the economy by the government, the 
Irish nonetheless implemented their program with far less political resistance than was 
witnessed in Greece. The social response also never reached the size or intensity of the 
protests or strikes in Greece or Portugal. The overwhelming majority of protests focused 
on very specific policies, such as closing hospitals or the bank bailout, but were not an 
overall rejection of the program. Even when the number of protests peaked in late 2011 
and early 2012, the number of participants was very small, ranging from a few dozen to a 
few hundred protesters at any given time. 
Portugal 
In post-revolution Portugal a new national identity developed that was driven by 
the goal of Portugal becoming a stable, modern, Western European democracy similar to 
its European neighbors, and away from being the poor, imperialist, dictatorship it had 
been for the previous 40 years. Most Portuguese believed the best way to achieve these 
goals and fulfill the aspirations of its new national identity was to make a full turn 
towards Europe and further Portugal’s European integration.61 The European turn 
manifested itself with Portugal internalizing the identity of the “good student” of Europe. 
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Here, the Portuguese acted in ways that were consistent with what it saw as appropriate 
actions for a ‘core’ European country and as a means of modernizing its country, 
consolidating its democracy, and reinforcing its “good student” identity.62 However, the 
Portuguese had never truly fulfilled these aspirations as they continued lagging behind 
their European neighbors. Therefore, Portugal viewed its Troika program as an 
opportunity to continue to make changes to further integrate with Europe and become 
more like other European countries by strictly adhering to the Troika’s policies and even 
exceeding its demands for structural reforms. There government took full ownership of 
the program and there was a strong consensus among the PS, PSD, and CDS for fulfilling 
Portugal’s obligations in the MOU, even if they disagreed with some of the individual 
policies. Additionally, protest developed slowly, and when it did flare up, it was either 
because it connected with other international events or grievances (not just Portuguese 
reactions to austerity), or due to objections to specific policies or the particular way in 
which the program was administered. While there was criticism from mainstream 
political parties, labor, and business organizations, the criticism was specific, the groups 
remained committed to fulfilling the MoU, and they always stopped short of rejecting the 
program in its entirety. 
Data and Methods 
Data for this dissertation comes from four sources: primary documents, secondary 
literature and histories, official online data sources, such as the OECD, and interviews 
with policymakers, bureaucrats, economists, and academics in Ireland, Portugal, and at 
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the European Commission. The interviewees were selected based on recommendations 
from experts in Ireland and Portugal, as well as from the interviewees themselves. I 
conducted 36 total interviews between November 2017 and May 2018. All but one of the 
interviews were digitally recorded and all of the recorded interviews were transcribed 
personally. The average interview time was 82 minutes. Each interview was conducted 
with a similar set of open ended, semi-structured questions, depending on which country 
the interviewee was being asked about. However, the questions varied somewhat 
depending on what I had learned in previous interviews. All interviews were conducted in 
confidentiality, and names have been withheld. 
In determining social responses, I relied on official statistics on protests and 
strikes where possible. Ireland and Portugal had official statistics for labor disputes, while 
only one union in Greece (GSEE) released statistics. Protest statistics were compiled 
using previous studies, where available. Karyotis and Rüdig (2017) compiled police 
statistics for all protests in Greece and Athens, Greece for the duration of Greece’s first 
Troika program and beyond. Accornero and Pinto (2015) compiled similar statistics for 
Lisbon. While these statistics included all protests and not just protests against austerity 
and structural reforms, they enabled me to compare official protest statistics between 
Athens and Lisbon to gain an understanding of the levels of protest in each city. To 
supplement the official statistics and when official statistics were not available, I used 
international newspapers such as the Financial Times, Reuters, and Bloomberg, as well 
as local papers in Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The international and local newspapers 
not only allowed me to understand the number of protest and strikes, but also roughly 
how many people participated, and the reasons for protests and strikes. 
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For Ireland, I used LexisNexis to gather all Irish Times and Irish Independent 
articles from November 2010 through November 2013 using the search terms “Ireland” 
and “protest” or “strike.” Both the Irish Times and the Irish Independent were used 
because they have home offices in different cities. The Irish Times is based in Dublin 
while the Irish Independent is located in Cork, which are the two largest cities in Ireland. 
This allowed me to have a more complete picture of the protests against the Troika 
program in Ireland. In Portugal, I used the web page for the newspaper Público, which is 
one of the most widely read publications in Portugal. In addition to being widely read, 
Público has headquarters in Portugal’s two largest cities, Lisbon and Porto, which like 
using newspapers based in Dublin and Cork in Ireland, allowed me to gain a more 
complete picture of the protests in Portugal. Using the search function from the website I 
gathered all articles from May 2011 through May 2014 using two different searches. One 
using the search term “protesto” (protest) and the other using the search term “greve” 
(strike). For Greece, I used the search function on ekathimerini.com to gather articles on 
protests and strikes for the year 2010. This was used to supplement the statistics from 
Karyotis and Rüdig (2017) as well as GSEE, and to gain an understanding of the reasons 
why people were protesting and participating in strikes. 
Methodologically, this dissertation uses a research design that includes both a 
small-n controlled comparison and within-case process tracing. Cross case comparisons 
are useful in accounting for important country specific attributes as opposed to making 
direct causal inferences from the comparison. This is more effective than using only one 
case as that would limit my ability to discern the effects of national identity whereas 
using the controlled comparison allows me to understand how each of the national 
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identities affected responses to Troika programs in multiple contexts. Because I am 
concerned with understanding the causal processes of decision making in the three cases, 
process tracing is also an appropriate method to incorporate. Carefully examining the 
decision-making process as it progressed and evolved is very useful for this dissertation 
as this allowed me to analyze the decision-making process at many points in time, 
enabling the argument to be more carefully tested. Further, process tracing allows for the 
analysis of the decision-making processes in each case to understand why specific 
decisions were made. When compared to forms of quantitative analysis, process tracing 
has the additional benefit of being able to establish causality.63 
Plan for the Rest of the Dissertation 
 The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following way. The next three 
chapters are the case studies, which are presented in chronological order with Greece 
first, then Ireland, and I finish with Portugal. Here I introduce the situation that each 
country was in with their Troika program, and then proceed with a detailed account of the 
crisis and its response. Each account is organized by the external pressures and policy 
responses to these pressures, which typically cover three-to-six-month intervals. This 
varies depending on the idiosyncrasies of each case. After the detailed account of the 
case, each chapter has an analysis section where the role of national identity in each 
country’s responses to their Troika programs is discussed. The dissertation ends with a 
short conclusion. 
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"What people forget is that we Greeks don't like authority. We have always 
resisted when we think something is unfair. We fought against the Persians at 
Marathon, the Germans during the second world war and we will fight the IMF 
because in reality we no longer have a government. It is foreign forces who are in 
charge of us now." - Giorgos Didimopoulos, May 5, 20101 
On May 3, 2010, after months of discussions, policy proposals, and negotiations 
between the Greek government, Brussels, and other European partners, Greece requested 
aid because it had lost access to financial markets. Greek 10-year bond yields reached 
more than 10 percent in late April 2010 and its deficit for 2009 reached 13.6 percent of 
GDP. Eurozone governments along with the IMF and the ECB agreed to provide €110bn 
in loans to aid to Greece in return for a 3-year economic adjustment program that 
included cuts to public expenditure, tax hikes, and structural reforms to the Greek 
economy. Greece’s request for aid made it the first Eurozone country to ever seek help 
from the IMF and made it subject to a strict monitoring program involving the IMF, 
ECB, and the European Commission. 
The main characteristic of the Greek response to its Troika program was 
resistance, both politically and socially. The program was not universally opposed, but 
even the initial commitment from the government to the implement the program was met 
with skepticism as many within the government and in opposition parties held 
reservations about the program. Politically, already-tenuous support for the program 
quickly faded as fighting among and within political parties increased even when the 
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government was faced with a potential default and losing its euro membership. The 
unwillingness or inability to take ownership of the program, reach a consensus, and work 
together continued and in many ways intensified with the “unity” government from late 
2011 up through the agreement for Greece’s second bailout in early 2012, which is where 
this chapter ends. 
Socially, there was intense resistance to the program from the beginning with 
numerous large, violent protests and significant labor unrest. Immediately after the MOU 
with the Troika was signed, there was a 48-hour general strike as well as large, violent 
protests. There were four general strikes in the first two months of the program, 
compared to zero in Ireland and two in Portugal for the entirety of their programs. While 
Ireland also saw one large protest immediately after its government signed the MOU with 
the Troika, protest activity decreased significantly shortly after. Portugal saw some 
protests, but it wasn’t until after 16 months and a monumental policy blunder by the 
government that the Portuguese resistance intensified. This is reflected in data comparing 
the three countries as well. 
The first thing that becomes apparent when examining the number of protests in 
Greece is how many more protests there were than in either Ireland or Portugal. If we 
only looked at Greece by itself, we might not see anything surprising by these numbers. 
We would expect countries to resist large cuts to public spending, tax increases, and 
structural reforms that will change the way the economy and society operate. However, 
similar policies were asked of the Portuguese and Irish and their responses were very 
different. How can we explain why the Greeks, facing a similar set of policies and 
reforms as the other two bailout countries – but especially similar to Portugal – offered so 
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much resistance to the Troika program, risking a disorderly default and ejection from the 
euro? 
This chapter will argue that the high level of resistance to Greece’s Troika 
program is not rooted primarily in material differences. The first response of many in 
explaining why the Greeks offered so much more resistance than the Irish or Portuguese 
is that their program was so much more difficult than the other two.2 However, many of 
these claims typically include all three of the Greek bailout programs. The initial 
response of large, violent protests and general strikes bringing Greece to a standstill does 
not coincide with a more difficult adjustment, especially in the first two years of the 
program, and before any measures were yet to be implemented. The argument that 
Greece’s response from politicians and the public was because of a more difficult 
program does not hold up to the data concerning fiscal consolidation. Yet fiscal 
consolidation was only one aspect of each of these programs as they were each required 
to implement a series of structural reforms to their economies. Ireland did not have nearly 
as many structural reforms to implement as the structural reforms agreed to in Ireland’s 
MOU were largely reforms to the banking sector, lowering minimum wage by €1.00, and 
implementing new labor activation measures. This is clearly not comparable to Greece. 
However, Portugal was required to implement many of the same structural 
reforms as Greece yet responded very differently to its Troika program. Both countries 
needed to put their fiscal policies on more sustainable paths, therefore they had a number 
of structural fiscal reforms to implement. The structural reforms required of Greece were 
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not more ambitious than what was expected from Portugal in its original MOU. In fact, 
there are many of the same reforms expected of Portugal and the number is greater for 
Portugal in its original MOU. Arguing that Greece had a more difficult program does not 
stand up to the reality on the ground. 
Institutions also fail to provide a persuasive explanation for Greece’s response to 
its Troika program. While it is true that the institutional structure of Greece created 
roadblocks to the program’s implementation, roadblocks are only causal factors to the 
extent that people try to take the road in question. If the Greeks were attempting to carry 
out the policies from the MOU by working with the Troika and were still incapable of 
implementing them because of capacity issues, this would point towards an institutional 
explanation. However, the brinksmanship that politicians and social actors were willing 
to engage in does not suggest that the Greeks were doing everything they could to 
implement the program and simply could not. Rather, the Greeks direct embrace of 
brinkmanship indicates a deliberate unwillingness to follow through on the program, not 
an inability to do so. This embrace of brinksmanship points to causes outside of the 
Greek institutional structure for its difficulty in implementing its Troika program. 
Additionally, many institutional roadblocks were also present in Portugal, but the 
Portuguese government was dedicated to implementing the program and found ways to 
work around potential impediments. Similar to Portugal, institutions may also shape 
specific policy options available policymakers, but they alone do not explain why 
politicians had so many reservations about the program, engaged in brinksmanship with 
the Troika and Europe, or why they failed to find ways to make the program work. 
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Finally, institutions struggle to explain why the public had such an intense negative 
reaction to the Troika program. 
Economic ideas also fail to adequately explain the Greek response. On the left the 
Greeks are much more skeptical of markets, but these ideas do not extend to the right side 
of the political spectrum. New Democracy and other political parties on the right do not 
subscribe to the same economic ideas as SYRIZA or PASOK, which can be very critical 
of markets, and especially neoliberalism. Yet, despite the difference in economic ideas, 
there were criticisms and rejections of the Troika program from across the political 
spectrum. Even though those on the right held more pro-market views they did not agree 
with many of the policies in the Troika program. 
This chapter argues that the trajectory of the Greek social and political responses 
to its Troika program were influenced by particular aspects of Greek national identity. 
Since the establishment of a modern Greek state in the early 19th century, Greece has 
been plagued by foreign interference in its domestic affairs. This includes important 
periods and events such as being ruled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly 400 years, the 
Nazi occupation, the Greek Civil War following WWII, and the Junta that had the 
support of the US. This feature of Greek national identity further solidified after the fall 
of the dictatorship in 1974 and encouraged a belief that Greece’s failures were caused by 
foreign meddling. Many Greeks came to believe that Greece would be great once more if 
they could keep the foreign meddlers out of their business. Modern Greek history played 
an important role in shaping Greek national identity as the insecurity caused by constant 
foreign meddling in Greek affairs led the Greeks to view resistance outside interference 
as heroic. This aspect of Greek national identity significantly influenced the strong 
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rejection of the Troika program by many politicians as well as the public as it was 
considered patriotic for Greeks to resist such an incursion by foreign meddlers. 
Greece’s political and social responses to its Troika program were influenced by 
Greek national identity in three ways. First, the Troika program was viewed by many as a 
foreign occupation. This was especially pronounced because of the association of the 
program with Germany, which had brutally occupied Greece during WWII. This was also 
associated with the US given its role at the IMF and to a lesser extent the rest of Europe, 
which Greece has traditionally felt dominated by. Second, and contrary to Ireland and 
Portugal, all options for resisting the Troika were on the table for the Greeks. Politically, 
there was criticism from opposition parties and the government itself from the beginning 
of the MOU. There was political infighting and failure to reach a consensus on the 
program. The program was haphazardly implemented, and Papandreou called a 
referendum on the program without consulting the Troika. Socially, there were large, 
intense, and often times violent protests that were much more sustained than in Ireland or 
Portugal. Unlike Ireland and Portugal, labor unions did not necessarily seek to keep the 
peace as some viewed their protests and strikes as a “social uprising.”3 They also staged 
many strikes, using very disruptive tactics, and held four general strikes in the first two 
months of the program. Finally, unlike the Irish and the Portuguese, the Greeks appeared 
to have little sensitivity to international and economic constraints. Despite a worsening 
economic position and deteriorating relationships with its European partners, elites and 
the public continued ignoring warnings from the Troika and others about how failing to 
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implement the program could lead to Greece defaulting and/or losing its euro 
membership. When viewing Greek responses to its Troika program through the lens of 
Greek identity, especially the impact of foreign meddling on modern Greece, it is not 
unexpected that Greece would offer such significant resistance to difficult policies 
imposed by foreigners. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Next is an account of the Greek crisis 
during its first Troika program. First, I describe the specifics the Greek Troika program. 
Then I document the history of the Greek program from May 2010 through June 2012. 
This section is organized chronologically into three-to-six-month periods. Each three-to-
six-month period includes two sub-sections: one section documenting the political 
responses to external pressures, such as bond markets and external pressures from other 
governments or the Troika, and the second section describes the social responses from the 
Greeks. Following the account of the Greek crisis is the analysis of the Greek case, which 
demonstrates that in a very complicated debt crisis, only an explanation that emphasizes 
national identity can account for the specific features of the Greek response. 
The Greek Economic Adjustment Program 
The Greek economic adjustment program included many of the same elements of 
previous adjustment programs that were administered by the IMF, such as spending cuts, 
tax increases, and structural reforms to help Greek exports be more competitive. 
However, in this case, another common and important element of many IMF structural 
adjustment programs was missing: Greece could not devalue its currency because it was 
part of a currency union. States can devalue their currency to increase their international 
competitiveness through cheaper exports. Currency devaluation is the preferred method 
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to achieve this because it is not as politically and economically difficult as an internal 
devaluation. With no ability to devalue its currency, Greece could only achieve increased 
competitiveness through an internal devaluation, meaning Greek wages and prices would 
need to be forced lower. The program incorporated objectives for both the short and 
medium-term. In the short-term, the program was designed to correct the fiscal imbalance 
and restore confidence enough to allow Greece to return to capital markets for funding. 
The other objective was to ensure the stability of the Greek banking system. In the 
medium term, the program was aiming to correct the external imbalance through 
structural reforms designed to increase competitiveness and move the economy to a more 
export-oriented model with more FDI and investment from abroad, and to create the 
conditions for sustainable growth. 
Greece’s first program included a large macroeconomic adjustment, especially in 
the public sector. This included spending cuts equivalent to 7.1 percent of GDP and tax 
increases amounting to 3.8 percent over the period 2010-2014. To reach these fiscal 
consolidation goals, there were large cuts in wages and cuts to pensions as these two 
areas amounted to roughly three-quarters of total primary expenditure in 2009.4 Wage 
cuts included abolishing the Easter, summer, and Christmas bonuses and replacing them 
with a flat bonus of €1000 for those earning less than €3000 per month while also 
reducing the allowances paid to high wage earners. Cuts to pensions included an 8 
percent average cut to those pensions exceeding €1400 per month, which affected about 
10 percent of pensioners. The program also included several structural fiscal reforms. 
                                                 




These involved reforming the pension system by raising the retirement age and create a 
stronger link between contributions and benefits, which would mean working more years, 
higher contributions, and a more contributory-based pension scheme. Reforms to the 
budgeting system and fiscal framework essentially made the budgeting process more 
transparent, provided oversight within the Greek government regarding Greek finances, 
strengthened the position of the finance minister vis-à-vis the line ministers, and 
strengthened budget procedures by the tax and tax collection system, and rationalization 
of the public administration. Other structural reforms included reforming the labor and 
product markets to boost international competitiveness and improve the business 
environment. The labor market changes included creating a social pact with social 
partners to establish a consensus on the following: a decentralized wage bargaining 
structure, allowing young and long-term unemployed to accept wages below the 
minimum wage, important parts of firing rules and costs, and revising some of the part-
time and temporary work regulations. The last two areas the MoU addresses for reform 
are the financial sector and the statistics office, which were addressed to stabilize the 
Greek banking sector and to improve the Greek reporting of financial statistics, which 
was severely insufficient in the run up to the crisis. 
External Pressures and Government Response From the Bailout through Summer 
2010 
On May 6, 2010, the Greek parliament approved the austerity measures that were 
previously agreed to with the troika institutions. The measures were passed by a vote of 
172 to 121 in the 300-member chamber. Three Socialist deputies abstained from voting 
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and were immediately expelled from the party.5 The measures were also supported by the 
far-right LAOS party. The measures were opposed by New Democracy, SYRIZA, and 
KKE. One member of New Democracy, Dora Bakoyanni, voted in favor of the measures 
and was expelled from the party.6 
Because of high levels of tax avoidance, one of the key structural reforms of the 
troika program was to reform the tax collection agency, which would also help reduce 
budget deficits for the Greek state. In May, the PASOK government released the names 
of more than 60 doctors and dentists accused of underreporting their taxes as well as the 
firing of Angela Gerekou, the tourism minister, after it was discovered that her husband 
owed €5.5m in unpaid income taxes.7 Also, in late May, the Greek finance ministry 
stepped up their fight against tax evasion and fired the heads of 20 tax offices and began 
to investigate hundreds of tax and customs officials suspected of corruption.8 
Greece continued to implement its economic adjustment program throughout the 
summer months as they marched on with both structural and fiscal reforms. Athens 
outlined a plan for the privatization of some State Owned Enterprises in the transport, 
communications, and energy sectors as well as passing many other structural reforms 
such as establishing the Hellenic Statistical Authority, reforming the local public 
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administration, private and public sector pension reforms, passing the Fiscal Management 
and Responsibility Act – aimed at curbing tax-evasion, and the simplification of the start-
up of new businesses, among others.9 On the fiscal side, by August, Greece reduced its 
cash deficit 46 percent compared to the same period in 2009 and ahead of the target for 
the year (40 percent) through cuts in wages, pensions, and other current spending as well 
as increases to the VAT and fuel and excise taxes.10 
Despite the Greek government’s efforts to fulfil the requirements of the program, 
it was dealt a financial blow by Moody’s in June as its Greek credit rating was 
downgraded four notches from A3 to Ba1 (junk status) with a negative outlook. The 
negative outlook was justified due to “current uncertainties arising from the implications 
of local government reform within the national plans to curb public spending as well as 
our expectations that in the short-term municipal revenues will likely be lower than 
anticipated due to a weakening economy.”11 
This sequence of events illustrates that the Greek government was initially 
committed to implementing the demands of the MoU, despite their own misgivings about 
the program and the misgivings of the opposition in parliament, labor unions, and public 
sector workers. The government was not enthusiastic about implementing the measures, 
but it had every intention of passing and implementing their economic adjustment 
                                                 
9 For a full list of the reforms implemented please see the document in footnote 10.  
10 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - First Review - summer 
2010,” europa.eu. August, 2010, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp68_en.pdf. 




program although some within PASOK accused the government of abandoning its 
socialist roots.12 Despite doubts by the Troika and many economists about Greece’s 
ability to consolidate such a large amount in such a short period of time, Greek policy 
makers publicly voiced their optimism about Greece’s ability to fulfill the requirements 
of the program. Yet, by the end of summer, two narratives had emerged in the months 
after beginning the program with the troika in May 2010. The optimistic narrative said 
that Greece was doing all it could, and the government had tremendous resolve to carry 
out the necessary reforms and austerity. The pessimistic narrative, which more closely 
examined budget numbers, tax receipts, and public opinion polls suggested things were 
getting much worse in Greece as 2010 progressed.13 
As summer came to a close, the first review of the Greek Program was conducted 
by a joint EC/IMF/ECB mission, which lauded the Greek government for managing an 
“impressive budget consolidation” in the first half of 2010 and for making “impressive 
progress in major structural reforms” to help transform the economy.14 While these 
reports highlighted Greece’s “strong ownership and determined implementation of the 
program so far” they also noted that there were many difficulties ahead in challenging 
entrenched interests, safeguarding the banking system, improving tax compliance, 
controlling sub-national government expenditure, and restoring competitiveness as well 
                                                 
12 Siani-Davies, Crisis in Greece, 144. 
13 Siani-Davies, Crisis in Greece, 141. 
14 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - First Review - summer 




as boosting growth.15 By many measures the Greek program was off to a relatively good 
start and George Papandreou attempted to use the early success of the program to call for 
“collective efforts to change the country” and portrayed the program as an opportunity 
for a fresh start where Greece could shed its past failures and reach its full potential.16 At 
this point, the rhetoric from Greece’s government about its Troika program was 
analogous to rhetoric used by Portugal’s government, which also saw its Troika program 
as an opportunity to implement reforms to its economy. Yet unlike the Portuguese, the 
Greek government did not receive the public backing it sought as many Greeks viewed 
the crisis not as an opportunity to make changes to the Greek economy and state, but as 
foreign meddling in Greek affairs. 
Social Responses From the Bailout through Summer 2010 
Social responses to the signing of the MOU with the Troika and the passing of the 
Troika program in parliament were met with waves of large and oftentimes violent 
protests as well as significant labor unrest. Unlike Portugal, Greece’s social responses at 
the beginning of its Troika program were large and intense, making international news 
headlines. Ireland had a 50,000 person protest soon after the Irish agreed to their Troika 
program, but protests of that size and intensity did not persist in Ireland. The sheer 
number of protests, violence, and disruptive tactics of the protesters separate Greece’s 
social response at the beginning of its program from Ireland or Portugal. However, it 
should be noted that despite the violence making international news headlines many of 
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the protests were not as violent as the protests in early May. Additionally, the protests 
tended to focus more on austerity generally than in Ireland or Portugal, suggesting Greeks 
rejected the Troika program in its entirety. This assertion is supported by an 
ekathimerini.com poll from May 2010 showing only 23 percent of Greeks support the 
measures outlined in Greece’s MOU with the Troika.17 Finally, there were a significant 
number of disruptive strikes and work stoppages that left the country paralyzed, including 
four general strikes between May 4 and July 8 that had the participation of Adedy and 
GSEE. 
The characteristics of the protests in Greece were much different from Portugal 
and Ireland. First, the number of protests in Greece was far beyond those witnessed in 
Portugal or Ireland as Karyotis and Rüdig (2018) reported roughly 2,390 protests in 
Greece from May through August 2010,18 including seven large protests,19 with more 
than 500 participants. Not only were there drastically more protests than in either Ireland 
or Portugal, but they were accompanied by large numbers of strikes and work stoppages 
as well as more violence and much more disruptive tactics. In early May just after the 
Greek government agreed to its bailout with the Troika, there was a 100,000-person 
protest20 accompanied by a 48-hour general strike that resulted in petrol bombs being 
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thrown at police and tear gas and flash bombs being fired on protesters. The violence also 
turned deadly as protesters threw a petrol bomb into an Athens bank, killing three 
people.21 Another example of disruptive tactics was when 35,000 truckers protested the 
liberalization of their sector by holding a week-long strike that led to shortages of 
gasoline and other goods, affecting many Greeks.22 
Additionally, while there were protests against specific policies, such as cuts to 
social security or pensions and the privatization of companies, 10 of the 26 protests 
reported by the English version of ekathimerini.com from May through August 2010 
focused on austerity more generally.23 This is much more frequent rate than the Irish, 
who protested the entirety of its Troika program only seven times out of the 47 total 
protests between November 2010 and June 2011. It is also more frequent than the 
Portuguese where only 14 of its 128 protests between May and December 2011 focused 
on the larger Troika program. 
There were also many strikes and work stoppages across numerous sectors. From 
May through July 8 there were four general strikes where Adedy and GSEE participated, 
whereas there were zero general strikes in Ireland for the duration of its program and only 
two general strikes in Portugal during its whole program that had the participation of both 
main trade unions. Strikes occurred in various sectors of the economy ranging from 
pharmacists to metro and rail workers to lawyers and sports betting shops, among others. 
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Unlike many strikes in Portugal, which were partial-day and not very disruptive, the 
strikes during this period in Greece tended to be at least 24 hours with others lasting up to 
one week while causing significant disruptions around the country. 
To summarize, the social response from Greece between the signing of the MOU 
with the Troika through August 2010 was much more swift and severe than in Ireland or 
Portugal. There were immediate, large, violent, and disruptive protests and strikes. The 
protests had more of a focus on rejecting the entire Troika program than those in Ireland 
or Portugal, while the number of strikes (general and sector specific) was greater and 
more disruptive to society than the other bailout countries. 
External Pressures and Government Response September – December 2010 
In September 2010 the PASOK party conference was held to select people for the 
upcoming regional elections but ended with a reshuffling of the PASOK cabinet shortly 
after the conference. Many within PASOK saw that it was losing ground politically 
because of their association with the MOU. Opinion polls showed around 60 percent of 
Greeks as dissatisfied with the cabinet’s performance and wanting changes before 
November’s local elections. In addition to the reshuffle, Papandreou added twelve 
ministerial posts and one minister left their post. With the addition of twelve additional 
ministers into the cabinet, not all of whom agreed with the MOU, the cabinet reshuffle 
simultaneously strengthened and weakened the government.24 In the wake of the 
reshuffle, George Papaconstantinou wrote a letter reminding the Greek people of their 
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commitment to the MOU’s implementation as well as controlling expenditure and 
proceeding with the structural reforms.25 
As the summer ended, concerns about a Greek default were heightened as many 
investors did not see a way to for Greece to reduce their debt levels without a large debt 
restructuring. These concerns led Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bond yields to rise sharply 
in early September. Despite talk of a potential Greek default, both Papandreou and 
Papaconstantinou dismissed such claims. Parliament passed legislation that would cut 
salaries of those earning over a certain amount by 10 percent and prevent wage increases 
passed parliament, but did not result in any loss of jobs. Those that may have been fired 
were redeployed to other areas of public service. Greece also passed legislation that 
essentially granted tax amnesty to millions of citizens, which was contrary to the wishes 
of the troika and those in PASOK who wanted real reform to curb tax avoidance.26 Yet, 
throughout much of the early autumn months the Greek crisis appeared to be 
diminishing27 as local elections were approaching in Greece. 
The main focus of the government throughout the early autumn months was on 
the local election, where George Papandreou stated that if PASOK did not win a clear 
victory, he would call a general election. The Greek prime minister also declared the 
elections as a referendum on their troika program just days before the November 6 
elections. However, despite the fact that PASOK only won five of the 13 races in the 
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local elections, Papandreou did not call snap elections as the center right party New 
Democracy also secured five of the 13 regional seats. There was unusually low voter 
turnout with nearly half of the voters staying home in some regions and an opinion poll 
conducted by Metron showed that 80 percent of those polled were against snap 
elections.28 
Despite the Greeks focusing on local elections for much of the autumn, in October 
the infamous Deauville declaration was made by Germany and France, which stated that 
in future bailouts they would like to see more private sector involvement to help 
“Member States to take appropriate coordinated measures to safeguard financial stability 
of the Euro area as a whole.”29 This declaration meant that in the future, government 
bonds of countries that requested help from the European Stability Mechanism could be 
reduced in value through haircuts and investors would lose out.30 With this declaration, 
bonds from EU governments now contained more uncertainty and bond spreads began to 
rise in Europe, but especially in Greece. 
In November, Greek bond yields continued to rise as Ireland began talks for their 
own bailout, which was formally requested on November 18, 2010. Eurostat also revised 
total Greek debt up from 115.1 percent to 126.8 percent and the 2009 deficit up to 15.4 
percent. Greece passed its 2011 budget in late December, which called for more spending 
                                                 
28 Kerin Hope, “Papandreou demurs over snap poll after regional losses,” Financial Times, November 7, 
2010, https://www.ft.com/content/3315f114-ea7c-11df-b28d-00144feab49a. 
29 France and Germany, “Franco-German Declaration,” www.eu.dk, October 18, 2010, 
https://www.eu.dk/~/media/files/eu/franco_german_declaration.ashx?la=da. 
30 On November 28, the Ecofin council reviewed PSI as contained in the Deauville Declaration and decided 
that in the event of a Member State’s insolvency, private sector creditors would need to participate in 
negotiations to help establish debt sustainability instead of imposing mandatory haircuts on private sector 
creditors. 
73 
cuts and tax rises, and resulted in more protests as well as a general strike. In December, 
the Troika also conducted its second program review that showed a deepening recession, 
expenditure overruns, and missed targets, which coupled with a warning from S&P of a 
potential downgrade of Greek debt and Greece was back in the international spotlight 
again at the end of 2010. 
Social Responses September – December 2010 
Societal responses during the last four months of 2010 continued many of the 
trends from the summer months. After a decrease in protest and strike activity in August, 
there was a dramatic increase in activity, especially from September through November. 
During this period there were roughly 2,450 protests31 in Greece and continued industrial 
action, including another large general strike and a civil service strike. Similar to the 
summer months, violence accompanied some of the protests and many of the strikes and 
protests were very disruptive to daily Greek life, blocking roads, closing ports, grounding 
flights, and halting railways. 
While the number of protests were only slightly higher than in the May through 
August period, many of the targets of the protests remained the same. There were a 
number of protests against austerity more generally, and there were also more protests 
targeting specific changes, such as pay structure, permanent contracts, and tolls on new 
roads. The autumn also brought students and teachers back to university, leading to many 
protests against changes to education reforms, and students at Aristotle University even 
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occupied the main administrative office to protest the reforms.32 The yearly march 
commemorating the 1973 student uprising against the junta saw a crowd of around 
17,000 march to the U.S. embassy. The protest combined the traditional march with 
chanting slogans against international efforts to solve Greece’s debt crisis, such as “No 
IMF, no EU, let’s take our fate into our own hands.” The protests also turned violent as 
students began throwing stones and police fired tear gas in response.33 
Similar to the previous period documented above, there was significant labor 
unrest with strikes and job stoppages across many sectors of the economy. Transportation 
was one of the hardest hit sectors as numerous strikes were carried out by Hellenic 
Railways, truckers, and public transportation more broadly. Similar to Portugal, there 
were partial transportation strikes, but there were also many multi-day strikes, such as an 
eight-day strike by seamen and a 16-day strike by truck drivers, where they parked on the 
side of the road and refused to deliver their shipments.34 Additionally there were many 
24-hour strikes in various sectors, such as transportation, journalism, garbage collection, 
betting shops, and kiosk owners, with several causing disruptions around the country. 
Finally, there was a civil service strike in October and a general strike in December. The 
civil service strike, while smaller than previous strikes, still had the participation of 
roughly 65 percent of civil servants and shut tax offices, public hospitals, and 
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government offices.35 The general strike in December was held by Adedy, GSEE, and 
PAME, and was the largest demonstration in Athens since May. The protests were very 
disruptive as an estimated 80,000 protesters were on the streets of Athens.36 The strike 
grounded flights, shut down public transportation, led to a media blackout, and shut 
schools. What began as mostly peaceful protests, ended in violence as anarchists threw 
firebombs and rocks and burned cars. Once again, tear gas was used in response to the 
violence and vandalism. 
During the last four months of 2010 social responses continued many of the 
trends from the summer months as protest and strike activity remained elevated. Similar 
to the previous months, many protests targeted the austerity measures, but there were also 
more specific reforms that were protested. Once again, violence accompanied some of the 
protests and many of the strikes and protests continued to be very disruptive to daily 
Greek life as many multi-day strikes occurred across various sectors of the economy as 
Greeks displayed their anger at the harsh measures required by its Troika program. 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 2011 
In the beginning of 2011 Greece continued to push forward implementing their 
program, but conditions were quickly deteriorating. The Greek government was facing 
increasing societal resistance and a rising unemployment rate, which was running at 13.5 
percent in February 2011. In February, the Troika undertook its third review of Greece’s 
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adjustment program and both reports from the IMF and the European Commission noted 
a deteriorating economic situation, deeper recession, and increased tensions in 
implementing the program. The IMF’s report noted some slow progress, but also stated 
that “the program remains at a crossroads.”37 The Commission’s report specifically 
stated, “going forward, there are major challenges,” citing “a tense financial situation, 
contagion from other peripheral economies, persistent deficiencies in tax collection, some 
delays and capacity problems in delivering complex and far reaching structural 
reforms.”38 
Towards the end of winter, the economic situation continued to worsen as hitting 
deficit and structural adjustment targets became more elusive. Athens released figures 
showing a contraction of 1.4 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2010 and a 4.5 
percent contraction for 2010. These figures were released amid a vote in parliament to 
pass legislation that would liberalize Greece’s state-owned transportation services. 
Athens’ five main transport organizations had accumulated losses totaling around €38bn 
and this overhaul would attempt to reduce costs by merging companies, cutting salaries, 
and transferring workers that would lose their jobs to other areas of the public sector.39 
The Greek government also unveiled legislation to crack down on tax evasion, which 
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included jail time for those convicted of not paying taxes, and the creation of an 
independent body of tax arbitrators for disputes over €150,000.40 
In February, there was a botched press conference by the troika where its team 
surprisingly suggested that Greece could raise €50bn by 2015 through privatization. This 
caught many people by surprise as the original memorandum mentioned the possibility of 
raising €1bn per year through privatization, but the figure of €50bn was never 
mentioned.41 Soon after this troika press conference, Papandreou unexpectedly 
announced that Greece would embark on the €50bn privatization plan in return for the 
three-year extension and one-point interest rate cut granted to Greece by other European 
leaders in mid-March. The privatization commitment led to increasing political 
disagreement from the opposition and within PASOK. Predictably, the move was 
criticized by both members of both New Democracy and the leftwing parties for giving 
into pressure from creditors to “sell the family silver.”42 But, later in March, when 
Papandreou announced the first steps towards implementing the €50bn privatization 
program, he did so in spite of harsh opposition within PASOK and his own cabinet.43 
By the end of winter, talk of restructuring Greece’s debt was starting to become 
commonplace in the international media as many were starting to have concerns that 
Greece would be unable to return to capital markets in late 2011. In March, Greek debt 
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was downgraded three notches by Moody’s from B1 to Ba1, and two notches by S&P to 
BB-, which increased worries about a Greek default and resulted in sharp rises in Greek 
bond yields. This led to a sharp rebuke from the Greek government as well as Brussels. 
The Greek finance ministry released a statement accusing Moody’s of only focusing on 
“the downside risks” while ignoring the progress Greece had made towards fiscal 
consolidation.44 Despite the ratings downgrade, in early March Greece was able to raise 
€1.62bn in an auction of six-month treasury bills with a yield of 4.75 percent, which was 
only 31 percent of the issue, but Greece’s debt manager Petros Christodoulou argued, 
“Given the circumstances, the downgrade and the uncertainty in the eurozone, it went 
quite well.”45 
Social Responses Q1 2011 
In early 2011, the number of protests declined from the previous quarter, but was 
still significant. There were roughly 1,170 protests46 in Q1 in Greece. Resistance came in 
the form of strikes and protests from those who opposed the government’s proposed 
structural reforms but also evolved into more grassroots actions, such as the “won’t pay” 
movement. This movement involved Greeks refusing to pay highway tolls and riding 
buses or the metro without paying for tickets to protest rate hikes for tolls and mass 
transit. The prime minister accused the movement of running a civil disobedience 
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campaign intending to undermine the structural reforms agreed to in the troika program.47 
In January, pharmacy owners, lawyers, and civil engineers among others marched in the 
streets of Athens to protest measures to liberalize “closed shop professions,” which 
would do away with their current privileges and protections.48 In mid-February, bus, 
metro, tram and trolley services organized a coordinated shut-down of services by staging 
a 24-hour strike in protest of the transportation liberalization law.49 And, in late February, 
the talk of renegotiation of the terms of Greece’s bailout resulted in more protests and 
strikes, which were met with police action and prompted speculation of intensified social 
and industrial action should Greece fail to secure more generous terms on its troika 
program.50 Surprisingly, despite the opposition to the reforms from some groups within 
society, a poll conducted around the same time showed that 54 percent of respondents 
agreed that the crisis was an opportunity to move the economy forward but the same poll 
showed that about two-thirds of respondents believed that people should protest the 
measures as well.51 
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External Pressures and Policy Responses Q2 of 2011 
Throughout the spring of 2011, Greece was facing numerous external pressures: 
The recession was deepening, deficit numbers were revised upwards, ratings agencies 
continued to downgrade Greek debt, discussions about reforming the Greek program 
became more commonplace, political divisions between and in within parties were 
intensifying, and there was growing talk of Greece leaving the euro. This led to 
increasingly desperate measures to avoid default and hit fiscal and structural reform 
targets, culminating in the passage of the medium-term fiscal strategy (MTFS), which 
included more spending cuts and tax increases. 
In late March, S&P downgraded Greek debt two grades to BB-, which is well into 
junk territory, and fears of a debt restructuring for Greece were starting to emerge. In 
mid-April, fears intensified that Greek debt would be restructured. Comments by the 
German and Greek finance ministers emphasized the need to make changes to the Greek 
program and spooked markets further, sending the spread between Greek and German 
bonds to euro-era highs.52 However not all Greek government officials agreed the 
program needed restructuring, as George Provopoulos, Greece’s central bank governor 
argued that debt restructuring was “neither necessary nor desirable,” as “it would have 
catastrophic consequences for the ability of the government and the private sector to 
access markets” and would negatively affect the pension funds, banks, and individuals 
holding Greek government bonds.53 At this point, if changes to the Greek program were 
                                                 
52 Jennifer Hughes, “Greek debt hit by restructuring fears,” Financial Times, April 14, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/086d7be6-667b-11e0-ac4d-00144feab49a. 
53 Kerin Hope, “Greece rules out debt restructuring,” Financial Times, April 18, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/a7e43d8a-69b5-11e0-826b-00144feab49a. 
81 
made, it was unclear what changes would include as there was primarily talk of debt 
restructuring and extending maturities, which would help reduce some of the pain of the 
Greek program. The issue of whether private creditors would be forced to take haircuts 
on their Greek bonds was central to the debate on Greek debt restructuring as some 
feared this would open other countries in the eurozone, such as Ireland and Portugal, to 
contagion. The Greek government’s preference was to extend the maturity of its bonds 
without burning bondholders, but in order to do this the reforms would need to be sped 
up and better implemented to improve Greece’s credibility with its creditors.54 
These fears of a Greek debt restructuring plagued not only Greek markets, but 
markets across Europe as well, and Greece’s goal of returning to bond markets was 
thrown into doubt when Eurostat revised Greece’s 2010 budget deficit from 9.4 percent 
to 10.5 percent of GDP. Adding to the uncertainty and casting further doubt on Greece’s 
ability to fulfill the terms of their program, Portugal formally requested financial 
assistance from the troika in early April. On April 19, Greece had a successful bond 
auction of 13-week bonds, for which demand exceeded the offer by over three times.55 
Yet, as a result of the deteriorating economic and political conditions as well as 
Eurostat’s deficit revision, Greek 2-year bonds jumped almost ten percentage points in 
the month of April to 24.34 percent on April 26.56 
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In May, Greece’s situation continued to deteriorate further as there was not only 
increased talk of Greek debt restructuring, but news stories about a potential Greek exit 
from the eurozone became more regular. When press leaks emerged with stories about 
how the Greek government was considering leaving the euro, a not-so-secret meeting of 
euro area G20 finance ministers, Jean Claude Junker, Jean-Claude Trichet, Ollie Rehn, 
and the Greek Finance Minister, George Papaconstantinou took place in Luxembourg.57 
Spiegel Online indicated the meeting was convened to discuss Greece’s potential exit 
from the euro, but after the meeting both the Greek government and the European 
Commission denied that there was any possibility of a Greek exit from the eurozone.58 
Shortly after the meeting in Luxembourg, Greece and its European partners 
acknowledged publicly that Greece would not be able to raise money in bond markets in 
early 2012, as was expected in the original memorandum. Therefore, in early May, it was 
believed by many that the Greek bailout plan would have be adjusted if it had any chance 
of success, but how it would be altered would still need to be agreed upon.59 
Despite the mounting external pressures, Greek prime minister George 
Papandreou continued to press for unity in an effort to fulfill the demands of the 
adjustment program, saying on Greek TV, “We have to devote all our strength to 
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implementing reforms in the coming months, whatever the obstacles.”60 In early May, 
Greece also revealed an ambitious plan to for raising revenues as well as fighting tax 
evasion, which would reduce the debt by €11.8bn during 2011-13. These measures 
included collecting taxes in arrears owed to the state, strengthening tax compliance, 
improving tax collection mechanisms, closing tax loopholes, and founding a financial 
police force to help reduce incidents of tax fraud and avoidance.61 
Yet, even with the push for fulfilling the demands of the program, Greece could 
not create any breathing room as S&P cut Greece’s credit rating by two notches to B, 
citing that any voluntary debt restructuring by Greece would be treated as a default, and 
later in May Fitch cut Greek debt three notches from BB+ to B+ with a negative outlook 
due to worries about Greece’s ability to implement its program. The IMF also added 
pressure on Greece to follow through with their privatization program and to speed up the 
structural reforms agreed to in the memorandum.62 Additionally, cracks were beginning 
to show in the government’s cabinet as Papandreou was being publicly criticized by his 
own cabinet ministers. The health minister, Andreas Loverdos, spoke out against the 
mixed policy messages that the government had been sending the Greek people while the 
energy and labor ministers had publicly opposed the €50bn privatization plan.63 
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In early June, conditions in Greece continued their downward trajectory as 
markets continued to worry about Greece’s ability to hit its program targets. The 
recession was deeper and longer than anticipated, political consensus was becoming more 
difficult, and reforms were not being implemented due to things such as “weakness in 
political coordination and constraints in administrative capacity…weighed on programme 
implementation.”64 Eurostat increased their budget deficit projections for 2011 from 7.4 
to 9.5 percent and Moody’s cut Greece’s credit rating from B1 to Caa1 and said there was 
a 50 percent chance of default. The credit downgrade was due to Greece’s failure to 
stabilize its debt position, the difficulties of implementing the program, and a “track 
record of underperformance against budget consolidation targets.”65 The euro area 
members wanted these commitments before they would release more funds and the IMF, 
per its own rules, needed Greece to show that its funding needs for the next twelve 
months could be covered before releasing the fifth tranche of funds. 
Early June was especially tense, as negotiations for a second bailout package 
became much more serious between eurozone governments, Troika institutions, and 
Greece. Countries such as the Netherlands, wanted more private sector involvement, 
while others, such as the ECB, were concerned with how extending maturities and 
making sector contribute to the solution would affect the rest of Europe. Greece 
submitted its Medium-term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) to the Greek parliament in early 
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June, which included adjustments totaling €28.3 billion (12% of GDP). €6.5 billion alone 
in the second half of 2011. Half of this would be from higher duties, property taxes, and 
restructured VAT brackets. Expenditure was to be reduced by public sector wage cuts, 
merging of state entities, efficiency gains, reform to the health and social security 
systems in order to curb pharmaceutical and pension costs. There was also an extensive 
privatization program that included selling a number of SOEs, such as the Hellenic 
Postbank.66 This was approved by the cabinet but was criticized by many PASOK 
deputies. One parliamentarian resigned from PASOK but did not leave parliament. 
Several others threatened to vote against the package leading the media to doubt whether 
it would pass in parliament. On June 10, Papandreou addressed the nation and called for 
political consensus, but these calls were rejected by PASOK’s leftwing deputies and the 
opposition. New Democracy said the mid-term strategy was “unreliable, unfair, and 
ineffective,” while describing the new tax hikes as “unacceptable.”67 Fears of the 
possibility of a Greek default also increased further as S&P cut Greece’s long-term credit 
rating to CCC in June, making it the worst rated country in the world.68 
By mid-June, George Papandreou had begun talks with the opposition about 
forming a national unity government with New Democracy. Despite Papandreou offering 
to resign in exchange for forming the government of national unity, the unity government 
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was never formed. However, Mr. Papandreou reshuffled his cabinet and announced he 
would be having a vote of confidence later in the week. Mr. Papandreou replaced finance 
minister George Papaconstantinou, the architect of austerity measures who was despised 
by many in Greece, with Evangelos Venizelos. Mr. Papandreou survived the vote of 
confidence with a vote of 155 to 143, but shortly after the vote, the mission from the 
troika institutions identified a €5.5bn financing gap in Greece’s MTFS that would need to 
be addressed before the next tranche of funds could be released.  EU leaders were also 
increasing their pressure on Greece by urging support for the program by all parties 
despite the staunch opposition of the program by Antonis Samaras, the leader of New 
Democracy. The Papandreou government re-worked parts of the MTFS to plug the 
€5.5bn hole, resulting in new measures totaling roughly €28bn of spending cuts and tax 
increases. At the end of June, the Greek parliament passed the MTFS with only one 
PASOK deputy voting against the measures, temporarily staving off disaster.69 
Social Responses Q2 of 2011 
Social responses in Q2 represented an escalation of resistance from Q1 and 
peaked in June as there were roughly 875 protests across the country in that one month, 
which was the most of any single month in the Troika program up to that point.70 Overall, 
resistance to the Troika continued to ebb and flow with the measures taken by the Greek 
government, as protests and strikes occurred in response to moving forward with the 
€50bn privatization drive as well as the passage of the MTFS. Additionally, Q2 of 2011 
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saw the beginnings of the “indignados movement,” which started first in Spain but then 
spread to Greece and other countries in southern Europe in late May. June was a 
contentious month as the MTFS was being debated and was eventually passed in 
parliament, leading to violent protests. 
The privatization drive, as mentioned above, was opposed by many MPs in 
parliament as well as some in the PASOK government cabinet. In April, when Greece 
announced plans to appoint international advisers to help with the privatization program, 
Greek unions vowed to oppose the measures. Genop-DEH, a public sector union that 
represented about 24,000 workers at the state electric utility, led the charge against the 
privatization drive. Its president Nikos Fotopoulos stated, “we will not allow our 
company to be sold to a private investor with the interests that are not those of the Greek 
consumer.”71 Despite the resistance to privatization pledged by Greek unions, much of 
April and May were relatively quiet with regards to public protests and resistance to the 
troika program. The trade unions held a one-day general strike in mid-May, but it only 
attracted around 15,000 protesters, which was half the number expected. In mid-May, the 
Financial Times even noted that reform fatigue had eroded much of the enthusiasm for 
protesting.72 
However, on May 25 there were numerous demonstrations in various cities in 
Greece that started more than a month of continuous protest that came to be known as 
“The Indignados Movement.” Roughly 20,000 protesters gathered in Syntagma square, 
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just outside the parliament building. 5,000 protesters assembled in front of the White 
Tower in Thessaloniki, and others congregated in cities around Greece. The indignados 
movement continued from May 25 until August 7, 2011. The protests in Syntagma square 
continued into June, intensifying on weekends as more people could attend, with crowds 
growing into the hundreds of thousands on June 5.73 The protests were peaceful until 
mid-June, when the government released its MTFS, which resulted in violent clashes 
between protesters and the police in Syntagma Square in Athens. Many of ‘the 
indignados’ were trying to block MPs from entering into parliament to debate the MTFS 
and demanded its withdrawal.74 This was also the first time the indignados movement 
coincided with general strikes and rallies by GSEE and Adedy, the public sector unions, 
leading to large and diverse crowds in Syntagma Square. At the same time, an opinion 
poll conducted prior to the cabinet reshuffle showed that 47.5 percent of those surveyed 
wanted the MTFS rejected by parliament, while 34.8 percent were in favor of passing the 
legislation, and the rest were undecided.75 
Protests were again ratcheted up in late June, when the MTFS was being debated 
and voted on in Greek Parliament. PAME, Greece’s communist-led trade union, 
commenced a 48-hour period of anti-austerity strikes and protests where many public 
services and government offices were shut down and air traffic controllers delayed flights 
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by participating in two four-hour work stoppages. PAME, along with GSEE and Adedy, 
also marched on parliament in protest of the MTFS, while the indignados continued their 
protests in Syntagma Square.76 The violence came to an end in the late evening of June 
29 after a post office below the Ministry of Finance was burned out by a fire. In the end 
the MTFS was passed, and Greece secured the fifth tranche of funds from the Eurogroup 
and IMF despite the large number of protesters and intensity of the protests and strikes 
throughout the end of May and nearly all of June. 
Q2 of 2011 saw an escalation of tensions in Greek society as protest and strike 
activity increased significantly from Q1. June 2011 had the most protests of any month 
since Greece entered the Troika program. There were also new forms of resistance, such 
as the Indignados Movement that contributed to the increase in social resistance to the 
Troika program. The passage of the MTFS capped a very turbulent month of June as 
protests turned violent, leading to clashes with police in Syntagma Square. 
External Pressures and Policy Responses July - November 2011 
The second half of 2011 proved to be the most contentious and unpredictable 
period of the Greek crisis to that point. On the heels of a reshuffled cabinet and the 
passage of the MTFS, the Greek government continued to run into roadblocks as it 
attempted to implement the measures agreed to with the troika. After negotiating a 
second bailout package with significant haircuts to private bondholders in July, the 
Troika found shortfalls and missed targets and demanded more reform from the Greek 
government. This led to a chaotic two months in September and October that saw the 
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collapse of the government and the formation of a unity government to secure the next 
tranche of bailout loans and restructure the debt before elections calling elections. 
In early July, Moody’s downgraded Portuguese debt from Ba2 to Baa1 because of 
contagion fears from Greece. The discussions of private sector involvement for Greece 
implied burden sharing and it was assumed that burden sharing would be a precondition 
for lending to Portugal, scaring off potential investors. The Troika and Eurozone 
governments tried to come up with ways for Greece to restructure its debt without 
causing the ratings agencies to declare Greece in default, but S&P warned that rolling 
over debt or extending maturities would result in a default.77 As July progressed 
Eurozone countries and Troika institutions continued to devise ways to help the Greeks 
get their debt on more sustainable footing, but the major obstacle concerned how to get 
private bondholders to pay part of the new bailout. Eurozone countries were concerned 
that if they let Greece technically default, they would be signaling to the world that they 
were fine with Eurozone countries defaulting, which would threaten larger economies 
such as Spain and Italy. 
European leaders held an emergency summit on July 21 to finalize a second 
Greek bailout. Greece wanted a deal quickly, to secure funding, while Germany and the 
Netherlands urged private sector involvement (largely to appeal to their domestic 
audiences). The ECB was still terrified that any default would destabilize the markets, 
with Trichet warning that if Greece defaulted the ECB would no longer be able to accept 
defaulted bonds as collateral, potentially cutting off Greek banks from ECB funding. On 
                                                 
77 Matt Steinglass, “Voluntary Greek debt plan ‘unrealistic,” Financial Times, July 7, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8c78d8b0-a873-11e0-8a97-00144feabdc0.  
91 
July 21 a deal was reached for a new €109bn bailout of Greece where private 
bondholders will contribute €37bn by agreeing to either swap or rollover debt for new 
bonds that would mature in 30 years. This also included a commitment from Europe to 
support Greece until it was able to return to financial markets, which was a potentially 
unlimited guarantee. There would be four options for the bond swap/rollover. These were 
three types of debt exchange and one rollover plan, all with different durations and 
interest rates. The bondholder programs amounted to roughly a 21 percent reduction in 
the bonds value, so they were expected to trigger a selective default by the ratings 
agencies. The European leaders made sure to emphasize that the bondholder program 
would be limited to Greece because it was “an exceptional and unique solution.” This 
program would cut an estimated €26bn off Greece’s existing €350bn debt by 2014.78 
Additionally, the deal agreed to lower interest rates for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal by 
extending maturities from 7.5 years to 15-30 and lowering interest rates to an average of 
3.5 percent for all three countries.79 
Many were happy following the summit and Papandreou likened the deal to 
enjoying the benefits of Eurobonds. Despite the upbeat mood, there were some issues 
with the package, such as not knowing if it had enough firepower to stave off crisis in the 
secondary markets as well as the absence of a timetable. Also, Fitch described the bond 
deal as a ‘restricted default’ and on July 25, Moody’s cut Greece’s credit rating three 
notches to Ca-, leading to increased market volatility in the short-term. 
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Until the beginning of September, Greece was relatively quiet aside from a side 
deal made between the Greek and Finnish finance ministers, which threatened to derail 
the second package. The deal would have Greece deposit millions of euros in an escrow 
account as an insurance policy that Greece would not default on Finland’s share of the 
rescue. Other eurozone countries were upset with the agreement because, according to 
Dutch finance minister Jan Kees de Jager, “it is not compatible with the principle of equal 
treatment of all euro countries.”80 
However, the Greco-Finnish side deal fell into the background as Troika officials 
suspended talks with the Greek government on September 2 due to disagreements about 
how to cover a €1.2bn budgetary shortfall. The walkout put the next €8bn tranche of 
bailout funds at risk unless Greece took more action to fulfill its current austerity program 
and Troika officials also accused Greece of dragging its feet with the implementation of 
structural reforms, privatization, and improvements to tax collection. Without any further 
measures, Greece’s budget deficit projection was set to increase to nearly 9 percent of 
GDP as opposed to the target of 7.6 percent.81 
Greece was resisting Troika demands to accelerate public sector job cuts and 
other spending cuts, while arguing the deeper than expected recession was to blame for 
the budgetary shortfall. However, Troika officials noted that only a third of the shortfall 
could be accounted for by the deep recession and Greece was also coming under 
increasing pressure from Germany and the EU for failing to implement many of the 
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structural reforms agreed to earlier in the summer as part of the second troika bailout. 
One Greek economist was quoted in the Financial Times as saying, “The Troika returned 
to Athens and found only broken promises, there had been no practical progress during 
the summer.”82 
Greece’s response to these new external pressures involved walking a tight line 
between trying to reduce the domestic political damage that would come from 
announcing new austerity measures and still drafting a budget that was credible to the 
Troika. The following week, Venizelos announced that Greece would begin to cut jobs 
immediately in order to comply with the Troika’s demands. Greece had agreed to cut 
150,000 public sector jobs by 2014 according to the second bailout agreed to earlier that 
year, but their implementation had been delayed due to significant political resistance. 
Venizelos also said an emergency property tax would be applied for 2011-2012 and all 
elected officials would take a 7 percent salary cut for 2011 while blaming the €2bn 
shortfall on poor revenue collection.83 On September 10, George Papandreou announced 
new austerity measures to fulfill the demands of the Troika. He announced he would be 
cutting civil service salaries, dismissing 20,000 public sector workers within the next two 
weeks, nationalizing many struggling banks that were seeking capital injections from a 
€10bn bank stability fund, and he also defended his €50bn privatization program.84 
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Despite these pledges from the Greek government, markets were becoming increasingly 
anxious about a potential Greek default. Its two-year bonds reached a bid yield of 74 
percent and its ten-year bonds hit 23.55 percent.85 
As Greece was trying to secure the next tranche of bailout loans, the government 
announced new austerity measures on September 21 that included lowering the tax-free 
income threshold from €8,000 to €5,000. Pensions below €1200 per month would remain 
untouched, but pensions over €1200 would have the amount over €1200 reduced by 20 
percent. Pensioners under 55 with a pension of more than €1000 would have anything 
above €1,000 reduced by 40 percent and 30,000 public sector workers would be placed in 
a labor reserve by the end of 2011,86 meaning they would earn a reduced salary 
(speculated to be around 60 percent) for a specified amount of time and then if no new 
jobs were found they would be let go.87 The next week Greece passed the property tax in 
parliament, but said it would not implement the other parts of the program until late 
October, including cutting public sector jobs. This move added to European countries’ 
skepticism that Greece would fulfill its end of the bargain and implement the policies it 
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had pledged to do.88 
In early October, facing intensifying pressure from the Troika and other EU 
countries to implement the measures agreed to in the summer, the Greek cabinet 
approved large cuts in the 2012 budget. The new budget called for raising €6.5bn in 
spending cuts, including the dismissal of 30,000 public sector workers, 23,000 of which 
would be nearing retirement and another 7,000 would be dismissed as part of mergers 
and the restructuring of many state-controlled organizations.89 The following day, Greece 
acknowledged it would miss its 2011 deficit target of 7.6 percent as the deficit was now 
projected to be 8.5 percent of GDP. A draft budget was also revealed, which detailed 
further cuts. There would be a 5.8 per cent overall reduction in wages and pensions for 
2012 and 9 percent cuts to the health and welfare budget. The cutting 30,000 public 
sector jobs would save the state €200m in 2012, while launching a unified payment 
system for civil servants was expected to save €950m. There would be an extra 
‘solidarity tax’ of 2-5 percent collected for the month of October and a property tax to be 
collected through household electricity bills.90 
In the run up to the parliamentary vote on the 2012 budget, the government and 
MPs in parliament faced added external pressures as a group of northern European 
countries, led by Germany and the Netherlands, were pushing for PSI to include private 
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bondholders taking more of a haircut than the 21 percent agreed to in July. Germany was 
reportedly pushing for haircuts as big as 50-60 per cent, which was deemed unacceptable 
to bondholders and threatened to derail the second bailout.91 There was also considerable 
internal pressure as the dismissals of public sector workers were opposed by unions and 
workers and the unified payment system was opposed by better paid bureaucrats because 
it would cut their pay between 15 and 20 percent.92 Despite the wrangling about haircuts 
and the opposition from domestic groups, the austerity bill passed in parliament on 
October 20 by 154 to 144 votes. 
The following week European leaders and Greek bondholders reached an 
agreement where bondholders would take a 50% haircut in the face value of their bonds, 
which was estimated to help Greece reduce its debt levels to 120 percent of GDP by the 
end of the decade. The agreement also indicated that European governments would 
provide an additional €100bn until 2014, including required recapitalization of Greek 
banks. Greece was also to generate €15bn from project Helios (an export-oriented solar 
project) or other privatization revenue in addition to the privatizations already agreed to. 
The agreement also established monitoring capacity on the ground in Greece by the EC 
and other Troika institutions, that would work with national experts, the Greek 
government, and the Troika to “offer assistance in order to ensure the timely and full 
implementation of the reforms.” The EFSF was also strengthened by allowing it to offer 
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risk insurance to investors buying bonds on primary markets and there was a renewed 
commitment to strengthen economic governance by requiring German-style debt brakes, 
such as writing a balanced budget, into each constitution.93 
Greece was thrown into political turmoil and the fate of the Greek program once 
again was in doubt the following week when George Papandreou announced that he 
would be putting the second bailout package up for a referendum and he would be asking 
for a vote of confidence in parliament. This caught Europe completely off guard. One 
senior EU official quoted in the FT said it was “like a bolt out of the blue”. “I don’t think 
anyone expected this,” the official said. “The calculation has to be this is the only way 
[Papandreou] believes he can get this through.”94 There was much speculation as to why 
Papandreou felt he needed a referendum. Some guessed it was to avoid being seen as a 
puppet of the Troika while others saw it as bringing the democratic process back in and 
others viewed it as a desperate move by an unpopular politician.95 The reaction inside 
Greece to the vote of confidence and referendum was chaotic. The opposition had been 
calling for elections for some time and had been increasingly critical of the program, but 
it was critical of this move as well, with Antonis Samaras saying that a referendum was 
“not the way out” and “the only option is elections and, like Ireland and Portugal, to 
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request the obviously necessary changes in the bail-out agreement.”96 One interviewee 
from Ireland commented about the referendum, saying, “I had discussions with them and 
essentially what he wanted to do was similar to what we were doing. His problem was 
that he didn’t feel that he had a mandate for it and what he wanted to do is that he wanted 
to have a referendum to approve the, basically a program, which was fairly close to what 
we had.”97 Some PASOK deputies announced they would not vote for the referendum bill 
when it came to parliament and another resigned from the party but did not give up her 
seat.98 
Markets reacted quickly to the news of the referendum, with the euro falling in 
value, European bank stocks were hammered, and the Greek and Italian stock markets 
fell nearly 7 percent. Papandreou also faced tremendous pressure from his European 
partners to continue with the plan he had agreed to in late October. At the G20 Summit in 
Cannes, France, Merkel and Sarkozy both pushed for Greece’s referendum to be about 
leaving or staying in the euro as opposed to accepting or rejecting the most recent 
package of reforms just agreed to.99 On November 2, the EU suspended the €8bn tranche 
of money due to Athens as part of its bailout and also demanded that Greece decide 
whether it wanted to leave the eurozone or not. Papandreou agreed that the referendum 
would be about staying in the eurozone or not and not just about the €130bn rescue 
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package.100 Papandreou also said that he was open to forming a unity government with 
New Democracy that would endorse the bailout and then take the country to elections. 
There created a split in PASOK between older party loyalists who agreed with 
Papandreou retaining power and younger ‘reformers’ that wanted a change in leadership. 
In total there were five PASOK MPs who opposed the referendum plan, which eliminated 
PASOK’s 3 seat majority in parliament.101 However, the following day Papandreou 
abandoned his plan to hold a referendum on eurozone membership as ND promised to 
support the terms of the €130bn rescue package. Papandreou said that with the support of 
the opposition there was no need to hold the referendum and that “Failure to back the 
package would mean the beginning of our departure from the euro,” adding, “if we have 
consensus, then we don’t need a referendum.”102 
Papandreou survived the confidence vote, but there was enormous uncertainty as 
to the next steps to be taken. Papandreou and Venizelos wanted a unity government, but 
the opposition leader, Samaras, said Papandreou should resign first. Andreas Loverdos, 
the health minister who was seen as a potential successor to Mr. Papandreou, threatened 
to resign “unless moves are made immediately after the vote towards forming a national 
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unity government.”103 On November 5, Papandreou and Samaras met with Greek 
President Carolos Papoulinas and agreed to form a unity government and Papandreou 
agreed to step down. A successor was not chosen until November 10, only after days of 
negotiation between the two main parties. On November 10, Lucas Papademos, a former 
vice-president of the ECB, was announced as the new prime minister and the new 
government included PASOK, New Democracy and Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), a 
smaller conservative party. The Papademos government was not a formal coalition, but a 
coalition with a narrow mandate of securing the next trance of financing and making sure 
the debt was restructured before calling a new election. 
This period was a very chaotic and uncertain time for Greece. Papandreou was 
ultimately unable to implement the austerity reforms without the support of New 
Democracy, who later agreed to support the reform package to avoid Papandreou’s 
proposed referendum. A tumultuous autumn ended with Papandreou resigning and what 
amounted to a caretaker government made up of political rivals assuming power to 
ensure Greece received its next tranche of funding from the Troika. 
Social Responses July – November 2011 
The societal responses to changes in and the implementation of Greece’s bailout 
program moved along with the passage of legislation that threatened entrenched interests 
and public sector workers and enterprises. What started off as a relatively quiet July and 
August transformed into chaos in the late summer and early autumn. As more austerity 
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measures were agreed to and the government attempted to secure the next tranche of 
funding to avoid defaulting on its debts, social resistance to further austerity intensified. 
The summer of 2011 was somewhat quieter than Q2 regarding protests and social 
action in Greece as total protests in Q3 were just over 1,300. July saw a major decline 
from the nearly 900 protests in June, but there was a lengthy strike from the taxi drivers 
in mid-July, a protest from university students over reforms to the Greek university 
system in late August, and a decision by Greek café and restaurant owners to refuse to 
pay a 10 percent rise in the VAT. Taxi drivers were opposing measures to liberalize the 
profession, which would open them up to more competition through issuing more taxi 
licenses. Over the course of two weeks, striking taxi drivers blocked roads to Athens 
International Airport, the port of Piraeus, and bridges at the height of tourist season, 
causing major disruptions.104 These disruptions would continue into the autumn. 
In August, hundreds of students protested in response to changes in the university 
system to add competition and curb the students’ role in university administration. The 
new law would also allow private sponsorship of science, technology, and business 
programs at the universities and place a four-year deadline for finishing a degree. 
Following the student protest, members of the communist-led union, PAME, led a march 
to parliament after the bill was passed.105 
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Restaurant owners, who saw the VAT increase from 9 percent to 13 percent in 
2010 from 13 percent to 23 percent in 2011 voted at a general assembly of the 
PanHellenic Federation of Restaurants and Related Professions union to refuse to pay the 
additional 10 percent VAT. Owners argued that it would “drive many establishments out 
of business” as many had seen their businesses decline between 20 and 40 percent in the 
past year. The government expected the measure to generate roughly €750m over the 
next year.106 
Following the walkout of the Troika officials in early September, protests and 
strikes increased in intensity as the government vowed to implement the reforms 
demanded by the Troika. Minor protests began the day before Papandreou delivered the 
annual economic policy speech in Thessaloniki on September 10, but there were at least 
10 more demonstrations planned for the following day. During the speech an estimated 
crowd of more than 25,000 protesters were outside participating in the anti-austerity 
protests as Papandreou declared his intention to fulfill the terms of the bailout and 
implement the measures demanded by the Troika. Taxi drivers also staged a 24-hour 
strike on September 10 and many of them met in Thessaloniki to protest the 
government’s plan to open them up to competition. The demonstrations led to some 
violent clashes between police and protesters as roughly 100 people were arrested.107 
                                                 
106 Kerin Hope, “Restaurants in Greece refuse to pay VAT rise,” Financial Times, September 1, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/5a6e2be6-d4aa-11e0-a7ac-00144feab49a. 
107 Ekathimerini.com, “Security sky-high in port as thousands protest,” ekathermini.com, September 9, 
2011, www.ekathimerini.com/135881/article/ekathimerini/news/security-sky-high-in-port-as-thousands-
protest; Ekathimerini.com, “PM vows to push reforms despite opposition,” ekathermini.com, September 10, 
2011, http://www.ekathimerini.com/135883/article/ekathimerini/news/pm-vows-to-push-reforms-despite-




Protests and industrial action continued into the following week as the 
government continued to work with the Troika to secure its next tranche of bailout funds. 
Taxi drivers staged a two-day strike that included a rally outside parliament,108 and civil 
servants such as tax collectors and customs officials as well as garbage collectors all 
staged industrial action the following week.109 These protests and strikes continued 
throughout September and increased once the new austerity package was announced on 
September 21 as a strike was staged by Greek workers on September 22 that shut down 
public transportation as taxi and bus drivers as well as rail workers all took part in the 
strike. Over 7,000 protesters marched on parliament, including members of the 
communist group MAS and students, all protesting the new austerity measures that were 
passed by the government.110 
The protests intensified the following week as there was growing opposition to 
the plan to cut 30,000 jobs and transfer those workers to the labor reserve for roughly 60 
percent of their previous salary. Public sector workers took over a number of state 
organizations ahead of the Troika’s return to Athens. They occupied the Finance Ministry 
and held unannounced sit-ins at the ministries of development, justice, health and 
environment, and the national accounts office. The sit-ins were timed to coincide with the 
return of the Troika for further talks. “These are timed to coincide with the return to 
                                                 
108 Ekathimerini.com, “Taxis launch two-day strike,” ekathermini.com, September 11, 2011, 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/135889/article/ekathimerini/news/taxis-launch-two-day-strike. 
109 Ekathimerini.com, “Workers scale up protest action,” ekathermini.com, September 13, 2011, 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/135925/article/ekathimerini/news/workers-scale-up-protest-action. 





Greece of the Troika and the barbarous new measures that have been decided to cut our 
salaries further” read an Adedy statement. The unified payment system, which would put 
all civil servants on the same payment level and was opposed by many of the higher paid 
civil servants was being delayed because of foot dragging and resistance from mid-level 
bureaucrats.111 
Protesters also blockaded the statistics office in Athens, to which the head of 
Greece’s statistical agency warned that the blockade of the statistics office as well as the 
walkout by its employees could delay or prevent approval from the troika for the next 
tranche of loans. The delay was projected to be two to three days and the deadline was 
September 30th to allow the troika to recalibrate the draft budget before it goes to 
parliament. Andreas Georgiou, chairman of ELSTAT (the Hellenic Statistical Agency), 
told the Financial Times that he could not give the Troika the figures needed to finalize 
the 2012 budget because of the walk-out and takeover of ELSTAT, saying that “We will 
miss tonight’s deadline for sending final updated debt and deficit figures for 2010 to 
Eurostat because I and my team can’t get into the building to finish the job.”112 
With the cabinet approving the 2012 budget, which called for large spending cuts 
and dismissals of public sector employees, GSEE and Adedy staged a general strike in 
early October, which saw thousands of Greeks walk off the job, but did not draw as many 
protesters as they had hoped, with the police estimating a crowd of 13,000 and rally 
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organizers estimating around 25,000 participants. However, the strike affected travel and 
transportation and shut down tax offices, courts, and schools.113 Also, municipal workers 
in Athens blocked the entrance to the main landfill for two weeks, leading the 
accumulation of over 6,000 tons of garbage on Athens streets. This was eventually ended 
when riot police evicted the workers in mid-October, allowing private trash collectors to 
dispose of the garbage.114 
Industrial action continued and intensified over the next couple of weeks in the 
run up to the parliamentary vote on the 2012 budget. There was a 48-hour strike from the 
transportation sector, members of GENOP, the union representing workers at the Public 
Power Corporation took over the company’s billing department to prevent it from 
sending out electric bills that contained newly levied property taxes, civil servants 
occupied at least seven ministries, municipal employees staged sit-ins, tax collectors 
staged a four-day strike, and customs officials began a ten-day strike intended to bring 
about food and fuel shortages.115 
The social responses during this time came to head leading up to the vote in 
parliament on the revised 2012 budget when Greek unions called for a 48-hour general 
strike and promised it would be one of the biggest strikes since the beginning of the 
crisis. The strike included many in the transportation services, all taxi drivers, and led to 
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the cancellation of most flights. Teachers, shopkeepers, bankers, tax inspectors, doctors, 
customs officials, and journalists also joined in the strike, which closed schools, shut 
down media broadcasts and newspaper circulation, and delayed imports coming into the 
country. The first day the protesters in Syntagma Square, outside Greek Parliament, 
numbered between 75,000 and 125,000116 and the second day estimates put the number 
of protesters between 70,000 and 100,000117. Despite the large protests, the budget was 
passed through parliament. Throughout the remainder of October, social action 
continued, but at lower levels than in the lead up to the vote on the budget. Many smaller 
protests also took place. These included a 24-hour transportation strike, hundreds of 
protesters at the Thessaloniki parade commemorating Greece’s entry into World War II, 
which forced the parade to be cancelled for the first time ever, and a three-hour strike 
called by the civil servant union in mid-November. 
Following the large amount of social action surrounding the passage of the MTFS 
in June, this protest cycle started off relatively calm but increased in intensity as the 
Troika demanded more cuts and reforms, ultimately culminating in numerous strikes 
from the public and private sectors, the takeover of government buildings and public 
spaces, and massive protests that put Greece in a state of gridlock in October as the 2012 
budget was being debated in Greek Parliament. 
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External Pressures and Policy Responses December 2011 – March 2012: From Unity 
Government to Second Bailout 
The time period following the formation of the Papademos government was 
characterized by political infighting, tight deadlines to meet the Troika’s demands, and 
serious discussions within Europe of Greece leaving the euro before a second program 
was eventually agreed to and elections were called. To secure the next tranche of funding 
and meet all of the requirements of the troika in order to finalize a second bailout, Greece 
had to pass another austerity budget for 2012, convince its private bondholders to 
“voluntarily” take a significant haircut on the bonds they owned, and finish implementing 
the measures demanded by the Troika before a second program could be agreed to. 
Furthermore, Greece had to do this all with a technocratic government that included three 
political parties that were political rivals. 
The new government was reported to have more than half of Greeks supporting it. 
According to a poll conducted by ekathimerini.com, 55 percent of Greeks approved of 
Papademos’s appointment and only 18 percent reported a negative view.118 However, 
soon after forming the government, the new coalition suffered from infighting. Each 
party accused the others of failing to meet obligations or criticized specific policies. 
Almost immediately, there was a delay with the written pledge to the Troika from all 
three parties in government stating that they would implement the policies they had 
agreed to. Without this pledge the sixth tranche of funds would not be disbursed. In 
                                                 





particular, Samaras was dragging his feet on the pledge as he wanted some of the policies 
changed to promote more growth, but he later signed the pledge after pressure from those 
in Troika institutions.119 The new LAOS minister of transport rejected the proposal to 
liberalize the taxi profession and the new PASOK minister in charge of the labor reserve 
ruled out any firings. Events such as these led to rumblings that the Troika was already 
unhappy and Karatzaferis, the leader of LAOS, said after one meeting with the troika, “I 
believe they have no trust in us at all.”120 
Passing the 2012 budget proved to be the easy part for this government, despite 
opposition from the leftwing parties SYRIZA and KKE as well as violent protests outside 
parliament. The budget, which had initially been negotiated in October and revised in 
November, passed in parliament in early December with a vote of 258-41. The 2012 
budget called for further spending cuts, the dismissal of thousands of public sector 
workers, reductions in wages and pensions, and cuts to the health and welfare budget. 
The passing of the budget allowed the IMF to sign off on the sixth tranche of funding the 
next day, which guaranteed Greece would meet its financing needs through the end of the 
year.121 
Throughout December and January there were ongoing discussions between 
Greece, the Troika, eurozone governments, and private bondholders over PSI, the 
structure of the haircuts, and how deep they would be. Bondholders were worried that 
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cuts would exceed 50 percent, which would be unacceptable to them. Finalizing PSI for 
Greek bonds was an urgent matter because it was a precondition for the approval of the 
second Greek bailout program. Also, Greece was facing a €14.4bn bond redemption on 
March 20. Many believed Greece would be unable to pay the bond redemption unless 
their second program was approved along with a large haircut on privately held bonds.122 
Throughout the winter months, talks regarding Greek PSI and a second Greek 
program continued in fits and starts, unleashing new speculation about a Greek default. 
There were two reasons for such prolonged negotiations with intermittent progress. First, 
there was a disconnect between Greece, European leaders, and private bondholders on the 
interest rate for new 30-year bonds to be issued by the Greek state. Greece had agreed 
with bondholders to an interest rate of just under 5 percent. However, Germany and other 
Northern European countries wanted a rate of between 2-3 percent, which would increase 
bondholders’ losses from 60 percent to 80 percent in net present value terms. The 
Eurogroup wanted an average rate of no higher than 3.5 percent while bondholders 
wanted public sector holders of Greek sovereign debt to also take the same voluntary 
haircut as private bondholders.123 The haircut could not be forced on bondholders 
because they would need to “voluntarily” take the haircut in order for Greece to avoid 
default from ratings agencies. The haircut was seen as an essential condition for the 
second bailout, because without a significant haircut Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio would 
be unsustainable according to the IMF, which would prevent them from participating in 
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the program. These negotiations would continue up until February 21 when the Eurozone 
approved the second Greek bailout. 
The second issue with approving the second bailout package was the ongoing 
negotiations around the austerity measures to be taken before and during the new bailout. 
This would include more austerity measures before the bailout is approved and four more 
years of very unpopular structural and fiscal reforms. During negotiations in early 
February, the Greek coalition wanted the Troika to ease some of the conditions of the 
second bailout package, including an extra €3bn in spending cuts in the 2012 budget. The 
Troika’s proposal included projected cuts of 25 percent to private sector wages, 35 
percent to supplementary pensions, and roughly 100 state-controlled organizations would 
be shut down, causing thousands of job losses. Samaras wanted concessions on private 
sector wages, which were part of this package, but the Troika refused, forcing the three 
parties in government back to the drawing board. France and Germany then stepped up 
the pressure on Greece to agree to the terms of the new €130bn bailout, threatening that 
there would be no rescue unless all three parties signed that they would implement the 
deal. However, the three parties’ inability to come to an agreement on cuts to pensions 
brought Greece ever closer to a potential default.124 
On February 9, the party leaders of PASOK, New Democracy, and LAOS agreed 
to a new round of austerity cuts in early February, but they were rejected by the Eurozone 
finance ministers, who demanded an extra €325m in cuts. Five ministers resigned in 
protest of the wage and pension cuts, four of which were from LAOS, which also left the 
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government at this point. After further negotiations between PASOK and New 
Democracy and amid violent protests outside parliament, new austerity measures were 
passed parliament by a vote of 199-74. 43 deputies from PASOK and New Democracy 
were expelled from their parties for not supporting the legislation. A few days later 
Samaras submitted a letter to the Troika declaring his commitment to implementing the 
measures if New Democracy would win the next election and on February 21 the second 
Greek bailout was agreed to by the eurozone. 
The second Greek bailout totaled €130bn and included a “voluntary” haircut of 
53.5 percent for private sector bondholders, which is more than the 50 percent haircut 
agreed to the previous October. This also called for reductions in some pensions, 
minimum wage, more reforms to fight tax evasion, further privatizations. The second 
program also included a retroactive reduction in interest rates from the initial Greek 
program from other member states (which was mostly bilateral loans) and the EC 
strengthened its Task Force for Greece by creating a permanent presence on the ground in 
Greece, which was intended to bolster its capacity to provide and coordinate technical 
assistance. Greece agreed to add a legal measure that would be added to the constitution 
later, which gave priority to debt servicing over domestic expenditure. There was an 
increased monitoring presence from Europe as well as requiring a prior action plan before 
funds could be released.125 Even though there was an agreement for the second bailout 
Greece still had work to do in order to secure the €130bn bailout plan. They needed to 
complete 38 specific actions related to tax, spending, and wage policies, such as firing 
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underperforming tax collectors, passing legislation to open up closed professions, moving 
forward on privatizations due to take place in June, and strengthening rules against 
bribery.126 
Greece passed the required legislation, and on February 24, launched its debt 
swap program, which would run until March 12. After applying some pressure to 
holdouts on the bond swap program, the program had a participation rate of 95.7 percent 
after the collective action clauses were initiated.127 By clearing these hurdles, Greece’s 
second bailout was approved by all European and national parliaments as well as the IMF 
by mid-March. The new bailout package was approved in Greece’s Parliament on March 
21 by a vote of 213-79, finalizing the package of €174bn worth of aid. 
At the end of 2011 and into the beginning of 2012 Greece had come to the end of 
the road with its first Troika program. The government had to simultaneously pass a 
budget for 2012 while negotiating a second Troika program and ironing out the details of 
the haircut for private bondholders. After much infighting and many disagreements with 
the Troika, the government passed a budget and was able to successfully negotiate a 
second Troika program worth €130bn that also included “voluntary” haircuts for private 
sector bondholders. 
Social Responses December 2011 – March 2012 
Like previous social responses, the strikes and protests occurring during the 
Papademos government responded to government legislation. After a decrease in protests 
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from December to January, there was an increase in protests in February and March as 
the second bailout package was being negotiated. The protests and strikes were more 
sustained and tended to be from specific sectors of the economy opposing legislation to 
liberalize their industries. After February’s roughly 820 protests, there was a downward 
trend through the summer months and less than 100 protests in the month of August.128 
Greece was relatively quiet for the first couple of weeks of the Papademos 
administration and, as stated earlier, a poll conducted shortly after the change in 
leadership revealed that more than half of Greeks had a positive view of Papademos.129 
November was relatively free of social action aside from Greek power workers taking 
over the accounting office of the electric company to protest the government’s proposal 
to cut electricity to those who did not pay the property tax, which was to be administered 
through electricity bills. This led to the government delaying the implementation of 
cutting the electricity of those who did not pay their property tax.130 
Unlike November, December saw much more social action as the government had 
just secured the sixth tranche of funding by including more austerity measures. Social 
action in December included a general strike and many industry specific strikes and 
protests. December started with a 24-hour general strike and protests against spending 
cuts, which had less participants than previous protests. There were roughly 20,000 
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participants in Athens131 and another 6,000 protesters in Thessaloniki.132 From mid-
December through the new year there was a flurry of industry-specific action. There was 
a three-day strike held by public TV and radio stations, as well as municipal radio 
stations and the Athens News Agency to start what would be a three-day rolling strike. 
Pharmacists held a 24-hour strike to protest the liberalization of their industry, the health 
sector held a four-hour work stoppage that coincided with a three-hour work stoppage 
called by the civil servants’ union Adedy. The next week railway workers called a five-
hour work stoppage, which shut down all OSE (Hellenic Railway Organisation) trains 
and held a rally outside the finance ministry. Around Christmas many archaeological 
sites and museums were shut down as guards staged a strike over not being paid extra for 
working weekend shifts since October. 
January saw a drop in the numbers of protests, but social action persisted as the 
government continued to negotiate with the troika and private bondholders to secure a 
second bailout. Industry specific strikes continued along with more general strikes and 
protests. In early January pharmacists and doctors staged a 48-hour strike to protest 
changes to the health sector, such as reducing drug prices. State hospitals also 
participated in the strike and would remain on strike until January 6 in protest of the new 
state healthcare body EOPYY. Many of the doctors working for the main social security 
                                                 
131 Kerin Hope, “Calm reigns at Greek protest,” Financial Times, December 1, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/57fa9804-1c44-11e1-9b41-00144feabdc0. 




fund, IKA, feared they would lose patients to doctors working for EOPYY.133 Lawyers 
staged a three-day strike in mid-January and extended it another three days in protest of 
liberalization measures. Also, in mid-January Athens Labor Center (EKA) and GSEE led 
a 24-hour strike over wages and labor rights that disrupted travel in Athens. At the end of 
January, pharmacies closed for one afternoon to protest the lifting of restrictions on 
pharmacy hours of operation. 
February saw a large increase in protests as the Troika and the Greek government 
came closer to an agreement between themselves as well as with private bondholders. 
Social action intensified. There were multiple general strikes, increased sector specific 
action, huge protests resulting in violence and clashes with riot police, and significant 
property damage. In early February GSEE and Adedy called a 48-hour general strike in 
conjunction with protests outside of Parliament as well as another protest organized by 
PAME. The strike disrupted transportation services and 10,000 people took part in a 
protest outside parliament, which led to clashes with police. At the same time, roughly 50 
members of the workers’ union GENOP took over the Environmental Ministry in Athens 
to protest a law that would allow the privatization of Greece’s power transmission 
system. 
The social action intensified as the terms of the second bailout were debated in 
Greek Parliament and passed on February 12. Only a couple of days after the first 48-
hour general strike of February GSEE and Adedy called a second 48-hour general strike 
on February 10. The first day of social action saw thousands of workers participate in the 
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strike and finance ministry employees staged a sit-in at the ministry of finance to protest 
the new agreement between the government and the Troika, which would result in laying 
off thousands of civil service workers. Employees of the Health Ministry also staged a 
sit-in to protest to protest health sector cutbacks. Government offices, schools, courts, and 
museums and archaeological sites were also closed. Many professional groups, such as 
lawyers and doctors also participated in the protests.134 These protests culminated on 
February 12 when 60,000135 people protested austerity in Syntagma Square, of which a 
small group of anarchists smashed and defaced store fronts, with foreign banks and 
companies being targeted. Violence between rioters and riot police ensued and many 
businesses went up in flames with around 150 shops being looted and 48 being set on 
fire.136 The following day, Athens lawyers began a three-day strike to protest the 
liberalization of their profession, which would be extended until the end of the month. 
The remainder of February and into March when the second bailout was finalized 
between all parties, social action in Greece was less intense than the first part of February 
and primarily involved specific sectors protesting changes to their industries with a few 
smaller rallies led by labor unions. In late February gas station owners blocked the Greek 
Finance Ministry to protest fines on owners charged with illegal fuel trading while state 
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hospital workers and private practitioners held a 24-hour strike to protest the healthcare 
cuts. In early March, the Athens metro, electric railway, and tram all shut down in a 24-
hour strike against wage and pension cuts and in mid-March lawyers and seamen both 
called 48-hour strikes. 
Protests were much less intense in this period as there were a few smaller protests 
across the country and some half-day work stoppages led by the unions. On the evening 
before the second bailout package was agreed to by eurozone governments (February 21), 
there was a protest of about 1,500 people outside the Greek Parliament building and the 
following day GSEE and Adedy held an anti-austerity rally in the afternoon. A week later 
the same labor unions called a three-hour work stoppage at noon and a demonstration in 
central Athens that evening. Outside of these few events, industrial action was limited 
and much less intense as the second bailout was approved, conditions for the debt swap 
were met, and Greece was heading to new elections in the spring. 
The finalization of the second bailout led to the fizzling out of an intense period 
of social action that included strikes and protests that increased beginning in June of 2011 
with the passage of the MTFS and new privatization measures. From December through 
March Greeks responded to the actions of their government as they implemented a flurry 
of strikes, protests, and sit-ins aimed at voicing their objections and forcing the 
government to withdrawal or minimize many of the measures. February marked the 
month with the most protests (roughly 820) and a downward trend would continue 
through August, where there were less than 100 protests in all of Greece.137 
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Post Second Bailout 
In April, as Greece was looking to move on from the political and economic 
turmoil of the past two years, elections were called for May 6. However, the results of the 
election were inconclusive, and no government was formed, which led to a new round of 
political disorder and more talk of Greece exiting the euro throughout the month of May. 
On May 17 a caretaker government led by Panagotis Pikrammenos, Greece’s highest-
ranking judge, took office and new elections were scheduled for June 17. No party ran on 
a platform of being in favor of the memorandum as all parties wanted some form of 
renegotiation. Whichever party won, there would be tensions with the Troika regarding 
implementing and sticking to the policies. Outside of KKE, no party was advocating 
leaving the euro and returning to the drachma. SYRIZA even explicitly insisted that 
Greece stay in the euro. 
The second election had less turnout than the one a month earlier. New 
Democracy won with 29.7 percent of the vote. SYRIZA received 26.9 percent and 
PASOK received 12.3 percent. New Democracy formed a coalition with PASOK and the 
Democratic Left on June 20, but no deputies from PASOK or the Democratic Left took 
ministerial posts. New Democracy and PASOK had 162 seats between them, but 
including the Democratic Left added to its legitimacy and democratic mandate to the 
government and the memorandum. 
At the point that the second bailout was signed, and elections were called, clear 
differences can be seen between the response of Greek elites and society to those in 
Ireland and Portugal. There was much more disagreement among politicians about the 
policies being asked of Greece as well as the passage and implementation of those 
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policies. Societal groups, such as unions and interest groups like taxi drivers, 
pharmacists, and lawyers were much more vocal and disruptive in Greece than the other 
two cases. There was a change from the Papandreou-led government to the Papademos-
led government and then to new elections and a new government after the second bailout 
was finalized. Unions and workers took much more social action which disrupted and/or 
prevented the passage and implementation of many of the measures in the memorandum. 
In addition to the clear differences demonstrated up to this point in the Greek 
case, the need for a second bailout and sheer size of the total amount of money involved 
to cover both Greek bailouts separates Greece from Ireland and Portugal as far as 
comparability is concerned. With an initial package of €110bn and a second package 
worth €174bn, the total for the two bailouts reached €284bn. The debt exchange program, 
which was intended to reduce Greece’s overall debt load, eliminated €107bn138 of 
Greece’s face value debt. Including this into the total calculation, the amount borrowed 
by Greece in the two bailouts was €177bn, which was almost €100bn more than the 
€78bn bailout of Portugal and nearly €100bn more than the €85bn bailout of Ireland. The 
large difference in the amount borrowed between Greece and the other two countries 
makes the second bailout a logical stopping point in the Greek case despite social and 
political upheaval that continued for several more years. 
The following section is the analysis of the Greek response. The evidence 
suggests that Greece’s national identity best explains the response from Greek leaders 
and the public. The most notable aspects of this response, detailed in the above section, 
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were that the Troika program was viewed as a foreign occupation, everything was “on the 
table” for the government and society to resist the Troika, and the Greeks’ were much 
less sensitive to international and economic constraints than Ireland or Portugal. 
Analysis of the Greek Case 
Three important characteristics of Greece’s response to its Troika program 
provide the evidence for the importance of national identity in shaping the Greek 
response. First, many in Greece interpreted the Troika program as a foreign occupation. 
This was especially pronounced because of the association of the program with Germany, 
which had brutally occupied Greece during WWII. Anti-German sentiment rose 
significantly and politicians on the right and left played to historic memories, especially 
the Nazi occupation during WWII. There was a large increase in newspaper articles 
critical of Germany and their stance on the Troika program. Politicians that argued the 
MOU must be implemented were denounced as puppets of the Germans. 
Second, and contrary to Ireland and Portugal, all options for resisting the Troika 
were on the table for the Greeks. Politically, there was fundamental criticism of the 
program from opposition parties and the government itself from the beginning of the 
MOU. There was political infighting, a lack of ownership, and constant undermining of 
the program. The program was haphazardly implemented, and Papandreou called a 
referendum on the program without consulting the Troika. Socially, there were large, 
intense, and oftentimes violent protests that were much more sustained than in Ireland or 
Portugal. Unlike in Ireland and Portugal, Greek labor unions did not necessarily seek to 
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keep the peace as some viewed their protests and strikes as a “social uprising.”139 They 
also staged many strikes, using very disruptive tactics, and held four general strikes in the 
first two months of the program. 
Finally, unlike the Irish and the Portuguese, the Greeks appeared to have little 
regard for international and economic constraints. Having been shut out of bond markets 
and reliant on the Troika for funding, Greece continued to miss deficit and reform targets, 
delay reviews, and engage in brinksmanship with the Troika. Dire warnings were issued 
from the Troika and other European leaders about the failure to implement the program 
potentially leading to default and ejection from the euro. Yet political leaders continued 
to engage in brinksmanship as they were willing to challenge the Troika and Europe up to 
the point of risking its euro membership, as that was unacceptable. However, social 
actors continued to protest and voice their opposition to the Troika and its policies even 
after it was clear that a disorderly default and losing its euro membership were real 
possibilities should Greece fail to meet its international obligations. 
As in the Irish and Portuguese cases, the argument is not that national identity is 
the only causal factor that affected Greece’s response to its Troika program. However, 
when comparing the timing, focus, and intensity of the Greek response, the role of 
national identity must be recognized as central. There were other factors exerting 
influence on the Greek response, such as interest group pressure against many of the cuts 
and reforms agreed to in the MOU. Yet, Ireland and Portugal faced similar pressures 
from groups within their own societies and found ways to implement their programs 
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without the need for another program. There was also intense political pressure, 
especially for PASOK, to reject the policies agreed to in the MOU, but this pressure was 
again present in Ireland and Portugal and their governments were able to implement their 
respective programs. 
Institutional barriers to implementation of the program certainly existed in 
Greece, making the passage of austerity legislation and implementation of structural 
reforms more difficult. The presence of labor union and the fragmented nature of the 
Greek state, with its central bureaucracy spread out over 1552 buildings and each 
ministry having an average of 302 departments presented significant hurdles.140 However, 
the Greek story is not one of a country doing everything it could to implement the MOU 
and finding itself unable because of a fragmented state or lack of capacity. Instead, it is a 
story of constant contestation and questioning of whether or how much the program 
should be implemented. The government actively engaged in brinksmanship with the 
Troika, leading to review delays, missing deficit and reform targets, and eventually 
needing a second program. The brinksmanship tactics meant that politicians largely 
agreed to legislation only when their backs were against the wall, facing default or losing 
euro membership. Societal actors continued to be defiant in the face of these massive 
constraints as large protests and strikes continued despite warnings from other European 
leaders, the Troika and Greek politicians. Additionally, significant institutional barriers 
were also present in Portugal. Labor unions, especially for the public sector, play a large 
part in Portuguese society but UGT decided to negotiate with the government as opposed 
to the overt and large-scale resistance offered by Greek unions from their program’s 
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outset. Portugal had an additional institutional hurdle with its Constitutional Court that 
ruled four separate times against various elements of austerity legislation. While this 
would have been a convenient excuse for the government to back out of its commitments 
in the MOU, the government persisted by developing alternatives and remaining 
committed to its program. 
Finally, some might argue that the lack of a belief in liberal economic ideas can 
best explain Greece’s rejection of the Troika’s and its policies. Not only does Greece lack 
a strong liberal economic tradition, but many are sympathetic to socialist ideas. Given 
these conditions, one would expect Greece to offer significant resistance to “neoliberal” 
policies that many disagreed with. But, if economic ideas were the primary causal force 
in responses to each country’s Troika program, Greece and Portugal should have behaved 
similarly as Portugal also lacks a strong liberal tradition and many Portuguese have 
socialistic leanings. However, we see drastically different responses between Greece and 
Portugal. 
Greek National Identity 
Beginning with the establishment of the modern Greek state in 1832 and 
continuing through their accession into the EEC and later the EU, Greece has endeavored 
to become a modern country at the core of Europe. Much of modern Greek history is the 
story of Greeks trying to “find their way home” to Europe – politically, socially, and 
economically. Yet, there has been hesitancy from some within Greece as time and again 
that journey has been questioned by the Greeks themselves and sidetracked or derailed by 
other powerful countries, including those they wished to join. Throughout this process of 
modernization and eventually democratization the national identity of Greece has been 
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shaped by many domestic and international events. Greek national identity has remained 
consistent in some areas and evolved in others. One of the most central aspects of 
national identity throughout the history of modern Greece is the seamless connection 
between ancient Greece and the present-day state.141 The other deeply rooted part of 
Greek identity is the sense of being a puppet of powerful foreign countries, who 
interfered in Greek affairs and have held the Greeks back. As Nikos Svoronos argued in 
1953, “a distinctive and central part of Greek identity was the Greek people’s natural 
disposition to resist constant foreign encroachment.”142 As will be discussed here, this 
disposition to resist foreign encroachment is a common theme through modern Greek 
history and this was incorporated further into Greek identity in the post-junta period. This 
encouraged the belief that Greece’s failures were caused by foreign meddling and ridding 
themselves of foreign interference would allow Greece to be great once again.143 
Greece has a spectacular past that reaches to antiquity. Nevertheless, under nearly 
four hundred years of Ottoman rule, Greek awareness of its ancient past nearly 
disappeared. However, with the push of Western classical scholarship, Greece’s 
intelligentsia developed an awareness “that they were heirs to a heritage that was 
universally revered throughout the civilised world.”144 The connection to Classical 
Greece was not a foregone conclusion. Just after Greece won its independence form the 
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Ottoman Empire, there were two opposing identities that emerged and competed. One 
was “Hellenic,” focusing on modern Greece’s connection to Ancient Greece, paganism, 
and Western values rooted in antiquity, the other emphasized Greece’s connection to the 
Orthodox Byzantine Empire and Christianity. Not until the 1860s when Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos published his five-volume history of Greece were these contending 
identities reconciled. Paparrigopoulos cast Greek history as originating in antiquity and 
moving to the Byzantine Empire and into modern Greece. This allowed Greeks to claim 
both heritages. They were both Eastern and Western as well as pagan and Christian. This 
synthesis created unity out of seemingly separate parts of Greece’s past and allowed all 
Greek people, whether they identified more with the Hellenic or Byzantine past, to be 
included. This is one of the core aspects of Greek identity that still exists to this day.145 
In the 19th century this connection to Greece’s ancient past was crucial for the 
support that Philhellenes146 in Europe gave to the Greek independence movement. While 
Greece was controlled by the Ottoman Empire and largely unaware of its ancient past, 
there was also no concept of a Greek nation. Renaissance Europe had claimed the 
Classical age of antiquity as the roots of the “West”, tracing its civilization back to 5th 
Century B.C. Athens.147 Because many in Renaissance Europe felt that ancient Greece 
was where their own civilization originated, they were excited at the prospects of an 
independent Greece and wanted to ensure that the new Greek state succeeded. The 
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connection of 19th century Europe to ancient Greece was an important motivation for 
Europeans to intervene into Greece’s domestic affairs.148 This included some who were 
seen as supporters of the existing political order in the 19th century, such as Viscount 
Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary. He asked whether “those, in admiration of 
whom we have been educated (the Greeks) be doomed…to drag out, for all time to come, 
the miserable existence to which circumstances have doomed them.”149 Clogg (2002) also 
notes that this attitude has endured into the late 20th century as one foreign office minister 
commented during a debate in British Parliament concerning Greece’s membership in the 
European Community that it would be “fitting repayment by the Europe of today of the 
cultural and political debt that we all owe to a Greek heritage almost three thousand years 
old.”150 
After the “Great Schism”151 regarding participation in WWI and the Asia Minor 
debacle152 that ended Greek irredentism, the interwar period in Greece saw democracy 
give way to dictatorship under the rule of Ioannis Metaxas and then to occupation and 
civil war. The 1940s were one of the most traumatic decades in Greek history as Greece 
was brutally occupied by Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria during WWII. This period helped 
solidify Greece’s fears of foreign interference into a durable feature of Greek identity. 
Despite British aid, Greece could not hold off the Axis powers and the brutal WWII 
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occupation left indelible scars on Greek society. The economy completely collapsed, tens 
of thousands of Greeks were executed, and famine claimed hundreds of thousands of 
lives between 1941 and 1944. Although the occupation was brutal, there was a large 
underground resistance that formed to fight the occupiers. The most important guerilla 
organization was the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), which was controlled by 
the communist KKE. As the communist-led resistance gained power following Italy’s 
surrender in 1843 anti-communists who had been shunned by KKE and ELAS began 
collaborating with the Nazis in greater numbers. When WWII ended, this set the stage for 
the Greek Civil War between communist and anti-communist factions.153 
Given the communist/anti-communist divisions at the end of WWII, the Greek 
Civil War became the first proxy war of the Cold War between the US and USSR. The 
Greek state was supported by the US and the UK while the communists, led by KKE, 
were supported by the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The Greek Civil War was 
essentially a battle to decide whether Greece’s destiny would lie with the capitalist 
democracies in the West or with the communist USSR. With support from the US and 
UK, the communists were defeated, and Greece was firmly oriented towards the West. 
However, the civil war and its legacy only added to the view that Greece’s destiny 
was being shaped by meddling foreigners as opposed to Greeks themselves. In addition to 
both sides of the conflict being dependent on support from major powers, in the wake of 
the Civil War the Greek government was deeply dependent on external support, although 
its patron had changed from the former Great Powers of Europe to the US.154 Clogg 
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(2002) notes that “the government’s dependence for its political and military survival on 
external patronage effectively made Greece a client state of the United States. Few major 
military, economic, or…political decisions could be taken without American 
approval.”155 This level of foreign influence and control over Greek affairs led some to 
label the early Cold War period as one of Amerikanikokratía.156 
After the Greek Civil War that there was a new optimism within Greece and its 
was driven primarily by economic growth under the leadership of Constantine 
Karamanlis. With the aid of the Marshall Plan and the Greek-American Economic 
Cooperation Agreement, Greece maintained high rates of growth and significant progress 
toward modernization. The Greek government stabilized the drachma, maintained 
balanced budgets, and liberalized international trade, helping Greece maintain economic 
growth of roughly 7 percent between the mid-1950s and the late 1970s. Greece also 
became an associate of the European Economic Community in July 1961, moving it even 
closer to Europe. However, the mismanagement of the transition to democracy post-Civil 
War led to a coup by junior officers in the military and the military junta, which was in 
power from 1967-74. During this time the US gave the junta its unconditional support, 
further alienating many Greeks, and serving as another example of foreigners meddling 
in Greece’s affairs. 
The military junta collapsed in 1974 after a military defeat at the hands of Turkey 
that resulted in a new coup that ushered in the most recent period of democracy. The 
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transition back to democracy was viewed as a step forward for many Greeks as “there 
was a general belief that Greece would now finally fulfill its original goal of becoming a 
truly modern European country by combining a dynamic and prosperous economy with 
stable and liberal democratic institutions.”157 The politicians who assumed power after 
the fall of the junta brought back Constantine Karamanlis,158 who believed Greece’s 
future turned on an association with the West. However, when it came to moving this 
vision forward, society was split. Karamanlis was a modernizer who remarked that “he 
was determined to industrialize Greece and Europeanize the Greeks, ‘if necessary, by 
force.’”159 Andreas Papandreou represented the other side of the split as he saw the EEC 
as a threat to Greece’s sovereignty.160 Greece started negotiations to join the EEC 
formally in 1976 but encountered internal and external resistance. Not only were 
European leaders reluctant to allow Greece to join but PASOK, under the leadership of 
Andreas Papandreou, opposed Greece joining the EEC as well as NATO. In the 1977 
elections, Papandreou vowed to withdraw Greece from the EEC and NATO,161 as well as 
take a much tougher stance on the US and Turkey. In 1979, Papandreou refused to 
partake in the parliamentary debate about joining the EEC and PASOK boycotted the 
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vote.162 However, Papandreou was elected as prime minister in 1981 and would serve 
until 1989, and again from 1993-96. While in office Papandreou moderated his stances 
towards the EEC, NATO, and the US. Nevertheless, he still had reservations about 
Greece joining the EEC. One primary contradiction of Papandreou and PASOK was that 
they eventually developed a policy agenda that was very pro-European, but they 
simultaneously continued to fan the anti-European flames that many Greeks shared.163 
After a Brussels summit in 1985, Papandreou stated that Greece would not withdraw 
from the EEC, ending formal resistance to joining the European bloc.164 
Despite the skepticism of PASOK towards Europe and the EEC, Greek political 
parties came together to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in July of 1992. This resulted in 
difficult austerity budgets by both the New Democracy (1990-93) and PASOK (1993-96) 
governments in the first half of the 1990s as they attempted to meet the criteria for the 
EMU. When Papandreou died in 1996, he was replaced by Costas Simitis, who was very 
pro-EU and prioritized the modernization of Greece. Simitis, who was Prime Minister 
from 1996-2004, oversaw many noteworthy achievements for Greece. In the second half 
of the 1990s and first half of the 2000s Greece joined the euro, saw a united Cyprus join 
the EU, and held the 2004 Olympics. Simitis’ pro-European stance, however, did not win 
over many inside PASOK as he never received more than 71 percent of votes to be party 
leader and many in PASOK did not share his views on modernization.165 Papandreou 
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even criticized Simitis’ commitment to Europe, at one point calling him the “Foreign 
Minister of the EEC in Greece.”166 
Yet, Simitis leading PASOK meant that both PASOK and New Democracy had 
leaders that were very committed to the EU and to Greece meeting the criteria to join the 
euro, which they did in 2001. Simitis’ economic program to gain membership into the 
euro was heavily criticized as he was said to be pursuing a “neo-liberal inspired 
agenda.”167 The 2004 Olympics were a particular high water mark for the Greeks as 
Kalyvas (2015) notes that despite the expectation of many that Greece would fail to pull 
off the games, “most Greeks must have felt that their country had finally fulfilled the 
dreams of its founders.”168 Despite all of the achievements during Simitis’ time as Prime 
Minister, many of the reforms were limited in scope and did not persist afterwards. He 
never truly won PASOK over as many within PASOK felt he was out of step with the 
party’s membership and took PASOK away from its socialist roots.169 
To summarize, Greece has two primary elements to its national identity. First, is a 
seamless connection between the Greece of antiquity and the Greece of today, including 
its role in the Byzantine empire. The second element is the sense that Greece’s greatness 
has been hindered by foreigners meddling in Greek affairs, often making Greece a puppet 
of powerful foreign countries. The numerous examples of foreigners meddling in Greece 
have occurred since the founding of the Greek state in 1832 and they have been 
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highlighted in this section. The remained of this chapter will detail the ways in which 
these particular aspects of Greek national identity can be seen influencing the responses 
to Greece’s Troika program. 
Foreign Occupation 
The first way of illustrating the role of national identity in Greece’s response to its 
Troika program is through the interpretation of Greece as the victim of yet more foreign 
meddling.170 Many Greeks viewed its Troika program as a foreign occupation where 
austerity policies and structural reforms were being imposed from the outside on Greece 
– with the help of their elites, who was the victim of foreign aggressors. This 
interpretation led to the Troika program being viewed as a threat by many Greeks and the 
discourse that emerged in response to the Troika cast the program as more than an 
economic threat. It was viewed as a threat to sovereignty and national identity, and it was 
explicitly blamed on foreigners, with a particular animus for Germany. 
The interpretation that the Troika program was a foreign occupation played into a 
key aspect of Greek national identity that saw Greece as the victim of foreign countries 
continually interfering in Greek domestic affairs.171 As Kalyvas (2015) explains, “the 
sense of being a puppet in the hand of powerful forces in the international arena has 
become a deeply rooted part of Greek identity.”172 And for good reason: modern Greek 
                                                 
170 Zinova Lialiouti and Georgios Bithymitris, ""The Nazis Strike Again": The Concept of "The German 
Enemy," Party Strategies and Mass Perceptions through the Prism of the Greek Economic Crisis," in The 
Use and Abuse of Memory: Interpreting World War II in Contemporary European Politics, eds. Christian 
Karner and Bram Mertens (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017), 155-172. 
171 Matthew Mazower, “Greece’s history is defined by foreign meddling,” Financial Times, March 8, 2010, 
https://www.ft.com/content/4bede68a-2aef-11df-886b-00144feabdc0. 
172 Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know, 203. 
133 
history is littered with examples of such foreign interference. These foreign interventions 
subsequently produced negative feelings towards the intervening countries, including the 
British in the 1800s, the Nazis during WWII, the US in the second half of the 20th 
century, and the Germans since 2009. 
There was a second interpretation of the crisis, characterized by self-blame, 
criticism of Greece’s corruption and its inability to modernize, as well as its failure to 
integrate with the rest of the EU, but it proved to be less persuasive.173 This line of 
reasoning was similar to Brian Lenihan’s statement in Ireland that “we all partied,” 
however it did not resonate with the Greeks in the same way. Many journalists and 
political elites also sought to frame the bailout in terms of a life and death struggle for the 
future of Greece, where the austerity measures were Greece’s only realistic path.174 While 
some in Greece saw this as an opportunity to fix mistakes of the past, the interpretation 
that the Troika program was a foreign occupation by European countries, especially 
Germany, was more powerful as the victimization interpretation is more deeply 
“embedded in the national identity construction” and holds a “hegemonic position within 
the Greek public sphere.”175 
The belief that the Troika program was viewed as a foreign occupation is 
displayed when examining who protested in Greece as well as the rhetoric of some of the 
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protesters. It has been documented that the protests in Greece were more frequent, 
generally larger, and more intense than protests in Ireland or Portugal. Many assume this 
is simply because of the difficulty of Greece’s Troika program, arguing the economic 
reality in Greece was much worse than Ireland or Portugal.176 However, there is reason to 
doubt this assertion, as all three countries suffered comparable economic pain and a 
number of studies on the protests in Greece indicate that the protests were about more 
than just the harshness of the austerity measures imposed from the Troika. 
Rüdig and Karyotis (2013) examined who protested in Greece to understand why 
people did or did not engage in protests. They found that while relative deprivation was 
significant for predicting who might protest (what they refer to as “protest potential”), 
and who might hold anti-austerity views, it played no part in predicting who actually 
participated in protests or strikes. They wrote, “Based on these findings…the factors that 
predict protest potential are not a good measure of who actually takes part in protest. 
High levels of deprivation can convince large sections of the population to embrace the 
idea of protest against government policy. However, while deprivation increases the 
potential for austerity protest, it is not an independent predictor of actual protest.”177 This 
suggests that the notion that the Greeks protested more because its Troika program was 
more difficult than Ireland’s or Portugal’s may not be entirely accurate. 
Some have attempted to explain the difference in social unrest in Troika program 
countries by using cultural explanations (Andronikidou & Korvas, 2012, Rüdig & 
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Karyotis, 2013, Donovan & Murphy, 2013). Greece is often viewed as unique for its 
protest culture that developed after the fall of the Junta. As Pappas and O’Malley (2014) 
point out, in Greece, “social unrest episodes are therefore seen as rites of passage, 
motivated by a culture of sympathy toward anti-state resistance.”178 Rüdig and Karyotis 
(2013) build on this general sentiment by arguing that the best predictor of participation 
in protests and strikes was previous participation in protests and strikes. In other words, 
the stronger the protest culture, the more likely it is for protest potential to be turned into 
protest participation.179 However, the argument that Greece’s protest culture makes them 
more likely to protest does not withstand empirical scrutiny. When looking at protest 
participation in Greece and Ireland, from 2003 – 2007, the percent of people that 
participated in lawful protests in Ireland was either higher or equal to the percentage of 
Greeks participating in lawful protests prior to the Troika programs in each country.180 
Additionally, Nam’s research on protest activity between 1990-1995 indicates that, when 
adjusted for different population sizes, Ireland has many more protests per million than 
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Table 6: Protests per 1 Million Inhabitants from 1990-1995 




Additionally, Pappas and O’Malley point out that Ireland has historically been an 
innovator in social protest, as it was the first place in the world to use mass political 
movements.182 Thus, if Ireland has a significant history of social protest and as much if 
not more protest experience as Greece from 2003-2007 as well as significantly more 
between 1990 and 1995, how can we explain that the Greeks protested in higher numbers, 
more frequently, and more intensely during their Troika program than the Irish? The 
answer, as will be shown below, lies in the widespread interpretation of the crisis as 
being the fault of foreigners and being imposed by foreigners on the Greeks. 
We see this first through examining opinion data during the crisis. While many 
Greeks disliked the Troika program and its policies, who they blamed for their ills is 
instructive in establishing that many Greeks saw the program as caused by foreign 
economic and political actors such as the foreign investors/speculators, Germany, and 
globalization. Greeks were less willing than Portugal to blame themselves or their 
government for their economic ills. Only 23 percent of the population supported the 
measures in the MOU while about two-thirds of Greeks were against the measures.183 
Compare this to Portugal where only 43.4 percent of voters said it was wrong to accept 
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the Troika agreement.184 Additionally, while Greeks and Portuguese were very similar in 
their blame of foreigners, Greeks were less likely to blame themselves or their 
government for the financial problems of their country. Karyotis and Rüdig (2013) found 
that 41 percent of Greeks blamed the PASOK government that came to power in 2009 
and 64 percent blamed the New Democracy government that was in office from 2004 to 
2009185 whereas Moury and Freire (2013) show that 85 percent of Portuguese voters 
blamed the Portuguese government.186 Similarly, nearly twice as many Portuguese as 
Greeks said everyone was to blame.187 On the other hand, 42 percent of Greeks blamed 
the EU, 50 percent blamed Germany, and 66 percent blamed foreign 
investors/speculators.188 Interestingly, 67 percent of Portuguese blamed the bankers while 
50 percent blamed the EU. These comparisons are displayed below in Table 7. 





Everyone is to 




Greece 41% 20% 50% 66% 
Portugal 85% 39.10% 50% 67% 
However, in a complex crisis, blame can be expected to be directed at multiple targets 
and the lack of blame on Greeks and the Greek government indicates most of this blame 
was directed outwards as opposed to the Portuguese who had high levels of self-blame 
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for their crisis. Moreover, the willingness of Greeks to blame foreign economic and 
political actors as opposed to themselves is congruent with the “Greece as victim of 
foreign interference” interpretation of its Troika Program. 
The interpretation of the Troika program as Greece being victimized by foreigners 
or their traitorous elites was expressed by protesters, indicating that reasons for protesting 
went beyond the austerity measures and pure material explanations. This line of 
reasoning was found to be popular on the far-right189 as well as by those on the left,190 
indicating the presence of a cross-cutting national identity that transcended Greece’s 
political spectrum. Georgiadou and Kafe (2020) document the narratives of the far-right 
protesters who were in the “upper” part of Syntagma Square during the Indignados 
protests in 2011 as they sought to uncover the radicalization process for far-right 
protesters in Greece. Throughout this process the narrative of Greece as victim of foreign 
interference becomes apparent in both who is blamed for Greece’s situation and the 
reasons people chose to protest. Theodossopoulos (2013) also notes that the “issue of 
foreign guardianship…fueled strong reactions, especially among left-leaning indignants, 
who possessed a very articulate vocabulary to highlight inequalities in the capitalist 
system. In a similar line, citizens from all political affiliations condemned the ‘powerful 
                                                 
189 Vasiliki Georgiadou and Anastasia Kafe, "'It's not the austerity, stupid'; interpreting the frames of the 
far-right wing radicalization," in Public Discourses and Attitudes in Greece during the Crisis: Framing the 
Role of the European Union, Germany, and National Governments, ed. Dimitris Katsikas. (New York: 
Routledge, 2020), Kindle, Chapter 2. 
190 Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, “Infuriated with the Infuriated? Blaming Tactics and Discontent about the 
Greek Financial Crisis." Current Anthropology 54, no. 2 (2013): 200-221. 
 
139 
of the world’ for Greece’s predicament.”191 
Blame was framed either as a conspiracy that was out to destroy Greece and take 
away its sovereignty or as treason by MPs.192 Common targets of blame were Europe, the 
EU, Germany, the IMF, banks, the memoranda, foreigners, Americans, Turks, Jews, the 
Parliament and MPs. 
One quote from a far-right protester encapsulates the blame of treasonous elites 
and how if it wasn’t for foreign interference in Greek affairs and the elites that colluded 
with them Greece would be great again. They said: 
If we had democracy, then this nation would take off. But we were undermined by 
PASOK and the bankers.193 
 
Another protester said:  
These traitors have sold everything, from national issues to the economy, I am 
disgusted.194 
 
Those on the left drew even more explicit blame to foreigners, with one Greek saying: 
The foreigners are worried that we will not return the borrowed money. They 
don’t really care about Greece. They never did. History has proven that, again and 
again: the nations of the West use Greece for their own interests.195 
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The reasons expressed by some of the protesters also indicate that protesters were taking 
part in the protests for reasons beyond the economic situation. One encapsulates this view 
well:  
I am not here because they cut/reduced my pension but because they weakened 
my country. I am not here for the economic part but for the patriotic.196 
While the crisis undoubtedly fueled anger about the economic situation, much of the 
population believed that the crisis was caused by foreigners enabled by the treasonous 
elite, who then foisted an unfair rescue package on the Greek people.  
Finally, there was much anger and blame directed toward Germany as they were 
viewed by many Greeks as dominating Europe and dictating an austerity program that 
was seen as a major threat to Greek well-being. This can be seen in the public discourse 
that largely attributed the austerity program and its consequences to Germany.197 This 
was displayed in a number of ways, such as anti-German news articles becoming more 
common from 2010 through 2012 (where this study ends), protesters increasingly 
drawing on German stereotypes, and political parties also using the growing anti-German 
sentiment for their political ends, among others. 
Orsi (2015) notes that four anti-German lines of reasoning emerged, despite the 
limited amount of truth each contained. The first line of argument was that the euro is a 
German project engineered for Germany’s benefit. Second, the euro is a German ploy to 
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dominate Europe, continuing the aspirations of the Nazis. Third, this is the third time the 
Germans have attempted to destroy Europe in the past century. Last, Germans still have 
not paid for their past wrongdoings and owe Greece compensation for the atrocities of the 
Nazi era.198 These lines of reasoning appeared frequently in newspapers around Greece, 
which were subsequently picked up by the international media.199 Popular television 
hosts also made repeated anti-German references.200 These feelings would eventually 
spillover into politics as some Greek politicians began to demand reparations worth 
hundreds of billions of euros from Germany and the Greek Finance Ministry setup an 
expert group to examine the issue in the fall of 2012.201 Despite there being limited truth 
in these lines of argument they were nonetheless impactful in conjuring nationalist 
responses and bringing former grievances against Germany to the surface, contributing to 
the strong rejection of the Troika program. 
The focus on Germany allowed those critical of the Troika program to use the 
aspect of Greek identity that saw Greece as the repeated victim of foreign intervention 
and to draw on cultural memories of the brutal Nazi occupation during WWII. Therefore, 
a rallying cry developed that it was patriotic to resist the Troika program as many had 
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resisted the Nazis during WWII.202 A spring 2012 Pew Research Center poll showed 83 
percent of Greeks believed that “German/EU power over our economy” was a major 
problem. The next closest country was Spain at 47 percent. In the same poll, 78 percent 
of Greeks had a somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Germany. The 
average unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Germany for the countries surveyed 
was 26.5 percent.203 Furthermore, a poll conducted by VPRC, one of the leading 
independent public opinion research organizations in Greece, noted that 32.4 percent of 
Greeks associated Germany with Hitler, Nazism, and the Third Reich. 79 percent saw the 
role of Germany as negative while 76 percent saw the role of Germany as hostile, and 81 
percent had a negative opinion of Angela Merkel. Finally, 91 percent of respondents saw 
the Greek claim for reparations from WWII as fair and 77 percent agreed with the 
statement that “Germany exerted a Fourth Reich policy.”204 As one Greek nicely 
summarized the anti-German (and anti-West) feelings of the Greeks: 
Ha! The Germans! They say we owe them money! They forget how much they 
owe to us: the destruction they caused in the war, the war-compensations that we 
did not claim after the war. History is re-written again. The people of the West 
were always ungrateful for all that Greece has offered them.205 
Anti-German sentiments were also commonly expressed by the media as well as 
politicians, across the political spectrum. As Lialiouti and Bithymitris (2013) point out, 
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Germany’s instructions for Greece’s economy to recover were seen as a direct challenge 
to Greece’s national sovereignty as right and left-leaning populist publications both used 
memories of the German occupation to delegitimize the government and Troika’s 
policies. They also note that journalists who claim to denounce national stereotypes 
produced anti-German columns, highlighting some of the questionable anti-German lines 
of argument. One columnist wrote: 
When my classmates at school blamed the Germans for both world wars – and 
especially the second one – I used to correct them: ‘Not the Germans, guys, the 
Nazis. They are not identical. I am sorry that I am about to forget this for a 
while…Germans. For the third time in less than one hundred years you practice 
the sport of humiliating and crushing people…With a euro that is actually a 
disguised mark, you nullify any notion of a meaningful life, unless the life you 
propose for us is to work twenty hours a day for 800 euros [per month] in order to 
be productive.206 
 
Another writer played into the similar lines of argument, writing:  
 
I don’t think there is anyone on the international scene at the moment who 
provokes such negative emotions in me as Mrs. Merkel and the Germany she 
represents…in her look and her deeper aspirations, in her ‘vision’ I see once again 
the paradoxical and unexplored psyche of a ‘Great Germany,’ cruel and 
determined to be the one to dictate whatever goes on in Europe even if that leads 
to blood baths, as she has proven in the past – and not just once…Great Germany 
is moving to a new ‘world war’ for the third time in recent history.207 
 
Anti-German feelings also seeped into the world of sports as Greece and Germany faced 
off in a soccer match in October 2011. The Greek sports magazine Gavros pictured 
Angela Merkel in a Nazi uniform and urged the players of Olympiacos F.C. to “kick 
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Germans in order to make Greece smile and humiliate the Fourth Economic Reich.”208 In 
the lead up to a soccer match between the Greek and German national teams in June 
2012, the Greek magazine Dimokratia also portrayed Angela Merkel in a Nazi uniform 
with the headline “Work makes you free” which was a slogan from Nazi concentration 
camps.209 
Anti-German feelings were even felt in consumer purchasing patterns. Fouka and 
Voth (2016) show that when there were public clashes between Greek and German 
governments during the Troika program, German car sales in Greece decreased. 
Furthermore, the decrease was larger in areas where Nazi atrocities were the worst and 
where the right-wing radical party Golden Dawn won large shares of votes.210 This not 
only displays the role of cultural memory and the long-lasting effects of the Nazi 
occupation on Greek identity, but it also illustrates the way that Greek identity, in 
particular the aspect where Greece was again the victim of foreigners meddling in Greek 
affairs, influenced responses to Greece’s Troika program. 
Finally, as anti-German sentiment rose, politicians sought to use this to increase 
their political fortunes. All political parties used anti-German strategies to serve their 
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ends, although with their own different spin on anti-German sentiment. These strategies 
were also used regardless of their stance on the memorandum. The one exception is KKE, 
a communist party. Despite overwhelmingly anti-German feelings within the party,211 
they did not used anti-German discourse as they believed that the crisis was primarily 
caused by capitalism and “big Greek capital.”212 
PASOK and ND used these arguments to shift the blame away from them to 
Germany for austerity, however their situations were different. PASOK needed to walk a 
tightrope between two discourses. First, they sought to shift blame from themselves by 
employing a narrative that PASOK and the Greek people were the victims of foreign 
lenders and Germany was responsible for the harsh austerity measures. Second, they 
needed to do this while also continuing its pro-Europe discourse. New Democracy was in 
a bind with regard to Germany because they were part of the same European party 
family, the European People’s Party. Even with being pro-memorandum, which was done 
to secure the second bailout in 2012, its leader Antonis Samaras still played up the 
conflict between southern Europe and Merkel in a TV interview prior to the 2012 
elections. While New Democracy had resisted calls for German war reparations in the 
past, the party changed course in 2012 as they “appeared as a moderate and efficient 
claimant in January 2012.”213 
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As for the main opposition parties, SYRIZA, which was the main opposition party 
from the left during the first Troika program was explicitly pro-EU but also incorporated 
anti-German messaging, albeit inconsistently. In SYRIZA’s manifesto for the 2012 
elections, they demanded Germany pay reparations for WWII and even had Manolis 
Glezos, a Greek icon for his defiance of the Nazis during their WWII occupation of 
Greece,214 at the top of its list of election candidates. Additionally, some SYRIZA 
candidates used slogans against the “4th Reich” when campaigning for the 2012 
election.215  As would be expected, the far-right parties, consisting of Golden Dawn and 
Independent Greeks incorporated anti-German sentiments into their rhetoric as well as 
rhetoric about the treasonous elites in parliament. The Independent Greeks were also on 
board with demanding reparations for the WWII occupation by the Nazis, blamed the 
treasonous government, promised “to chase the Nazis away again,” and referred to the 
Troika as occupiers.216 Golden Dawn was in a bind as it is a neo-Nazi party with pro-
Nazi beliefs. However, despite inconsistent anti-German discourse they were able to still 
capitalize on anti-German feelings by portraying the politicians as traitorous elites acting 
on orders from foreign interests.217 
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This section documented that the first way the role of national identity presented 
itself in Greece’s response to its Troika program is through the interpretation of Greece as 
the victim of foreign powers. This was shown in three ways. First, there was the 
discourse from Greeks indicating that the Troika program was more than an economic 
threat as it was a threat to their sovereignty, their national identity, and the future of the 
Greece itself. Second, Greeks were much more likely than the Irish or Portuguese to 
place the blame for the crisis on outside forces, whether that was the EU, IMF, financial 
markets, and speculators. Finally, the interpretation of Greece as the victim of foreign 
powers is displayed in the rise of anti-German sentiment throughout Greece’s Troika 
program. The next section will document how, unlike Portugal and Ireland, nearly 
everything was “on the table” regarding appropriate actions to take in response to the 
Troika. 
Everything is on the Table 
Further evidence for the role of national identity in shaping Greece’s response to 
its Troika program is seen in the kinds of options societal and political actors considered 
while in the Troika program. Because the program was viewed as a foreign imposition by 
European countries, the EU, and the IMF, many more options were considered to resist 
the program than in Ireland or Portugal. Unlike Portugal and Ireland, where responses 
that might jeopardize fulfilling the obligations agreed to in the MOU were not widely 
considered, in Greece it appears that any and all options for resisting the Troika were on 
the table. Protests were immediate, long-lasting, large, disruptive, intense, and many 
times violent. Labor unions opted for confrontation and with the government and the 
Troika, and even threatened violence. Unions were relentless in holding strikes and 
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protests, including four general strikes in the first two months of the Troika program. 
Many of these strikes employed disruptive tactics that shut down important parts of the 
economy or government, severely disrupting daily life for many Greeks. Politics was 
characterized by a failure to take ownership of the program, constant political infighting, 
failing to truly commit to the program, and blaming the Troika and other European 
countries, resulting in the failure to meet deficit and structural reform targets. 
In comparative perspective, the social response was remarkable simply for its 
size, scale, duration, and intensity. There were major protests in the months leading up to 
the signing of the MOU, as there was talk of a bailout program as early as March. This 
led to large, violent protests in Athens as well as a 24-hour general strike. When the 
MOU was signed in early May 2010 the social response was very large, immediate, and 
intense. Despite the initial similarities to Ireland, which had a 50,000 person protest 
almost immediately following the signing of its MOU, Greece’s immediate reaction was 
much larger, more intense, and included significant violence. Furthermore, unlike Ireland 
where the protests fizzled out before a slight uptick in 2013, Greece saw largely sustained 
protest and strike activity for the duration of its program. Additionally, whereas Portugal 
saw little social action until a general strike five months after its government signed the 
MOU with the Troika, Greece’s unions immediately held a 48-hour strike and there were 
massive, violent protests that led to clashes with police and left three bank employees 
dead. Media reports indicated that Athens looked like a war zone. While the protests that 
continued throughout Greece’s Troika program did not all have this level of intensity and 
violence, episodes of violence and clashes with police were common occurrences. 
Furthermore, the number of protests in Greece significantly outnumbered those in Ireland 
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or Portugal. Accornero and Pinto (2015) compiled data on protests in Lisbon using 
Portuguese police statistics. In 2011 there were 298 protest events in Lisbon and in 2012 
there were 579.218 Compare this to the data for protests in Athens, where there were 
roughly 4,235 protest events in 2010 and 1,680 in 2011. Even with a large drop-off in 
protest activity in Athens in 2011, there were still three times as many protests in Athens 
than in Lisbon.219 This is illustrated in Figure 1, below.220 
Figure 1: Protests in Athens, Greece and Lisbon, Portugal 
 
This was also seen in the level of industrial action in Greece, which was much 
higher than the other Troika countries. Labor unions in Greece were uninterested in 
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negotiating with the Troika or the government from the beginning, and instead opted for 
confrontation. This is a stark contrast from ICTU and Siptu, the main unions in Ireland, 
and UGT in Portugal, all of which negotiated agreements with their governments.221 
GSEE president Yiannis Panagopoulos urged his union to reject the invitation from the 
Labour Minister, adding that, “We have no margins to bargain and negotiate. All bridges 
have been cut off.”222 No negotiations meant unions were going to strike and protest, 
which they did to a much larger extent than in Ireland or Portugal. Although there is no 
official data on Greek strikes, GSEE223 provides some data for strikes in their union; it 
conducted 201 strikes in 2011 and 232 in 2012.224 Compare this to official statistics for 
all strikes in Portugal, and there is a stark difference. Portugal had 61 strikes in 2011, 113 
in 2012, and 77 in 2013.225 Finally, Ireland had a total of 27 labor disputes for the entire 
duration of its Troika program.226 
The particularly intense protests at the beginning of Greece’s program warrant 
more explanation as many typically assume that Greece responded with such fury 
because their program was so much more difficult than either Ireland or Portugal. It is 
true that in the long-term, the Greeks certainly suffered much more than the Irish or 
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Portuguese. They were involved in a debt restructuring deal as well as two more Troika 
programs. However, this was not the case in the early phases of the program, especially 
in terms of the initial deficit targets that were revealed before any policies had been 
implemented. The original MOU expected Greece to make a fiscal consolidation of 10.9 
percent of GDP between 2010 and 2013. Between 2011 and 2014, Portugal was expected 
to make a fiscal consolidation of 10.6 percent of GDP. Similarly, but not quite as drastic, 
Ireland was expected to make a fiscal consolidation of 7.5 percent of GDP. The first two 
years of Portugal’s program required a consolidation of 8.7 percent of GDP while 
Greece’s program required a consolidation of 6.5 percent of GDP. Even Ireland was 
expected to make a larger fiscal consolidation in 2011 (essentially the first year of its 
program) than Greece. Ireland’s program required a consolidation of 3.5 percent of GDP, 
compared to Greece’s expected consolidation of 2.4 percent. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, it also cannot be argued that the structural reforms required of 
Greece were more onerous. Many of the same structural reforms were required in 
Portugal and they were more detailed in Portugal’s MOU. 
Similar to Ireland and Portugal, there were protests and strikes focused on specific 
policies, such as cuts to social security and pensions or liberalizing professions, but there 
was also a much larger rejection of the Troika program in its entirety. As noted above, 10 
of the 26 protests recorded on the English version of ekathimerini.com between May and 
August 2010 were protesting austerity more broadly. The calls for rejection of the Troika 
program intensified as the program moved forward. For example, protests erupted when 
members of the Troika, such as IMF director-general Dominique Strauss-Kahn, visited 
Athens December 2010 and again when representatives from the Troika were in Athens 
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for a quarterly review in September 2011. In 2010, it was also common for news 
broadcasts to show protesters marching against policies in the MOU on a daily basis.227 
This line of protest intensified further after Greece entered its second program and when 
Angela Merkel visited Athens in the fall of 2012. 
Greek protests and strikes also employed tactics that were disruptive to society 
and included violence, which was not seen in Portugal or Ireland. On numerous occasions 
protesters threw petrol bombs at police and even set buildings on fire. These events 
increased when budgets were being passed or further austerity measures were debated in 
parliament. When the mid-term fiscal plan was being debated in mid-2011 protesters 
attempted to surround parliament to prevent MPs from being able to debate the plan.228 
Additionally, in September 2011 employees of the Finance Ministry held a sit-in to 
prevent Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos from meeting with the Troika.229 While 
there are many more examples of protests becoming violent or disruptive to the public 
and the political process, these examples highlight the difference between protests in 
Greece and those in Ireland and Portugal. Protests in Ireland and Portugal remained 
overwhelmingly peaceful and did not disrupt the political process as in Greece. Maybe 
even more significant was that employing such tactics during protests was never truly “on 
the table” for Ireland or Portugal. 
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The strikes were just as disruptive as protests, shutting down important sectors of 
the economy and services that Greeks relied on daily, such as taxis, doctors, and 
pharmacists. The truckers strike in autumn of 2010 disrupted the supply of food and fuel 
around Greece, and the taxi strike in the summer of 2011 blocked roads to the Athens 
International Airport as well as the Port of Piraeus and bridges.230 All of these actions 
were not only disruptive to Greek citizens, but the taxi strike was carried out during the 
height of tourist season. The four general strikes held between May and July of 2010 
affected significant portions of Greek society as it shut schools, public transportation, 
took media off the air, and grounded flights. In total during the first Troika program, from 
May 2010 through March 2012, there were 13 general strikes called by GSEE and 
Adedy. Many of the strikes had real consequences on an already fragile economy and 
disrupted important industries, such as shipping and tourism, that many Greeks rely on. 
By comparison, Portuguese strikes were also frequent, but tended to be partial day 
strikes, which were not nearly as disruptive. The number of general strikes in Portugal (2) 
was also significantly less than Greece (13), and Ireland had zero general strikes. The 
clear distinction between Greece and Ireland and Portugal with regard to strikes, is not 
only the number of strikes but the disruptive tactics that the strikes employed, which had 
real economic and social consequences for the Greek people. 
Some unions even vowed to use violence if further austerity measures were 
implemented. This was something that was not only explicitly “off the table” for Irish 
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and Portuguese unions, but for the overwhelming majority of citizens in each country as 
well. In October 2011, as new austerity measures were being debated in parliament, 
unions promised bloodshed on the streets if the government brought in private contractors 
to clean up the trash in the streets. The chairman of the Greek taxi owners vowed that 
they would “not go to the cemetery alone.”231 
The way the Greek governments approached the Troika program was also much 
different from what was seen in Portugal and Ireland. Instead of viewing the program as 
an opportunity to make reforms like the government in Portugal, or a storm to be 
weathered like the Irish, Greek politicians tended to see the program as a foreign 
imposition and a threat to Greece. This view can be seen throughout the government 
response to the Troika program as many options that were clearly off the table in Ireland 
and Portugal were on the table for Greek policymakers. Because many in the government 
as well as the public viewed the program as being imposed from outside onto Greece it is 
not surprising that implementation of the program was frequently undermined and there 
was little cooperation with the Troika after 2010. 
Furthermore, the Portuguese and Irish governments took ownership of their 
programs, created new departments232 to help execute their programs, and Portugal went 
as far as rehearsing Troika reviews to avoid any surprises during the actual Troika 
reviews. Despite some praise in Troika reviews during 2010 for its commitment to 
implementing its program, Greece never took full domestic ownership of its Troika 
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program like Ireland and Portugal did, which only exacerbated its problems. This made 
the implementation very difficult and delayed finalizing program reviews.233 One 
interviewee from Portugal spoke to this, saying: 
In Greece many people told me from the Troika, that it was actually the Troika 
collecting taxes. At least on the side of Portugal, the government was on one side 
of the table and the Troika was on the other side. In Greece, it got so bad that at 
times it was actually the Troika managing the state.234 
From the beginning of the program there was a political split on whether Greece 
should enter the Troika program. Only PASOK and the far-right LAOS Party voted in 
favor of the MOU with New Democracy, SYRIZA, and KKE voting against. This again 
marks a departure from Portugal where the PS, PSD and CDS voted in favor of the MOU. 
Additionally, the PS did not publicly criticize the program until nine months after 
Portugal had entered its Troika program. What was considered off the table for the first 
nine months in Portugal, namely publicly breaking the political consensus about the 
program, was on the table immediately in Greece. Ireland is somewhat similar to Greece 
as the opposition parties Fine Gael and Labour, voted against the Troika program with 
Fianna Fáil, the Green Party, and three independents voting in favor. Fine Gael and 
Labour were highly critical of certain aspects of the Troika program and vowed that they 
would renegotiate it if they were in government. However, these criticisms were aimed at 
very specific policies like the lowering of minimum wage by €1, the interest rate on the 
loans, and the inclusion of the Anglo Irish Bank promissory notes in Ireland’s debt total. 
Also, once they entered office in early 2011, the Fine Gael/Labour coalition executed the 
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Troika program while making small tweaks. 
The lack of consensus about the program from the start meant that attempts to 
forge a consensus were short-lived and/or consistently undermined. When the program 
first began, Papandreou tried to explain to the Greek public that this was an opportunity 
to correct the mistakes of the past, but it did not resonate the same way as it did in 
Portugal, where there was much more support from the public for their Troika program. 
In Greece, the lack of political consensus plagued its Troika program from the beginning. 
Political parties constantly blamed one another and cooperation among parties did not 
materialize until late 2011235 when it was necessary to secure the sixth tranche of loans 
from the Troika and ensure there was a debt restructuring deal before calling new 
elections. 
Forming a technocratic “unity government” that included PASOK, New 
Democracy, and LAOS did not stop the blame shifting and reluctance to commit to the 
program as there was significant infighting within the government. Each party accused 
the others of failing to pull their weight. Each criticized some of the policies in the MOU, 
and constantly attempted to change the terms of the agreement. The infighting continued 
to the point that even having all three parties sign a pledge to implement the MOU in late 
2011 was fraught with controversy and delays. 
Once in government, the policies agreed to by the previous government were not 
guaranteed to be implemented. The new Transport Minister, from LAOS, scrapped the 
previous PASOK minister’s plan to liberalize the taxi profession. He instead wanted to 
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base the number of taxi licenses on population density. The new PASOK minister 
responsible for managing the labor reserve immediately ruled out any firings.236 These 
actions undercut structural reforms and measures to help Greece hit its fiscal targets and 
demonstrate that actions that would have been considered completely out of bounds in 
Ireland or Portugal were very much on the table in Greece. 
When the government managed to agree on policies, they were almost 
immediately undercut, sometimes by those in the government that just agreed to the 
policies. In February 2012, the unity government agreed to a new round of austerity cuts 
to secure the second bailout. This led to five ministers resigning because of the wage and 
pension cuts and LAOS leaving the government. George Karatzaferis, the leader of 
LAOS, said “he could not support measures that undermined the country’s 
sovereignty.”237 Furthermore, after Antonis Samaras, the leader of New Democracy, told 
his deputies to back legislation or be expelled from the party238 he then said that the 
measures should be renegotiated after elections in April. Before the vote, he said, “I ask 
you to vote in favor of the new loan agreement today and to have the ability to negotiate 
and change the current policy, which has been forced on us.”239 
The final example illustrating that “everything is on the table” in Greece was 
when George Papandreou surprisingly called for a referendum on the €130bn second 
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bailout from the Troika in late October 2011, just five days after the Greek government 
and the Troika concluded negotiations that had been ongoing for months. Many 
speculated on the reasons for the referendum, ranging from Papandreou wanting to shore 
up his slim parliamentary majority to forcing New Democracy to take a position on the 
package to declaring Greece’s national sovereignty and trying to gain leverage in 
negotiations with the Troika.240 The second bailout had been rejected by politicians 
across the political spectrum, including some in PASOK, and the leaders of New 
Democracy and SYRIZA both demanded Papandreou call snap elections. The 
announcement of the referendum caught Europe and the Troika by surprise, leading to 
demands from Merkel and Sarkozy that any referendum be made into a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
choice regarding Greece’s membership in the euro. Ultimately, Papandreou withdrew the 
referendum because he was not willing to risk losing membership in the euro. However, 
what differentiates the Greek situation from Ireland and Portugal in this example, was 
that Papandreou was willing to have Greeks consider a full-scale rejection of its Troika 
program. This was almost unthinkable to the governments in Ireland and Portugal and 
was certainly never seriously considered throughout the program. 
These examples make it very clear that Greece viewed the Troika program as 
something that was imposed on them from foreigners and that Greece was going to 
explore all options when it came to resisting the Troika and its policies. Options such as 
calling a referendum or arguing for renegotiation of a deal that had not yet passed 
parliament were undoubtedly off the table in Ireland and Portugal. In both Ireland and 
Portugal governments worked to adjust aspects of their Troika programs and then sought 
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to adhere to those changes. In Portugal, austerity measures were ruled unconstitutional by 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court on four separate occasions and the government found 
ways to still hit its deficit targets. In Greece, for some of the same people who just agreed 
to policies with the Troika to immediately argue they needed renegotiated, even before 
they were formally passed in parliament, shows the extent to which everything was on 
the table in Greece. 
This section has argued that the influence of Greek national identity on the 
response to its Troika program can be seen through the wide range of options that were 
considered by societal and political actors that were not considered by similar actors in 
Ireland and Portugal. Because the program was viewed as an imposition from the outside 
by European countries, the EU, and the IMF, many more options were considered to 
resist the program than in Ireland or Portugal. Protests happened immediately after 
signing the MOU, were long-lasting, large, disruptive, intense, and many times violent. 
Labor unions chose to be confrontational with the Troika and the government, even 
threatening violence, while also disrupting daily life for many Greeks. Politically, there 
was a failure to take ownership of the program, constant political infighting, undercutting 
policies, blame cast towards the Troika and other European countries, and a surprise 
referendum that caught Greeks and the Troika off guard. All of these actions resulted in 
the failure to meet deficit and structural reform targets, decreased trust between the Greek 
government and the Troika, and led a second Troika program. 
Constraints? What Constraints? 
The final way Greek national identity can be seen influencing Greece’s response 
to its Troika program is through how international and economic constraints were much 
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less influential with the Greeks than with the Irish or Portuguese. This line of reasoning 
dovetails with the notion that “everything is on the table,” but has a distinct emphasis. 
This section specifically highlights the responses those in Greece had to the constraints 
that people in other countries and the Troika appear to have seen as requiring Greece to 
go with the program. This section argues that the Greeks were much less sensitive to 
these constraints at the governmental and societal levels than either the Irish or the 
Portuguese. 
All three Troika bailout countries faced two constraints: (1) that they were all 
dependent on the Troika for financing to run their governments because they had been 
shut out of bond markets; and (2) all three signed binding international agreements 
committing themselves to the austerity policies and structural reforms in their respective 
Troika programs. In other words, all three countries needed to implement a series of 
difficult austerity measures and structural reforms to receive the money required to keep 
their governments functioning, avoid bankruptcy, and eventually regain access to bond 
markets. The alternative was to forego the Troika program, borrow at excessively high 
interest rates, risk default, and potentially be forced out of the euro. The insensitivity to 
these constraints is illustrated through the way that the Greeks engaged in brinksmanship 
with the Troika in the face of defaulting or being forced out of the euro. The 
brinksmanship tactics led to missing deficit and reform targets, delayed reviews, and 
eventually a second Troika program. To some degree we might be tempted to interpret 
these failures in implementation to reflect institutional or other obstacles to policy 
effectiveness in Greece, not a distinct unwillingness to respect the program. Yet, the 
constant brinksmanship seen in Greece undercuts arguments that this was due to lack of 
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capacity or other institutional factors that may have prevented the Greeks from adhering 
to the MOU. Rather than this being a case where Greece did all they could to implement 
a difficult program and failed to do so, we can see that most Greek actors balked at 
implementation and adopted strategies of brinksmanship and resistance that appears to 
simply deny the constraints. 
While Greece had a core group of government officials that was initially 
committed to fulfilling its obligations in the MOU, the same commitment was lacking 
from other government ministers as well as opposition parties and other social actors. 
Following Papandreou’s first cabinet shuffle in September 2010, only four months after 
signing the MOU, Finance Minister, George Papaconstantinou had to send a letter to 
government ministers reminding them of their obligations in the MOU and that they 
needed to control expenditures as well as ensuring structural reforms were 
implemented.241 
Even when talk of Greece exiting the euro dominated news stories, or ratings 
agencies downgraded Greek government debt, or an Argentinian style default looked 
inevitable, Greece appeared determined to continue resisting the Troika’s policies. The 
difference between political and social leaders was that the limit of how far political 
leaders were willing to push stopped at the potential of being forced out of the euro. 
However, most of the key politicians were willing to probe the limits of what EU leaders 
would accept before that happened. When being forced out of the euro became a real 
possibility at various points throughout the Greek Troika program, the government was 
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able to find a way to agree to new austerity measures and even a second Troika program 
in 2012. The public and other social actors, such as labor unions, were more willing to 
forego membership in the euro if it meant getting rid of the Troika and its harsh austerity 
policies as well as not having to take direction from Europe, Germany, and the Troika. 
Whereas the government found ways to agree to difficult policies when their backs were 
against the wall, the public continued to hold massive demonstrations and strikes when 
the policies that were needed to ensure that Greece would remain in the euro were passed, 
indicating that economic and international political constraints exerted less of an 
influence on those outside of the government. 
The same kinds of economic and international political constraints were 
acknowledged in Ireland and Portugal as alternatives to their respective Troika programs 
were considered but quickly dismissed, as not agreeing to a Troika program was viewed 
as much more costly than agreeing to a program, and leaving the euro was not an option 
from the beginning. Both Ireland and Portugal responded by staying committed to the 
MOU’s implementation, but simultaneously worked to minimize the social costs 
associated with their programs while focusing on revising certain aspects of their MOUs.  
As one former minister in Ireland said: 
Obviously, we have to live within the constraints in terms of reaching the deficit 
target of 3 percent of GDP in the timeline we agreed. We actually extended that 
for a year as you recall. One of the first things we did to make it bearable for us to 
get to that threshold. What we realized that we couldn’t simply ignore the fact that 
our income as a state had fallen by 30 percent, but our expenditure not only had 
not reduced, it had actually increased because we had heading to half a million 
people unemployed. So, we needed to ensure that we kept a funding stream 
available from the only people who would lend us money, the troika, but we 
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wanted to establish from the outset that we would do that in negotiation and in 
with built in flexibilities.242 
Greece, on the other hand, took a much different track. While the first Troika 
review was broadly positive, there were some grumblings from other European countries 
in late 2010 that Greece was already failing to meet its obligations in the MOU and that 
further funding should be withheld.243 When Moody’s downgraded Greek debt by three 
notches in March of 2011, ten PASOK MPs signed a petition asking the government to 
sue Moody’s for the downgrade, which they claimed undermined their bargaining 
position at the upcoming European Summit.244 Criticism of ratings agencies downgrading 
sovereign debt were common in Troika program countries. Portugal’ Finance Minister 
criticized Moody’s for downgrading its debt to junk in 2011, but the government 
continued to push forward with the program. In Greece, instead of taking the downgrade 
as a warning and marching forward to implement the program, they sought to blame the 
ratings agencies for Greece’s financial problems. 
With European leaders openly discussing a Greek default and/or exit from the 
euro in the spring of 2011, the Greek government continued missing more targets and the 
program was beginning to come apart. With external pressure on Greece greatly 
increasing, reaching an agreement on new austerity measures was fraught with difficulty 
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and delays. Greek ministers warned the state would soon run out of money245 and the 
Greek European Commissioner, Maria Damanaki warned that Greek membership in the 
euro would be threatened if the medium-term fiscal strategy (MTFS) was not passed, 
saying: 
I am forced to speak openly…either we agree with our lenders on a program of 
tough sacrifices…or we return to the drachma.246 
Greece eventually released its plans for the MTFS in early June 2011. Yet, despite 
the dire warnings from the Troika and Greek officials about default and exiting the euro 
if the government failed to pass the MTFS, PASOK deputies criticized the package and 
threatened to vote against it, while New Democracy refused to support the new measures. 
This led to nearly a month of negotiations between PASOK and New Democracy to agree 
on the MTFS and Papandreou reshuffled his cabinet, which included replacing the 
Finance Minister with Evangelos Venizelos. Even then, the two parties could not reach 
an agreement as the new Finance Minister traveled to a Eurogroup meeting in mid-June 
to present the changes to MTFS that would allow it to pass through parliament more 
easily. The changes were rejected by the Eurogroup, which then demanded that there be a 
vote of confidence for PASOK. After PASOK survived the confidence vote, the MTFS 
was eventually passed in late June. However, this was only after significant resistance to 
the Troika’s demands, and in the face of serious discussions about a Greek default and 
Greece being forced out of the euro. 
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Another example illustrating the government’s disregard for international and 
economic constraints can be seen in February 2012, when the “unity” government formed 
in the wake of Papandreou’s resignation needed to agree on another austerity package 
with the Troika to close the funding gap that had been accumulating throughout 2011. 
The Troika had given the government its list of ten “prior actions” they needed to 
implement before the second bailout could be approved,247 but the government could not 
agree on the measures and missed its third deadline in a week. The deadline was missed 
despite warnings from the EU and others that failing to agree to the measures could force 
Greece into a disorderly default, and that the EU could survive without Greece. The 
prime minister of the Netherlands said, “We are currently so strong in the rest of the euro 
zone…that we can handle an exit of Greece”248 while two economists from Citi released 
a report arguing that Europe could handle letting Greece leave the eurozone as its banks 
were in a better position to absorb Greek losses than only a few months earlier.249 Greece 
finally agreed to the measures and passed them through parliament on February 12, but 
this was only after trying to alter the agreement, which was rejected by eurozone finance 
ministers. Even in the face of the very real constraints of a disorderly default and being 
forced out of the euro, Greece missed three deadlines and attempted to change the 
agreement with eurozone finance ministers at the last second. Only when the government 
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was completely out of time and it was looking over the edge at a total financial and social 
catastrophe did the governments finally agree to the measures. 
The final illustration of the Greek government’s disregard for international and 
economic constraints is shown through their lack of commitment to a signed international 
agreement that their sovereign government agreed to. Some resistance to complying with 
a difficult international agreement is not surprising, but the contrast to Portugal and 
Ireland is striking. Many in Ireland and Portugal felt that once the government signed the 
MOU with the Troika, the government had an international obligation to implement the 
MOU, despite their disagreements with some of the specific policies. One former 
minister in Portugal, who was in the opposition when the MOU was signed, summarized 
this sentiment well: 
When we get into government…it’s not a question of opinion, it’s a question of 
international obligations. So, it doesn’t matter if we agree or don’t agree with the 
things…that are in the memorandum. The things that are in the memorandum are 
an obligation to the Portuguese state. If we got into power, of course we would 
deliver. We will apply the things that are in the memorandum. Then, of course, 
politically…we wanted to try to rebalance some things, but we know that we had 
that obligation…it was an obligation that we had to fulfill and deliver.250 
Not only was Portugal committed to meeting its international obligations, which 
were negotiated by the PS and not the PDS or CDS that implemented the program, but 
they did this despite disagreements with parts of their MOU with the Troika. Even those 
that disagreed with policies251 of the program as it progressed did not reject the program 
in its entirety and maintained that Portugal should meets its commitments in the MOU. In 
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Greece, the government was initially committed to the program, but all other parties 
except LAOS rejected the program. In the initial months of the program, New 
Democracy sought to block many of the austerity measures required by the MOU,252 and 
as the program continued New Democracy refused to support measures that would enable 
Greece to meet its commitments in the MOU.253 This even continued into 2012, when all 
parties in the “unity” government were required to commit to implementing new austerity 
measures required to approve the second bailout. Antonis Samaras had refused to commit 
to implementing these new cuts to the point where Greece was on the verge of a full-scale 
default the following month.254 New Democracy finally agreed to commit to the 
measures, but only after their brinksmanship nearly led to a disorderly default and 
ejection from the eurozone. 
Finally, much of the public appeared to disregard international and economic 
constraints even more than politicians. Whereas most politicians drew the line at losing 
membership in the euro, social actors were willing to push further and risk default as well 
as losing its euro membership if it meant ridding themselves of the Troika and austerity. 
Unions continued to strike, and protests only intensified as new measures that were 
required to secure the release of funds from the Troika were introduced. Continuing the 
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theme of this section, these responses to new austerity measures differed greatly from 
what was seen in Ireland and Portugal. Ireland saw virtually no industrial action and its 
protests remained much smaller than either Greece or Portugal. Portugal saw an increase 
in protest action and strikes following the botched social security tax proposal in 
September 2012, but the protests remained overwhelmingly peaceful and continued to 
focus largely on specific policies, not rejecting the whole Troika program. 
In many of the instances described above, there were clear warnings (default and 
exit from eurozone) from the Troika, European leaders, and even Greek leaders about the 
consequences of failing to pass and implement the austerity measures and structural 
reforms that were agreed to in the MOU. However, these warnings went unheeded by 
many social actors. Although Papandreou initially sold the Troika program as both a 
foreign imposition and an opportunity to correct the mistakes of Greece’s past, he also 
talked about the choice to enter the program as “not a pleasant decision,” but necessary to 
save the country.255 Papandreou also told parliament that the alternative to the Troika 
program was “failure, the bankruptcy of the country.”256 Yet, Greece was technically 
already bankrupt as it had been shut out of bond markets, but these warnings carried little 
weight with unions and others protesting Greece’s entry into its Troika program. Unions 
immediately called a 48-hour general strike and there were multiple other strikes as 
Athens plunged into chaos. Unions would call three more general strikes through July 8, 
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as large and often violent protests intensified. At this point it was “only bankruptcy” that 
was seen as the consequence of failing to implement the MOU, yet many of the unions 
and protesters still wanted the Troika and IMF out of Greece. 
Again, during the debate over the MTFS in mid-2011, there were myriad 
warnings about the consequences of Greece failing to pass measures that would enable 
them to meet their deficit and structural reform targets form the MOU. This time there 
was the added consequence of Greece potentially being forced out of the euro being 
discussed across Europe. When the MTFS was being debated and eventually passed 
through parliament protest actions increased as “the indignados” movement had 
established itself in Syntagma Square. Even with the consequences of failing to pass the 
MTFS being well-known, protesters tried to prevent the vote from occurring and GSEE 
and Adedy called another 48-hour general strike while holding large rallies outside 
parliament. 
Actions such as these continued throughout 2011 but intensified as Greece was 
nearing its agreement for a second Troika program. By this point, Greece was at the end 
of the line as far as Europe was concerned and there was widespread talk of Greece 
leaving the euro should it fail to pass the austerity measures needed to secure the second 
bailout package. Again, this had little effect on the social actors, who continued to reject 
the Troika’s policies. GSEE and Adedy called two 48-hour general strikes within only 
days of each other and organized huge protests outside of parliament. As Siani-Davies 
describes, “outside parliament the demonstrators were so thick that it took hours to cross 
the center of Athens.”257 Protests erupted into violence as rioting was widespread, which 
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caused serious damage to 45 buildings while around 150 stores were vandalized. Overall, 
the damage was estimated to be in the tens of millions of euros.258 While the anti-
austerity protesters did not cause all of the damage, the intensity and size of the responses 
to the finalization of the second Troika bailout indicates that there was a substantial 
percentage of the Greek population that was ready to risk leaving the euro and 
bankruptcy as opposed to continuing to implement the Troika’s austerity policies. 
In summary, this section has argued that the final way we can see Greek national 
identity influencing Greece’s response to its Troika program is in widespread Greek 
disregard for international and economic constraints that appeared to exert much more 
influence on Ireland and Portugal. Having been shut out of bond markets and reliant on 
the Troika for funding, Greece continued to miss deficit and reform targets, delay 
reviews, and engage in brinksmanship with the Troika. Even after being warned that it 
could lead to a disorderly default or losing its euro membership, some continued to resist. 
While politicians drew the line for resisting the Troika at possibly being ejected from the 
euro, many in society appeared willing to risk euro membership as protests and strikes 
intensified during periods where new austerity measures were being negotiated or passed 
in parliament. 
Conclusion 
This chapter argues that Greek national identity best explains the trajectory of the 
Greek response to its Troika program. While facing many of the same external pressures 
of the other Troika programs, Greece chose to rebel against the Troika and Europe, failed 
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to take ownership of their program, and undermined its own program. Parties fought with 
each other, and social actors relentlessly resisted the program. From the beginning of 
Greece’s program there was a lack of commitment from political parties to its 
implementation and the commitment weakened as the fiscal measures and structural 
reforms became increasingly unpopular. The government missed deadlines for new 
austerity packages, delayed their own program reviews, and engaged in brinksmanship 
with the Troika and Europe, even though many in Europe were seriously discussing a 
Greek default and exit from the euro. Socially, the response was intense, frequent, and 
often violent from the beginning of the program. The evidence from this chapter 
illustrated three main ways that Greek national identity influenced Greece’s response. 
First, many in Greece viewed the Troika program as a foreign occupation, where other 
countries in Europe (especially Germany) and the IMF were imposing unfair policies on 
Greece. Second, when it came to resisting the Troika, nearly everything was “on the 
table.” There were few things that were not considered by political and social actors as 
acceptable ways to resist and undermine the program. There were many more protests 
than in the other Troika program countries and they were large, intense, and violent. 
Strikes were frequent and disruptive with some labor leaders even threatening to use 
violence. Politicians refused to cooperate with one another and instead fought and blamed 
the other parties, forcing delays of program reviews and deadlines for new measures to be 
missed. Finally, there was an insensitivity to international and economic constraints that 
nearly led to a disorderly default and Greece exiting the euro. Despite these real threats 
from Europe and the Troika, Greek politicians continued to delay, grandstand, engage in 
brinksmanship, and undermine policies that were needed to secure funding or even a 
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second Troika program. Only at the last minute did they agree to policies seen as crucial 
to meeting their commitments in the MOU and maintaining their euro membership. 
Socially, Greece was even more insensitive to these constraints as there were large 
protests and disruptive strikes even as the future of Greece was in the balance. In the end, 





“I think the people of Ireland understood how the economy worked and 
understood this was our mess essentially, and we were going to have to dig 
ourselves out of it. People…couldn’t see an alternative and if you went on strike, 
what was going to happen? The government didn’t have any choices…I think that 
people understood that there weren’t choices…basically, sit back and take the 
pain and then move on was more of the attitude.”– Interview with ESRI 
Economist 
 
Ireland was the second country in the Eurozone to request help from the Troika, 
coming only months after the bailout agreement with Greece in May 2010 and before the 
Portuguese program in May 2011. Unlike Greece and Portugal, the private sector was at 
the heart of Ireland’s problems. The Irish economy had experienced a property and 
construction boom and bust throughout most of the 2000s, which was fueled by excessive 
bank lending. However, it wasn’t until after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 that capital rushed out of the Irish banking system. This capital flight led the Irish 
government to issue a blanket guarantee of all deposits, loans, and obligations in 
Ireland’s six largest banks, which totaled €440bn, and was 287 percent of Ireland’s GNP 
in 2008.1 Over the next two years, confidence in the Irish banking system as well as the 
country’s fiscal position continued to erode as bank losses continued to increase and the 
government’s attempts at propping up the banking sector further exacerbated the Irish 
budgetary situation. After weeks of denying there were even talks about an Irish program, 
Ireland agreed to a three-year, €85bn bailout package with the European Commission, 
ECB, and IMF on November 29, 2010. In return, Ireland would make cuts to public 
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expenditure, raise taxes, reform and stabilize its banking sector, implement structural 
reforms, and be subject to strict monitoring by the European Commission, IMF, and 
ECB. 
The Irish responses to its Troika program, unlike in Portugal, did not develop in 
distinct phases. Initially, it appeared that there would be some significant resistance to the 
program from the mainstream opposition parties Fine Gael and Labour, who immediately 
called for a renegotiation of certain aspects of the bailout, but never rejected the bailout in 
its entirety. Labor union leaders also called for mobilization in the streets to oppose the 
agreement, leading to a 50,000 person protest in Dublin the weekend after the MOU with 
the Troika was signed. These initial forms of resistance, however, subsided rather 
quickly. While the Fianna Fáil/Green Party government, which negotiated the bailout, 
remained committed to the program’s implementation, Fine Gael and Labour both 
continued to argue for renegotiating parts of the deal through the general election in late 
February 2011, although they both agreed with the necessity of implementing the 
program. After the general election in February 2011, the new Fine Gael/Labour 
government remained committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Troika program, 
but they sought to play the long-game with the Troika regarding renegotiation. This was 
similar to the government’s strategy in Portugal but was a major difference between the 
political response between Ireland and Greece, where the program was widely rejected. 
Social responses cooled off significantly after the initial 50,000 person protest in 
Dublin in November 2010 and never reached the intensity that was seen in Greece or 
Portugal. Labor unrest was almost completely absent for the duration of the program. 
There were not many protests in 2010 and through the first three quarters of 2011. 
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Protests that occurred were small and targeted very specific policies, such as the closing 
of a hospital or cuts to education, not the entirety of the Troika program. In October 
2011, the number of protests increased significantly as Ireland’s own “Occupy” 
movement began. This saw the number of protests increase from 29 in Q3 of 2011 to 273 
in Q4 and 298 in Q1 of 2012. While the number of protests increased drastically, the size 
of these protests remained very small, ranging between 10 and 100 people at any given 
time. While it has been documented that anger towards austerity, the government, and the 
Troika slowly increased as Ireland came closer to exiting its program,2 this anger is not 
reflected in the protest statistics while Ireland remained in its program. Much of this 
anger was directed toward three particularly unpopular new taxes: a household charge 
(essentially a property tax), water charges, and septic charges. However, the brunt of 
public outrage did not begin until 2014, after Ireland had left its Troika program. Below 
are Figure 2 and Figure 3, which illustrate the trajectory of Irish protests as well as strikes 
throughout the Irish Troika program. 
How then, do we explain the Irish responses to its Troika program, which was 
almost universally understood as a consequence of bad decisions by its banks, and led to 
a government bailout that left the public on the hook for the bill? Although the Irish 
suffered somewhat less than the Portuguese or the Greeks in the crisis, and emerged first 
from their Troika program, one might have expected an intense reaction to the state 
requesting a Troika bailout to cover debts it accrued solely because it had rescued a 
handful of private  
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Figure 2: Irish Protests 
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banks. This led to a dramatic increase in Ireland’s budget deficits,3 a 9% fall in GDP 
between 2008 and 2010, massive budget cuts prior to the bailout, including a 14 percent 
cut in public sector wages in 2009.4 Further fiscal measures totaling 7.5% of GDP were 
implemented during the Troika program, including further cuts to public sector wages 
and Social Protection.5 Yet, despite the crisis’ origins in the private banking sector and 
the economic pain the Irish were forced to endure after, Ireland sustained a political 
consensus for the duration of the program with no mainstream party or labor union 
arguing for a comprehensive rejection of the program, and there were primarily mild 
protests that targeted specific policies with very little labor unrest. 
This chapter will argue that the lack of resistance to Ireland’s Troika program is 
not rooted primarily in material differences. Although the Irish Troika program was 
somewhat “easier” than the Greek and Portuguese programs, Ireland was still forced to 
make an economic adjustment equivalent to 7.5 percent of GDP with additional structural 
reforms. Unlike the Greek and Portuguese crises, where the causes were more widespread 
throughout society, Ireland’s private banks were the unmistakable cause of the Irish 
crisis. It seems surprising that there was not more resistance to the Irish Troika program 
when the bailout of the Irish banks led to a government debt crisis where the public was 
forced to foot the bill for the banks’ mistakes. Many jobs were lost, pay was cut, and 
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taxes were increased, yet there was never broad resistance to the program as seen in 
Greece or in the latter phases of the Portuguese program. 
Nor do institutional features offer a compelling explanation of the Irish response. 
Irish institutions certainly differed from those in Portugal and Greece, creating fewer 
roadblocks for implementing the program. Ireland’s existing flexible labor regime and a 
globalized, free market-oriented economy certainly helped the government’s ability to 
implement difficult policies that might not be possible in Portugal or Greece. However, 
institutions are not determinative of policy choices, especially when they will be very 
unpopular and politically costly. While institutions may have shaped the available policy 
options, they do not explain why an absence of institutional barriers and some modest 
organizational incentives would lead political parties across the political spectrum to 
agree to and implement difficult and costly policies. Finally, institutions fail to explain 
why a population would agree to take on major social costs and public cuts to bail out 
private banks that were widely seen as having been reckless. 
Another potential explanation centers on economic ideas, as Irish views tend to be 
more pro-market than Greece or Portugal. Parsing ideas from identity is made more 
difficult because the Celtic Tiger aspect of Irish identity is so intertwined with market 
logic. Yet, while it is true that the Irish stand out for pro-market economic views relative 
to Greece and Portugal,6 this is itself a sign of the role of identity. It is the Irish as a 
society who stand out for these views, and because this is a national pattern that includes 
even those actors (left leaning political parties, labor unions etc.) whom we might expect 
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to react strongly against an austerity program in which the public pays costs for a 
specifically private-bank-driven crisis, the dissemination of these ideas across the 
political spectrum indicates the presence of the Celtic Tiger identity and not merely 
economic ideas. Furthermore, one must answer the question of how people come to hold 
certain views about markets. The same free market, “neoliberal” ideas were also available 
to the Greeks and Portuguese, but much smaller portions of their societies believed these 
ideas should guide their economies. The Labour Party, which is affiliated with the Party 
of European Socialists at the European level, not only executed the Troika program while 
in government with Fine Gael but suggested only relatively small changes while trying to 
protect the social safety net. Even the two major labor unions did not offer much 
resistance to Troika program or suggest a radically different path forward. If economic 
ideas were the primary causal factor, one must ask why the Labour Party and Irish trade 
unions either bought into ideas that appear to be at odds with their interests and ideology, 
or why they agreed to policies they did not agree with. 
This chapter argues that the path of Irish political and social responses to its 
Troika program was influenced by its “Celtic Tiger” national identity. Similar to 
Portugal, Ireland developed a social purpose identity to achieve national goals, in this 
case modernization and economic growth. By the second half of the 20th century Ireland 
had been independent for multiple decades but remained one of the poorest countries in 
Europe. Ireland looked to eschew its endemic poverty by embracing modernization and 
focusing on economic growth, making modernization a nation building project. 
Eventually, the focus on modernization and economic growth displaced the previous 
nation building focus, which centered on Irish culture, and was conservative, Catholic, 
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rural, and anti-modern. The vision of modernization was embraced by politicians and 
bureaucrats as well as the majority of the public, which led to massive changes in the 
Irish economy and society. Ultimately, after many difficult reforms, Ireland’s economy 
was transformed into an open, global, interconnected economy with a heavy focus on 
FDI. Through decades of changes in the economy that culminated in the success of the 
“Celtic Tiger” in the 1990s, a faith in free markets and Ireland’s FDI-based economic 
model was imprinted on Irish national character. The achievement of modernization and 
becoming a country with one of the highest GDP per capita in the world only further 
solidified this faith in free markets and the Celtic Tiger economic model. The success of 
Ireland’s efforts to modernize, led the Celtic Tiger to become more of a cognitive model 
for the Irish to see their country and their economy. Therefore, when Ireland’s crisis hit, 
there was no suggestion that Ireland should radically alter its economy, but a continuation 
of the same policies that previously led it from poverty to prosperity. 
The Celtic Tiger identity can be seen influencing the Irish response to its Troika 
program in three ways. The first indication of the role of identity is the national nature of 
Irish beliefs in specific economic policies and general support for austerity, which were 
discussed above. Additionally, there was a strong belief that Ireland’s economic model, 
which was labeled the Celtic Tiger in the 1990s, was still fundamentally strong. This 
belief held despite the banking problems in the late 2000s, which led to massive 
government deficits and its Troika bailout in 2010. This belief in the Celtic Tiger 
economic model was expressed across the political spectrum and revealed that many 
believed the economic policies responsible for Ireland’s dramatic increase in wealth prior 
to 2008 would deliver similar results again as long as the “rotten” sectors of the economy 
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– banks and construction – were adequately dealt with. Only the far-left, consisting of 
Sinn Fein or groups such as People Before Profit, expressed criticism of the 
government’s decision to implement the Troika program and attempt to guide the 
economy back to its Celtic Tiger roots. The two main political parties Fianna Fail and 
Fine Gael, as well as the Labour Party, and even mainstream labor unions were largely in 
agreement with this approach. The labor unions wanted to spread out the pain, but even 
their most radical idea, which was hardly radical, was to spread the program out another 
two years and avoid frontloading the program. This belief in free markets and economic 
growth that was instilled with the Celtic Tiger is even more interesting given that the 
Irish crisis began with private banks that ran amuck and it was the public who was being 
asked to pay the costs of getting back to the Celtic Tiger. 
Secondly, responses from political leaders, leaders in civil society, and the public 
indicate that strong rejections of the program were largely off the table. After some initial 
posturing from Fine Gael and Labour to renegotiate the Troika Program in late 2010 and 
in the lead up to the February 2011 election, once Fine Gael and Labour won the election 
and formed their coalition, the government remained committed to implementing the 
program. Fianna Fail, which negotiated the Troika program, did not offer any real 
criticism of the program as the Fine Gael-Labour government executed it. The new 
government wanted to renegotiate parts of the program, but they were very specific and 
did not involve a full-scale rejection of the program as was witnessed in Greece. The Fine 
Gael-Labour government wanted to lower interest rates, burn senior bondholders of their 
banks, and restore minimum wage, while Labour also sought to extend maturities on the 
Troika loans and stop paying on the Anglo Irish Bank promissory notes. This approach 
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was more similar to the approach Portugal took to renegotiating parts of its Troika 
Program than the grandstanding and brinksmanship of Greece. Ireland’s faith in its 
economic model led it to stay the course and implement the program while trying to 
lessen the burden on itself through some renegotiation. Additionally, the public’s reaction 
mirrored the political reaction with the largest objections to the program occurring in late 
2010. After 2010 the overwhelming majority of protests were focused on very specific 
policies, such as closing hospitals or the weekly walk against the bank bailout in Cork 
and were not an overall rejection of the program. Even when the number of protests 
peaked in late 2011 and early 2012, the number of participants at the “Occupy” protests 
was very small, ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred protesters at any given time. 
Taken together, this points to a country that saw a broad rejection of its Troika program 
as largely off the table. 
Finally, similar to Portugal, Ireland’s elites worked diligently to differentiate 
themselves from Greece, but Irish elites also did not view themselves as being like 
Portugal. Ireland had become one of the richest countries in the world with a solidified 
place in the world economy that had been a stable democracy for decades whereas 
Greece and Portugal were younger democracies with much poorer economies that 
continually struggled to generate growth. Being lumped together with Greece was viewed 
as almost insulting because the Irish viewed themselves in such a different light than 
Greece. This attitude was on display in 2011 as Ireland’s Minister of Finance, Michael 
Noonan, joked about making T-shirts reading “Ireland is not Greece.” While Irish elites 
acknowledged how bad they felt for their Greek friends they dismissed any comparison 
to Greece out of hand. 
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Next is an account of the Irish crisis 
from beginning to end. This account is organized by first describing the Irish program. 
Then the history of the Irish program from November 2010 through December 2013 is 
documented. This section is organized in three to six month sub-sections with each sub-
section broken down further with one section on the political responses to external 
pressures, such as bond markets and external pressures from other governments or the 
Troika, and another section describing the social responses from the Irish. Following the 
account of the Irish crisis is the analysis of the Irish case, which emphasizes that in a very 
complicated debt crisis, only an explanation that emphasizes national identity can account 
for the features of the Irish response. 
The Irish Program 
The Irish program had many similarities to the Greek and Portuguese programs, 
especially with fiscal measures. However, the Irish program lacked the in-depth structural 
reforms asked of the Greeks and Portuguese. The overarching objective of the Irish 
Troika program was to restore financial market confidence in Ireland’s banking sector as 
well as the country itself. The strategy for accomplishing this was comprised of three 
primary elements: I) A fundamental downsizing, deleveraging, and reorganization of the 
banking sector. II) Restoring fiscal sustainability, which included a difficult fiscal 
consolidation. III) Structural reforms focused on competitiveness, intensifying labor 
market activation measures, and some product market reforms for sheltered service 
sectors. 
Similar to the Greek and Portuguese cases, Ireland agreed to execute a fiscal 
consolidation plan that was based on the draft budget for 2011 as well as the National 
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Recovery Plan released in late 2010. Fiscal consolidation measures included spending 
cuts as well as tax increases that was projected to equal 7.7 percent of GDP. Of these 
adjustments, 4.9 percent of GDP was to be achieved through expenditure cuts while there 
would be revenue increases equal to 2.8 percent of GDP.7 Specific fiscal consolidation 
measures included lowering personal income tax bands and credits, reducing pension tax 
relief, reducing general tax expenditures, increasing excise and other taxes, increasing the 
property tax, increasing the carbon tax, cutting social protection expenditure, reducing the 
number of public service employees, reducing existing public service pensions, and 
cutting capital expenditure.8 
Because of the centrality of the Irish banking system to its crisis, the Irish 
program required a major overhaul of the banking sector. New legislation to enhance 
financial regulations was to be passed and implemented and the banking sector was also 
to be reorganized and downsized in order to operate without state support. Ireland was to 
continue with its bank recapitalization plan, worth around €50bn, that was revealed at the 
end of September 2010. It was also to continue deleveraging its banks and meet the loan 
to deposit ratios of the Basel III accords, require its banks to hold at least 10.5 percent of 
core tier 1 capital with its biggest banks of Allied Irish Bank9, Bank of Ireland, and EBS 
required to recapitalize to 12 percent of core tier 1 capital. The program also required 
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Ireland to establish a plan for the resolution of Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide 
Building Society, which were the “bad banks” at the center of its property boom.10 
While the Irish program included some structural reforms, they were nowhere 
near as daunting as the reforms asked of the Portuguese and Greeks. These measures 
included reducing the minimum wage by €1.00, reforming the unemployment benefit 
system, strengthening its labor activation policies, gradually increasing the retirement age 
to 68 by 2028, liberalizing sheltered domestic services sectors, such as the legal 
profession, medical services, and pharmacies. The Irish program also aimed to encourage 
growth in the retail sector by eliminating the cap on the physical size of retail stores. 
Finally, the Irish were required to establish a budgetary advisory council to provide “an 
independent assessment of the Government’s budgetary position and forecasts.”11 
What is evident about the Irish Troika program is that it included similar elements 
to the Greek and Portuguese programs, with the similar elements being not as extreme 
and the addition of drastic changes to its banking sector. The fiscal consolidation was not 
as deep as the others and the structural reforms were less challenging. The added 
challenge of the Irish program came in the form of its banking sector that needed to be 
significantly deleveraged, reorganized, and subject to stricter regulations. Despite being 
an “easier” program, the Irish still made significant sacrifices to meet their program 
targets and exit the program on time. 
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Political Response and External Pressures after the Bailout with the Troika 
After weeks of denials, Ireland formally requested aid on November 21, 2010, 
which led to immediate calls for the government to step down and a new general election, 
as well as promises from opposition parties to renegotiate parts of the agreement. The 
Green Party announced it would leave the government coalition with Fianna Fáil if new 
elections were not called for January. Fianna Fáil Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Brian 
Cowen announced that there would be new elections in January, but only after the 2011 
budget was enacted. The opposition leaders Enda Kenny (Fine Gael) and Eamon Gilmore 
(Labour) as well as Sinn Féin all called for the Dáil (Irish Parliament) to be dissolved, 
and for an immediate election prior to the passing of the budget.12 Additionally, there 
were calls from within Fianna Fáil for Mr. Cowen to resign and dissolve parliament 
immediately. Despite the calls from within his own party, Cowen was defiant, saying, 
“there will be a time for political accountability to the electorate. The interests of the 
electorate, of all our people, would not be served by delay or, worse, casting into doubt 
the steps that are necessary to secure our economy and financial stability.”13 
External pressures on Ireland also remained elevated, even after the request for 
aid from the Troika as Ireland’s sovereign debt rating was cut two notches by S&P. After 
announcing the details of the bailout plan the euro fell to a two-month low, the Irish 10-
year bond yield remained over 9 percent – significantly higher than the 5 percent bond 
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yield from July 2010,14 and many in the media doubted Ireland’s ability to adhere to its 
program, predicting Ireland would have to default and maybe leave the euro. Any 
speculation on default was summarily dismissed by the Finance Minister, Brian Lenihan, 
and others in the government. However, with the uncertainty of the Irish program, credit 
markets across Europe froze as investors were worried about contagion to Portugal, 
Spain, and Italy, but more generally about European banks. 
In early December markets were temporarily boosted when Ireland released the 
2011 budget, which needed to be passed before Ireland could receive the first tranche of 
funding from the Troika. The budget included €6bn worth of savings, including cuts to 
public spending, tax increases on the middle and lower classes, a reduction in the child 
benefit, and cuts to pay for ministers. The budget allocated €200m for work placements 
and training for those out of work.15 Before the budget was passed in mid-December, 
Fitch cut Ireland’s sovereign debt rating by three notches,16 and days after passing the 
budget Moody’s downgraded Irish debt five notches, which was only two grades above 
junk status. Moody’s also warned that further downgrades were possible as Ireland was 
put on a negative outlook.17 The move by Moody’s prompted the ECB to extend a £10bn 
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lifeline to Irish banks, further expanding its liquidity assistance to Irish banks.18 
As 2011 started, pressure continued to be centered on Prime Minister Brian 
Cowen as he came under fire for his ties to the disgraced banker Sean Fitzpatrick (Anglo 
Irish Bank) and the Fianna Fáil-Green Party coalition was starting to crumble for good. 
Cowen survived a confidence vote on January 18, but six ministers submitted their 
resignation in the following days. Cowen then stepped down as the leader of Fianna Fáil 
but remained on as prime minister to eventually call for an election. Shortly after, the 
Green Party pulled out of the coalition but continued to support the minority coalition 
with vital aspects of the budget legislation.19 Similar to when the bailout program was 
announced, Fine Gael and Labour both agreed to the fiscal goals in the program, but also 
remained committed to renegotiating parts of the deal.20 
Social Responses From Troika Announcement Through the January of 2011 
The initial social response to the announcement that Ireland was requesting aid 
from the Troika was mixed. Similar to Portugal and Greece there were calls for 
immediate street protests and increased industrial action, a rejection of reductions to the 
minimum wage and further spending cuts, and general anger towards the current 
government. On the other hand, Ireland responded much like Portugal as there was 
relative acquiescence in the beginning stages of the bailout agreement. Most of the 
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protest actions taken were quite small and not very disruptive to everyday life – outside 
of one large protest in Dublin in late November. 
Immediately after the announcement of the request for aid, there was a lot of talk 
about protesting and resisting the Troika program, especially from trade unions. Jack 
O’Connor, the General President of the Services Industrial Professional and Technical 
Union (Siptu) publicly rejected any proposal that would reduce the minimum wage.21 The 
following days saw small groups of around 50 or less people protesting in Dublin against 
the government and the Troika bailout. The largest protest of the entire bailout period 
(November 2010 – November 2013) occurred on November 27, 2010. The protest was 
organized by the trade unions Siptu and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), had 
an estimated 50,000 participants, and was a direct response to the Troika bailout. The 
protest was largely peaceful, with speeches from trade union leaders and other far-left 
leaders, but around 250 protesters went to the Dáil where they were met by gardaí (Irish 
police) in riot gear.22 At the end of the protest, UNITE, another trade union in Ireland and 
the UK, announced it was planning a “campaign of civil disobedience” ahead of budget 
day on December 7.23 This manifested into a gathering on December 7 of about 1,500 
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protesters outside the Dáil to protest the 2011 budget.24 
After the main protest in late November, protests remained rather small in 
comparison, ranging from a few dozen protesters to around 500. The protests primarily 
occurred in Dublin and Cork, Ireland’s second largest city. The exceptions being 5,000 
students from University College Cork and the Cork Institute of Technology who 
protested against planned increases in university registration fees25 and the anti-budget 
protest, both of which occurred in early December. However, from the announcement of 
the bailout through January 2011 and leading up to the announcement of new elections in 
March, the social response can be described as spiking in late November and tapering off 
significantly after student protests in Cork and the anti-budget rally in early December. 
The total number of protests recorded in the Irish Times and Irish Independent for this 
time period was 15, with only three having participation greater than 500. While this 
amount of protest is far less than Greece in the aftermath of signing its bailout, social 
resistance in Ireland compares to that of Portugal when looking at protests but is far less 
when it comes to strikes and industrial action. 
External Pressure and Government Responses from the Campaign to the end of Q1 
2011 
Political uncertainty remained high in Ireland as opposition parties were calling 
for either a renegotiation or rejection of the Troika bailout. The political uncertainty in 
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combination with the Irish Central Bank more than halving its growth forecast for 2011 
to around 1 percent as well as S&P and Moody’s downgrading all major Irish banks to 
‘junk’ status26 kept pressure on Irish bond yields through the end of March. Additionally, 
Irish banks would undergo a major reorganization and stress tests would reveal an 
additional €24bn was needed to shore up the Irish banking sector. 
Brian Cowen officially dissolved parliament in early February and called for 
elections, which were scheduled for February 25. Opposition parties continued to argue 
for renegotiation during the campaign as Fine Gael wanted to get a lower interest rate and 
impose haircuts on senior bond holders. Labour wanted these changes as well as an 
extended time frame for the fiscal adjustment, limits to privatization, restoring the 
minimum wage, and to stop paying the Anglo Irish promissory note from 2010.27 Other 
pressures persisted throughout February as Anglo Irish Bank warned of record losses28 
and the slogan of “burning senior bondholders,” which became increasing popular during 
the campaign, came under fire from the Troika and especially the ECB.29 
Fine Gael won the election, but fell short of an overall majority, leading to a 
coalition with Labour, which finished second. The fall of Fianna Fáil also marked the 
first time since the 1927 election that it had not been the largest party in the Dáil. The 
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Fine Gael/Labour coalition would be in charge of administering the Troika bailout over 
the next three years. However, the election of parties that were insistent on renegotiating 
parts of the Troika bailout did not help Ireland’s standing in Europe or in markets. The 
Irish plea for renegotiation faced stiff resistance in Northern Europe and Irish 10-year 
bond yields reached 9.36 percent at the end of February.30 Irish leaders would meet more 
resistance to its renegotiation aims from France and Germany at a March European 
Leaders Summit. Prime Minister Enda Kenny was told that Ireland would need to impose 
more austerity or raise Ireland’s 12.5 percent corporate tax rate before there would be 
considerations of lowering the interest rates on its bailout.31 
As the coalition became official and a program of government was agreed upon, it 
did not veer too far from the original Troika agreement. The government agreed to 
implement the 2011 budget passed by Fianna Fáil and to stick to the first two years of the 
Troika program, which was intended to buy the government time to renegotiate parts of 
the program with which they disagreed.32 The new government immediately created the 
Economic Management Council (EMC), which consisted of the Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister) Enda Kenny, Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) Eamon Gilmore, Minister of 
Finance Michael Noonan, and the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform Brendan 
Howlin. The government also began work to form the Department of Public Expenditure 
and Reform, which would become operational in July 2011. 
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Throughout the remainder of March, Irish bond yields continued to climb as Irish 
banks came under further scrutiny and Portugal’s economic situation continued to 
deteriorate. Drafts of the ESM included language to force investors to share in the 
burdens of a sovereign default, leading to speculation that the EU was afraid a country 
was going to default. The fears of default and worries that Germany would continue to 
press Ireland over its corporate tax rate sent Irish 10-year bond yields to 10.7 percent at 
the end of March.33 A stress test on Irish banks at the end of March revealed that the Irish 
banking sector would need an additional €24bn in capital, which meant that the Irish 
government would need more than the €35bn allocated from the Troika for bank 
recapitalization. These numbers also brought the total for Ireland’s bank rescue since 
2008 to €70bn. The Irish government simultaneously announced a drastic restructuring of 
its banking sector, which was still dependent on the ECB’s ‘emergency liquidity 
assistance’ (ELA), by designation Allied Irish Bank (AIB) and the Bank of Ireland as its 
“pillar institutions,” splitting up Irish Life, and merging EBS with AIB.34 
Social Responses February and March 2011 
As the general election campaign began, responses from the public and broader 
society remained relatively calm, with no events or protests coming close to approaching 
the 50,000 person protest in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the MOU. Labor 
disputes during the entire first quarter of 2011 were very small and never approached the 
level of industrial action witnessed in Greece or Portugal. Overall, the social response 
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was very calm and did not disrupt daily life in Ireland. There were a total of eight protests 
in February and March of 2011, and only three with participation of 500 people or more. 
Additionally, there were only three labor disputes in the whole first quarter of 2011, 
which included 335 workers and a total of 2,451 days lost.35 
Public protests were rare and relatively small during February and March 2011. 
The largest protests were by nurses who were protesting government plans to cut their 
payments and eliminating payments to student nurses during their mandatory placement 
in hospitals during their final year of school. In mid-February nurses staged lunchtime 
demonstrations in hospitals around Ireland that had about 3,500 nurses participating.36 A 
week later, about 3,000 nurses marched in Dublin to protests the cuts and urge people to 
vote for candidates promising to reverse the cuts37, while in mid-March some nurses 
called off work in protest of the cuts, affecting services at some hospitals.38 Starting on 
March 6, a group of people in Ballyhea, a village in north Cork, began marching the 
length of the village every Sunday after church in protest of the Irish government making 
taxpayers liable for Irish banks. The numbers were small with the first march drawing 
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around a dozen protesters, 70 protesters on March 20, and fewer on the 27th.39 Finally, in 
mid-March, restaurant and catering workers protested in Dublin against working 
conditions and pay in the sector. 
Industrial action was very limited as it was contained to only three labor disputes 
in the first quarter of 2011. Of these labor disputes, the most high-profile was restaurant 
and catering workers, who wanted better working conditions and higher pay. While 
Greece and Portugal’s strike and industrial action figures are only given yearly, the level 
of industrial action in these two countries is significantly higher than what was 
experienced in Ireland in 2011. In total, Ireland had labor disputes in 201140, while 
Greece had 201 strikes and 116 work stoppages in 201141 and Portugal had 88 strikes.42 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q2 2011 
 The second quarter of 2011 continued to present the Irish government with 
challenges as economic data was disappointing. Despite these challenges, Ireland 
continued to press forward with the program while attempting to renegotiate aspects it 
disagreed with. Ireland also started pushing more for haircuts to be forced on senior 
bondholders at some of its worst banks, which was resisted from the ECB. Projected 
growth rates were revised downward, and Ireland received multiple cuts to its sovereign 
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debt rating as its 10-year bond yields continued to rise. Ireland had the added pressure of 
Portugal entering its bailout and fears of a Greek default. 
April was a difficult month for Ireland as it faced many headwinds. Germany was 
defiant in its insistence that Ireland raise its corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent. This was a 
non-starter for the Irish government across all political parties and was defended by Irish 
Enterprise Minister Richard Bruton. Bruton also announced that Ireland would reverse 
the €1 reduction in minimum wage that was part of the Troika bailout.43 In mid-April, 
Allied Irish Banks released a plan to cut more than 2000 jobs in order to reduce costs and 
shrink its balance sheet as part of the government rescue. This news came as AIB 
announced losses of €10bn for 2010.44 The uncertainty surrounding the total bill for 
bailing out Ireland’s banks and the doubts about a debt restructuring led Moody’s to cut 
Irish debt two notches, putting Irish debt at one notch above ‘junk.’45 Finally, following 
weaker than expected first quarter growth, Ireland cut its growth forecast from 1.75 
percent in December to 0.75 percent.46 
Throughout May 2011 Ireland continued to struggle in markets with their bond 
yields reaching over 11 percent in late May as fears of a Greek default impacted Irish 
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bond yields.47 The resistance from Europe to lowering Irish interest rates continued into 
May as France joined Germany in demanding that Ireland raise its corporate tax rate if it 
wanted interest rates lowered.48 Also, Portugal entered its Troika bailout and there was 
increased concern about the solvency of Spain and Italy. In May, the Troika also released 
its first review of the Irish program and the review was positive, noting that the 
implementation of the program had been strong and policies were in line with the MOU. 
Economic projections were revised downward 0.5 percent as investment recovery was 
delayed and economic growth for 2010 was revealed to be -1 percent, which was lower 
than the expected -0.2 percent.49 
June was eventful for Ireland for a number of reasons. First, Irish banks 
announced that junior bondholders would take very large losses (up to 90 percent) on 
their bank bonds.50 Second, Finance Minister Michael Noonan announced that Ireland 
wanted to impose haircuts on €3.5bn of senior bonds at Anglo Irish Bank and Nationwide 
Building Society. Noonan noted that the IMF and US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner 
agreed with the finance minister. However, the ECB and some investors remained 
steadfastly opposed, fearing that it “would be a very negative signal for the markets 
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indeed and could have repercussions far beyond Ireland.”51 Finally, Ireland’s bond yields 
continued to rise throughout June, rising over 12 percent in late June, indicating doubts 
about the Irish program and its ability to fix its ailing banking sector. 
Throughout the second quarter of 2011 Ireland faced significant challenges, from 
rising bond yields to disappointing economic data and resistance to renegotiating parts of 
its bailout program. However, the Irish government pressed forward, implementing the 
program, creating distance between Ireland and Greece, and receiving praise from the 
Troika and others around Europe for its efforts. 
Social Responses Q2 2011 
Protests during the second quarter of 2011 continued to be very small and the 
targets of the protests were very specific. The size of the protests never came close to 
approaching the 50,000-person protest from November 2010 and the intensity of the 
protests continued to be low. Additionally, labor disputes continued to be very rare and 
much smaller than the labor disputes in Portugal and especially Greece. 
The kinds of protests witnessed in the second quarter of 2011 in Ireland generally 
involved less than 100 people and were targeting specific policies or cuts, but not 
necessarily rejecting the whole Troika bailout. Examples of the kinds of protests that 
occurred include small protests against education cuts that would freeze hiring and cut 
special needs assistants,52 demonstrations of around 100 people against changes to Dublin 
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Bus routes (although there was a petition signed by about 30,000 people),53 those 
protesting banks repossessing houses, and homecare helpers protesting the government’s 
move to put home-help services out to tender, arguing it would lead to privatization of the 
services.54. The largest protest, which saw 8,000 farmers come to Dublin, had nothing to 
do with the Troika bailout. This demonstration was to urge the government to investigate 
the low prices being paid to producers by retail chains in Ireland.55 
Similar to the first quarter of 2011, there were only three labor disputes in Ireland 
during the second quarter of 2011. The three labor disputes involved 462 workers and led 
to only 572 working days lost. One labor dispute involved restaurant and catering 
workers, and they crashed the Irish Restaurant Awards Ceremony in Dublin, where they 
dressed up as waiters and confronted their employers. The Restaurants Association of 
Ireland wanted to end the legally binding minimum pay rates and improve working 
conditions.56 
Also similar to the first quarter of 2011, Ireland experienced a low level of protest 
and resistance to the Troika program. While there were protests, they tended to be aimed 
at specific policies and should not be seen as a rejection of the Troika program, as was 
witnessed in Greece. Additionally, the level of industrial action remained low and non-
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disruptive to everyday life in Ireland. 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q3 2011 
The third quarter of 2011 began with tensions high as speculation of second Irish 
bailout intensified. Ireland endured rising interest rates on its bond yields as well as its 
sovereign debt rating being downgraded to ‘junk’ status. Adding to the tense atmosphere 
was the situation in Greece, where the EU was trying to get Greece a new aid package. 
Yet, the fears of a Greek default impacted Irish bond yields and brought Spain and Italy 
further into the mix of possible bailouts as their bond yields also rose. However, once EU 
leaders agreed to a new Greek bailout that included reducing interest rates and extending 
maturities for Ireland and Portugal as well, Irish bond-yields began to drop. Ireland also 
received a very positive review from the Troika in mid-July, which showed signs of 
optimism. Yet, despite falling bond-yields Ireland still had concerns about Europe’s 
demands regarding its corporate tax rate as well as its ability to hit its deficit target for 
2012. 
July was a mixed bag for Ireland as there was tremendous pressure on Ireland but 
positive news that the country’s efforts might be paying off. Following a Moody’s 
downgrade of Portuguese debt in early July Irish bond-yields continued to rise and 
Moody’s also downgraded Ireland’s debt rating to ‘junk.’. Moody’s cited concerns about 
the Irish potentially needing a second Troika program as well as worries about the 
increasing likelihood of private bondholders being required to take losses in a second 
program. Irish two-year yields jumped from 13.98 percent to 20.11 percent in eight days 
and 10-year yields jumped to 13.98 and then 14.29 percent following the Moody’s 
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downgrade.57 However, just days after the Moody’s downgrade Ireland received a very 
good review from the Troika, stating that its fiscal situation was ahead of schedule for 
2011, praising the previous measures to restore its banking sector, and that the troika 
expected growth to strengthen moving forward as there was 1.3 percent growth in the 
first quarter of 2011.58 
During July, Greece was working with the Troika on finalizing a new bailout, 
which added more pressure on Ireland and perceptions of its ability to fulfill its program. 
In mid-July, eurozone leaders agreed to a new Greek deal that had benefits for Ireland 
and Portugal as well. Ireland saw the interest rate on its bailout from the EU drop from 
about 6 percent to between 3.5 and 4 percent and the maturities were extended to at least 
15 years.59 Adding to the good news, George Osborne, the UK’s Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, announced he was cutting the interest rate on Ireland’s bilateral loans from 
the UK from 5.9 percent to 3.5 percent.60 
The rest of the summer was much quieter as the Irish economy was showing signs 
of revitalization. Bond yields continued to fall, with 10-year yields falling below 8 
percent in late September and economic growth starting to make its way back. Exports by 
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multinationals such as Pfizer and other high-tech multinationals helped Ireland’s 
recovery.61 However, not everything was positive in the August and September. In 
August Finance Minister Michael Noonan raised doubts that the €3.6bn of cutbacks and 
revenue measures agreed to in the MOU might not be enough to meet the 2012 deficit 
target of 8.6 percent of GDP. These remarks met resistance from some in the business 
community as they warned against austerity measures that went beyond the agreement. 
The general director of the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), was 
worried that “austerity measures greater than those already planned would be at odds 
with the economic needs of the country at this time.”62 Also, despite being positive about 
the recovery in Ireland, the IMF cut Ireland’s growth forecast from 0.6 percent to 0.4 
percent in 2011 and from 1.9 percent to 1.5 percent in 2012, citing the global slowdown 
that would hit Irish exports.63 
Ireland made substantial progress towards fulfilling its Troika program in Q3 of 
2011 as interest rates from the Troika were lowered, bond yields fell significantly, and 
the review from the Troika was overwhelmingly positive. Despite this progress, 
unemployment continued to be high entering into Q4, Ireland’s bad banks had not been 
fully dealt with, and Ireland was still pushing to renegotiate parts of the MOU. 
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Social Responses Q3 2011 
Social responses in Q3 of 2011 continued some of the trends from first half of 
2011 but social resistance also intensified as there was more than a doubling in the 
number of protests from Q2 – from 11 to 29. Despite the increase, the number of protests 
still paled in comparison to Greece. The number of protests was more comparable to the 
number of protests in Portugal, but Portuguese protests had much greater numbers as well 
as more industrial action. Many of the Irish protests remained relatively small, reaching 
no more than around 2,000 people at any one event. Of the 29 protests recorded in the 
Irish Times and Irish Independent newspapers,64 only two protest were directly 
challenging the Troika, although many were related to cuts due to the Troika program. 
Finally, labor disputes continued to remain minimal throughout this time period as there 
was only one labor dispute involving 17 workers.65 
Cuts and proposed cuts to the health care sector were primarily responsible for the 
increase in demonstrations during the third quarter of 2011. The most contentious dispute 
involved the closing of the emergency department at the Roscommon Hospital, where its 
24-hour emergency department was replaced by an 8am to 8pm urgent care facility. 
Making this situation more controversial were the promises made by politicians 
(including Enda Kenny) to protect the services at Roscommon during the most recent 
election. In total, the Roscommon protests accounted for 12 of the 29 protest events and 
healthcare concerns accounted for over half of the protest events (17 of 29). Starting in 
                                                 
64 This number is in addition to the ongoing protest on Sunday mornings in Ballyhea Village, Cork. 
65 Central Statistics Archive, “Release Archive 2011,” Central Statistics Office, 
https://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/archive/releasearchive2011/ 
204 
July and continuing into early September, there were a series of events protesting cuts to 
the emergency services at Roscommon Hospital. The demonstrations ranged from a few 
dozen people to around 1,500 people. The events included a protest of over 1,000 people 
outside parliament in early June,66 600 people protesting outside the Roscommon 
Hospital in mid-July,67 protests along highways near Roscommon warning drivers not to 
get in an accident, and protests in neighboring towns. Protesters also made their presence 
known at events the Taoiseach, Enda Kenny attended, with 1,500 people protesting at the 
Connacht Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) final.68 Another relatively large protest 
included more than 2,000 people in the town of Portlaoise in early July. They were upset 
with potential cuts to its emergency services, but this was due to staffing shortages which 
were eventually filled. 
The protests against the cuts to certain bus lines around Dublin continued, as did 
protests against cuts to special needs teaching assistants. Similarly, the Sunday marches 
in Ballyhea Village in Cork continued, but new protests and groups also came into focus 
during this period. There was the formation of a group called “The Enough Campaign” 
that was against the Troika and its policies. They organized two protests with the support 
of labor unions, MPs, and other organizations opposed to the Troika. The protests 
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targeted Troika officials when they came to Dublin for the quarterly review in mid-July.69 
There was also the first protest against household and water taxes, which would become 
larger issues as the program progressed.70 
The third quarter of 2011 was a time of relatively increased protest from the 
beginning of the program, but as before the protests were largely centered around specific 
policies relating to health care, education, and the closure of certain bus routes in Dublin. 
While the number increased to something more similar to what was seen in Portugal, the 
numbers of protesters never exceeded 2,000 and industrial action remained very low. 
This time period did see the beginnings of protests specifically aimed at the Troika as 
well as the beginning stages of the movement against household and water charges, 
which would become more contentious through the program. 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q4 2011 
The fourth quarter of 2011 was mixed for the Irish as they continued to implement 
the austerity policies agreed to in its MOU and move the country closer to regaining their 
economic sovereignty. This led to praise from the Troika and other observers, but Ireland 
also faced many headwinds at the end of 2011. The global slowdown in the second half 
of 2011 threatened to derail its fragile recovery. New austerity measures in the 2012 
budget angered the business community, and despite the implementation of its program, 
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unemployment remained stubbornly high. Additionally, it would also be revealed that the 
Irish economy contracted in the third quarter. Finally, the Irish continued their efforts at 
renegotiating of parts of its program, as they felt their compliance had earned them some 
leeway. 
Despite the progress made throughout the third quarter of 2011, pressures on the 
Irish government and society continued to mount in early October as unemployment was 
still at 14.5 percent and figures were released showing that 76,000 people emigrated from 
Ireland between April 2010 and April 2011. Adding to the difficulties, housing prices in 
parts of Dublin had fallen 55 percent below their peaks and according to Moody’s nine 
percent of residential mortgages were in arrears of 90 days or more.71 Yet, not all news in 
October was negative as 10-year bond yields were down to 7.7 percent from 14.07 
percent in July.72 While this was still high, it was a significant drop from the summer and 
indicated that many believed Ireland was moving in the right direction. This belief was 
further reinforced as the media and investors praised Ireland for implementing austerity 
without complaint or mass protest. Also, LCH.Clearnet, one of the U.K.’s largest clearing 
houses, cut margin costs on Irish debt due to its falling bond yields.73 
Heading into the third review from the Troika in mid-October, Ireland was hoping 
to use much of the good news from the summer and fall to its advantage as it sought to 
renegotiate parts of the Troika bailout. The government had three goals going into the 
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review. First, it wanted to renegotiate their commitments to raising income taxes. Second, 
the government wanted to use money gained from the sale of state assets to invest in job 
creation as opposed to repaying its debt. Finally, Ireland wanted to lower the cost of 
bailing out its banks by tapping the EFSF, which had lower interest rates. The review 
from the Troika was very positive as they praised Ireland’s program implementation and 
commitment to fiscal consolidation. However, there were concerns that the global 
slowdown could hit Ireland’s recovery because its recovery was so dependent on exports. 
The Troika did not explicitly rule out any of the demands of renegotiation, but they were 
not granted at this point. At the Troika’s press conference, the European Commission’s 
mission chief for Ireland, Istvan Szekely, stated that it might be possible for Ireland to tap 
the EFSF, but it would depend on negotiations between EU states.74 
Despite the largely positive news in October, November was a much more 
difficult month for the Irish in a number of ways. In early November Ireland cut its 
economic growth forecast from 2.5 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent and the government 
announced plans to introduce more austerity measures to meet the 2012 budget deficit 
targets. Ireland would implement €3.8bn in austerity measures as opposed to €3.6 in the 
Troika MOU. Ireland also announced a new four-year plan in which it would implement 
€12.4bn in austerity measures instead of €11.8bn75 and announced that a number of large 
infrastructure projects would be postponed in efforts to meet the budget deficit targets in 
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its program. The new four-year plan called for cutting capital spending by €1.3bn in 2012 
and €7.3bn in 2013.76 Additionally, the Irish government authorized a $1bn repayment to 
Anglo Irish Bank bondholders at full value. Opposition criticized this as breaking its 
campaign promise to impose losses on bondholder to help with the debt. Making matters 
worse, Greece had just received a 50 percent haircut on its debt, leading to criticism that 
Greece was getting a better deal despite missing its austerity targets.77 
As November progressed, the pressures on the government continued to increase 
as Willie Penrose, the Irish Minister of State for Housing, resigned due to cuts resulting 
in the closure of a military barracks in his constituency. Only days later it was revealed 
that the Irish budget had been leaked to the German Bundestag before being presented to 
the Irish parliament, angering many in Ireland. With all of the praise being thrown 
Ireland’s way, some began to worry that the cuts were doing major damage and might be 
doing long-term harm. The Irish central bank also released a forecast projecting a 2.6 
percent fall in real personal consumption for 2011 and an additional 0.8 percent in 
2012.78 Ireland’s central bank also revealed that the number of mortgages in arrears had 
risen over 7,000 between June and September, bringing the number to nearly 63,000. 
Towards the end of November and as the EU summit approached on December 9, 
Ireland continued its push to renegotiate parts of its deal as Finance Minister Michael 
Noonan sent a proposal to the European Union asking permission for Ireland to tap the 
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EFSF, which had low interest rates, to repay €31bn in promissory notes it issued when 
recapitalizing Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society. Talks continued 
leading up to the EU summit in December as one of the main issues to be discussed was a 
proposal to strengthen EU oversight of budgets, which would require a treaty change. 
Because EU treaty changes require a referendum the Irish government saw this as an 
opportunity to continue its renegotiation plans. In exchange for holding a divisive 
referendum, Ireland wanted the cost of its bank bailout reduced by €15b to €20bn, which 
could be accomplished through tapping the EFSF to repay the promissory notes.79 While 
nothing was agreed to in December, this issue would continue to be discussed into 2012 
as Ireland looked for ways to ease their crushing debt burden. 
December turned out to be a particularly difficult month for Ireland as they faced 
increased headwinds from another austerity budget, lower than expected growth, and cuts 
to growth projections for 2012. Ireland released another harsh budget for 2012 in early 
December, including €2.2bn in spending cuts. €1.5bn of these cuts would come from 
social welfare, health, and education while an additional €750m would be cut from 
capital expenditure. Other measures included plans to cut the winter fuel allowance for 
pensioners, cuts to the number of assistant teachers for disadvantaged students, and lone 
                                                 




parent supports. The cuts would be accompanied by a €1.6bn rise in taxes80 and the 
overall, the adjustment for 2012 would amount to 2.25 percent of GDP.81 
Pressure on the Irish government continued to increase as it was revealed that the 
Irish economy contracted 1.9 percent in the third quarter of 201182 and the IMF cut 
Ireland’s growth forecast for 2012 from 1.9 to 1 percent of GDP. The IMF cited eurozone 
uncertainty and lower than expected domestic demand. Also, unemployment was still 
above 14 percent and over 40,000 Irish nationals had emigrated in 2011.83 Despite all of 
the negative news concerning Ireland’s economic situation, a stress test was performed 
on Irish banks that revealed they had increased their tier-1 core capital, indicating that the 
banking sector was beginning to stabilize.84 
This section illustrated that the end of 2011 started out with positive news as the 
Troika believed Ireland was implementing its program well and interest rates continued 
to drop. However, November and December proved to be more difficult for Ireland in 
many ways as it faced decreasing growth rates and projections, the passing of another 
difficult budget, high unemployment, and a global economic slowdown. Nevertheless, 
throughout the difficulties, Ireland persisted with its program and continued playing the 
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long game with the Troika in an attempt to be renegotiate parts of its deal in return for 
implementing the program. 
Societal Response Q4 2011 
In the fourth quarter of 2011, the frequency of protest action against the Irish 
austerity program increased compared to earlier periods, but the trend of small protests 
occurring sporadically across the country continued. Whereas the third quarter saw only 
29 protests, the fourth quarter saw the emergence of Ireland’s own “Occupy” movements 
in Dublin and Cork, which account for the increased number of protests (183) during this 
time period. Despite the increased number of protests due to the Occupy movements, the 
numbers of people protesting was still relatively small aside from a student protest of 
around 20,000 students in mid-November. Outside of the “Occupy” movements, there 
were only a total of 20 protests. Additionally, there were only two labor disputes. Each 
dispute lasted one day and there was a total of 580 workers involved. 
As the fourth quarter began, around 80 protesters mimicked the US’s Occupy 
Wall Street movement and place tents outside the Irish Central Bank to protest the bailout 
and austerity while demanding the government burn bank bondholders.85 A week later 
these protests would spread to Cork and Galway, and these protests would continue 
through the end of 2011. Although the camps remained relatively small, ranging between 
a few tents in Galway to 15 to 30 tents in Dublin and Cork. The amount of people 
participating was also small, ranging between 10 and 100 protesters at any given time. 
October saw a few other small protests, such as marches in Dublin involving 400 and 600 
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participants voicing their opposition to the Irish austerity program and “corporate 
greed.”86 In early October, there were also 22 workers of the Dublin bar, Shebeen Chic, 
that locked themselves inside to protest banks foreclosing on the bar.87 
Throughout November, the “Occupy” protests continued along with many other 
small protests and two larger protests, one by students and the other protesting against the 
closure of a community nursing unit. The smaller actions included some localized 
protests, such as 1,000 people in west Cork protesting changes to its ambulance service 
but most of the small protests targeted cuts in the budget and banks. Sinn Féin staged a 
protest at two branches of Bank of Ireland because the bank had refused to grant 
mortgage customers a 0.25 percent rate cut88 and around 2,000 people protested in Dublin 
against cuts in the 2012 budget.89 There were two larger protests, with the largest in mid-
November when around 20,000 students marched in Dublin to protest any cuts to 
education or raising of fees in the upcoming 2012 budget.90 The other larger protest 
included 5,000 people in County Laois taking to the streets to oppose the closing the 
Abbeyleix Community Nursing Unit. 
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As the year ended, small protests continued but there were no major protest events 
that took place. The “Occupy” camps continued, there were some protests against the 
closure of a nursing unit in Galway, and some people were upset at new septic tank 
charges, but major protest action was not seen. The protests in Galway opposing the 
closure of the St Francis Nursing Home saw “thousands” of people participate, but exact 
numbers were not given.91 New septic tank charges angered Irish in the rural parts as 
about 100 protesters interrupted a city council meeting in Galway in mid-December.92 
Additionally, veterinarians, who normally perform meat inspections, protested the 
government’s decision to move meat inspection jobs to civil servants by refusing to work 
more than their contracted hours, leading to some factories turning away farmers and 
operating below capacity.93 While December saw some protests, they were not large and 
did not cause disruptions outside of the ongoing “Occupy” movements in Dublin, Cork, 
and Galway. 
To summarize, the fourth quarter of 2011 saw a continuation of many of the 
previous trends in Ireland’s social response to its Troika program, but there were some 
significant differences in this period. There was a marked increase in protest activity, 
which was accounted for primarily by the “Occupy” movements, and there was a large 
student protest of around 20,000 people. Despite the “Occupy” movement increasing the 
total numbers of protests in the fourth quarter of 2011, these protests remained relatively 
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small and did not cause disruptions to society. Health care and education continued to be 
two of the most contentious issues for the Irish as they led to the largest protests. Finally, 
the trend of labor peace continued as there were only two labor disputes in the fourth 
quarter of 2011. 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 2012 
The new year for Ireland began with a mix of positive and negative news as the 
government continued to comply with the Troika while looking for ways to find savings, 
lower its debt burden, and grow the economy. The good economic news was offset by 
high unemployment, downwardly revised growth projections, and data indicating the 
Irish economy re-entered recession in 2011. Ireland attempted to renegotiate parts of its 
deal while having to navigate a potential referendum on the new fiscal treaty for the EU, 
which was essentially a vote on Irish membership in the eurozone. Overall, this time 
period continued to show that Ireland was dedicated to fulfilling its program but also 
made moves to ease some of the conditions to make its implementation more bearable for 
the country. 
January began with some positive economic news, which suggests that the 
economy was beginning to come back on track. The budget deficit for 2011 came in at 
9.9 percent of GDP, which outperformed the program target of 10.1 percent. Ireland also 
revealed that foreign companies made record investments in Ireland in 2011, leading to 
nearly 13,000 new jobs being created and helping Ireland’s economy return to positive 
growth for the first time in three years.94 Ireland also saw its food and drink exports hit an 
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all-time high in 2011 as they grew 17 percent from 2010. Bond yields continued to fall, 
allowing Ireland to return to bond markets where it swapped €11.8bn worth of treasury 
bonds trading at 4.9 percent for bonds trading at 5.15 percent. This move delayed bond 
maturity dates from January 2014 to February 2015.95 
However, the economy also faced its share of difficulties as the Troika cut its 
2012 forecast for Ireland in mid-January, which was followed by the Irish Central Bank 
in early February. Both institutions expected economic growth in Ireland to be 0.5 
percent of GDP, down from 1 percent for the Troika96 and 1.8 percent for the Irish 
Central Bank.97 Despite the revision, the Troika continued to praise Ireland’s efforts in 
fulfilling its program. Additionally, the Irish statistics office showed that house prices had 
fallen 54 percent from their peak in 2007 and 16.7 percent in 2011. There were also about 
130,000 people either in arrears or who had restructured their mortgages with their 
bank.98 Worries increased throughout February as the expiration of some major 
pharmaceutical patents, such as Lipitor, added to concerns about Ireland’s recovery 
because it would lead to losses in tax revenue.99 Finally, in March, the Irish statistics 
office released data showing that Ireland’s economy had re-entered recession as the Irish 
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economy contracted by 0.2 percent in the fourth quarter. This followed a 1.9 percent 
contraction in the third quarter of 2011 and a 2.2 percent drop in GNP during the fourth 
quarter.100 
During the first quarter of 2012 Ireland also made moves to stimulate its economy 
by leveraging its strict adherence to the Troika program to have some conditions relaxed. 
Ireland introduced several new initiatives to accomplish this. First, there was a new tax 
incentive scheme to attract foreign executives. Second, Enda Kenny unveiled a new 
action plan for jobs that included a loan guarantee for companies with trouble accessing 
credit, a €150m development capital scheme focused on companies with exporting 
potential, a €100m micro-financing scheme that would run over the next ten years, and a 
“finder’s fee” of €4,000 to Irish citizens that could bring new jobs to the country.101 
Ireland also hosted Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in a bid to attract more Chinese 
investment in Ireland. Finally, Ireland agreed to sell up to €3bn in state assets, which 
helped win approval from the Troika to reinvest up to one-third of its earnings from the 
sale into jobs programs.102 
In the midst of Ireland trying to keep its economy moving in the right direction, 
the EU passed its new fiscal treaty, which needed to be passed in 12 of the 17 Eurozone 
countries to go into effect. Because the Irish have to approve any significant transfer of 
sovereignty to Europe through referendum, Ireland spent most of the first quarter of 2012 
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debating the necessity of a referendum. The Irish government desperately wanted to 
avoid having its population vote on a treaty that could lead to a backlash against its 
Troika program or lead to the Irish being forced to leave the eurozone. Voting against the 
fiscal treaty would have also cut Ireland off from the European Stability Mechanism right 
when Ireland’s economy was starting to show signs of life. While the government did not 
prefer a referendum, as many as 72 percent of Ireland favored putting the new fiscal 
treaty up for a referendum.103 By the end of February, Prime Minister Enda Kenny had 
been advised that the Irish constitution required a referendum on the new fiscal treaty. 
The referendum was scheduled for May 31. This was the requirement because countries 
such as Germany insisted on the new fiscal rules being enshrined in each country’s 
constitution. 
However, the demands of Germany, among others, that the new fiscal rules be put 
in each country’s constitutions created an opportunity for Ireland to lower its debt burden. 
Ireland wanted to restructure €31bn worth of promissory notes used to cover the cost of 
winding up Anglo Irish Bank in return for holding a potentially divisive referendum for 
the fiscal treaty. Ireland wanted to renegotiate the entire €31bn, but this was rebuffed by 
the ECB and European Commission. After numerous talks between the Troika and 
Ireland, an agreement was struck to restructure its €3.06bn promissory note payment due 
at the end of March. Ireland would use a long-term government bond instead of cash to 
make the payment. While the IMF was supportive, the ECB was more skeptical of the 
move, citing concerns about losing credibility with investors and delaying Ireland’s 
                                                 




return to capital markets.104 
As stated above, the first quarter of 2012 was mixed for Ireland. There was some 
good economic news that was offset by high unemployment and the news that Ireland 
returned to recession in the second half of 2011. Ireland also made moves to stimulate its 
economy by leveraging the strict implementation of its Troika program and targeted 
investment. Finally, Ireland was able to win some concessions regarding its promissory 
notes despite the reservations of the ECB. Overall, Ireland’s strategy of ‘playing the long 
game’ regarding its Troika program was starting to pay off as it was beating fiscal deficit 
targets and could see some small rewards coming its way for its adherence to the 
program. Rough roads were still ahead with the referendum approaching in May and an 
economy still struggling to grow again, but the Irish could see their efforts beginning to 
payoff.  
Social Responses Q1 2012 
The first quarter of 2012 continued the trend of increased protest that began in the 
fourth quarter of 2011, illustrating an increase in resistance to the demands of the Troika 
program. While these protest actions were an increase for Ireland, they still paled in 
comparison to what was witnessed in Greece and even in Portugal, as the numbers of 
people participating remained relatively low. There were 298 total protests, of which the 
“Occupy” movement accounted for 231. There was also a day of protest all over Ireland 
against water and household charges that would be coming into place that saw 40 
different protests across the country. In addition to these protest actions, there were 26 
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others with 8 protests focused on workers’ rights or workers receiving pay after firms had 
closed. There were also 6 protests against cuts to education and four related to health 
care. Finally, Ireland continued to have labor peace as there was only one labor dispute 
with one firm. This included 75 workers and 161 days of lost work. Even though these 
protests were not on the scale in numbers of Greece or Portugal, they demonstrate that the 
Irish were becoming increasingly upset with the additional charges and cuts that were 
required due to the Troika program. This was particularly evident with the household, 
water, and septic tank charges, which led to the day of protests that included 40 separate 
protests across the country. 
The “Occupy” movement in Ireland, which accounted for the vast majority of the 
protests in the first quarter of 2012, continued from the start of the year, but the camps in 
Dublin and Cork were disbanded in March. The Dublin camp was forcibly disbanded by 
the police, but there were only about 15 people participating when the police made the 
protesters leave.105 In Cork, the protesters, which had dwindled to less than ten people, 
voluntarily left its protest camp a few days after the Dublin camp was disbanded. The 
small camp in Galway continued throughout the first quarter and into May before it was 
disbanded by police. 
The nation-wide rally held by the Campaign Against Household and Water Taxes 
was also another significant protest event during this time because there were 40 cities 
and towns that participated. The individual protests ranged from 10 at a library in Dublin 
                                                 




to 800 in Cork.106 The numbers were still small in comparison to Greece and Portugal, 
but this was an increase from previous protests across Ireland. 
Other notable protests during this time included protests against cuts to education, 
which saw one protest outside the Department of Education in mid-January of between 
3,000 – 4,000 people,107 another in late February that included around 2,000 protesters in 
Castlebar,108 and another in Donegal that involved roughly 3,000 parents and teachers.109 
There was also a rally in Dublin of about 1,000 people to bring attention to the impact 
that austerity was having on rural communities.110 
For Ireland, this was a time of increased protest with three separate locations for 
the “Occupy” movement, relatively large protests against cuts to the education budget, 
and a nation-wide coordinated protest against household and water charges. The numbers 
of participants were not especially large, but the increased number of protesters indicated 
a population that was growing weary of the austerity measures that were required of the 
Irish in their Troika program. 
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External Pressures and Government Responses Q2 2012 
Despite Ireland’s continued implementation of its austerity program and the praise 
it received from the Troika, the second quarter of 2012 was one of the most uncertain 
times for Ireland during its Troika program as Ireland faced a referendum on the new 
fiscal treaty. Failure to ratify the treaty could have had severe consequences for Ireland 
such as being shut out of ESM funding, delaying a return to bond markets, and putting 
Ireland’s Troika program at risk. However, the referendum passed in the end of May and 
the Irish ratified the new fiscal treaty. The uncertainty about the referendum also sent 
Irish bond-yields temporarily higher before continuing their fall that had begun in 
October of 2011. Ireland also faced other hurdles to its economic recovery as it continued 
to battle high unemployment and an ongoing European-wide slowdown, which led to 
lower growth projections. However, the second quarter ended with potentially ‘game-
changing’ news as the EU summit agreed to allow ESM funds to be directly injected into 
banks, potentially eliminating the cost of recapitalizing Ireland’s banks from the 
government balance sheet. 
While the government was relatively confident in the passage of the fiscal treaty, 
many commentators in the media were uncertain as polls throughout the spring showed a 
yes vote in danger of falling apart. In the weeks leading up to the referendum, polls 
varied as numbers of those supporting a yes vote were as low as 37 percent with 35 
percent uncertain and 24 percent against111 and as high as 53 percent supporting a yes 
                                                 




vote with only 31 percent against and 16 percent undecided.112 The variation in polls 
leading up to the referendum also affected Irish bonds as their yields rose from just under 
7 percent in early May to nearly 7.5 percent just before the referendum.113 The lines were 
also drawn pretty clearly politically as the Fine Gael/Labour Coalition along with Fianna 
Fail and the business community supported a yes vote and Sinn Féin led the no campaign 
along with labor unions and various socialist groups.114 Labor unions, while urging 
members not to vote ‘yes’ did not encourage a ‘no’ vote as the consequences of the 
referendum failing were believed to be dire.115 In the end, the referendum passed with 60 
percent voting ‘yes’ and 40 percent voting ‘no’, averting a potential crisis and notching a 
win for the government. 
Outside of the referendum, Ireland faced a mixed batch of news as it received 
another largely positive review from the Troika in June, although the review warned that 
Irish banks were still very fragile and that Ireland would face headwinds as the European 
economy was in a slowdown, which could hurt exports.116 The Irish Fiscal Advisory 
Council, which was formed in 2011 as an independent body to offer analysis on whether 
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the government was meeting its budgetary targets, issued a statement saying that Ireland 
would need an additional €400m in austerity to meet its 2012 deficit target of 8.6 percent 
of GDP. This came only a little more than a month after the IMF advised against more 
austerity out of fears it would damage the economy.117 Additionally, Ireland revised its 
growth forecast for 2012 downward from 1.3 percent to 0.7. The government also cited 
the slowdown of the European economy, which would hurt Irish exports.118 As the 
second quarter ended, Ireland announced that its unemployment rate had increased from 
14.5 to 14.8 percent during the first quarter of 2012, which was the highest 
unemployment rate since the financial crisis began.119 
Also, despite praise of Ireland’s implementation of austerity measures, the 
European Commission questioned Ireland’s policy of cutting public sector workers as 
opposed to reductions in pay, citing fears of the cuts jeopardizing the delivery of public 
services. However, the Croke Park labor agreement in 2010 mandated that there would be 
no public sector pay cuts in exchange for industrial peace, which put Ireland in a difficult 
spot. Finally, Ireland was given some potentially game changing news at the European 
summit at the end of June. Eurozone leaders agreed to make EU bailout funds available 
to be injected directly into Spanish financial institutions and the summit agreed that 
Ireland would be considered for similar treatment. If this was approved, the bank 
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liabilities Ireland’s government was responsible for would be removed from the 
government’s balance sheet, potentially helping Ireland solve its banking crisis that was 
at the heart of its sovereign debt crisis. The announcement of the deal sent long-term Irish 
borrowing costs down to 6.35 percent as there was the potential for €64bn of Irish 
government debt to be wiped from its balance sheet.120   
 While the second quarter of 2012 was dominated by discussions and canvasing 
for and against the fiscal treaty, which ultimately passed, Ireland faced a number of other 
obstacles on its path towards restarting its economy. Unemployment was still very high 
and even increased slightly, and the Irish economy was forecasted to grow at a slower 
pace due to the European-wide slowdown. Also, the Irish agreement with labor unions to 
ensure industrial peace had drawn criticism from Brussels as it worried about Ireland’s 
ability to deliver public services. Despite what was a very tense second quarter of 2012, 
there was tremendous optimism as Ireland continued making progress with implementing 
its Troika program, passed the fiscal treaty, and had the possibility of erasing the banking 
debt that was central to its financial crisis.   
Social Responses Q2 2012 
 The second quarter of 2012 saw a significant decrease in protest activity from the 
previous two quarters but had four protest events with over 500 participants. With only 
Occupy Galway remaining out of the three “Occupy” camps, protests during the second 
quarter of 2012 totaled only 70. Of the 70 total protests, 46 were at Occupy Galway, 
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which was forcibly disbanded in mid-May, and a further 13 protests were accounted for 
with the weekly protest walks in Ballyhea. When one excludes Occupy Galway and 
weekly marches in Ballyhea, which had small numbers of participants, there were only 
21 other protests in the second quarter of 2012. Similar to trends regarding labor disputes, 
Ireland had only three labor disputes involving only three firms, but they involved more 
workers (1,445) and more lost days of work (7,754) than in previous quarters.121  
 Of the 21 protests outside of Occupy Galway and the Ballyhea marches, only 
three events had over 500 participants and these included a protest outside the Labour 
Party Conference, a protest against closing a nursing home, and a May Day march in 
Dublin. The protest outside the Labour Party Conference in Galway was a collection of 
people upset about the household charge, youth precarity, and those angry at the Labour 
Party for breaking campaign promises. The police were needed to keep the peace and 
ended up using pepper spray on some of the protesters.122 3,000 people protested the 
closing of the Abbeyleix Community Nursing Home in late April, as the Health Service 
Executive announced the week before that it would close the hospital. Workers as well as 
residents participated in the protest as they hoped the government would reverse its 
decision.123 The anti-austerity May Day protests were organized by the Dublin Council of 
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Trade Unions and 500 people attended the march. People attending ranged from Occupy 
activists to anti-household charge campaigners to union representatives.124 Overall, 
Ireland saw a significant decrease in the number of protests in the second quarter of 2012 
and with the break-up of Occupy Galway in mid-May, the numbers fell further. Outside 
of the three larger protests mentioned above, the protest actions taken in Q2 of 2012 
remained poorly attended.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Q3 2012 
 The third quarter of 2012 for Ireland continued the trend of mixed news regarding 
the economic and political situation, but the bad news far outweighed the good. The good 
news was that Ireland continued to meet its fiscal targets and implement its Troika 
program, it returned to bond markets for the first time since September 2010, and even 
announced a stimulus package of €2.2bn. The bad news was that Ireland’s economy was 
still very sluggish as it reported zero growth in the second quarter and economic 
projections for 2013 were cut by the Troika and the Irish Central Bank. Irish banks were 
also struggling as AIB and Bank of Ireland posted losses through the summer and Irish 
banks had reduced loans to Irish businesses by roughly one-third from the fourth quarter 
of 2010, impeding progress towards a recovery. Also, youth unemployment continued to 
hover around 30 percent as emigration reached a 25-year high.125 There was also a 
disagreement in the Fine Gael/Labour coalition about additional cuts to health services. 
Finally, the bank bailout deal agreed to at the end of June, was thrown into doubt as 
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northern European finance ministers did not want the agreement to apply to debts 
previously incurred by governments. Overall, the Irish were doing everything the Troika 
wanted, but had little to show for it in economic terms.  
Social Responses Q3 2012 
 The third quarter of 2012 continued the downward trend in protest activity in 
Ireland witnessed in the second quarter as all of the “Occupy” camps had been disbanded 
and protests occurred with lower frequency and had fewer participants. There was a total 
of 27 protests and the weekly Ballyhea march accounted for 13 of the 27 protests. There 
were seven protests relating to health care and three protests related to workers and 
working conditions. None of the protests during the third quarter of 2012 involved more 
than 400 participants, which was a protest in mid-July outside of parliament against 
household and water charges.126 There was one labor dispute in the third quarter, which 
involved 400 workers and 571 lost days of work. This dispute was a one-day strike by 
Dublin taxi-drivers after the airport took away 55 of the 445 parking spots from taxis 
earlier in the week.127 After increased protest activity began in late 2011, much of the 
increased activity had fallen off by the summer of 2012 and protests around Ireland were 
very few and far between, with crowds ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Q4 2012 
 The fourth quarter of 2012 was a difficult time for Ireland as its efforts to 
implement its Troika program were praised by the Troika and others in Europe, but the 
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Irish economy was still sputtering along. In a major blow to Irish debt reduction efforts, it 
was decided that the June agreement to directly inject capital into bailed out banks would 
not be applied retroactively, meaning that Ireland’s bank rescue would remain on the 
Irish books. In addition to this disappointment, Ireland’s central bank revised its growth 
forecasts down for 2012 and 2013 and unemployment remained around 14 percent. After 
the criticism from the European Commission about laying workers off as opposed to 
implementing pay cuts, the Irish planned to move forward with a plan to cut a number of 
allowances paid to public sector workers. This put the government at odds with the 
unions which vowed to oppose the cuts as they would violate the 2010 Croke Park 
Agreement.128 More negative economic news appeared in mid-November, Ireland cut its 
growth forecast from 2.2 percent to 1.5 percent for 2013 and from 3 percent to 2.5 
percent for 2014 as its main trading partners were continuing to experience slowdowns, 
which were cutting into Irish export growth.  
 Ireland also revealed its 2013 budget in December, which added to the ongoing 
economic pain. The budget included an additional €3.5bn in austerity measures including 
€2.25bn in spending cuts and the new measures included a number of new taxes as well 
as a new property tax, which was particularly unpopular. The 2013 budget left income 
taxes and social benefits largely untouched but reduced the monthly child benefit by €10 
per month.129 In the weeks following the release of the budget, the IMF urged Ireland to 
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delay further austerity measures even if it meant missing its fiscal targets as it argued that 
further austerity would damage an Irish economy that was facing significant risks. This 
warning was announced just before the Irish national statistics office released economic 
figures showing that the Irish economy grew at 0.2 percent in the third quarter of 2012.130  
 Despite the flurry of negative news, Ireland had some positive developments in 
the fourth quarter. The eighth review from the Troika was positive again and the IMF and 
Ireland both agreed that being able to access the ESM to help Irish banks would have 
been beneficial despite the resistance from northern European countries. Fitch also 
changed Ireland’s outlook from negative to stable while keeping its sovereign debt rating 
at BBB+. This sent Irish 9-year bond yields to 4.7 percent, its lowest rate since June of 
2010. Ireland also sold €500m in three-month bonds at a rate of 0.55 percent, which was 
significantly lower than the 4.2 percent Greece had to pay. Additionally, Franklin 
Templeton purchased €8.4bn worth of Irish bonds, helping push interest rates down.131 
Finally, Irish banks were starting to show some signs of life as AIB and Bank of Ireland 
raised €1.5bn combined in November.132 Ireland also extended its bank guarantee 
through 2013 even as Bank of Ireland claimed they were able to re-enter debt markets.133 
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 The fourth quarter for Ireland didn’t offer much in the way of positive news as 
potential bank relief was thwarted and Ireland continued to face economic headwinds 
despite another positive review from the Troika. The June agreement to allow the ESM to 
directly recapitalize banks was basically dead for any existing debt and growth 
projections were all revised lower than previously expected. The Irish budget also led to 
backlash because of its new property tax and warnings from the IMF that further austerity 
should be delayed due to weaknesses in the Irish economy. Despite Ireland’s adherence 
to its Troika program, it was still unable jumpstart its economy. 
Social Responses Q4 2012 
 After two quarters of relatively calm responses following the disbanding of the 
“Occupy” camps, the fourth quarter of 2012 saw an increase in protest activity with 43 
total protests and eight protests with over 500 participants. Again, while not reaching the 
frequency or numbers seen in Greece or Portugal, this was a significant increase in 
protests for Ireland compared to the previous two quarters. The weekly Ballyhea march 
accounted for 13 of the protests, but there were an additional 13 protests related to health 
care cuts or changes in health care services. Six protests were organized against cuts to 
education and five further protests were held against banks. Most of the protests ranged 
from a few dozen to three or four hundred, but there were some protests with thousands 
or tens of thousands of participants.  
The largest protest related to austerity saw between 12,000 and 15,000 people on 
the streets of Waterford in mid-November to protest the government’s neglect of the 
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region and the possible downgrading of its hospital.134 In late-November an anti-austerity 
march in Dublin was organized by the Campaign Against Household and Water Charges, 
Irish labor unions, and far-left political groups such as the United Left Alliance and Sinn 
Fein. The march had around 10,000 protesters and wanted to bring attention to the cuts 
brought on by the government.135 Protests against cuts and proposed cuts to education as 
well as fee increases were also more frequent during the fourth quarter of 2012 as there 
were protests of 3,000, 1,500, and 500 highlighting these grievances during this period. 
While the Irish government was doing its best to hit its fiscal targets and keep the social 
peace, there were growing frustrations as a sixth consecutive austerity budget was passed 
and cuts to healthcare and education deepened. Despite the increase in protests around 
Ireland from the previous two quarters, the level of resistance still paled in comparison to 
Greece and Portugal and never veered towards the violence witnessed in Greece.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 2013 
 The first quarter of 2013 was monumental for Ireland. All the sacrifices the 
country had endured in its Troika program up to this point began to show some results as 
it was reported that Ireland’s economy grew 0.9 percent in 2012 and it accessed bond 
markets multiple times, issuing its first 10-year bond since 2010. The true turning point 
was when the government side-stepped the ECB and liquidated Anglo Irish Bank, 
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swapping the promissory notes for bonds with longer maturities and lower interest rates. 
This move created some initial uncertainty because it was done without an explicit 
agreement from the ECB, but it alleviated many fears about Ireland’s ability to exit its 
program as this would reduce the overall amount of money Ireland would need to raise to 
meet government obligations. 
 However, not all news was initially positive as 2013 began. The EU released a 
draft of bank rescue plans that walked back on the commitment made in June of 2012 for 
direct bank recapitalizations by the ESM, formally ending any hope that Ireland’s bank 
bailouts could be wiped from its debt.136 Irish banks were also facing a mortgage crisis 
that some were worried could threaten Ireland’s exit from its bailout. Housing prices had 
fallen 50 percent from 2007 and one in five mortgage holders was in arrears, leaving 
doubts about the banks’ ability to absorb the mortgage losses.137 Brussels warned Ireland 
in late-January that its recovery might be in jeopardy unless there was some relief on its 
€64bn in bank debts. This warning came as Ireland was continuing to negotiate with the 
ECB about restructuring the Anglo Irish promissory notes, which would have left Ireland 
paying €3.1bn per year for ten years on the existing promissory notes. The deal proposed 
by Ireland was rejected by the ECB in late-January because of worries it would amount to 
monetary financing, which is illegal under EU law.138  
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 While negotiations with the ECB over Ireland’s promissory notes had been 
ongoing for over a year, they were ratcheted up starting in September of 2012 as the next 
payment was due in March of 2013. As the negotiations intensified in early 2013 there 
was no explicit agreement between Ireland and the ECB, and the Irish government felt as 
if it was running out of time to reach a deal. The coalition was also in jeopardy as Labour 
argued it would not be able to be a part of a government that paid the promissory notes as 
detailed before the deal. The original notes had an interest rate of 8 percent and had to be 
paid back in ten years, costing the Irish government €3.1bn per year for ten years. The 
ECB governing council was meeting on February 7 & 8, and after meeting on the 7th, the 
ECB wanted to sleep on the decision. As the ECB continued to be non-committal in early 
February, Ireland moved on its own to start the process of liquidating IBRC and 
swapping the promissory notes. That night, the Irish government moved forward with the 
legislation to liquidate IBRC without the approval of the ECB. The legislation passed in a 
late-night session of the Dáil and the following day Mario Draghi said that the ECB “took 
note” of the Irish actions, which was essentially giving approval of liquidating IBRC 
without officially doing so. With the ECB’s “approval” of the deal, Ireland finally 
received some much needed debt relief and many people, such as Tánaiste Eamon 
Gilmore noted that this was the first time since the crisis began that they felt like Ireland 
would succeed and recover.139  
 The promissory note deal was a huge accomplishment for the Irish government 
and gave Ireland some much needed confidence at the beginning of 2013. After the 
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promissory note deal, S&P moved Ireland’s outlook from negative to stable140 and 
Ireland issued a new 10-year bond that raised €5bn at 3.9 percent.141 Ireland also reported 
that the economy grew at 0.9 percent in 2012 and the government reached a deal with 
trade unions for pay cuts and longer hours for civil servants. This was a deal for the time 
being, but four trade unions walked out of the meetings and the deal would need to be 
ratified by union membership.142 In the end, the first quarter of 2013 was a major turning 
point for the Irish. Despite an uncertain and chaotic lead up to the promissory note deal, 
Ireland’s strategy of playing the long-game was paying off as its debt burden had been 
lowered to a more manageable level and there was a significant increase in optimism that 
Ireland would be able to successfully exit its program and return to bond markets on time.  
Social Responses Q1 2013 
 The social response in the first quarter of 2013 continued the general trend of a 
low number of protests with a few events registering more than 500 participants, but also 
showed indications that the Irish were growing increasingly frustrated with austerity as 
more people began attending nationwide rallies against the unfair share of the European 
bank crisis that Ireland bore. The number of protests dropped from 43 in the fourth 
quarter of 2012 to 28 in Q1 2013. 13 of these protests were the weekly Ballyhea marches 
and there was a total of nine protests with 500 or more participants. Irish labor disputes 
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remained minimal as there were only two disputes involving 107 workers and 228 days 
lost.143  
Of the nine large protests, six occurred in early February when ICTU organized 
anti-austerity protests called ‘Lift the Burden’ marches. These happened in Dublin 
(25,000), Cork (6,000), Galway (2,000), Sligo (6,000), Limerick (2,000), and Waterford 
(2,000). There were an estimated 25,000 protesters in Dublin and all six locations were 
estimated to have around 50,000 participants.144  The marches were specifically to 
highlight unfair burden of the European bank crisis that Ireland had accepted. Unions 
cited recent figures from Eurostat indicating that Ireland shouldered 42.6 percent of the 
total cost of the European bank crisis. The marches occurred on the heels of the 
promissory note deal, but unions also wanted the European Union to honor its 
commitment to use ESM funds to recapitalize banks.145 The other large protests included 
a 1,500 person protest against the closure of a Garda station in Dublin,146 500 nurses and 
midwives protested a plan to pay recent nursing graduates 80 percent of the normal 
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salary,147 and a rally of around 600 people protesting the new property tax in Dublin.148 
While Ireland continued to see low numbers of protest throughout the first quarter of 
2013, there were larger protests that attracted tens of thousands of participants, indicating 
a growing frustration with the austerity program. However, the protests organized by the 
trade unions in early February came on the heels of the promissory note deal, which 
directly addressed some of the concerns of the protesters.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Q2 2013 
 Similar to much of Ireland’s time in its bailout program, there was a mix of good 
and bad news for Ireland in the second quarter of 2013. Ireland won some concessions 
from the Troika, which eased some of the burden on the Irish budget. The biggest of 
which was the seven year extension on repaying loans to the EU. The Troika also gave 
Ireland an overwhelmingly positive review for the spring of 2013 despite citing some 
potential pitfalls. On the negative side, Irish trade union membership rejected the newly 
negotiated “Croke Park II” in April. However, the two sides negotiated the Haddington 
Road Agreement, which was finalized and approved by union membership. Ireland also 
sparred with judges over their pay and executive interference in the judiciary. Finally, the 
official statistics supporting an Irish recovery were brought into question by a new report 
and it was revealed that Ireland’s economy was back in recession in the first quarter. 
Even though bond yields continued to fall, the Troika praised Ireland for its efforts, and 
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gave the Irish some much needed relief, the Irish economy continued to sputter along as 
growth was uneven.  
After the major victory of securing a deal on the promissory notes in early 
February, Ireland looked to continue making headway towards the exit of its Troika 
bailout. The strategy of playing the long game of strictly meeting its fiscal targets while 
aiming to gradually renegotiating parts of its bailout was continuing to bear fruit as 
Ireland (and Portugal) were given an extra seven years to repay loans given to them by 
the EU. This helped with the immediate debt burden and was intended ease its exit from 
the program in December.149 The Troika’s spring 2013 review was again very positive as 
it highlighted the progress Ireland had made at addressing its internal and external 
economic balances and projected confidence that Ireland was on the road to recovery. 
The report also highlighted challenges, such as a high debt-to-GDP ratio, high 
unemployment, and some issues with bank debt and weak profitability. Yet overall, it 
was another very positive review as Ireland also gained approval from the Troika to 
change or delay a number of the policies it agreed to with the Troika. It delayed the 
implementation of its water charges as there were not enough meters to implement the 
charge adequately and fairly,150 they postponed the bank stress test from the fall of 2013 
into the first half of 2014,151 and cancelled a plan to sell some of its forests to raise 
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 Despite the significant progress made with implementing its program and some 
help from the Troika in easing some of the conditions, there were still some challenges 
facing the Irish government regarding its newly negotiated labor agreement, a spat with 
judges over pay, and the legitimacy of the economic recovery. The biggest challenge was 
the rejection of the “Croke Park II” labor agreement by Irish trade unions. The 
government and union leadership agreed to a deal at the end of February that would 
implement further labor reforms and public sector pay cuts, but it was defeated by the 
union membership by a margin of 54-46 percent. The defeat left the door open to 
potential labor unrest as five years of austerity budgets had taken its toll on Irish 
workers.153 However, the government and unions went back to the drawing board and by 
mid-June unions had agreed to the “Haddington Road Agreement.” This agreement 
would help the state save €300m in 2013 and €1bn over three years by introducing pay 
freezes, pension cuts, changes to overtime, and an increase in working hours, among 
other changes.154 This agreement was approved by the union membership in June, but 
only after the government passed emergency legislation that would have allowed the 
government to unilaterally impose cuts to pay and working conditions.155  
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Irish judges also clashed with the government regarding pay cuts to their salaries 
and pensions. The Association of Judges argued that the government violated the 
constitution as pay and working conditions of judges are protected from interference 
according to the Irish Constitution.156 Finally, there were questions about the economic 
recovery in Ireland as it was revealed that GDP fell 0.6 percent in Q1 of 2013, primarily 
due to falling exports,157 and the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) issued a 
report arguing that Ireland’s recovery had been exaggerated by foreign companies 
headquartered in Ireland. According to the report, companies legally in Ireland, but for 
tax purposes (redomiciled PLCs), overstated Ireland’s current account surplus by as much 
as five percent. Ireland reported an official current account surplus of 6.1 percent, but it 
fell to 0.6 percent when removing the redomiciled PLCs.158  While Ireland was earning 
praise from the Troika and doing everything they could to hit their targets and return the 
economy to growth, it wasn’t quite out of the woods yet as some uncertainties existed 
about its ability to produce consistent growth and for the first time there was a real threat 
of labor unrest with the rejection of the “Croke Park II” deal. Nonetheless, the 
government responded and avoided a potentially devastating scenario.  
Social Responses Q2 2013 
 The second quarter of 2013 continued to be rather subdued in terms of the social 
response to the crisis as there were only a total of 26 protests, 13 of which were the 
                                                 
156 Jamie Smyth, “Row erupts in Ireland over judges’ pay,” Financial Times, April 16, 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/546d3c2c-a669-11e2-bc0b-00144feabdc0. 
157 Jamie Smyth, “Irish economy back in recession amid exports slump,” Financial Times, June 27, 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/35f13914-df1d-11e2-881f-00144feab7de. 
158 Jamie Smyth, Irish recovery exaggerated by redomiciled PLCs,” Financial Times, May 16, 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/eb114bda-be3f-11e2-9b27-00144feab7de.  
240 
weekly Ballyhea marches that continued to be small. There were only three large protests 
(over 500 participants), with crowds of 5,000, 700, and 600. During the second quarter 
there was a significant threat of labor unrest as the Croke Park II agreement was rejected 
by unions. However, as noted above, the government, unions, and their membership 
reached the Haddington Road Agreement the following month, which reduced tensions 
with labor in Ireland. In addition to these agreements, there were three labor disputes in 
the second quarter. They involved 2,408 workers and 3,417 days lost. The largest of these 
disputes was the 48-hour strike by Bus Eireann, which accounted for 99 percent of the 
total days lost during Q2 of 2013.159  
The 5,000-person rally that occurred in April and was a combination of anti-
austerity and anti-tax protesters. The anti-tax protesters were a combination of those 
upset about the household charge and new property tax, indicating that there was a 
segment of the population becoming increasingly resistant to the policies demanded by 
the Troika. The march began at Parnell Square and ended at Dublin Castle, where the 
Ecofin meeting was taking place.160 Another anti-austerity protest was staged on May 1, 
for May Day. The march was organized by the Dublin Council of Trade Unions and 
about 700 people participated as they marched through Dublin demanding a reversal of 
the austerity policies of the Troika.161 The other large protest involved 600 participants 
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and took place in late-June. This protest involved parents and teachers who continued to 
highlight ongoing cuts in education to special needs children. This is one of many 
protests against cuts to special needs students that teachers and parents had participated in 
since the Troika bailout began.162 Finally, Bus Eireann held a 48-hour strike to protest the 
company’s cost-cutting measures. The strike disrupted travel as tourist season was just 
starting to ramp up, but an agreement was reached a few days later after 23 hours of 
negotiating.163 
Similar to the first quarter of 2013, there were a small number of protests in the 
second quarter of 2013 and only a handful were very large. However, the frustration with 
new taxes such as the household charge and property tax were starting to become major 
issues for certain segments of the Irish population. Different from previous months, there 
was a real threat of labor unrest, and a 48-hour bus strike disrupted some travel around 
Dublin as tourist season was picking up. However, the protests and labor disputes were 
still very small in comparison to either Greece or Portugal, where the frequency and 
numbers of participants were much greater than in Ireland.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Q3 2013 
 The third quarter of 2013 saw most of the pressures on Ireland begin to lessen but 
there was still an air of uncertainty regarding the Irish Troika program. Ireland was on 
track to exit the program in December, but there were questions about whether it should 
use a precautionary line of credit, or backstop, that may have required further 
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conditionality from the Troika. There were also some cracks starting to show between 
Fine Gael and Labour regarding the budget for 2014 as exiting the Troika program would 
give Ireland some more flexibility with its fiscal policies. Despite the uncertainty, Ireland 
was still moving forward and finally seeing some progress with its economy and the 
Troika again praised the Irish for their dedication to its program.  
Small increases in interest rates on Irish bonds, going from 3.46 percent in mid-
May to 4.20 at the end of August,164 led some to question Ireland’s ability to exit the 
program in December. However, after this slight uptick in interest rates, Irish bond-yields 
started to decrease at the end of August and would continue to do so through the end of 
its Troika program. Ireland was also trying to negotiate a precautionary credit line 
without conditionality with the Troika. The goal was to provide more confidence to the 
market as Ireland exited the program, but the government was wary of doing that at the 
expense of Ireland regaining its economic freedom.165 There were also disputes between 
the coalition parties regarding the 2014 budget and how much belt tightening would be 
necessary to meet its fiscal targets as Ireland exited the program. The Troika 
recommended further austerity measures of €3.1bn for 2014, which Labour disagreed 
with, saying they were still committed to reaching a deficit of 3 percent of GDP by 2015, 
but that they were not required to, and should not go beyond that number.166There were 
other concerns as well, such as how the expiration of pharmaceutical patents would affect 
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tax revenues and the effects of high numbers of mortgages in arrears on bank balance 
sheets.  
Yet, there was positive news in the latter part of the third quarter as the Irish 
economy was beginning to improve after five years of harsh austerity and two and a half 
years in its Troika program. Ireland reported that it exited recession in the second quarter 
as GDP grew by 0.4 percent with exports and personal spending increasing and Ireland 
recorded a current account surplus of €2.9bn in the second quarter.167 Ireland also saw 
residential housing prices rise and a new repossession process was passed in parliament 
to help banks deal with the large number of mortgages in arrears. Additionally, Ireland’s 
sovereign debt outlook from Moody’s was upgraded from negative to stable.168 Finally, 
the government had another very positive review from the Troika, as it praised Ireland’s 
strong commitment to the program despite Ireland’s fragile recovery.169 While there were 
still some lingering doubts about Ireland’s exit from the program, especially surrounding 
the backstop, the heavy lifting had been done and Ireland was starting to see positive 
economic news as it edged closer towards its economic freedom.  
Social Responses Q3 2013 
 Social responses during the third quarter of 2013 saw many of the same trends 
from 2013, such as a small number of protests, but there was an increase in labor unrest. 
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In total, there were only 19 protests, of which 13 were the weekly Ballyhea marches. 
Only two of the protests were of at least 500 participants and the others involved fewer 
than 100 people. Labor unrest increased from previous quarters as Dublin Bus staged a 
three-day strike in August. There was a total of four labor disputes involving 3,032 
workers and 6,718 days lost.170 As stated above, while this was an increase for Ireland in 
labor unrest, it was far below the labor unrest witnessed in Greece and Portugal.  
 The largest protest of the third quarter of 2013 happened in mid-September as 
about 2,500 people marched in Ballinasloe to protest the government’s decision not to 
open 22 acute mental health beds at a mental health unit in their town. Labor unions, 
including Siptu and Impact joined in the protest as did mayors from other rural areas.171 
The other large protest in the second quarter was an anti-austerity protest outside 
parliament in mid-September. There were “hundreds of protesters” from groups such as 
Anti-Eviction Ireland, Pensioners Against Cuts, Republican Sinn Féin, and the Unite 
trade union. The protest caused major traffic delays as a group of about 300 protesters 
blockaded a part of downtown Dublin. The group’s dispersal required the use of pepper 
spray from police.172  
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 Labor unrest was still very low, but the three-day Dublin Bus strike made waves 
because of the disruption it caused to thousands in the Dublin area that use the service 
daily. Workers went on strike to protest an €11.7m yearly cost-cutting plan.173 The 
Dublin Bus strike accounted for 3,000 of the 3,032 total workers and 6,429 of the 6,718 
total days lost with labor disputes in the third quarter of 2013.174 While the third quarter 
of 2013 saw very little social reaction as the Irish program was heading towards its end, 
there were still very small but vocal groups opposed to a range of the measures instituted 
during Ireland’s Troika program.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Q4 2013 
Entering the fourth quarter of 2013 the most serious threats to Ireland’s successful 
exit of its Troika program appeared to be behind the Irish as they were looking forward to 
regaining economic sovereignty. Some still had concerns with Ireland’s ability to exit the 
program without a backstop as the recovery remained fragile, unemployment continued 
to be over 12 percent, and overall debt was still very high. However, Ireland would 
successfully exit the program on December 15 without a precautionary line of credit. 
There was plenty of positive news in the fourth quarter as Ireland moved closer to 
exiting its bailout, including a move in early October to suspend issuing any new bonds 
until after it exited its bailout program. Ireland argued that it had met its funding needs 
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for 2014 and was looking to convey this confidence to markets.175 Ireland also received 
approval from the Troika to reduce the planned austerity measures for 2014 from €3.1bn 
to €2.5bn. While Labour was much more enthusiastic about the easing of austerity (as its 
approval had plummeted throughout the program) the government coalition could now 
present an easier than expected budget for 2014.176  Yet, both the Irish Central Bank and 
the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council warned against relaxing austerity measures as it could 
make hitting fiscal targets more difficult in the future.177 Ireland also revealed that 
unemployment fell from 13.6 percent to 12.8 percent in the third quarter and the 
department of finance projected growth would hit two percent in 2014.178 Unemployment 
would continue falling as it hit 12.5 percent in October. The Irish also decided not to sell 
the retail part of Bord Gáis Eireann, the state gas company. Some questioned this move 
as they thought it might signal Ireland’s unwillingness to completely fulfill its Troika 
program, but Ireland pulled the sale because the price offered was too low and Ireland’s 
finances were significantly improved.179 
In mid-October Ireland released another austerity budget for 2014 that included 
the €2.5bn in austerity measures agreed to with the Troika. As mentioned earlier, this 
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contained €0.6bn fewer austerity measures after winning approval from the Troika earlier 
in the fall. The budget included cuts to unemployment benefits for young people and to 
health benefits for pensioners. It also raised taxes on alcohol and cigarettes.180  
The most contentious issue as Ireland moved to exit its Troika program was the 
decision to exit the program without a backstop. The debate about Ireland’s decision 
would continue up until December 15 when it exited its Troika program. Applying for the 
precautionary credit line would have provided an extra buffer against any unforeseen 
difficulties but applying for the credit line would have included additional fiscal 
constraints, which were deemed too politically risky given the finish line was so close. 
Turning down the credit line also made Ireland ineligible for the ECB’s bond buying 
program known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but the Irish believed they 
had built up sufficient cash reserves to cushion any change in market sentiment.181 The 
Troika and the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council pushed for Ireland to take the backstop as it 
would help reassure investors if markets turned south in the wider eurozone.182 Troika 
officials were quoted as saying that Ireland’s decision not to take the backstop was 
politics triumphing over economics as Ireland’s recovery was still fragile and some 
worried about potential holes in Irish banks as their stress test would be conducted in 
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2014.183 Regardless of the doubts about Ireland’s ability to return fully to bond markets, 
its high debt to GDP ratio, and its choice to not take the precautionary credit line, Ireland 
exited its bailout program on December 15, 2013, which was celebrated by many around 
the country as well as in Brussels and at the IMF.  
Social Responses Q4 2013 
 The social responses during the fourth quarter of 2013 saw a slight uptick from 
the third quarter as the 2014 budget had pensioners and students especially upset with the 
cuts to be implemented. Overall, there were 25 protests in the fourth quarter of 2013, with 
Ballyhea accounting for 13 of the protests. Out of the twelve remaining protests, there 
were five that involved more than 500 participants, two involving pensioners protesting a 
range of cuts in the 2014 budget and three involving students protesting cuts to education. 
The amount of labor disputes also slightly increased as non-consultant doctors held a 
one-day strike to highlight overwork. In total, there were five labor disputes involving 
five firms, 6,394 workers, and 4,602 lost days of work.  
 One of the largest protests took place in early October as students gathered in 
Dublin, Cork, and Sligo to protest cuts to third-level education. The demonstrations were 
organized by the Union of Students in Ireland’s “Fight for Your Future Now” campaign. 
The students were protesting cuts to student maintenance grants, which help students 
cover living costs, and any further cuts to education. There were roughly 1,000 students 
                                                 




in Dublin and Cork and between 1,000 and 2,000 in Sligo.184   
 The other two larger protests in the fourth quarter of 2013 involved pensioners 
and cuts to their benefits in the 2014 budget. In late October, there was a gathering of 
around 2,000 pensioners outside of parliament to protests cuts to benefits such as 
reducing the telephone allowance and bereavement grants, withdrawing medical cards of 
some 35,000 people over 70, and increasing the pension levy.185 The other protest 
involving pensioners occurred in early November as around 500 pensioners gathered in 
Cork to protest cuts in the 2014 budget. The bereavement grants along with increasing 
prescription charges and the removal of thousands from having medical cards were of 
special concern during the rally.186  
 There was a slight increase in labor disputes, but again, the depth and intensity of 
the disputes never reached the levels seen in Portugal or Greece. There were only 5 labor 
disputes, and the most high-profile strike was by non-consultant doctors in early October, 
who were striking to bring attention to the long hours they worked. Overall, labor unrest 
was very minimal in Ireland throughout the Troika program and the action that occurred 
was not disruptive in ways seen in Portugal or Greece.  
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 This section has given a detailed account of the responses to the Irish Troika 
program from November 2010 through December 2013. During the Irish program there 
were some initial signs of resistance to the program from opposition political parties, 
labor unions, and the public, but this resistance was rather short-lived. Politically, Fine 
Gael and Labour both voiced their displeasure with the Troika program but only aimed to 
renegotiate parts of the agreement and did not wholly reject the program. Once Fine Gael 
and Labour formed a government after the election in early 2011, they remained 
committed to implementing the program while simultaneously seeking a renegotiation of 
items like the interest rate, reversing the minimum wage cut, burning senior bondholders 
of banks, and getting the Anglo Irish promissory notes off the government books. Similar 
to Portugal, Ireland played the long game with the Troika and renegotiation, but Ireland 
was able to maintain a political consensus about its program until it exited the program in 
mid-December 2013. Social responses also began intensely as the weekend after Ireland 
signed the MOU with the Troika 50,000 people protested in Dublin. However, this would 
be the largest single protest during the Troika program. An occupy movement began that 
resulted in many small protest camps being setup around the country, but its effects were 
minimal. Anger toward austerity, the Troika, and the government did start to build in 
2013 as new taxes for water, property, and septic systems were passed, but this anger did 
not culminate until after the Irish exited its program. Additionally, many of the protests 
that did occur were aimed at specific policies and not a broader rejection of the Troika 
program. Finally, labor unrest was minimal throughout the program, with only a slight 
increase toward the end of 2013. 
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 The following section is the analysis of the Irish response. I argue that Ireland’s 
national identity as the Celtic Tiger offers a compelling explanation for the responses 
detailed in this section. The Celtic Tiger identity can be seen as influencing the Irish 
response to its Troika program in three ways. First, the Irish displayed a continued faith 
in their FDI-based economic model and free markets, despite a banking crisis that 
collapsed the economy and led to the Troika bailout. Second, the responses from political 
and social actors indicated that a strong rejection of the Troika program was “off the 
table.” Third, Irish elites made significant efforts to differentiate themselves from Greece 
and to some extent Portugal.  
Analysis of the Irish Case 
 There are three main features of Ireland’s response to its crisis that show evidence 
for the importance of the Celtic Tiger identity. First, across Irish society there was a 
strong belief in the Irish FDI-based economic model and free markets despite the 
economic difficulties that the Irish had faced. Even though Ireland’s economy had 
collapsed because of its banking crisis and subsequent government bailout, many still 
expressed a faith that the core of the economy was strong and that if Ireland could 
collectively tackle the banking issue, things would turn around. Many viewed this as a 
banking crisis and rejected the notion that Ireland needed to reform its economy. This 
was echoed by the structure of the Irish program as well, as the Troika recommended 
very few structural reforms in comparison to Greece and Portugal. Finally, some 
economists viewed the program as a missed opportunity to make necessary adjustments 
to the economy, as many were eager to simply return to the policies that were responsible 
for its previous prosperity. Second, similar to and even more so than Portugal, the 
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responses from societal actors, policymakers, and government leaders indicated that a 
strong rejection of the overall program was off the table. Outside of some initial 
posturing by mainstream opposition parties (Fine Gael and Labour) and labor unions such 
as ICTU and Siptu, there was no serious consideration given to rejecting the program. 
Instead, the mainstream organizations that offered criticisms highlighted specific issues 
such as the interest rates of the loans, burning bondholders of banks, or length of the 
program, and not an outright rejection. On the fringes, far left parties such as Sinn Fein 
and groups like People Before Profit wholly rejected the Troika program, but their 
influence was minimal as they never successfully organized broad resistance to the 
program. Protests were organized but tended to be small in size and number, and 
primarily focused on specific policies as opposed to the Troika program broadly. Labor 
unrest was very minimal, especially in comparison to Portugal and Greece. Finally, Irish 
elites made a significant effort to differentiate themselves from Greece, but also Portugal. 
Given the success of the Irish economy, becoming one of the richest countries in the 
world, and being a stable democracy for decades, the Irish felt bad for its two southern 
neighbors but felt the need to emphasize that Ireland is not Greece or Portugal. However, 
it was more important to distinguish themselves from Greece because of the negative 
reputation they had regarding their Troika program.  
 For the Irish case, the argument is not that national identity is the only causal 
factor at work, but the lack of resistance throughout Irish society and in its politics is best 
explained by taking national identity into account. There are certainly other factors at 
work in the Irish case and the fact that the Celtic Tiger identity is tied so closely to the 
economic interests, economic ideas and the institutions that govern the economy makes 
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Ireland an exceptionally hard case to isolate the role of identity. Despite Ireland’s 
program being somewhat “easier” than the Greek or Portuguese programs, Ireland still 
had a difficult economic adjustment on top of austerity budgets from 2008 – 2010 along 
with some structural reforms. The major difference between Ireland and the other two 
bailout countries is that Ireland’s crisis was not the result of out of control public 
spending, but was unequivocally a crisis in its private banks, which was then transferred 
to the public sector. The Irish were asked to cut services, jobs, and salaries while raising 
taxes all in order to pay for its banks that had gone bust and yet no major anti-bank 
movement or anti-austerity movement formed in response. The general acceptance of 
austerity measures to pay for bad decisions that most Irish had no part in, seems to 
indicate a deep faith in the market and Ireland’s economic model.  
Economic ideas appear to be a promising explanation for the Irish case, and it is 
not surprising that many people in Ireland are pro-market. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil are 
both center right parties and have dominated Irish politics. However, the buy-in to the 
Troika program from those on the left seems to indicate that the role of economic ideas is 
likely subordinate to another factor. Further, one must ask how people come to have 
certain views about markets, not just what views they hold. Arguing that people hold 
certain views is different from understanding where those views originated but 
differentiating between the two is helpful for illustrating the role of identity. In this case, 
it is argued that national identity plays an important role on understanding where these 
economic ideas originate, indicating it plays a significant role in Ireland’s response. 
While those in the Labour Party and in labor unions did not agree with everything in the 
Troika program, their suggestions for tweaking the program were anything but radical, 
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indicating that they were mostly on board with the requirements of the program. They 
sought mainly to tweak the parts they felt were most unfair. The relative acceptance of 
standard neo-liberal policies by many on the left suggest a major role for national identity 
in influencing the Irish response to its Troika program. 
 Unlike Portugal and Greece, institutional barriers to the Troika program’s 
implementation were much less prevalent. There is no general right to strike, and 
employers are not required to recognize unions, which may explain some of the lack of 
protests and strikes but fails to account for why larger and more sustained manifestations 
were not attempted. Institutionalism is also another explanation that could be enmeshed 
with the Celtic Tiger identity. Because the FDI-based growth model had been in place for 
some time before the Irish crisis, many of the existing institutions helped reinforce and 
promote the status quo. However, an absence of institutional barriers and some modest 
organizational incentives does not appear to be an adequate explanation for why political 
parties across the political spectrum would agree to implement difficult and costly 
policies. Additionally, institutions fail to explain why a population would agree to take on 
major social costs and public cuts to bail out private banks that were widely seen as 
having been reckless.  
Irish National Identity – From Catholic Ireland to The Celtic Tiger 
 The term Celtic Tiger was coined in 1994 by Kevin Gardiner from Morgan 
Stanley and suggested comparisons with the East Asian “Tiger”187 economies that had 
experienced high growth between the 1960s and the 1990s. Ireland’s journey from a 
poor, backward, isolated, former colony of Britain to the Celtic Tiger began well before 
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the 1990s and this journey transformed Ireland’s economy, country, and national identity. 
After decades of poverty following Irish independence, new Irish leaders made a decisive 
move away from the isolationist, Catholic, anti-materialistic, rural, and anti-modern 
vision of the leaders of Irish independence to one defined by modernization, economic 
growth, and integration into the global economy.188  
 After Ireland achieved independence from Britain and following the Irish Civil 
War the main focus of nation-building was to create a truly Irish Ireland that emphasized 
frugality, a rural anti-materialistic lifestyle, and Catholic moral codes.189  This vision had 
been shared by all sides of Irish nationalism since the 1890s and continued in the 1920s 
under the leadership of W.T. Cosgrave190 and later Father Edward Cahill and Éamon de 
Valera. Under Cosgrave Ireland made the Irish language mandatory in primary school 
and passed Catholic moral legislation, such as outlawing divorce and artificial 
contraception. The Irish government also sought to keep the Irish pure by “turning back 
the filthy modern tide.”191 Ireland setup a Censorship Board that had to approve 
literature, movies, and news. While these efforts to create Catholic Ireland had some 
critics, there were also some who thought the government did not go far enough 
incorporating Catholic moral teaching into the law. In particular, this group included 
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Éamon de Valera and the Fianna Fáil party.192 
 De Valera, who left Sinn Féin in 1926 because they refused to recognize the Irish 
Free State, founded Fianna Fáil two months later. Fianna Fáil took over the reins of 
government in 1932193 and continued the cultural vision of an Irish Ireland with Catholic 
morality. He also oversaw the ratification of a new constitution in 1937 that further 
enshrined the vision of Irish Ireland, as it focused on Catholic moral codes, rural living, 
and anti-materialism.194 While the new constitution enshrined Catholic moral codes into 
law, it did not enshrine Catholicism into the constitution as religious freedom was 
protected, leaving the door open to eventual reunification with Northern Ireland.195   
Under De Valera’s leadership, Ireland also turned inward economically. De 
Valera sought to make Ireland economically self-sufficient where the Irish were 
dependent on no other state and Irish industry would be controlled by Irish industrialists 
and not foreigners. Ireland imposed high tariffs and passed legislation to limit foreign 
capital’s access to Irish industries. This largely insulated Ireland from the worst of the 
Great Depression and during WWII Ireland remained neutral and emerged largely 
unscathed. The policies of self-sufficiency and isolationism appeared to be validated as 
unlike the rest of Europe, the Irish had plenty of fuel thanks to the turf from its bogs, and 
food was in plentiful supply. The apparent success of the 1930s and the WWII period 
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only further entrenched the vision of a self-sufficient, Irish Ireland.196 
Following WWII many felt the vision for Irish Ireland was coming to fruition, but 
the post-war period and the 1950s would prove to be an extremely difficult time for the 
Irish. The failures of the 1950s would begin a process of profound change in Ireland. In 
addition to a tumultuous political landscape with four different governments between 
1948 and 1957 the economy was stagnant as protectionism and import substitution 
strategies failed. The economy averaged less than one percent growth throughout the 
1950s. Emigration and unemployment were also consistent problems as young adults 
(primarily men) sought work elsewhere.197 These challenges led to a new generation of 
politicians coming to power by the end of the 1950s who were not as connected to the 
Revolution and the vision of an Irish Ireland as the leaders through the 1950s.  
De Valera left politics in 1959 and was replaced by Seán Lemass, who would 
plant the initial seeds for Ireland’s dramatic transition from Irish Ireland to the Celtic 
Tiger. There were two primary documents that were the springboard for big changes in 
Ireland. The first was the 1958 report by T.K. Whitaker, the Secretary of the Department 
of Finance, Economic Development. Whitaker argued that the Irish state should have a 
more direct role in economic development, and this would be necessary if Ireland was 
ever going to modernize. It was essentially an embrace of Keynesianism and using the 
state to “pump-prime economic growth.”198 This led Ireland to eschew protectionism and 
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welcome more foreign direct investment (FDI), with the help of the Irish Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA).199 Ireland’s regime of low taxes and low wages, along 
with massive FDI in the 1960s, brought 350 foreign firms to Ireland.200  
The second crucial document was a 1965 OECD report, Investing in Education. 
This report had a significant impact on Ireland’s economic development in the second 
half of the 20th century as it jumpstarted an overhaul of Ireland’s education system. The 
report that revealed Ireland’s education system to be wholly inadequate, with large 
disparities in outcomes and a lack of opportunities for poorer children to move beyond 
primary school. Investing in Education moved the focus of the Irish education system to 
the development of human capital and away from the prevailing views of education in 
Ireland, especially the “obsession with Gaelicization and religion.”201 Although financial 
investment in schools didn’t greatly increase until the mid-1970s,202 significant reforms 
were made starting in the 1960s. The minimum age to leave school was raised to 15 and 
free secondary school (as well as transportation) was instituted. This led to an increase in 
secondary school enrollment from 96,058 in 1958 to 116,859 in 1968. New colleges and 
technical schools were built, university attendees doubled between 1961 and 1971, and 
attendance at technical colleges grew by four times.203 While the outcomes of reinventing 
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the Irish education system have been unevenly distributed,204 these changed to the 
education system marked a monumental shift for Ireland that would help set the stage for 
the Celtic Tiger. By the end of the century Ireland would have a well-educated, high-tech 
labor force. As Bartlett (2010) states, “It seems clear that the origins of the Celtic Tiger 
economy of the 1990s can be located in the decision to extend secondary education to all. 
In terms of the educational and social benefits, the results were incalculable.”205 
In addition to specific policies to aid in Ireland’s development and modernization, 
Whitaker published many articles about the need for a new mindset and a new national 
ideology within the Irish population.206 Whitaker believed the Irish needed to stop 
focusing on the ideals of Irish Ireland and embrace a more growth-oriented mindset.207 
One example is the Irish view of FDI. Many Irish still thought of FDI as “code for British 
recolonization of Europe”208 and Whitaker believed that attitudes such as these needed to 
be eliminated if Ireland was ever going to be prosperous. As the ideas in Economic 
Development and Investing in Education were embraced by a younger generation of 
politicians and intellectuals a new nation-building renaissance myth was created that 
challenged the romantic nationalism of Irish Ireland. As Fanning (2008) explains, “The 
developmental narrative was…crucially important in constituting an economic nation-
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building project of modernisation.”209 
The embrace of this new economic nation-building project was aided by the 
horrible experience of the 1950s in Ireland, which largely discredited the protectionist 
and isolationist economic policies of De Valera. As Ireland opened up its economy in the 
1960s, a new generation of Irish abandoned the previous vision of Ireland as self-
sufficient, isolationist, and autarkic and Irish Ireland began to be supplanted by a new 
dogma focused on economic growth.210 Irish attitudes towards this vision continued 
through the 1960s and into the 1970s, but Ireland saw challenges to the economic success 
of the 1960s. The excessive borrowing and spending along with the oil crises of the 
1970s left Ireland in a dire situation by the beginning of the 1980s. Unemployment was 
upwards of 17 percent, emigration had returned, inflation was around 20 percent, and the 
national debt was over 120 percent of GDP.211 
Despite these challenges, the 1970s were also crucial for continuing Ireland’s 
economic growth and modernization nation-building project. Ireland joined the EEC in 
1973, which had massive support by the public. With 71 percent voter turnout, 83 percent 
of Irish voted to join the EEC in 1972. The joining of the EEC was seen by some as 
further signaling that Ireland was breaking from its past.212 By joining the EEC, Ireland 
was now less dependent on the UK for its economy213 and the Irish government argued 
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that participation in EEC institutions would extend Ireland’s sovereignty.214 Ireland was 
also a recipient of large structural funds from the EEC and later the EU, which helped 
with infrastructure projects and furthered Ireland’s modernization. Ireland received £13 
billion in grants and subsidies between 1973 and 1991 and a further £20 billion in EU 
structural funds between 1985 and 2000.215 Former Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald also 
noted that Ireland joining the EEC was a major factor for the takeoff of Ireland’s Celtic 
Tiger economy, saying:  
Had it not been for the opening of the European market to the Irish-made products 
as a result of EC membership, none of these advantages, natural or policy-created, 
could have produced the kind of economic growth that Ireland has experienced 
during most of the period since the 1960s…It was the availability of this 
European market that initially created the scale of demand for labour in Ireland 
that eventually became such an extraordinary feature of the 1990s.216 
The move towards Europe not only continued the break from Ireland’s isolationist and 
protectionist past but was indispensable for positioning Ireland’s economy to become the 
Celtic Tiger in the 1990s.  
 In addition to joining the EEC in 1973, the 1970s were a defining decade for the 
IDA, which became autonomous from the government in 1969, and an autonomous state-
sponsored body in the 1970s. Under the leadership of Michael Killeen, the IDA was 
revolutionized.217 Starting in the 1970s and continuing into the Celtic Tiger years, the 
IDA focused on attracting industry leaders in high-growth sectors of the economy such as 
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pharmaceuticals, IT, software, and food processing. The IDA particularly focused on 
American companies and this strategy started to show promise by the end of the 1970s 
but would not be fully appreciated until the 1990s. By 1978, 25 percent of industrial jobs 
were because of FDI and by 1983, 17.5 percent of the total manufacturing workforce was 
employed by American firms. By 1993 it was 25 percent.218 While the economy of the 
1970s was reeling, the seeds of the Celtic Tiger were continuing to be planted and the 
Irish embrace of Ireland’s FDI growth model and free markets persisted. 
 Ireland’s economic problems from the 1970s spilled over into the 1980s as it was 
another very difficult decade for the Irish economy. High inflation, public debt, and 
unemployment, emigration, and fraught labor relations were persistent problems. Despite 
criticisms of the management and structure of the economy – mostly from the left and 
those committed to an Irish Ireland – “the pursuit of growth as a national religion 
persisted” during the 1970s and 1980s.219 After three elections in 17 months a Fine 
Gael/Labour government held power from 1982-1987 and instituted difficult austerity 
measures that finally began to stop the economic bleeding. When Fianna Fáil won the 
election in 1987, it continued the austerity measures of its predecessors as many across 
the political spectrum agreed these policies were necessary to tackle the crisis.220 Fianna 
Fáil also took further steps to liberalize the economy that included restructuring the tax 
code to benefit corporations and continued to attract significant amounts of FDI through 
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the plans of the IDA.221 The social partnership process between the government, 
employers, and employees also began in 1987, leading to successive labor agreements 
have been credited as large contributor to the Celtic Tiger economy of the 1990s as wage 
restraint kept business costs and inflation low.222  
 The 1990s are when the policies and reforms of the previous 30 years came 
together to produce the Celtic Tiger economy. The Irish economy began growing in the 
late 1980s but spectacularly took off in the 1990s and into the new millennium. Living 
standards began to rise, as did consumption, with the Irish buying more cars and building 
new houses.223 Unemployment fell from 18 percent in 1987 to 4 percent in 2000 while 
GDP growth shot up with Ireland experiencing growth between 5 and 10 percent of GDP 
between 1994-2001.224 FDI increased even more through the 1990s and in the year 2000 
Ireland had six times the FDI of its nearest competitor in Europe. By 2005, FDI from the 
US was directly responsible for employing 100,000 people.225 Emigration had also 
become immigration as more foreigners came to Ireland looking for work and many Irish 
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who left in the 1980s returned.226  
By the turn of the millennium, Ireland had become one of the richest countries in 
the world per capita and the Ireland so many had been working to create since the 1960s 
finally appeared to come to fruition. The Ireland of its founders lost out to the Ireland of 
economic growth and modernization. As Foster notes, “Puritan Ireland fought hard for its 
survival, as we have seen, but it went in the end.”227 At the turn of the 20th century there 
were still questions about how the Celtic Tiger would transform Irish society and national 
identity moving forward, but there was agreement that Irish society had been transformed 
with the success of the Celtic Tiger.228 Ireland was transformed beyond just its economy, 
as the Irish had become a more confident people with an international profile that was 
envied by many around the globe. Many Irish not only saw themselves as transformed, 
but the Irish were now influencing the world. As Logue (2001) notes,  
The end to introspection, the turning outwards to the world and the new self-
confidence which are the results of both the Celtic Tiger experience and the 
involvement in Europe have had other remarkable effects. Our cultural influence 
extends through the whole world in many different forms. This process has been 
called the hibernicisation of Europe but it is fair now to talk about the 
hibernicisation of the world. Our music, dance, films, pubs, literature, theatre, 
athletes are everywhere.229 
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Despite Ireland’s economic success and its newfound confidence, the 
mismanagement of the economy in the 2000s led to real estate and banking bubbles that 
shattered the Irish economy in 2008. The confidence engendered by the success of the 
Celtic Tiger was severely tested as the banking crisis collapsed the Irish economy and led 
to an international rescue by the Troika. While the need for an international rescue was an 
embarrassment for one of the wealthiest countries in the world, the Irish retained their 
confidence that had developed throughout the 1990s and had faith that their economic 
model that had taken so long to realize was fundamentally strong. This mindset and the 
devotion of the Irish to their economic model would be crucial in helping them weather a 
most difficult storm from the end of 2010 through 2013. The next three sections will 
detail the ways in which Ireland’s Celtic Tiger identity can be seen influencing the 
responses to its Troika program. 
Faith in Ireland’s FDI Economic Model and Free Markets 
 The first way that the Celtic Tiger identity can be seen as influencing Ireland’s 
response to its Troika program is by the expressed belief by most that the fundamental 
elements of Ireland’s growth model were strong and that the policies responsible for its 
tremendous wealth would also guide Ireland back to the place of prosperity seen before 
the crisis. Ireland’s faith in its economic model, which is largely based on foreign direct 
investment (FDI), having an open, globalized economy, and a reliance on the free market 
was expressed repeatedly in interviews and in many accounts of the crisis, regardless of 
the individual’s political persuasion. The only exceptions to this attitude were the 
extreme far left, which included Sinn Fein and groups like People Before Profit, which 
comprised less than twenty percent of the seats in the Irish Parliament. Even more 
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striking was that, despite the banking and construction sectors being overwhelmingly 
responsible for the crisis, there was a popular, but not universal, sentiment that the 
responsibility for these excesses lay with the average Irish citizen and not with the banks, 
property developers, and politicians that enabled a banking crisis to bankrupt the Irish 
state.  
It is undeniable that the banking and construction sectors were at the heart of the 
crisis, yet many in Ireland seemed to accept that all Irish had to pay for the imbalances 
that resulted from these two sectors of the economy. While the sentiment that all Irish 
were responsible for the excesses and recklessness of the 2000s was more prominent on 
the right side of the political spectrum, it was still a popular position throughout Irish 
society. As an economist from ESRI summarized: 
I think the people of Ireland understood how the economy worked and understood 
this was our mess essentially, and we were going to have to dig ourselves out of 
it…They were very cross, quite understandably because the incompetence of the 
way the economy had been managed and the central bank’s failure to regulate the 
banks, the people, and they still are extremely cross over it but that doesn’t mean 
that you shoot yourself in the foot like, the Greek option where it’s like fish on a 
hook. That you rig it and rig it to try and get off it. Basically, sit back and take the 
pain and then move on was more of the attitude.230 
A similar view is expressed by Donovan and Murphy (2013) when discussing the 
overwhelming support of the electorate for parties broadly supporting the Troika program 
in the 2011 election,231 saying:  
It may be the case that the Irish people are realists at heart and recognize that very 
many of them benefited from the fruits of an artificial boom. Justifiably, there 
continues to be much controversy as to who (including foreign lenders to the Irish 
banks) should pay precisely which part. Nevertheless, there appears to be broad 
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acceptance that much of the cost of the excesses has to be borne by Irish citizens, 
particularly given Ireland’s small open economy and its dependence on key 
external partners.232 
This sentiment was echoed by others throughout Ireland’s economic crisis, especially 
policymakers from Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Former Fianna Fáil Finance Minister Brian 
Lenihan said:  
We decided as a people, collectively, to have this property boom…That was a 
collective decision we took as a people…we all partied.233  
Former Fine Gael Minister for Jobs, Enterprise, and Innovation, Richard Bruton, 
expressed similar views at the Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking 
Crisis in 2015. While acknowledging problems with the euro’s architecture, he said: 
The lion’s share of the damage, Chairman, was done to the Irish economy was the 
fault of domestic economic and financial mismanagement. It’s my belief…that 
the Irish economic crash, it wasn’t a result of a tsunami way out in the ocean that 
swept away a whole bunch of very sustainable and clever economic policies, that 
the fault lines that made Ireland so vulnerable in those years had developed from 
bad policy over an extended period of time, and that far from building on 
enterprise, innovation and exports, economic success had come from speculation, 
property, and debt…That was the flaw, in the…if you like, in the underlying, real 
economy. It was also was undermined, in my belief, by…a State that had become 
sluggish, wasteful, self-indulgent, in the way it approached its spending and its 
delivery, and the challenge of public service reform.234 
Former Fine Gael Taoiseach Enda Kenny sent mixed messages about who was 
responsible for the crisis. When he addressed the country in December 2011, he said, 
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“Let me say this to you all: You are not responsible for the crisis.”235 However, in 
January of 2012 at the World Economic Forum, he said, “People simply went mad, 
borrowing…The extent of personal credit, personal wealth created on credit, was done 
between people, banks – a system that spawned greed to a point where this went out of 
control completely with a spectacular crash.”236 These quotations indicate a surprising 
level of support for the notion that all Irish deserved to pay for the mistakes of a few, 
even after the imbalances they created nearly bankrupted the country. As stated above, 
this view was not universal as Simon Carswell of the Irish Times summarized before the 
Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis in 2015: 
I do not accept the proposition put forward by many of the key players involved 
in policy-making, banking, building, or regulating that there were so many people 
responsible for the crisis that it is difficult to pin individual blame on a few. Moral 
responsibility for the excesses of this period can be cast widely, but legal 
responsibility for what happened and what was permitted to happen far less so. 
There were a limited number of people involved in key decisions, in particular 
those decisions taken in response to the crisis that had major consequences.237 
 Just as revealing, nearly all interviewees responded that they believed the 
fundamental elements of Ireland’s growth model and structure of the economy were 
strong, and that their crisis was an instance of banks and the construction sector run 
amuck. Therefore, if those sectors could be sorted out, Ireland could get back to the 
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growth and prosperity it enjoyed before its banking and property bubble. When asked 
about the soundness of the Irish economy, one former Minister from the Labour Party 
said: 
The core of the Irish economy was sound. We had been in government until 1997 
and…the period of growth in the Irish economy had started in that stage, it was 
export led.238  
They continued when asked about the core of the economy upon entering office in 2011 
and indicated that not only were many sectors of Ireland’s economy sound, but that they 
needed to essentially double down on their FDI economic model, saying:  
We were confident about it. We were confident, for example, there were sectors 
of the economy that were sound. The food industry for example, was sound. That 
we had a strong tech industry, that we had…pharmaceuticals and medical care, 
life sciences businesses, financial services. We knew that that was sound. 
Provided it stayed. Provided it continued to have confidence in the country. So, 
we knew that if we could retain confidence by investors, first of all that they 
stayed with us, that they continued with whatever investment plans that they had, 
that we continued to attract investment, that we grew our trade. We knew that 
exporting, we’ve got to get back to exporting in the economy and that was why, 
for example, we revamped the whole export strategy, and…we established a new 
export trade council.239 
They continued about the new export trade council, expressing their continued faith in 
markets and the FDI economic model: 
It was completely joined up, led by the embassies. In a way we shifted our…focus 
of our diplomatic activity from…broader traditional kind of areas of diplomacy to 
economic diplomacy that the ambassador in that country needs a country team, 
which is all of the agencies and there’s a focus about getting markets and growing 
markets. And there was a big focus on increasing trade and particularly increasing 
trade for the indigenous economy. Enterprise Ireland became pretty important. 
The tourism sector. The idea of the gathering…getting all of these people back. 
That we set up this global economic forum, Irish people, business leaders who 
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were Irish, many of them very, very, helpful. And (Bill) Clinton, he came and 
addressed it.240 
This strategy of doubling down on Ireland’s FDI economic model, was also described by 
Eamon Gilmore, who was both Tánaiste and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
noting the global economic forum as establishing an Export Trade Council, which 
targeted 27 strategic markets for Irish exports.241 Additionally, a former minister from the 
2007 – 2011 Fianna Fáil/Green government echoed similar sentiments when asked about 
the Irish economy and highlighted the role of FDI, saying:  
The core was always strong. Yeah, the core was always strong… The core of the 
economy was always strong because you had this core of multinational companies 
and strong branded companies. The essential thing for them was stability, political 
stability. So, if we had ended up in Greek situation…people rioting on the streets, 
burning down the city, that would have become a problem for the essential 
stability of the country because the US multinationals who are here who employ 
350,000 people would say you know, and throughout all the time, throughout the 
period there was always, from 2012 on most people saw stability. There was 
always a stream of announcements of investments. And obviously tax policies 
helped things…But equally coming to the labor force, the Irish labor force is 
incredibly educated, incredibly flexible and the experiences…of multinationals 
here are very positive. That continued, and that pipeline always continued. And 
stability was the essential thing for that.242 
Similar sentiments were expressed from a former Green Party minister from the same 
government, saying:  
I won’t deny, our real economy had been hampered by the property bubble. Too 
much money was going into that and it was inflationary…but our underlying 
economy was still there. Now a lot of it is based on foreign direct investment but 
it’s not phony foreign direct investment. It’s based on real capabilities. Ok, yeah 
sure, Google need to pay more tax. They’re still employing 7,000 people here. 
You know, and even if it’s all just sales and backups type stuff, 7,000 people is a 
lot of people. And there’s loads of examples of that. And that economy actually 
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did reasonably well in the difficult time because you had a much lower cost base, 
no difficulty getting staff to come…the rest of the global economy recovered from 
the financial crisis reasonably quickly, so you were in a global market that was 
expanding.243 
They continued, discussing their faith in the Irish economic model:  
I suppose we had been through…in the late 80s we had a really severe decade of 
mass, mass migration and unemployment. We finally tackled it in the late 80s, 
tough measures again at that time. But we had that…in our memory, our living 
memory that says ok let’s just get on with it, do it, get out, get it behind us. And 
also, to a certain extent, a lot of the efficiencies in the Irish economy were in part 
created back then, so we didn’t have huge reforms to be doing…other people said 
you have to all this other reform, well actually we’d done most of that back in the 
late 80s/early 90s. So, it was more a case of just trying to get our basic fiscal 
position back in some sort of credible direction and then the economy would 
grow, which is what happened.244 
One representative from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) 
echoed the same sentiments, highlighting the imbalances is specific sectors, but 
expressing their faith in the Irish economy and its FDI economic model: 
There were lots of positive strengths to the economy. The investment in 
infrastructure, educated population, university sector was good, a lot of high tech 
companies, and a good balance…agri-food, tourism, financial services, software, 
ICT, Pharma, like lots of good sectors. So, there are positives and obviously we 
could build on those positives when we got the economy in a better place 
and…FDI continued to flow positively during, it dipped a little bit, but it was 
pretty good during the entire period. So, multinational sector, the foreign owned 
sector still had confidence in the economy, and they were investing. So, yeah 
there were still fundamental strengths, but alongside those fundamental strengths 
was a set of imbalances which needed to be addressed, which we allowed to 
develop.245 
The most revealing aspect of the above quotes is that they come from across the political 
spectrum, from those in the Labour Party on the left and Green Party that can be 
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considered far-left, to those in the center-right in Fianna Fáil. While it is true that 
Ireland’s economic model was successful up to the crisis in 2008, the faith interviewees 
displayed in the market as well as the Irish economic model across its political spectrum, 
even though the economy had just been brought to its knees, suggests the influence of the 
Celtic Tiger identity was a real, active force on policymakers’ decisions during its Troika 
program.  
Beyond those in parliament and the civil service that expressed faith in Ireland’s 
economic model and markets more broadly, even those from labor unions expressed a 
faith in Ireland’s economic model and free markets. A representative from one of the 
labor unions acknowledged the need to make the adjustment while arguing that the 
program should have been structured differently (this will be discussed later in this 
chapter), but the reasoning was that the Irish economic model allowed for the program to 
take a different structure. They said:  
The narrative really, from our point of view was that…this adjustment has to be 
made but two things need to happen. We need to make the adjustment over a 
longer period of time than 2015…and we need to kind of backload it to allow 
normal growth to take as much of the weight of adjustment as we can…Now, part 
of that you have to understand, was influenced by the composition of the 
industrial base of the economy here, which is hugely multinational. It’s dual in a 
sense. There is a kind of an indigenous base very heavily concentrated in food 
production and there is the multinational, which is pharmaceuticals, ICT, that type 
of thing. Our view was that those sectors were not really going to be hit too much 
by the recession.246 
Another representative from a different labor union was more forthcoming about their 
confidence in the economy and Ireland’s economic model, saying: 
Our core economy. The wider economy was actually solid largely due to the 
influence of FDI, foreign direct economy. But when you isolate, when you take 
out the banking, which of course impacted on all the other sectors, but if you 
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could isolate banking and construction, the rest of our economy…was quite sound 
and in my own union, on the private sector side of it, we were negotiating pay 
agreements of two and three percent per year going back to 2011…when we had 
deflation or near deflation in the economy. So, the underlying condition of the 
economy was very good.247 
What is most revealing in this quote is not just that there is confidence in an economy 
that had been destroyed because of its banks, but that the confidence was coming from 
those involved with labor unions, which naturally fall on the left side of the political 
spectrum. While both labor union representatives disagreed with the length of adjustment 
and the frontloading of the program, these quotes illustrate that a faith in both the Irish 
economic model and markets more generally was present even on the political left, 
suggesting the presence of the Celtic Tiger identity.  
An economist from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) also 
expressed faith in the Irish economic model when discussing meeting with the Troika 
right before the MOU was signed, saying:  
So, the Troika accepted the changes the incoming government made, and we met 
the Troika, that’s the ESRI, at every quarter when they were in Dublin and there 
were three things which they raised each time with the ESRI. The 
macroeconomics. To begin off with when Ashoka Mody was the IMF person, he 
had a seminar in 2009 in the department of finance and he was useless. He didn’t 
understand the Irish economy, wouldn’t read any of the research on Ireland, and 
said, “Ireland is, this is before the bailout itself, Ireland is, the model is broken, 
you’re not going to recover. And he wouldn’t read any research and I was 
absolutely furious. However, he was got rid of and they brought in Ajai Chopra to 
head it, who was extremely good, read the research, and they were too 
pessimistic, but you could understand why.248   
They continued, later in the conversation, speaking of the need to see the Irish crisis as a 
banking crisis and not a debt crisis as well as more faith in the Irish economic model:  
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And it was trying to convince Ashoka Mody from the IMF this is not a debt crisis 
and the issues of default or whatever, it’s not relevant. Ireland can trade its way 
out of this because the economy is working but we do have a problem with the 
banks. And there would have been a sympathy in particular from the IMF on the 
banks. The IMF were very cross with the ECB they, forcing Ireland to pay, now it 
was only about $5 billion so it wasn’t huge but forcing Ireland to pay the 
bondholders that the IMF really said this is crazy. So, the IMF were the friends.249 
A former official from Ireland’s Central Bank also expressed the confidence civil 
servants and politicians had in markets and especially Ireland’s economic model when 
asked about the soundness of the Irish economy at the time of the crisis, saying:  
We, almost without discussion, the officials and the politicians in charge and also 
opposition politicians instinctively said this is a problem related to the banking 
system and the excesses that have occurred in the property bubble. The rest of 
Ireland has been going fine. In 1996, 1998 Ireland was fine. Balanced economy, 
fiscal prudence. We…want to get back to that and our message both domestically 
and internationally is small little problem on the banking side, everything else is 
okay, your money is okay, your investing in Ireland is okay, the model is okay.250  
The faith in markets and the Irish economic model is further exemplified by some 
suggesting that the government really missed an opportunity to change aspects of the 
economy they felt needed adjusted. As the same former official from Ireland’s Central 
Bank said:   
Now, this of course to some extent was a missed opportunity for the politicians. 
Because they should have been saying the huge change in public expenditure has 
to go on and taxation has to go on to get back to the right place. What do we need 
to rebalance this? What changes do we want in society and, well it may be a 
bandwidth issue, it may be like a vision or imagination by the most Irish 
politicians. But they didn’t do that. They only wanted to get back to what was 
there before. In a narrow crisis management sense, that was a good point of view, 
but they also should have had some strategic thinking.251 
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They continued, when asked for clarification on whether the thinking was that Ireland 
temporarily got themselves in trouble, needed to fill the funding gap, and thought, let’s 
get back to the model we know works, and get rid of the things that didn’t, saying:  
Yes, yes, that’s, that was the way it was. And that was a missed opportunity to 
some extent, but for a crisis management it looks pretty good…I met people who 
think it’s great. Only Iceland did better than that.252  
This desire of many in Ireland to return to policies that ushered in its previous prosperity 
highlights another way that the Celtic Tiger identity was influencing policy decisions 
during its Troika program as the faith in Ireland’s FDI model seemed to limit what 
policymakers saw as necessary to move Ireland’s economy out of the crisis. 
 This section of the analysis has argued that the Celtic Tiger identity had imprinted 
on the Irish a faith in markets and its economic model that transcended its political 
spectrum, leading many to believe that the fundamentals of Ireland’s growth model were 
strong, but had just gone off the rails during the 2000s with banking and construction. 
Therefore, many believed that if Ireland could fill its temporary funding gap, the 
economy would recover, and Ireland could recapture its previous prosperity. However, 
the catch was that all Irish would be held liable for rescuing the banks and bear the 
burden of austerity resulting from the bad decisions of the banks and construction 
companies. The evidence suggests that many individuals not only expressed a faith in 
markets and the Irish economic model, but the popular viewpoint that the responsibility 
for the crisis as resided with the Irish citizen. That many Irish would believe it was 
appropriate for everyone to tighten their belts in response to banks going bust and 
needing a bailout from the government indicates the depth at which pro-market attitudes 
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were infused into Irish society. Additionally, the Fine Gael/Labour government 
essentially doubled down on the existing model and Ireland’s dependence on trade and 
FDI while earning criticism from some who felt that Ireland had missed an opportunity to 
make further changes to its economic model. With so many people across the political 
spectrum displaying a conviction in both free markets and the Irish economic model, it 
suggests that the Celtic Tiger identity had permeated much of society and influenced the 
decisions of policymakers during its crisis. In the following section this will be examined 
further by showing that many actions that would disrupt the Irish Troika program or 
threaten its economic growth model were off the table.  
Off the Table 
Further evidence of the Celtic Tiger identity affecting the Irish responses can be 
seen in what options societal and political actors considered during the duration of the 
program. The various options considered would not be classified as radical or disruptive 
in any way comparable to Greece as well as many of the responses seen in Portugal. That 
serious consideration was never given to anything that might disrupt Ireland’s ability to 
fulfil its obligations in the MOU or endanger the Irish economic model is rather telling, 
especially since it was widely understood that the reason for the crisis was because of the 
mistakes of its banking and construction sectors and not a wider societal problem. 
Outside of the very far-left, which had very little power, there was no serious 
consideration of defying the Troika, refusing to meet deficit targets, defaulting, or 
initiating major protests or significant labor conflict. As many of the quotes below will 
highlight, there was a sense that there was no alternative, and continuing a theme from 
the previous section, that somehow all Irish were responsible for the crisis and everyone 
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should bear the burden of austerity. This should not be taken as the Irish just accepted the 
demands of the Troika, but rather that they sought to play the “long game”, similar to 
Portugal, where they would meet their targets and seek to renegotiate certain aspects of 
their program. As one former minister from the Labour Party said:  
I think that it would be naïve to suggest that we were acquiescent to the program, 
we immediately established from the very first interaction (with the Troika) that 
we would have to have flexibilities. That in terms of domestic policy we knew 
best. Obviously, we have to live within the constraints in terms of reaching the 
deficit target of 3 percent of GDP in the timeline we agreed.”253 
The most remarkable of the responses to the Troika program, displaying the 
presence of the Celtic Tiger, was the general lack of public resistance to the program. 
There was a large, 50,000 person protest in Dublin the weekend after the government 
signed the MOU with the Troika, but no protest after approached that size or intensity for 
the remainder of the program, and they tended to focus on individual policies and not a 
rejection of the entirety of the Troika program. While the 50,000 person protest in late 
2010 was more aggressive than the initial Portuguese response, it was not representative 
of the overall Irish response and is quite different from what was witnessed in Greece, 
which had constant large protests, riots, and violence in the aftermath of the government 
signing the MOU with the Troika. Social action in Ireland was relatively small, and when 
the number of protests increased in October 2011 it was part of the larger globalized 
“Occupy” movement that started with “Occupy Wall Street.” Undoubtedly the Irish were 
upset about their economic situation, but there was not persistent mobilization until there 
was an international call to action, and even then, the Irish “Occupy” movement was very 
small compared to other countries. The number of protesters at the various camps around 
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Ireland ranged from ten to one hundred protesters at any time, whereas Portugal’s 
participation in the “Occupy” movement on October 15, 2011, which was considered 
timid compared to many other European countries, still saw over 40,000 Portuguese 
participate in protests across multiple cities.254  
Maybe even more telling was the lack of direct opposition to taxpayers being 
liable for huge bank losses. There were sporadic protests against the bank bailout during 
the Troika program, but the most sustained protest was in Ballyhea, on the outskirts of 
Cork. These protests in Ballyhea began in March of 2011 to protest the government 
making the Irish taxpayers liable for the bailout of Irish banks. While these protests were 
consistent, they were also very small, ranging from a dozen on the first weekend to 
upwards of 70 protesters. Additionally, they were not disruptive as they took place in a 
small village on the outskirts of Cork. The fact that this was really the extent of the 
organized and consistent Irish protest against the bailout of Irish banks, is striking 
considering the bank guarantee issued by the government in 2008 was equivalent to 
nearly 300 percent of Irish GNP. Furthermore, Irish protests were never very large, and 
when they did tend to reach significant (but still not very large) levels, they tended to 
focus on individual issues and were not a rejection of the whole Troika program, keeping 
most of the protests focused on local issues. For example, there were a number of protests 
that were aimed at very specifically at cuts to healthcare. 5,000 people protested the 
closing of the Abbeyleix Community Nursing Unit in November 2011 while there were a 
number of protests against the closing of the emergency services at Roscommon 
                                                 




Hospital. These protests saw upwards of 1,500 participants, which is much smaller than 
protests witnessed in Greece and Portugal. An example on the national level is when 
20,000 students marched in November 2011 to protest cuts to education in the 2012 
budget, but again it was a very specific policy and not a protest to reject the Troika’s 
whole Irish program. These are both examples of how Irish protests largely aimed at very 
specific and local issues and not the Troika or austerity more broadly. As public anger 
began to slowly increase in 2013 it continued to be in response to specific policies. These 
included the household and water charges as well as a septic charge in rural areas, which 
would become larger issues after Ireland left the Troika program. But even as the anger 
of many increased throughout 2013 it didn’t truly manifest until 2014, which was after 
Ireland exited its Troika program.  
As noted above, there wasn’t much of an appetite from the public to aggressively 
resist the Irish Troika program and interviewees from labor unions discussed having a 
difficult time mobilizing people for protests. One former labor union official expressed 
they difficulty they had with organizing protests and a social response even in 2008 and 
2009 when the bank bailouts were fresh and austerity began to be implemented, saying:  
There had been a lot of activity throughout 2009 where we tried to mobilize 
against what was a one-sided austerity agenda imposed domestically by the Irish 
government. I have to say that…we didn’t succeed in developing a very effective 
response…So, in terms of not being able to mobilize a very effective response, I 
don’t mean in terms of an alternative policy approach but because I think that we 
did have a reasonably coherent policy approach, a Keynesian approach, standard 
Keynesianism…But what I should say though is when I’m talking about not being 
able to mobilize an effective response, I mean in terms of the mobilization on the 
ground.255 
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The utility of protests was questioned by many, and even those in the labor union 
movement. When one former labor union official was asked about the lack of social strife 
in Ireland compared to Greece, they responded:  
I mean there’s a little bit of a danger that I would end up sort of justifying 
ourselves in all of this, but the reality is that we kept a strong hand on it. The 
protests themselves were of no particular value…other than they were good 
tension…relievers and it’s the only way you can you know we’re not happy type 
of thing to government. But…there was no sense that protests ever, although it 
achieves anything, but look any government worth its salt can survive a protest.256 
This was echoed by an economist from ESRI, who was asked about the absence of strikes 
and said:   
I think the people of Ireland understood how the economy worked and understood 
this was our mess essentially, and we were going to have to dig ourselves out of 
it. People…couldn’t see an alternative and if you went on strike, what was going 
to happen? The government didn’t have any choices. Were they going to cut 
welfare payments to pay? No, they weren’t. I think that people understood that 
there weren’t choices. They were very cross, quite understandably because the 
incompetence of the way the economy had been managed and the central bank’s 
failure to regulate the bank, the people, and they still are extremely cross over it 
but that doesn’t mean that you shoot yourself in the foot like the Greek option, 
where it’s like fish on a hook. That you rig it and rig it to try and get off it. 
Basically, sit back and take the pain and then move on was more of the attitude.257 
Throughout the Irish Troika program, not only was there an inability to organize 
widespread mobilization against the government or its policies, but the utility of those 
kinds of actions was questioned from those directly involved in the labor unions. Instead 
of a more confrontational approach in the streets they opted for negotiating agreements, 
which resulted in the Croke Park Agreement in 2010 (before the Troika) and the 
Haddington Road Agreement in 2013. Even labor unions were not asking for the entire 
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program to be scrapped, but merely a renegotiation to make policies more labor friendly.  
Labor unions also felt that they needed any protests to be kept orderly and 
nonviolent, with one former labor union official saying:  
So, but the whole thing was that we had to manage it and to keep it disciplined, 
controlled, within the labour movement, and try to move towards the best possible 
outcomes that we could get in the situation.258  
This is similar to what labor union leaders in Portugal expressed, but the reasoning as 
they continued was revealing as it focused on investor confidence. They continued: 
Yeah, there was no counter apart from people who wanted to actually burn cars 
and to things like that…But…we settled that very quickly because…we didn’t 
want to destroy international investor confidence in the country either. So, you 
felt…that you had to protest, but the whole thing had to be under control and 
fairly orderly.259 
When asked about whether the government had a strategy to ensure industrial peace, a 
former Labour Minister remarked: 
Yes, we did. We did…avoiding instability was a part of the strategy of 
maintaining confidence, maintaining the narrative that we were going to get out of 
this. And we had to maintain that narrative to sustain investor confidence, but also 
to sustain the confidence…we were talking to other member states, we were 
talking to the Commission…when the troika mentions yeah, they’re doing it, but 
this is going to work…I think a relationship with us of kind of (was) we have to 
check, ensure they’re doing everything, and weekly reporting, and quarterly 
review and so on, to one where they started to buy into our narrative that guys, we 
can get out of this, we can turn, we can actually, this can be a success… And to 
sustain that of course, maintaining industrial peace, talking to the trade unions, 
having the industry on board, having a kind of, you know, at that stage there were 
not big protests, so there was a sense that we were managing to get it done.260 
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An official from the Department of Expenditure and Reform had similar sentiments, 
saying:  
Yes…we were keen, so we were dealing with a crisis that had so many facets. 
Banking, fiscal, labor market and all the rest that we didn’t want to have industrial 
unrest as well because we thought that would undermine our capacity to have an 
economic model that would work, that would actually become viable and generate 
jobs again. So, we wanted to keep things quiet. So, yeah, so industrial peace, 
avoiding strikes, stoppages was a key part of it.261 
The fact that multiple interviewees referenced the economic model or investor confidence 
when asked about keeping industrial peace points to the impact of the Celtic Tiger 
identity on Irish thinking and interpretations of its crisis. Even in the Labour Party and 
labor unions, the reasoning for certain things being off the table centered on its economy, 
Ireland’s place in the international market, and maintaining the investor confidence that 
was so important to its economic model. By referencing international investor 
confidence, the labor union official indicated that the Celtic Tiger identity had indeed, 
permeated deeply into society. 
In addition to the desire to keep industrial peace, the strategy for gaining more 
labor friendly changes to the Troika program was less about popular mobilization and 
more about disseminating information about the specifics policies that needed changed to 
encourage support within the unions. As one former labor union official said:  
The messaging was quite sophisticated we spent a lot of money on it. The 
publication of materials, the kind of social media stuff and all of that. And it was 
kind of fairly simple stuff…it was a ten-point plan. Ten point plans are easily 
understood by people…So, yeah there was a lot, there was no popular labour 
movement descend from that. You know people signed up to it, they felt it was 
good, it was credible, it was working…to a degree that we could make it work. 
Yeah, so it was very expensive, but it was worth doing that, I think. It just had to 
be done…We just needed our own people needed to know what we were doing 
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and what our position was essentially. So, it had to be a reasonably good public 
understanding of our essential argument. And that’s what it was all about was just 
trying to get people to…Just the facts of this is the way we need to restructure this 
deal that’s going to work.262 
Another former labor union official discussed their union’s strategy during the Troika 
program and the difficulty mobilizing protests, saying:  
So, I think that to a very large extent from, certainly from the general election of 
2011 until 2013, until the end, until we got back to the markets as it were, our 
activity was concentrated around managing the protocol in the private sector, 
working the Croke Park Agreement, and trying to, through the Labour Party as a 
minority party in the government, to influence the direction of public policy. As 
distinct from major mobilizations and so on. We did produce in the autumn of 
2011 and again subsequently quite significant policy papers on structural funding 
and capital investment and how to generate capital investment, but in terms of 
mobilizations we didn’t have very much.263 
While the lack of mobilization in Ireland is surprising given that it was very well 
understood that private banks had led to the public being required to make significant 
sacrifices, it is just as surprising that the labor unions either could not generate 
enthusiasm for mass mobilization or did not think social action would make much of a 
difference. Thus, the labor unions opted to negotiate with the government and argue that 
the structure of the bailout needed changed to ease the burden on workers in the 
economy. There was no broad rejection of the program or denial that an adjustment 
needed to happen, as more disruptive actions that would derail the Troika program or 
compromise Ireland’s economic model were not considered.  
Those that suggested taking a more radical course of action, such as Gerry Adams 
of Sinn Fein, were dismissed out of hand across the political spectrum by interviewees. 
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One labor union leader responded to the notion of following Adams’ suggestion to ‘kick 
the Troika out’ by saying:  
You know their opponents would obviously point out that Sinn Fein went very 
quickly for the Greek line…That…they saw Yanis Varoufakis as a great guy and 
we follow him in all of this for a while until it didn’t work and then of course they 
just abandoned that line. The Trotskyists are a dead loss. I mean…as you 
probably know they would just oppose any kind of social democratic organization 
because it stands in the way of a revolution. If you look at it from where they 
stand…this is a golden opportunity to provoke a great deal of civil unrest and 
revolutionary activity and it didn’t succeed.264 
A former Labour minister expressed similar feelings about offering more overt resistance 
or ‘kicking the Troika out’, saying:  
We…tried to realistically say that that obviously is horse manure because what 
are we going to do for money if we haven’t got their money because nobody else 
could give us money or lend us money…so that was not only naïve because they 
understood full well what the implications were, but it was a nice soundbite, get 
rid of the troika, tell them to get lost and all will be well. When that actually was 
tried by the SYRIZA government in Greece you had imagined the closing of the 
banks, the destruction of people’s savings and income would have said yeah, the 
Irish strategy is actually the better. But of course, to a lot of people who were 
hurting they didn’t see that.265  
Another former Labour Party minister remarked in a similar way, saying:  
Well, we took the view that in a way we had to be pragmatic with our dealings 
with the troika. That, the option of, as Gerry Adams famously said it, telling the 
troika to go home and take their money with them, was not real.266  
A similar sentiment was expressed by a former Fianna Fáil minister regarding taking a 
more combative stance toward the Troika, saying:  
People were watching Greece while it was happening…and I think there was 
Alexis (Tsipras)…he got elected as this fire brand and the left wing here aligned 
themselves to him…the left here, Sinn Fein and the left parties aligned themselves 
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with SYRIZA and said this is the way to go, this is the way, look at them, they’re 
great people or something. And they went over and campaigned and when 
SYRIZA got elected into office. They were all in Greece and they were all in 
Athens. Like Sinn Fein people and People Before Profit. Then SYRIZA went into 
government and implemented austerity…and people here are actually quite astute. 
The Irish electorate is very astute. They saw this and that really kind of people 
just said, ‘there’s no way around this’.267   
Throughout the interviews and across the political spectrum, the refrain was the same. A 
strong rejection of the Troika program was off the table except for those on the far-left, 
who had very little political power.  
Even when discussing other options that could have been pursued, the proposals 
did not deviate from what was agreed to with the Troika. The labor unions as well as the 
Labour Party only wished to see the program extended a couple of years and to backload 
instead of front load the cuts. When discussing the various options floated, especially by 
labor unions, an official from DPER remarked:  
So, they obviously would have argued for a different way of getting through the 
crisis, but they, I think they accepted that…these are the limit of our options and 
they played those options the best they can. The notion of the default, no serious 
people were talking about default, nobody credible or serious was talking about 
default. A country like Ireland can’t default on its debts, its obligations. That’s not 
credible… we’re plugged into the international economy, we have a very 
developed financial service sector, a very open economy, we’re a developed 
country. And when somebody loans us money, we’re going to pay it back, 
because you may in the future require them. Well, we have 200 billion in debt 
which we need to roll over, so we need to access the markets. So, we fell out of 
the markets because they lost confidence, but we made sure everybody got paid 
back, and that’s pretty important.268 
Not only was market logic and the structure of the economy invoked in reasoning why 
certain actions were deemed off the table, but also a reference to Ireland as a developed 
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country, which is intimately tied to the Celtic Tiger and the economic success that 
economic model provided.  
As mentioned above, the proposals for adjusting the Troika program did not 
deviate much from the MOU signed by the previous government, but there was a feeling 
that there was no choice but to work within the program and to try and tweak it to make it 
“better” for their constituencies or organizations. Therefore, similar to Portugal, Ireland 
sought to play the long game of complying with the program, meeting the targets, and 
slowly pushing for an easing of the conditions. As one former Labour Minister said:  
The strategy was, we’d no choice other than to work the program… to mitigate 
the program. It was a sovereign international agreement that the previous 
government had signed. Yes, we could have said goodbye to the program at any 
moment had we an alternative source of funds. But we didn’t.269 
They continued: 
Yeah, and work it as cleverly as we can. We’re going to get as much foreign 
direct investment as we can because that’s that sector. And then the third thing 
was obviously the huge burden of debt was from bailing out the banks. So, one of 
the key structures on that was the promissory notes, which involved €3bn a year 
payment.270 
Even with acknowledging that the strategy was to work within the program while 
pursuing changes throughout, there was yet another reference to the importance of FDI 
and Ireland’s economic model, again using the role of Ireland’s economic model as 
reasoning for their decisions. When asked about alternatives to the program another 
former Labour Minister made similar statements about working within the program and 
how the “wildest” proposal for altering the program was from ICTU, who wanted to 
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extend the program to 2017,271 saying: 
Oh yeah…if you look at what were the alternatives, well first of all if you go back 
to the time of the 2011 election, nobody on the political spectrum argued with the 
figures…that this was the size of the deficit. Nobody argued with the objective of 
the objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact to get the deficit down to 3 
percent. Nobody argued with what the implications of that were in money terms. 
There were differences about how you fund it and there was the back-loading 
argument. Well, back-loading argument still left it to be done, but even the back-
loading argument, I mean even the most, the widest back-loading proposal was 
the congress (ICTU) proposal that was drawn out to 2017.”272 
They continued:  
It wasn’t, no, no it wasn’t crazy I mean this was all going to be paid whether it 
was 2017, 2015, 2014, it was all going to be paid and it was all going to involve 
increasing taxes and cutting expenditure. The big debate was the ratio. I mean 
there were two debates. One was the time for it and the second was the ratio 
between public expenditure cuts and…taxes.273 
They added, noting the debates about how to adjust the program and the reasoning for 
this strategy:  
So, that was the other element of the debate, was the ratio and I think those 
looking back on it…I came to be persuaded that, look we should get this over 
with. That prolonging, it’s going to have to be done anyway and prolonging it was 
also going to be a restraint of which, so it would be better to do it, so we ended up 
settling for 2014, which did get it over with and then you’ve built into that as far 
as you could. Now…it isn’t exactly classical Keynesianism…the kind of reduced 
public expenditure and stimulate growth in the economy at the same time. We did 
manage to do and it’s one of the factors we had was the issue of confidence… 
Well, two. One was confidence by international investors, which would have 
maintained the flow of FDI…A lot of what we had to do was about 
communicating, it was the renegotiation of the deal, but it was also the 
communication with the outside world that we were…going to get through this, 
and we needed to maintain the flow of, and maintain trade and so on. At the 
beginning of 2011 we knew that there were investment decisions that were on 
hold and…so I had been talking up our prospects of success and it was, yeah, 
we’re going to get through this, we’re going to come out of this program by the 
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end of 2013, beginning of 2014. We’re going to come out on target. We’re going 
to achieve what we’re going to do with our strategy and so on, so that was one 
was persuading, and we did, I think we succeeded in doing that because the flow 
of FDI did, in fact it increased.274 
Again, there are references to the crucial role of FDI in helping the Irish economy recover 
from former Labour Party ministers. Certainly, there were other issues the Labour Party 
was concerned with, such as protecting the most vulnerable and preventing harsh cuts to 
social protection, but the role of FDI and the Irish economic model in the minds of 
policymakers was ever present. This mindset was also expressed by a former Green Party 
Minister from the previous government as they discussed alternatives to “austerity.” They 
said:  
We were in our circumstances, as a modern, open, trading economy, which is 
reliant on international trade like no one else and which has a lot of private as well 
as public debt and when you look at the maths, just do the maths…and…nothing 
is certain, if to take the Argentinian example where you could be shut out for ten 
years or you could have higher interest rates for a period of years. With the level 
of private and public debt you have what’s the cost of that? It always kind of 
worked out more than the cost, even the hole was very big in terms of the banking 
one. And the banking one caused our…was connected to the level of contraction 
here and the debate in Ireland around our economic approach wasn’t so much 
around the public budget one, well it was but it was conflated with the banking 
one and we know the bank one always had prominence. We listened to all sorts of 
different views, I made my business to talk to a whole range of different people, 
bond traders, and others, bank people, city finance people as well as economists 
and listened to different views but I kept kind of coming back to when you looked 
over the edge of what the alternative is, it wasn’t, and austerity was it, austerity.275 
 In this section I have argued that certain actions were considered off the table 
from both policymakers and the public. Actions that would disrupt the Irish economic 
model or hinder their ability to complete the Troika program were considered out of 
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bounds. Therefore, the lack of protest, especially given the well-understood role of the 
banks in causing the crisis, was surprising. There was also a strong desire from both the 
government and labor unions to keep industrial peace and avoid violence in the streets. 
There were also discussions of how refusing the Troika program was simply a non-starter 
for everyone except the far-left and the alternatives proposed by the Labour Party and 
labor unions were relatively mild and did not deviate too far from the Troika program. 
However, the common thread between the reasons given from interviewees was the focus 
on maintaining investor confidence, continuing to attract FDI, and protect Ireland’s 
economic model. Given that these were the reasons that were discussed by those on the 
political left, it points to the influence of the Celtic Tiger identity on Irish decision 
making during its Troika program. 
Ireland is not Greece 
 The final way that the Celtic Tiger identity presented itself during Ireland’s 
Troika program was through assertions that Ireland was not Greece. In mid-to-late 2010 
when it was becoming more apparent that Ireland would need to ask the Troika for help, 
media outlets in Ireland and internationally began to make comparisons between Greece 
and Ireland. However, Irish politicians and civil servants put considerable effort into 
refuting these comparisons. After the past success of the Celtic Tiger economy, the Irish 
were very uneasy about being grouped with the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, and Spain) and wished to shed that label as soon as possible as they had come to 
view themselves as more on par with European “core” countries such as Germany.276 
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While many interviewees expressed their sympathies towards Greece and felt that the 
Greeks had been treated unfairly by the Troika and other European countries, Greece’s 
behavior towards the EU and the Troika was widely condemned in Ireland and the Irish 
explicitly sought to differentiate themselves from Greece. While this is similar to the 
approach taken by the Portuguese, the tone that the Irish took towards the comparisons to 
Greece was more dismissive than that of the Portuguese, who saw it as crucial that they 
create distance between themselves and Greece while showing they were closer to 
Ireland.  
Ireland also took some concrete actions to ensure that they were able to meet the 
Troika’s targets and make the necessary reforms to exit the program on time. Given the 
haphazard and sloppily organized response of the Greeks, one of the first things that the 
Fine Gael/Labour coalition did was create the Department of Expenditure and Reform 
(DPER) to manage the economic crisis and shore up Ireland’s public sector finances. 
DPER was similar to ESAME in Portugal although DPER has endured beyond the Irish 
Troika program. In addition to helping meet the terms of Ireland’s Troika program, 
DPER also handled all functions relating to the public service, public service reforms, 
and was responsible for managing public expenditure within the budgetary parameters 
that were set by the Minister of Finance. DPER was not only created to navigate the 
economic crisis, but to examine and reform the foundations of the Irish civil service. 
MacCarthaigh (2017) notes that the creation of DPER “represents one of the more 
significant developments in the history of Irish public administration.277 
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 In the months and weeks leading up to the Irish agreement with the Troika, Irish 
ministers and politicians stated and reiterated that Ireland was not Greece as they 
attempted to avoid a program as well as being lumped with the PIGS countries of 
Southern Europe. Despite the constant assertions from those in government and 
elsewhere that Ireland was not Greece, there were still many in the media making the 
comparison. One article in the Irish Times put it bluntly shortly before Ireland and the 
Troika agreed to the MOU: 
Irish Government Ministers have been saying over the past week that "Ireland is 
not Greece". In fact, the two countries could not be more similar. If there ever was 
such a creature as the Celtic Tiger, it had a cousin, the Hellenic Hound, trotting 
after it and emulating it. Overspend, overindulge, exaggerate, be overconfident. 
Each on the rim of a fragile Europe and an even more fragile eurozone, each 
proud of its independence from the age-old dominant neighbour, and proud of its 
historic contribution to European culture.278  
In the face of such arguments, the Irish continued to assert that this was not the case as 
they sought to convince the Troika and its European partners that Ireland was not Greece. 
As one former labor union official stated:  
The whole emphasis here on the part of the government and a lot of us, was to 
convince the creditor countries that we weren’t like them (Greece).279  
 However, there was a big difference between how those interviewed in Ireland 
saw the comparisons to Greece and how those interviewed in Portugal saw the same 
comparisons. Whereas the Portuguese recognized they had a lot of work to do to truly 
convince the Troika, investors, and its European partners that it was not like Greece, 
Ireland knew they needed to do this but was more dismissive of the comparisons to 
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Greece. It was almost as if they were saying, “we’re not Greece and it’s not even close.” 
Despite the more dismissive attitude, the Irish still actively contrasted themselves to 
Greece. This is probably best exemplified in Kerrigan (2012), who notes that Irish 
Finance Minister Michael Noonan spent most of 2011 “sneering at Greece” and even 
made a joking comment in mid-2011 that he was thinking about ordering t-shirts with 
“Ireland is not Greece” printed on them and selling them.280 This is all the more striking 
considering Ireland had just posted a deficit of 32 percent of GDP in 2010. A former 
Green Party Minister put it rather bluntly:  
You see we were different in a couple of ways to some of the other countries, to 
Greece and Portugal now this sounds arrogant, but it’s true. Various differences, 
firstly our own, we had a balance of payments surplus…. And, I won’t deny, our 
real economy had been hampered by the property bubble…but our underlying 
economy was still there…So, Ireland’s own economy was fairly healthy 
compared to Greece and Portugal, particularly Greece. They didn’t have the same 
balance of payments surplus, they had a balance of payments deficit and a 
contracting economy, whereas our real economy even though, our contraction was 
made in the public sector, it wasn’t really in the private economy. And the second 
difference, and this sounds arrogant, this is arrogant, but I think to a certain 
extent, we addressed our issue quickly and honestly and we restored confidence 
reasonably quickly when people saw actually what they said is pretty much the 
case and that helped. And I think one of the difficulties in Greece is people just 
didn’t quite trust what they were hearing. Particularly in terms of tax and revenues 
and so on. Whereas we were fairly up front.281  
An economist from ESRI reiterated this notion, saying: 
So, compared to Greece, where there were huge structural problems, basically the 
troika really didn’t make a difference in terms of what Ireland did. Ireland just 
decided what it was going to do and then did it.282 
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While this dismissive attitude was present during many of the interviews, many 
interviewees admitted that they felt sorry for their Greek partners and acknowledged the 
difficulties Greece was experiencing. However, they strongly disagreed with the ways the 
Greek government handled their relations with the Troika and other European countries. 
As one former official from the Irish Central bank put it: 
Now, how did I think the Greeks behaved? I think they messed up very badly in 
terms of their international negotiations, but I also recognize that they have 
domestic constraints and that politics in Greece is terrible. It’s very polarized in a 
way that it isn’t here at all. And everything has got a lot of baggage and it’s just 
awful. But they went through this kind of we are a proud country, we will never 
do this, grandstanding, and last minute, missing deadlines and then finally they do 
it. If you’re going to do it, just do it and then move on and try and work on stuff 
that isn’t going to be so high profile and that you can make wins on. If you’re not 
going to do it, then by all means don’t do it, but if you’re going to do it, don’t 
grandstand like that. It causes huge concern. It causes doubts about your 
commitment.283 
A former minister from Fianna Fáil was also critical of how Greece handled relations 
with the Troika, saying:  
Whereas in Greece, you know, they weren’t collecting the taxes and Greece was a 
basket case before the banking collapse. So, you cannot, and then they wouldn’t 
make hard decisions. So, I admit I had a certain sympathy with them for kicking 
up against Brussels, but it would be like some people I be working for right, when 
they’re fighting on the behalf against the authorities, but you’d say you know, 
they’d undermine their own case. They weren’t the best client you could have in 
terms of being responsible or looking after the property they had or whatever.284 
When asked about whether knowledge of the Greek situation influenced the way the 
Department of Expenditure and Reform operated, one official said:  
No, except that we demonstrated to people that there was a counterfactual. That 
not working with the troika program, telling your funders of last resort to get 
stuffed or deciding to play chicken with the ECB or the Europe, that led to your 
                                                 
283 Interview with former Irish Central Bank official, Dublin, Ireland, December 11, 2017. 
284 Interview with former Irish Minister, Dublin, Ireland, December 5, 2017. 
 
294 
banks closing down, the imposition of capital controls, and an absolute disaster. 
So, the counterfactual, the alternative to what we were doing was being played 
out in Greece and that wasn’t too good. That didn’t look too great.285 
Some interviewees discussed not only how they viewed Greece’s situation, but also how 
they perceived that it affected the Irish people at large. One former minister from Fianna 
Fáil discussed how SYRIZA was received by most in Ireland, saying: 
Yeah. The left here, Sinn Fein and the left parties aligned themselves with 
SYRIZA and said this is the way to go, this is the way, look at them, they’re great 
people or something. And they went over and campaigned and when SYRIZA got 
elected into office. They were all in Greece and they were all in Athens. Like Sinn 
Fein people and People Before Profit. Then SYRIZA went into government and 
implemented austerity…Yeah, and people here are actually quite astute. The Irish 
electorate is very astute. They saw this and…people just said, ‘there’s no way 
around this’.286 
Another former Labour Minister discussed how people reacted to the chaos in Greece, 
saying:  
I think people in Ireland reacted really negatively against the reports of violence 
in Greece because to be honest I think for a lot of people in democratic politics in 
Ireland the memory of the violence in the north was enough to turn anybody 
off.287 
They continued:  
“Yeah, so Greece was very influential because what happened with Greece. 
Although it was very far from Ireland southern part edge of the European Union, 
nobody in Ireland wanted to see the kind of civil strife or the total political 
meltdown that Greece endured.”288 
As in Portugal, Ireland saw Greece as the model not to follow and they could use 
the events in Greece to convince others to pursue a different path. Many believed that to 
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convince the Troika and its European partners that Ireland was not like Greece, it was 
crucial to not follow their lead, missing deadlines, grandstanding, and failing to 
implement agreed to reforms. Similar to Portugal, Ireland believed they were different 
and wanted to prove this by building credibility with the Troika and working within the 
program. As one former Minster from the Labour Party said: 
Well, we took the view that in a way we had to be pragmatic with our dealings 
with the troika. That, the option of, as Gerry Adams famously said it, telling the 
troika to go home and take their money with them, was not real. So, we had to 
work with them, that what we needed, what we sought to do was to build a 
working relationship with them. And that was done at a number of levels. It was 
done at official levels, it was done with Brendan Howlin and Michael Noonan, 
they worked fairly closely with them and had regular dialogue. But, also, we also 
needed to build a better relationship with the Commission and with the IMF and 
over time with the ECB… the mood towards Ireland was quite negative across 
European capitals at that stage. There was a perception that, ah, this is a 
peripheral partner, you know we’re not, and it’s coming into public view, attitude, 
German taxpayers, I mean going to be spending your taxpayers’ money to be 
bailing out guys from Greece…aren’t working…and don’t like paying tax. 
Fellows are in Ireland who lost the run of themselves building houses they didn’t 
need and buying properties in Spain, overstretching themselves. So, there was 
a…kind of a…punitive attitude…the kind of we need to be taught a lesson.289 
An official at the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform discussed how following 
Greece’s lead was never an option, saying: 
We were never going to go (the Greek way) anyway. That was never, because we 
thought the best option was to work with the program, but at various stages when 
the Greek authorities, and I know their situation was an awful lot worse than us, 
and it was very difficult for what they were being asked to do. And their situation 
was terrible, but the row that went down and the consequences certainly enabled 
us to say you can see a counterfactual here. The counterfactual isn’t great, so we 
need to stick with this program.290 
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In addition to the Irish refusing to follow the Greek example of how to approach 
its Troika program, some saw any association with the Greeks as detrimental to Ireland 
and its ability to separate itself from Greece. When asked about being in contact with 
people in Greece or Portugal, one former labor union official said: 
No, no, because to be honest with you we thought to be associated with Greece 
would be the kiss of death…we saw Ireland as being much more like a Nordic 
kind of economy, very open. Greece and Portugal are quite closed economies. 
Also, they had sort of structural problems in their economies that we didn’t have, 
and we didn’t see any value, quite frankly, in being involved…they didn’t press 
us to be involved with them and we didn’t push to be involved.291 
In the above quote, not only was Ireland being explicitly contrasted to Greece, but they 
actively compared themselves to the Nordic countries. Not only does the quote 
emphasize the structure of each country’s economy, which further suggests that the Irish 
economic model is entrenched into its national identity, but it speaks to perceived 
differences in national character.  
 One former Labour Minister also discussed their contact with officials from 
Greece, noting how they wanted to help but also how they did not want to be lumped 
with the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) countries:  
Well, we discussed with them…what was their experience…some of it was kind 
of a very practical, how are you getting on with the troika, we shared information, 
what they were saying. I think there was also certainly in our situation, we were 
careful in those discussions not to be lumped in with…we were very 
uncomfortable with being part of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and 
Spain) and we wanted out of that categorization as quickly as possible. So, we had 
a working relationship where we shared information, shared experience, talked 
about what was happening, but…we also had calculated that we would be first out 
and that we could be first out and therefore we didn’t want to, we wanted to leave 
that categorization as quickly as possible and be seen as a successful economy.292 
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Even though many wanted to compare Ireland to Greece as they were the second 
country to ask the Troika for a bailout, the Irish actively dismissed such comparisons, 
knowing they needed to do all they could to make sure the comparisons were not seen as 
legitimate. For the Irish, the contrast to Greece could not be starker and they worked to 
ensure others believed this as well.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that Ireland’s Celtic Tiger national identity best explains 
the trajectory of the Irish response to its Troika program, and especially the ways in 
which that response contrasted to the parallel responses in Greece or Portugal. Ireland’s 
economy, unlike Portugal or Greece, collapsed due to the reckless decisions of its private 
banks, but the fact that the people of Ireland were asked to foot the bill for bailing out 
Ireland’s private banks led to a peculiar response from politicians as well as the public. 
After some initial protests and posturing from opposition political parties to renegotiate 
the agreement in the lead up to a general election in February 2011, once the new 
coalition assumed power, they maintained the Irish commitment to fulfill the obligations 
of its Troika program. While the government was committed to the program, like 
Portugal, they played the “long-game” and sought to work within the program and made 
adjustments by working with the Troika and not grandstanding as the Greeks. The 
government continued this strategy throughout the program and did see some conditions 
of its Troika program eased as they hit targets and complied with the program. Social 
responses were never very intense as protests were never very large and tended to focus 
on specific complaints while labor unrest was almost completely absent. This chapter has 
presented the three main ways that the Celtic Tiger identity was exhibited throughout the 
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Irish Troika program. First, there was a strong belief across the political spectrum that 
Ireland’s economic model was still fundamentally strong, despite the banking problems 
that collapsed the economy in the late 2000s. Second, options for a strong rejection of the 
Troika program from policymakers, labor unions, and the public were considered off the 
table. Even proposals from those on the left (but not far-left) did not deviate very far from 
the original MOU and social resistance largely failed to materialize. Finally, similar to 
Portugal, Ireland made deliberate attempts to separate themselves from Greece in the 
minds of the Troika, their European partners, and investors. While the Irish were much 
more dismissive of this comparison than the Portuguese, they made a concerted effort to 
squash this comparison as they were worried that they would be lumped into this group 





“I see Portugal keeping the promise it has made to itself in the revolution. We do 
not want to have a communist dictatorship here. We don’t want to have an 
empire, a conservative authoritarian regime here. We want to be like the other 
Europeans. And probably we are not strong enough to do that on our own terms. 
We need to be anchored here with these guys. And that’s what we have to do…We 
are doing what we have to do to be what we want to be.” – Interview with a 
former advisor to Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho 
 
 The Portuguese Crisis was the third crisis in the Eurozone, coming after bailout 
agreements with Greece in May 2010 and Ireland in November 2010. Portugal agreed to 
a three-year, €78bn bailout package agreed to by Eurozone governments, the IMF, and 
the ECB on May 3, 2011. In return, Portugal would make cuts to public expenditure, 
raise taxes, implement numerous of structural reforms, and be subject to strict monitoring 
by the European Commission, IMF, and ECB. Not only did Portugal’s government 
commit to fulfilling its obligations to the Troika, but just after being elected in June 2011, 
the Prime Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho vowed to “go beyond the Troika” with regards 
to structural reforms.  
Portuguese responses to this externally-dictated bailout program developed in 
roughly three phases after May 2011.1 First, until early fall 2012, Portugal saw 
remarkably low levels of resistance to the program, both politically and socially. The 
immediate social response resulted in many low-level protests (ranging from a few dozen 
to a few hundred participants) as well as various strikes. Most strikes were small and 
short, and two attempts at general strikes had disappointing participation. This differs 
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significantly from Greece, where the signing of its MOU led immediately to massive 
protests and public sector strikes that ended in violence, and even in Ireland, where an 
estimated 50,000 protesters took to the streets of Dublin the weekend after signing its 
MOU. Politically, the main opposition party, the Socialist Party (PS), also voiced no real 
opposition to the program as there was a consensus that the program needed to be 
implemented. This made opposition minimal and allowed the required measures passed 
through parliament with only the far-left parties (representing 24 of 230 seats in 
parliament) voting against the measures. The political response also differs from both 
Greece and Ireland, where Greek opposition parties fully rejected the MOU and Irish 
opposition parties immediately called for a renegotiation of the agreement. 
The initial lack of resistance is even more remarkable given that Portugal initially 
had steeper fiscal consolidation targets and more numerous and specific structural reform 
requirements than Greece for the first two years of its program. The projected fiscal 
adjustment in the first two years of Greece and Portugal’s programs was 6.6 and 8.7 
percent of GDP, respectively, while the actual adjustments that took place were 7.3 
percent in Greece and 6.1 percent in Portugal.2 Yet, despite having a comparable fiscal 
adjustment through the first two years of its Troika Program, the Portuguese response 
was significantly more subdued than the Greek response to what was initially projected to 
be an easier fiscal adjustment, and what ended up being a comparable fiscal adjustment.  
The second phase, from fall 2012 through mid-2013, was characterized by a large 
increase in resistance to the Troika program from the public and elites. Yet, even once the 
                                                 
2 This excludes one off measures from Portugal such as a surcharge on personal income taxes, instituting 
the increase in VAT on energy earlier than planned, and transferring banks’ pension funds to state social 
security 
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Portuguese began to protest more seriously, it took a very specific, and catastrophic 
misstep by the government to bring large numbers of people to the streets. When the 
2013 budget was revealed in September 2012, it announced changes to the contributions 
to the Social Security Tax (TSU) that would require workers to increase contributions 
while employer contributions would decrease. The change in TSU contributions 
produced feelings of unfairness towards workers in an already difficult atmosphere of 
budget cuts, tax increases, and structural reforms. This prompted responses that took on a 
different and much more resistant dimension marked by increased strike and protest 
activity as well as intensity, including the largest public demonstrations since the 
Carnation Revolution in 1974. 
Also, while there was a minority in parliament and in the public that rejected the 
Troika and preferred that Portugal not participate in the program, there was no outright 
rejection of the program from the main opposition party (PS) or the majority of the 
general public, as was witnessed in Greece. As the main political opposition (PS) became 
more emboldened they began asking for the program to be renegotiated, policies 
changed, and some of the conditions relaxed, though there were no calls from the 
mainstream parties to reject the program outright. The second phase of the program 
marked a watershed moment for the Portuguese program as the credibility of the 
government and the program itself came into doubt. The increased protests and strike 
activity culminated in the summer 2013 when the government nearly collapsed after the 
resignation of Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar led to a disagreement between the PSD and 
CDS over his replacement. However, this crisis was avoided as the government cabinet 
was reshuffled and the coalition survived.  
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The tone again shifted in mid-2013, just after the government nearly collapsed. 
Strike and protest activity remained higher than in the first phase of the program but did 
not maintain the frequency or intensity of the second phase of its program, as strike and 
protest activity dwindled further the closer Portugal came to exiting its program. Unions 
and other groups opposed to the Troika and the government organized protests and 
rallies, but attendance was disappointing as it never approached the numbers reached in 
the second phase. This period was also marked by increased public distrust of the 
government and a firm position of the mainstream opposition (PS) that the program 
needed to be renegotiated and adjusted, which differed significantly from the initial phase 
of the program.  
Figure 4 and Figure 5, below, show both the trajectory of the protests as well as 
strikes throughout the program. The strikes are put in historical context since Portugal 
joined the EEC in 1986 and illustrate that the number of strikes and people participating 
is not as high as earlier periods in Portuguese history. 
How, then, do we explain that the Portuguese suffered economic pain much like 
the Greeks and Irish but sustained a political consensus about the program for 16 months 
with mainstream opposition never arguing for a complete rejection of the program, 
protested less, much later, and even then, in more specific, less sustained, and less 
extreme ways? This chapter will show that the answers do not lie in clear material 
differences, with the Portuguese simply having less to complain about. As is noted above, 
Portugal had steeper fiscal consolidation targets than Greece for the first two years of its 
program. It will also show that institutionalism struggles to account for the Portuguese 
arc. Certainly, Portuguese institutional constraints shaped and empowered their response 
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Figure 4: Portuguese Protests 
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to the program in important ways, but the Portuguese government not only found ways to 
work around its institutional constraints much more than did its Greece counterpart, but 
was adamant that it would do whatever was necessary to fulfill the program and exit the 
bailout on time. Nor does a compelling explanation appear to strongly reflect economic 
ideas held by the public as the Portuguese are not overwhelmingly in favor of free 
markets. While it is true that some in the PSD/CDS coalition strongly adhered to the 
“neoliberal” economic ideas3 contained in the MOU, survey data indicate that the 
majority of the public do not share these views.4 Also, the Portuguese political spectrum 
still retains some elements of the quasi-communist Carnation Revolution as it is shifted 
left relative to most other European countries. 
This chapter will show that the trajectory of the Portuguese social and political 
response to its Troika Program was influenced by Portuguese national identity. In post-
revolution Portugal a new national identity developed that was driven by the goal of 
Portugal becoming a stable, modern, Western European democracy similar to its 
European neighbors, and away from being a poor, imperialist, dictatorship. The majority 
of Portuguese believed the best way to achieve these goals and fulfill the aspirations of its 
new national identity was to turn towards Europe and further Portugal’s European 
integration. The European turn manifested itself with Portugal internalizing the identity 
of the “good student” of Europe. This should not be taken as Portugal blindly followed 
dictates from Europe, but rather that Portugal acted in ways that were consistent with 
                                                 
3 The 2011-14 PSD/CDS coalition is considered by many to be the most economically liberal government 
since the Revolution. 
4 European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 66, Autumn, 2006,” September 2007, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf. 
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what it saw as appropriate actions for a ‘core’ European country and as a means of 
reinforcing its “good student” identity. 
This chapter shows that the “good student” identity influenced Portugal’s 
response to its Troika program in three ways. First, there were many references to the 
“good student” narrative, or to ideas and phrases related to it throughout the program. 
The far-left and other critics of the program often criticized the government directly for 
being the “good student” or more Troika than the Troika, but there were also references 
to the “good student” from those who were in power. The references from those in power 
often made references to the content of the “good student” identity and very rarely came 
in a direct admission that they were acting as the “good student,” as this is a somewhat 
insulting label. These allusions were made from inside and outside of Portugal, 
illustrating that not only did the Portuguese view themselves through this lens and wish to 
maintain this identity, but that this identity was acknowledged from the outside as well. 
Second, responses from government leaders as well as societal actors indicate that a 
strong rejection of the program as a whole seemed to be off the table. The criticism from 
mainstream parties and organizations (CIP, PS, and UGT) was also not a rejection of the 
program overall but specific objections about particular policies or the ways the program 
was being administered. Criticism from these groups might have called for the 
renegotiation of certain policies, such as asking for more money from the Troika, the 
lengthening of maturities, lowering interest rates, and softening deficit targets, but it 
always stopped short of abandoning the program. Despite disagreements about specific 
policies, taking action that would directly threaten Portugal’s standing in Europe as the 
“good student” were off the table for the mainstream parties and most of the public. This 
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is further revealed in interviews with political and social elites, where many felt that 
fulfilling the program was necessary to live up to the aspirations Portugal has for itself as 
a modern, Western European democracy. In other words, fulfilling the mandates of the 
program was seen by many as what was necessary to sustain the “good student” element 
of Portugal’s national identity and help move Portugal towards its democratic and 
modernization goals.  
Also, major increases in protest and strike activity did not occur until a major 
policy error by the government concerning social security contributions, which created an 
opportunity for more generalized criticism of the Troika and the government. Lastly, 
Portuguese elites worked constantly to differentiate themselves from Greece and to show 
they were much more like Ireland. There was a concerted effort to distinguish themselves 
from the “bad student” of Greece in terms of their economic situation, but more 
importantly as a responsible, mature, European democracy.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Next is an account of the Portuguese 
crisis from beginning to end. This account is organized by first describing the Portuguese 
program. Then the history of the Portuguese program from June 2011 through May 2014 
is documented. This section is organized in three to six month sub-sections with each 
sub-section broken down further into one section on the political responses to external 
pressures, such as bond markets and external pressures from other governments or the 
Troika, and another section describing the social responses from the Portuguese. 
Following the account of the Portuguese crisis is the analysis of the Portuguese case, 
which emphasizes that in a very complicated debt crisis, only an explanation that 
emphasizes national identity can account for these features of the Portuguese response. 
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The Portuguese Economic Adjustment Program 
Like the Irish and Greek programs, the Portuguese economic adjustment program 
included many of the same elements of previous adjustment programs that were 
administered by the IMF. These included spending cuts, tax increases, and structural 
reforms to help Portuguese exports be more competitive and to loosen labor restrictions. 
As in all three cases, Portugal could not devalue its currency to increase their 
international competitiveness through cheaper exports because of its membership in the 
euro. The inability to devalue its currency meant Portugal could only achieve increased 
competitiveness through an internal devaluation, meaning Portuguese wages and prices 
would need to be forced lower. The overarching objective of Portugal’s program was to 
“underpin economic growth and macro-financial stability and to restore financial market 
confidence.”5 This was to be implemented on three fronts. First, to put fiscal policy on a 
sustainable footing; second, stabilize the financial sector; and third to implement 
significant structural reforms to ensure an orderly unwinding of internal and external 
imbalances as well as raising the growth potential of the economy.  
Similar to Greece, Portugal’s economic adjustment program included a large 
macroeconomic adjustment in the public sector with spending cuts to comprise two-thirds 
of the adjustment and tax increases the other third. Portugal would make expenditure cuts 
equivalent to 7.4 percent of its GDP and revenue increases of 3.4 percent of GDP over 
the period 2011-2014. 6 To meet these deficit targets and put Portugal’s fiscal policy on a 
                                                 
5 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal,” Europa.eu, June 28, 2011, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op79_en.htm. 
6 Ibid.  
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sustainable footing, Portugal would implement a front-loaded fiscal consolidation 
program. This program called for implementing the 2011 budget, which had already been 
passed in parliament. This included an average cut of 5 percent in government wages, 
reducing the government payroll lists, cuts to social transfers like unemployment benefits 
and family allowances, and freezing all other social outlays. The government would also 
curb spending in the health sector, state owned enterprises (SOEs) or public investment.7 
After 2011, Portugal would continue its fiscal consolidation by “improving the working 
of the central administration, eliminating redundancies, increasing efficiency, redefining 
the functions carried out by the public sector and reducing and eliminating services that 
do not represent a cost-effective use of public money, as well as streamlining the 
education system.”8 Portugal would also freeze promotions in the public sector and 
gradually reduce its staff, lower social transfers by suspending the application of pension 
indexation rules, freeze pensions, and levy a special contribution on pensions above 
€1500. Portugal would also strengthen its means-testing of social benefits and tighten the 
cost control of health care expenditures. Finally, there would be a reduction in the 
duration and generosity of unemployment benefits, limits on transfers to local and 
regional governments, and lower transfers to SOEs while cutting capital spending.9  
Portugal would also implement measures to increase revenue such as increasing 
property tax revenues by subjecting more properties to be taxed, increasing excise taxes 
                                                 
7 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal,” Europa.eu, June 28, 2011, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op79_en.htm. 
8 Ibid.  
9 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal,” Europa.eu, June 28, 2011, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op79_en.htm. 
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and the VAT base, as well as limiting the amount autonomous regions can reduce tax 
rates. Revenues would also be increased by broadening the base of income and corporate 
taxes and freezing deductions for items such as mortgages, rents, education, and private 
health care expenditures. 
The program also called for Portugal to implement a number of fiscal structural 
measures. These included implementing a new budgetary framework aimed at improved 
budget management and rationalizing the public sector to remove inefficiencies, which 
would lead to rearranging, merging, or closing redundant agencies. Also, the local 
governments would be more strictly monitored and reorganized or reduced to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs. The government would also reduce expenditure by reforming 
aspects of the health care sector by lowering costs in areas such as pharmaceutical prices 
and fees. Portugal would also review all existing public-private partnerships (PPPs) to 
assess any financial risks to the state and all new PPPs were put on hold until existing 
PPPs were reviewed. Finally, Portugal was to raise €5bn through privatization of SOEs in 
the transport, energy, communications, and insurance sectors.10  
Portugal was also to make numerous structural reforms with the goal of raising its 
potential GDP growth through a more flexible labor force and increased productivity. 
These reforms were much more numerous and detailed than the structural reforms in the 
first Greek program. To increase labor flexibility, Portugal was to lower the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefits to 18 months along with reduced benefits while 
unemployed. Additionally, the net benefit cap would be tightened, but the minimum 
                                                 
10 European Commission, “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal,” Europa.eu, June 28, 2011, 
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op79_en.htm.   
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contributory period to receive unemployment benefits would be lowered to allow many 
people that were cut off from unemployment benefits to have access. Portugal also agreed 
to lower severance payments to bring them in line with European averages and with the 
goal of aligning severance payments between open-ended and fixed term contracts. The 
definition of fair dismissal for open-ended contracts would be altered to be less restrictive 
and severance payments would be made portable between jobs by creating a fund that 
financed notional individual accounts, which was intended to ease job-to-job mobility. 
Another measure aimed at increasing productivity and firm competitiveness was to make 
working time arrangements more flexible and to reduce the costs of overtime. There 
would also be spending cuts to the education system and other improvements to increase 
educational attainment. Other structural reforms included changes to the housing market, 
liberalizing and improving the functioning of sectors such as energy, transportation, 
services and telecommunications, reform of an inefficient judicial system, stronger 
enforcement of competition rules, and reducing the regulatory burden on businesses.  
External Pressures and Government Responses Summer 2011  
The Social Democratic Party (PSD) and its coalition partner the People’s Party 
(CDS-PP) were ambitious about implementing the program from the time they took 
office in June. Pedro Passos Coelho became the next prime minister and following the 
PSD’s election victory he stated that Portugal would “go beyond the Troika” regarding 
the implementation of the structural reforms demanded by the program in order to 
distinguish Portugal from Greece and regain market confidence in the Portuguese 
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economy.11 Portugal also formed a new unit called Estrutura de Acompanhamento dos 
Memorandos (Memorandum Tracking Structure or ESAME), which was headed by 
Carlos Moedas, the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister. This new body was tasked 
with implementing the economic adjustment program and would liaise with the Ministry 
of Finance, Bank of Portugal, and other government agencies to accomplish this task.  
 However, almost immediately upon entering office, the ambitious goals for 
implementing the program came under threat as Portugal faced many difficulties getting 
the program off the ground. Portuguese two-year bonds jumped 70 basis points to 14.39 
percent in late June and 10-year bonds also began trading above 10 percent in the late 
spring and would remain above 10 percent until mid-2012. Moody’s downgraded 
Portuguese debt four notches to “junk” status in early July on fears it would fail to meet 
the program’s deficit reduction targets and remain shut out of financial markets. This led 
to speculation that Portugal could need a second bailout12 and as much as a 30 percent 
haircut on its government debt.13 The downgrade was rebuffed by the Portuguese 
government and debt agency as well as European Commission officials and European 
politicians. Portuguese Finance Minister Vítor Gaspar argued it did not reflect the 
dedication and unequivocal support of the government and the main opposition Socialist 
                                                 
11 Cardiff Garcia, “PM-elect aims to implement Portugal bail-out,” Financial Times, June 6, 2011, 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/06/07/586591/pm-elect-aims-to-implement-portugal-bail-out/; Peter Wise, 
“New leader determined to implement bail-out terms,” Financial Times, June 7, 2011, Asia Edition, World 
News. 
12 Jennifer Hughes, Ralph Atkins, and Michael MacKenzie, “Moody’s warns of second rescue for 
Portugal,” Financial Times, July 5, 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/16ac353a-a735-11e0-b6d4-
00144feabdc0. 




Party (PS) to implementing the program.14 There were also some revenue and 
expenditure cut slippages at the beginning of the program, but the government responded 
with offsetting measures intended to cover these shortfalls. For example, a special one-off 
tax was issued in late June that required Portuguese workers to forgo half of their 
December bonus, which normally amounted to the equivalent to an extra month’s 
salary.15  
There was some good news for Portugal over the summer. In July, the newly 
negotiated second Greek bailout also extended benefits to Portugal and Ireland. 
Portuguese debt maturities on its bailout loans from EU countries would be extended for 
up to 30 years and interest rates on those loans would be cut to an average of about 3.5 
percent.16 However, the second Greek bailout wouldn’t be finalized until 2012. Also, in 
August, the Troika mission to Portugal finished its first review of the program and said 
Portugal was on track to comply with its commitments under the program. Portugal’s 
government was praised for taking ownership of the program and its dedication to 
meeting fiscal targets. Yet, this was only after additional austerity measures were 
announced deal with the budgetary shortfall. These measures increased the VAT on 
electricity and natural gas and froze promotions in the police and military.17  
                                                 
14 Peter Wise, “Portugal hits back at Moody’s downgrade,” Financial Times, July 6, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/86e26194-a7a3-11e0-a312-00144feabdc0. 
15 Jennifer Hughes, Ralph Atkins, and Michael MacKenzie, “Moody’s warns of second rescue for 
Portugal,” Financial Times, July 5, 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/16ac353a-a735-11e0-b6d4-
00144feabdc0. 
16 Peter Spiegel et al., “EU leaders agree €109bn Greek bail-out,” Financial Times, July 21, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/952e0326-b3af-11e0-855b-00144feabdc0. 
17 Peter Wise, “Troika boosts eurozone bail-out support,” Financial Times, August 12, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/78ab958c-c4db-11e0-9c4d-00144feabdc0. 
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Social Responses From Troika Agreement Through the Summer of 2011 
 Immediately after the signing of the MOU with the Troika there were a number of 
social actions that were threatened by unions and workers, but from the signing of the 
MOU through the summer, social action was relatively quiet with small and sporadic 
protests that caused minimal disruption to society. Yet, the signing of the MOU and the 
election of the PSD/CDS-PP coalition revealed divisions within society as employers and 
business owners who agreed with the program were at odds with the unions, workers, and 
youth who opposed labor reforms and impending austerity.18  
 There was a general strike called for by the Federation of Civil Servants Union 
(Federação dos Sindicatos da Função Pública) on May 6 and the union reported a 60 
percent adherence to the strike. However, the Ministry of Finance estimated that only 
5,451 workers out of the more than 390,000 participated in the strike and only 27 of the 
10,554 services were closed.19 At the end of May rail workers for Comboios de Portugal 
(CP) resumed overtime strikes aimed at temporarily shutting down train service during 
overtime and public holiday shifts.20 Rail workers also launched a 24-hour strike on May 
30, which saw an estimated 90-95 participation rate from workers and shut down rail 
                                                 
18 Economist, “A grim inheritance; Portugal’s election,” Economist, June 9, 2011, 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2011/06/09/a-grim-inheritance. 
19 Lusa, “Governo fala em adesão “muitíssimo reduzida,”” Publico, May 6, 2011, 
https://www.publico.pt/2011/05/06/economia/noticia/governo-fala-em-adesao-muitissimo-reduzida-
1493010. 





lines across the country.21 There were other small protests in May such as a couple 
hundred police officers marching at the Portuguese/Spanish border with Spanish police 
officers and a small protest of a few dozen people at a José Sócrates rally in Faro, where 
the protesters were upset with increased tolls and job layoffs.22  
 An increase in social actions was planned for the month of June, but these actions 
were either cancelled or small in number. Workers at the Portuguese airline TAP 
approved ten days of strikes in June and July over disputes about workload and rest times 
for crew members and rail workers planned to continue their rolling strikes over pay and 
overtime. However, there was little that truly happened. The rail workers continued their 
strike action and on June 3 nearly 60 percent of rail services stopped across the country.23 
The planned strikes in June and July by TAP workers over were cancelled after an 
agreement was reached between National Civil Aviation Flight Personnel Union 
(Sindicato Nacional do Pessoal de Voo da Aviação Civil) and TAP with the Minister of 
Labor mediating the talks. The wave of ongoing strikes by rail workers at CP was 
cancelled after negotiations between rail workers and CP, which resulted with an 
agreement to implement new corporate agreements for CP and CP Cargo. This agreement 
                                                 
21 Lusa, “Sindicato contabiliza em 95 por cento a adesão à greve na CP,” Público, May 30, 2011, 
https://www.publico.pt/2011/05/30/economia/noticia/sindicato-contabiliza-em-95-por-cento-a-adesao-a-
greve-na-cp-1496582. 
22 Público, “Confusão no final do comício do PS em Faro,” Publico, May 27, 2011, 
https://www.publico.pt/2011/05/27/jornal/confusao-no-final-do-comicio-do-ps-em-faro-22154210. 
23 Pedro Crisóstomo, “Comboios pararam de norte a sul num dia com efeitos próximos de uma greve de 24 




was approved by the Inspector-General of Finance.24 In mid-June, roughly 100 protesters 
belonging to “True Democracy Now!” laid down at Rossio in Lisbon protesting the lack 
of “social justice” an demanding a more democratic government.25  
 July and August were pretty quiet months as Portugal saw some small protests but 
nothing that really disrupted normal day-to-day life. In July there were minor protests led 
by CGTP, the communist labor union in mid-July and a nurse strike at Braga Hospital 
over non-payment of overtime. At the end of July, CGTP (General Confederation of the 
Portuguese Workers) called for a demonstration outside the Assembly of the Republic 
(Portuguese Parliament) to protest reductions in severance pay but no statistics were 
given on the size of the protest, implying it was not very large.26 Protests against the 
reintroduction of tolls on the 25th of April Bridge were called for but the form of protest 
was for motorists to honk their horns as they drove across.27 Small protests in Lisbon and 
Porto were held to voice displeasure with rising public transportation fares and the 
reintroduction of tolls on the 25th of April Bridge. The demonstration in Lisbon saw 
                                                 
24 Raquel Almeida Correia and Raquel Martins, “Negociações de última hora travam paralisações 
agendadas na CP e TAP,” Público, July 10, 2011, https://www.publico.pt/2011/06/10/jornal/negociacoes-
de-ultima-hora-travam-paralisacoes-agendadas-na-cp-e-tap-22253338. 
25 João d’Espiney, “Cem pessoas deitaram-se no Rossio por uma “democracia verdadeira,”” Público, July 
12, 2011, https://www.publico.pt/2011/06/12/politica/noticia/cem-pessoas-deitaramse-no-rossio-por-uma-
democracia-verdadeira-1498476. 
26 Público, “CGTP promove uma concentração em Lisboa, junto à Assembleia da República, em protesto 




27 Lusa, “Presidente da Câmara do Barreiro apoia “buzinão” contra portagens na ponte 25 de Abril,” 




roughly 30 people delay buses for about five minutes, but the protests in Porto had 
around 100 people and disrupted traffic in front of the São Bento station in the evening.28 
In mid-August, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) led a demonstration of about 60 
people outside the headquarters of the bank BPN to oppose privatization and layoffs and 
at the end of August, a group of retirees and pensioners setup a “holiday camp” on the 
doorstep of the Prime Minister’s official residence to protest pension cuts and price hikes 
in medicine and transportation.29 
 The social actions in the summer immediately following the signing of the 
memorandum and the election of the PSD and CDS-PP coalition were very small in size 
and number as societal disruptions were virtually nonexistent. However, there were signs 
of increasing social tension starting to build as the cuts and tax increases were beginning 
to have an effect on people’s wallets and a number of protests and strikes were being 
discussed for the autumn as the budget for 2101 was beginning to be discussed as 
summer ended. 
External Pressure and Government Responses Autumn 2011 
 The last quarter of 2011 presented many challenges for the new Passos Coelho 
government and the government responded to meet these challenges while largely 
adhering to its economic adjustment program. The government faced an upward revision 
of its deficit for 2010 and budgetary slippages in expenditure and tax revenues for 2011, 
                                                 
28 Aníbal Rodrigues and Marisa Soares, “Protestos tímidos em Lisboa e no Porto, preços voltam a subir em 
Janeiro,” Público, August 2, 2011, https://www.publico.pt/2011/08/02/jornal/protestos-timidos-em--lisboa-
e-no-porto-precos-voltam-a-subir-em-janeiro-22614481. 




which resulted in further measures to cover the budgetary shortfall. The government also 
passed a tough austerity budget for 2012 that included significant spending cuts, tax 
increases, and structural reforms.  
Despite the challenges facing the Portuguese economy and the implementation of 
its austerity program, the Portuguese government attempted to stick to its ambitious plans 
of “going beyond the Troika.” In early September the Portuguese government revealed 
plans to cut the deficit to zero percent within the next five years with the goal of reducing 
public spending by 7 percent of GDP to 43.5 percent by 2015. The government also 
introduced new measures to address a budgetary shortfall, which included the largest 
government spending cuts in more than fifty years as well as a number of tax increases. 
The specific measures were a “solidarity tax” on the highest family and corporate 
incomes (similar to a wealth tax), an extension of the public sector wage freeze through 
2013, reducing welfare payments by 0.6 percent of GDP, and more quickly reducing the 
number of state workers. 30 Later in September, the autonomous region of Madeira 
revealed that it had accumulated an additional €1.1bn in hidden debt. This revelation by 
Madeira added 0.3 percent of GDP to the 2011 deficit but also forced the 2010 deficit up 
from 9.1 to 9.8 percent of GDP, making the 5.9 percent deficit target for 2011 more 
difficult to meet. This not only put a wrench in the government’s ambitious budgetary 
plans but made it more difficult for Portugal to separate themselves reputationally from 
Greece, which the government was explicitly trying to do.31 
                                                 
30 Peter Wise, “Portugal promises biggest cuts in decades,” Financial Times, August 31, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/d8c5147a-d3bd-11e0-bc6b-00144feab49a. 
31 Peter Wise, Portugal dealt blow over budget deal’, Financial Times, October 4, 2011, 
https://www.ft.com/content/6a2eda84-eea0-11e0-9a9a-00144feab49a. 
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 Economic and fiscal conditions continued to deteriorate in early October as the 
Bank of Portugal issued a report stating that Portugal was at risk of not meeting its deficit 
targets for 2011 as the new measures revealed in the beginning of September would not 
be enough to meet the 2011 deficit target and Portugal would need extra measures and/or 
significant structural reforms to meet future deficit targets.32 The report also projected the 
Portuguese economy to shrink 2.2 percent in 2012 as opposed to previous estimates of 
1.8 percent. In mid-October Prime Minister Passos Coelho made a televised address to 
unveil a new package of austerity measures. These measures included increasing working 
hours in the private sector by 30 minutes per day, the loss of some bank holidays, large 
cuts in health and education, the loss of more than a month’s wages by suspending 
summer and Christmas bonuses for employees making more than €1,000 per month, and 
further reductions for most other workers for a period of two years.33 Some tax benefits 
would also be discarded and Portugal would increase the value added tax.34 Portugal also 
transferred some bank pension funds from their separate account to the state social 
security system as part of its ‘extraordinary measures’ to shore up its 2011 deficit.35 
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 After roughly a month of negotiating and amendment proposals in parliament, the 
austerity package was approved in principle in mid-November and final approval was 
given at the end of November, with minimal changes to the budget proposed in mid-
October. The budget passed with all members of PSD (108 votes) and CDS (24 votes) 
voting in favor, while PS (74 votes) abstained, and the Communist Party (16 votes) and 
Block of the Left (8 votes) voted against. As the budget was being debated Fitch 
downgraded Portugal’s sovereign debt rating to junk status citing Portugal’s difficult 
economic outlook, “large fiscal imbalances,” and “high indebtedness across all sectors.”36  
While the negotiations over the budget were ongoing, the Troika also completed 
its second review of the Portuguese program in mid-November. The review was positive 
about the efforts of the government to implement the program and the progress it had 
made as it met targets for the fiscal deficit, general government debt, and external arrears, 
as well as meeting the structural reform benchmarks.37 However, both the IMF and 
Commission reviews noted serious risks to the program and challenges moving into 2012 
as the economy was forecast to contract by 3 percent and the outlook for Europe was 
revised down 1.25 percent from the spring forecast from the IMF, likely harming 
Portugal’s export potential. The IMF review also noted that fiscal targets were met with 
additional one-off measures, which implied a smaller underlying adjustment but still 
forecast Portugal to have made a 3.5 percent adjustment in the fiscal balance for 2011.38 
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 Despite the number of challenges facing Portugal in the autumn of 2011, the 
government passed a difficult set of measures and adjusted the existing program in order 
to keep its adjustment program on track. Passing the measures was never really in doubt 
as the government held a firm majority and the PS had agreed to implementing the 
measures as a condition of bailout.  
Social Responses Autumn 2011 
Even though the additional measures implemented by the government kept the 
adjustment program on track, they provoked the first real social responses as austerity 
was beginning to be felt in Portuguese pocketbooks. Social action tended to follow 
legislation, especially the 2012 budget, but also took many different forms. Small 
protests, where less than 500 people participated, were very common as were partial 
strikes that lasted for a few hours in a day. Large protests occurred a few different times 
with one general strike in late November. Despite the increase in social action, 
participation in strikes and protests was still relatively modest. Many of the protests drew 
only a few dozen to a few hundred people while the general strike saw low participation 
from the private sector and less than expected participation from the civil servants. 
As September of 2011 began, social action was virtually non-existent as Passos 
Coelho announced the new austerity measures to fill the budgetary shortfall in early 
September. Even with the announcement of the largest spending cuts in 50 years, the 
social response remained mostly calm. There were a number of small protests by various 
groups, such as teachers and students protesting changes to education policy and the cuts 
to education and a group of elderly people protesting the lack of doctors in Portugal. 
These types of protests would be common throughout the autumn, but there were no 
321 
large-scale events until the beginning of October. In early October, CGTP, the 
communist trade union, led a protest opposing the Troika’s policies that drew an 
estimated 130,000 participants in Lisbon (according to CGTP) and between 25,000 and 
60,000 in Porto.39 Inspired by the “Occupy Wall Street” movement in the US, the 
October 15 protests united many countries around the world to protest growing inequality 
and corporate influence in politics. While the protests in Portugal were more directly 
related to the Troika it took a major international protest event to bring large numbers of 
Portuguese to the streets. Protests occurred in cities across Portugal but at much lower 
rates than in other countries. Organizers of the protest in Lisbon estimated 100,000 
people but the newspaper El Pais estimated only 30,000.40 Estimates of protesters for 
Porto were between 10,000 and 12,00041 according to the police, and Coimbra had an 
estimated 300-700 protesters.42 
October also saw the Portuguese manifestation of the “indignados” that included 
two or three dozen people camping outside the Portuguese parliament, which was far less 
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than was witnessed in Greece or even Spain’s “indignados” movement.43 CGTP also 
organized many small actions throughout October, such as protests of a few hundred 
people and many partial strikes of a couple of hours across various sectors of the 
economy that were repeated for multiple days.44 The teachers continued their protests, but 
participation was low. For example, in late October, about three dozen higher education 
faculty and researchers protested outside the Ministry of Education against the wage and 
funding cuts in education.45  
November was the most contentious month of social action as the 2012 budget 
was set to be voted on in Parliament. The rhetoric from many social actors was strongly 
against the budget, but actions only partly supported the rhetoric. There were numerous 
strikes, but most were partial and did not cause much disruption to everyday life around 
the country. However, some partial transportation strikes affected upwards of 90 percent 
of trains during the strike,46 but other partial strikes had as low as 20 percent participation 
rates47 and others closed as few as 23 percent of rail lines.48  
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Small protests, such as the 100 people protesting the 2012 budget in front of 
parliament on November 10, continued throughout the month, but two major protests 
occurred in November. On November 12, the civil servants held a protest against the 
2012 budget in which the organizers estimated 180,000 civil servants, police, military, 
and prison guards marched in Lisbon.49 Less than two weeks later, the two major trade 
unions held a joint general strike, which was scheduled for the beginning of voting on the 
2012 budget. The strike, which was the largest in 30 years, closed factories, schools, 
universities, courts, public services, and stopped buses and trains. Most flights in and out 
of Portugal were cancelled and hospitals were limited to emergency services.50  
Even with the large disruption, there were disputes about participation in the 
strike. The government estimated that only 10.48 percent of central government workers 
(43,592 out of 414,987) participated,51 but the trade unions claimed (without releasing 
official numbers) the strike was a success52 as there was more participation in this strike 
than the general strike a year before when unions claimed more than 3 million people 
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took part in the strike.53 Despite the disputes over the numbers participating in the strike, 
the strike was the largest in 30 years in Portugal and caused some major disruptions while 
remaining overwhelmingly peaceful54 as the goal of the strike was to bring the 
government to the negotiating table with the social partners, according to the Secretary 
General of UGT, João Proença.55  
Following the general strike, social action continued the previous pattern of small 
protests and partial strikes happening regularly. Some transportation services were shut 
down sporadically for a few hours and protests involving a few dozen to a few hundred 
people occurred in various spots around the country. Local government workers protested 
the reduction of the number of local parishes outside the Assembly of the Republic in 
Lisbon as there were “several dozen” protesters in the morning but the local workers 
union, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores da Administração Local (STAL), expected more than 
a thousand protesters.56 Students marched to protest the changes to education and a 
couple dozen teachers protested outside the Prime Minister’s official residence and told 
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him to emigrate in response to him telling teachers that could not find jobs in Portugal to 
do the same.57 
In summarizing social actions in this time period, the Portuguese began to 
increase the frequency of actions such as strikes and protests but did not see consistency 
in the numbers of people protesting that was witnessed in other countries such as Greece 
or Spain. The general strike in late November was deemed a success by the unions and 
would succeed in bringing the government to the bargaining table the following year, but 
it was downplayed by the government and government numbers for participation in the 
strike were drastically different from what the unions estimated. Yet, as 2011 ended there 
was an increasing sense that things were only going to get worse before they could get 
better as austerity was beginning to be felt by the population. 
External Pressures and Government Responses Q1 and Q2 2012 
Throughout the first half of 2012 the Portuguese government would face a 
number of challenges in its attempts to comply with the terms of its bailout program. 
There would be continuous talk of the possibility of default and the need for a second 
program as many worried about contagion from Greece and interest rates on Portuguese 
bond yields shot up dramatically.  Portuguese debt was downgraded further, Europe was 
experiencing a continent-wide recession, and unemployment was beginning to rise 
beyond program projections. Yet, in the face of this adversity the government continued 
to stick to the program and secured a deal with trade unions, saw exports begin to rise, 
and had two successful short-term bond auctions.  
                                                 




As 2012 began, the implementation of the new budget and the austerity measures 
that accompanied it was off to a rocky start after Standard and Poor’s downgraded 
Portuguese debt two notches from triple B minus to double B, making it the third ratings 
agency to downgrade Portugal’s debt to junk status.58 The downgrade prompted a selloff 
and led to fears that the government could be entering default territory. These events sent 
Portuguese borrowing costs soaring with 10-year bonds reaching euro-era highs of 14.4 
percent in mid-January.59 There was a small snippet of good news as the Bank of 
Portugal released a report in January projecting a smaller contraction for the economy in 
2011, from 1.9 percent to 1.6 percent of GDP. However, the bank also forecasted that 
growth would shrink by 3.1 percent of GDP in 2012.60  
Portugal also faced contagion from Greece as the Greeks were in ongoing debt 
restructuring talks to lower their debt burden and secure a second bailout package. 
Investors worried Portugal might be the next to default and markets put this probability at 
about a 70 percent chance. António Saraiva, head of the Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry (CIP), argued that Portugal needed about additional money of €30bn but Pedro 
Passos Coelho was adamantly against any renegotiation of the program or asking for 
more money.61 Talk of a potential default and similarities to Greece’s situation nine 
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months earlier sent Portuguese 10-year bond yields to a new euro-era record of 17.26 
percent in late January62 and unemployment rose to 13.6 percent with youth 
unemployment reaching more than 30 percent.63 The rise in Portuguese debt yields 
prompted the ECB to intervene in its sovereign debt markets to ease the pressure and 
calm fears of default.  
In early 2012 Portugal was also negotiating with social partners over changes to 
the country’s labor law, which was part of the terms of the international bailout. The two 
largest unions, the CGTP and the UGT, were split over whether to agree to reform the 
labour law and UGT, the more moderate of the two unions, reached an agreement with 
the government on January 18. The agreement with UGT increased workdays by 
reducing the number of holidays and vacation days, made it easier to fire employees, cut 
overtime pay, reduced severance pay, and reduced the duration and maximum allowance 
of unemployment benefits, but made it easier to gain access to unemployment.64 Those 
on the far-left, such as BE, PCP, and CGTP criticized the law while the government, the 
Troika, business, and even Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz praised the law as a big step to 
helping the Portuguese economy.65  
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 Despite an increasingly difficult economic situation and fears of a Portuguese 
default, the Portuguese government remained committed to implementing its adjustment 
program in early 2012 regardless of how difficult it might be.66 Portugal produced some 
positive news in February as it had two successful bond auctions, raising €1.5bn in three-
month bonds at a rate of 4.068 percent in early February67 and raising an additional €3bn 
in short term bonds in mid-February. The Troika also performed its third review of the 
program and, while acknowledging the economic difficulties and future risks facing the 
country, both the European Commission and IMF applauded Portugal’s progress with 
fiscal and structural reform measures. The IMF also noted that, despite recent success in 
lengthening T-bill maturities, Portugal’s return to bond markets could be delayed, and if 
market access is delayed, “it may become necessary to call upon the pledges by European 
leaders to continue to provide adequate support to Portugal as long as the programme is 
on track.”68 The Troika added that euro member states “stand ready to support Portugal 
until market access is regained” as long as Portugal maintains “strict program 
implementation.”69 Therefore, despite the Troika acknowledging the large efforts of 
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Portugal to implement its program, the Troika itself had its doubts about Portugal’s 
ability to return to bond markets on the prescribed timeline.   
Although the review from the Troika was mainly positive, many observers heeded 
the IMF’s warning and continued to doubt Portugal’s ability to fulfill the terms of its 
program and return to bond markets by September 2013.70 Opposition politicians as well 
as business and union leaders urged the government to ask for more money from the 
Troika in order to alleviate some of the social pain caused by the austerity measures. 
Unemployment, which had hit 14 percent, was forecast to rise into 2013 and the 
Portuguese economy was expected to shrink by 3.3 percent in 2012.71 António Seguro, 
then leader of the PS, said that Portugal would need at least another year to meet the 
fiscal targets and wanted the government to renegotiate the interest rate and extend 
maturities on the loans. Labor unions and some industrial organizations had already come 
forth to urge the government to seek a renegotiation of the bailout, but this was the first 
time one of the three main parties spoke out publicly against the bailout package.72  
Even after receiving a generally positive third review from the Troika and 
continued efforts to comply with its international bailout, the beginning of spring failed to 
bring relief from media speculation that Portugal would need a second bailout. 
International media continued to question the viability of the Portuguese program and its 
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ability to return to markets in late 2013, which prompted Prime Minister Pedro Passos 
Coelho to write an op-ed in the Financial Times making the case that Portugal would 
continue to do everything it could to meet its obligations under its bailout agreement. 
Despite the skepticism, the program was largely on track and privatization proceeds had 
exceeded expectations while the current account deficit was narrowing.73 There were also 
some positive signs for the economy as the government reported that exports grew 13.5 
percent in 2011 and the government released figures that the 2011 deficit was 4.2 percent 
of GDP, well below the 5.9 percent target. However, this was only possible with 
extraordinary measures, such as the transferring of bank pensions to the social security 
fund, which amounted to €5.993bn and without these measures the deficit would have 
been 7.8 percent of GDP.74  
Throughout the first half of 2012 there were many challenges that the Portuguese 
government faced as it fought to adhere to the policies agreed to in its international 
bailout. During this time, the first signs of exactly how dedicated to fulfilling the program 
this government was started to come to fruition. And, as spring ended, Portugal continued 
to struggle as there were worries about contagion from Greece making its way to 
Portugal. Stories about Portugal’s need for a second bailout and/or debt restructuring 
remained commonplace in the international media. Portugal’s 10-year bond yields, while 
lower than the previous highs of more than 17 percent, were still above 10 percent and 
unemployment was rising, but the second half of 2012 would present more challenges for 
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a government desperately trying to differentiate itself from Greece and diligently 
implement its adjustment program. 
Social Responses Q1 and Q2 2012 
Social responses in early 2012 largely continued many of the patterns from 2011. 
There was a constant low-level of protest with demonstrations ranging from a few dozen 
people up to a few thousand, an occasional large protest in the tens of thousands, and one 
very large demonstration with around 100,000 participants. Unions and workers also 
threatened to call a number of strikes and did call many partial strikes. One general strike 
was called in March by CGTP but was considered disappointing by many commentators. 
Participation was also down as UGT did not participate in the strike due to its signing of 
the social concertation agreement in January.  
Early 2012 was relatively calm for protests and strikes. Most protests were small 
groups of workers protesting wage cuts, especially the holiday and Christmas bonuses but 
others protested austerity more generally. For example, in late January about 300 
maintenance workers for the Portuguese airline TAP gathered outside the company 
building to protest the holiday and Christmas bonus cuts.75 A similar situation happened a 
couple days earlier with Caixa Geral de Depositos Group, with 500 workers gathered 
after work to protest the same wage cuts.76 Transportation costs were also an issue as 50 
students gathered at the University of Lisbon in late January to protest the end of a 
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transportation pass giving students under the age of 23 a 50 percent discount on public 
transportation77 and in early February there was a march of about 300 people in Lisbon 
protesting rising transportation costs.78  
The transportation sector also staged periodic strikes. Some were partial and for 
only a few hours while others were for the entire day. These strikes included many of the 
public transportation companies and even some airline workers, which would participate 
in strikes to varying degrees and with varying frequency. The Federation of Transport 
and Communications Unions called a strike in early February because the transportation 
sector was being restructured without the input of the workers. Trains, buses, ferries, and 
metro systems all participated but to less of a degree than expected, with Reuters 
reporting that the strike was a flop as trains and buses continued running and only 
Lisbon’s metro and ferries were shut down.79  
CGTP held the largest rally in early 2012 at Praça do Comércio in mid-February 
to protest austerity, unemployment, precariousness. CGTP was also protesting the social 
concertation agreement signed by UGT, the government, and employers in January. 
CGTP claimed that more than 300,000 people attended but other observers estimated the 
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crowd was closer to 100,000.80 There were few other protests or strikes in February as the 
air traffic controllers called off a five-day strike and small protests against price hikes for 
boats and against the new urban lease law drew no more than 100 people. 
February also saw CP workers stage strikes around the holiday of Carnavale. The 
day before Carnavale, 97 percent of trains not considered as “minimum service” were 
cancelled before 10:00 AM. This started a forty-day period of partial stoppages which 
would last until March 31. Lisbon Metro also went on a 24-hour strike on March 21 to 
protest overtime pay, which they claimed was less than the negotiated amount.81  
March began with small austerity protests all over Europe, and in places such as 
Lisbon “dozens” gathered to protest austerity.82 There was also a threatened strike from 
TAP workers to protest pay cuts. Workers asked for an exemption and in early March the 
government granted the exception to keep wages intact through 2012. They were exempt 
from pay cuts but did have to comply with the elimination of holiday and Christmas 
allowances for workers making more than €600 per month.83  
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The largest form of resistance to the austerity program was the general strike on 
March 22. The general strike caused widespread disruptions in public transportation, 
hospitals, ports, courts, and schools. Public transportation was gridlocked in Lisbon and 
Porto as participation from the public transportation sector was greater than in 
November.84 However, overall strike participation was down significantly from what was 
expected as the two major unions were split on the strike. CGTP led the strike and UGT 
refused to participate after having signed the social concertation agreement in January. 
Reuters reported the numbers of protesters in Lisbon as well below the 100,000 that 
gathered in Lisbon in mid-February.85 The overall membership in the transport sector was 
estimated by the Federation of Transport and Communications Unions (FECTRANS) at 
between 70% and 100% and the postal services saw participation at 65.8 percent.86 The 
government did not release figures on strike participation. The private sector largely 
operated as usual, and businesses and commerce functioned normally for the most part.  
What made this general strike different was the lack of enthusiasm for it. 
Editorials asked whether it made sense to protest87 and whether general strikes would 
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actually lead to answers to the difficult situation in Portugal.88  Even labor union leaders 
acknowledged that participation in the strike was much lower than expected and that it 
was difficult to mobilize workers.89 For Autoeuropa’s Palmela plant as well as TAP 
Airlines and the Lisbon Airport it was a normal workday. Antonio Costa Pinto, a 
prominent professor at the University of Lisbon, was quoted in Reuters as saying, “If you 
compare this strike to the previous general strikes90 in Portugal’s democracy, this one 
clearly is in the low end.”91  
 At the end of March, the National Association of Parishes (Anafre) organized a 
rally in Lisbon to protest the consolidation of parishes, which was one of the reforms 
agreed to in the Troika MOU and would help to rationalize local governments and reduce 
administrative costs of the state. The government had recently passed a bill to merge 
parishes, which would reduce the number of parishes by 25 percent and would lead to job 
losses in many local parishes.92 Protest organizers claimed that 200,000 people 
participated in the protest while the police estimate was around 60,000, continuing the 
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trend of vastly different participation estimates in protests. Parish consolidation protests 
would continue to varying degrees into June, with the largest reported demonstration was 
3,000 people in Lisbon.93   
 Throughout the spring there were also many partial strikes, especially in the 
transportation sector. Air traffic controllers began a partial strike in mid-April against a 
cut in operating costs and wage cuts that would last into early May when another five-day 
partial strike was announced. This would last from May 11 until May 25 and affect 
numerous flights. Another strike was threatened in June but called off at the last minute 
as the Ministry of Finance decided to come back to the negotiating table. Many were 
worried about how it would affect the tourism industry and the jobs in that industry given 
the tough economic conditions and the total losses for the airline TAP including the two 
previous strikes were estimated to be upwards of €19.7 million.94 Other strikes included a 
partial strike by public bus company Carris in which buses ran on the school holiday 
schedule from May 7-13 for 30 percent of normal routes.95 Partial strikes also affected 
CP train routes as workers stopped various lines roughly once a week throughout May 
and June. The workers protested overtime payments, rest, and holidays. Transtejo Group 
workers shut down ferries on the Tagus River around Lisbon, once in May and again in 
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June, over wage grievances and management’s refusal to negotiate the company 
agreement. The city of Lisbon also witnessed partial strikes from waste collection 
workers and metro workers over wage and overtime disputes.   
 Small protests also continued through the spring, usually averaging between 
dozens and hundreds of protesters, and remaining largely peaceful. Hundreds of people 
protested the closing of the country’s largest maternity ward in Lisbon in mid-April while 
other small protests against changes to the National Health Services also surfaced. May 
Day rallies organized by UGT and CGTP gathered a few thousand protesters against 
austerity and the Troika.96 In early May hundreds of farmers protested the government, 
the lack of places to sell their goods, and low prices of national production while also 
criticizing the tax increases and agriculture policies.97 Other small protests were 
organized against austerity policies, the creation of larger school clusters, highway tolls 
in the Algarve, the new urban lease law that would give landlords more rights via their 
tenants, and cuts to the “thirteenth month” of wages. One June protest, led by CGTP and 
PCP (the Communist Party) drew the largest crowd since the March 31 protest against 
parish consolidation. A crowd of around 20,000 was estimated to attend a protest against 
the government, the Troika, and the degradation of living standards. Despite the crowd, 
the protest was peaceful and rather low key.98  
                                                 
96 Carlos Pessoa, “UGT acusa o Governo de só se preocupar com a austeridade e exige cumprimento do 
acordo,” Público, May 2, 2012, https://www.publico.pt/2012/05/02/jornal/ugt-acusa-o-governo-de-so-se-
preocupar-com-a-austeridade-e-exige-cumprimento-do-acordo-24471193. 
97 Público, “Agricultores em protesto,” Público, May 5, 2012, 
https://www.publico.pt/2012/05/05/jornal/agricultores-em-protesto-24489194.  
98 José Bento Amaro, “CGTP acusa a troika de fazer "agiotagem pura e dura" com Portugal,” Público, June 
17, 2012, available https://www.publico.pt/2012/06/17/jornal/cgtp-acusa-a-troika-de-fazer-agiotagem-pura-
e-dura-com-portugal-24734890.  
338 
Portuguese social responses to the economic adjustment program during the first 
half of 2012 can be seen as continuing many of the same trends from 2011 from the 
signing of the MOU, which was characterized by a pattern of constant low-level protest 
and partial strikes with the occasional large, peaceful demonstration. However, the larger 
demonstrations, especially the general strike in March, were not embraced with the 
enthusiasm of the general strike in November 2011. With the exception of the June 
CGTP/PCP protest against austerity and the Troika, large demonstrations in Portugal 
were difficult to find after the general strike in March and the protests against parish 
restructuring.  
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q3 and Q4 2012 
Even after a positive review from the Troika in June, economic pressure on the 
Portuguese government continued through the summer as Portugal was enduring a deeper 
than expected recession throughout the summer months and into the autumn. Despite 
deteriorating economic conditions, the government continued to move forward, trying to 
meet the terms of its Troika program. However, the second half of 2012 would see 
increased external pressures from a continued recession, increased unemployment, and 
bleak growth prospects. There would also be increased pressures from inside Portugal as 
the Constitutional Court ruled that some wage and pension cuts were unconstitutional, 
and the 2013 budget proved to be the most controversial budget since the revolution in 
1974. 
In early July, the unemployment rate reached 15.2 percent and 36.6 percent for 
those under 25. This prompted the Prime Minister to encourage unemployed youth to 
emigrate to Brazil, Angola or elsewhere, which drew significant criticism. Estimates put 
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emigration between 120,000 – 150,000 in 2011, most of which are well-educated 
university graduates. In response to the growing youth unemployment problem the 
government announced a €344bn initiative to address youth unemployment by offering 
hiring incentives for small and medium sized companies as well as internships and 
financial support to boost entrepreneurship.99 Also in early July the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the suspension of holiday and Christmas bonuses from only public servants, 
pensioners and retirees was unconstitutional as it placed additional sacrifice on those in 
the public sector and those receiving public pensions. The suspension of holiday and 
Christmas bonuses, which was included in the 2012 budget, was already being 
implemented so the court ruling would only apply to holiday and Christmas bonuses after 
2012.100 This damaged the government’s fiscal consolidation plan and new measures 
would need to be implemented for the 2013 budget later in the year.  
The summer months were increasingly tough for Portugal even though the Troika 
and other commentators believed that Portugal was doing everything it could to 
implement its program.101 In late July, the OECD released a report warning that Portugal 
was in danger of failing to meet its fiscal targets. The report cited tight credit conditions 
because of bank deleveraging, weak international growth that would hit exports, and 
Portugal’s ambitious fiscal targets for 2012, which were expected to depress demand 
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further. All of these factors were expected to lead to a deeper than expected recession and 
add to existing economic problems.102 The Portuguese government confirmed that it 
would miss its deficit target of 4.5 percent of GDP in August after tax revenue for the 
first seven months of the year fell short by €2.85bn.103 With the worsening economic 
conditions and the constitutional court ruling, interest rates on Portuguese 10-year bond 
yields remained elevated. Where yields were nearly 14 percent in January, they remained 
around 12 percent throughout the third quarter, indicating that while Portugal appeared to 
be dedicated to the program, Portugal had “yet to convince international investors, 
indicating the need for a rigorous Programme implementation.”104 
The first of two major crises for the Portuguese program occurred in September 
2012 as the government unveiled new austerity measures in its 2013 budget, which was 
released days before the Troika’s fifth quarterly review of the program. The most 
controversial measure involved the social security tax, which required workers’ 
contributions to social security to increase from 11 percent to 18 percent, while 
employers would see their contributions fall from 23.5 percent to 18 percent. These new 
austerity measures were hailed by the IMF and others but received massive backlash 
within Portugal as hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest (to be discussed in 
the next section). Instead of abstaining from voting, which the PS had done with all 
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austerity measures up to this point, the PS threatened to vote against the 2013 budget 
when it was presented to parliament in October. Yet, some of the harshest criticism came 
from those in the PSD as well as Paulo Portas of CDS-PP. The measures were also 
opposed by trade unions, some economists, the Catholic Church, and some employers 
even vowed to raise wages to make up the difference in pay.105  In response to the 
criticism and public protests, the following week Passos Coelho retreated from further 
cuts and met with trade unions and employers to come up with alternative ways to cut the 
deficit and ended with what was known as the “huge tax increase.”106 Ultimately, the 
government’s reversal of the social security measure and further wage cuts marked the 
end of the fiscal devaluation strategy in favor of replacing cuts in pay and rises in 
contributions to social security with tax increases elsewhere.  
Despite the criticism from many in society as well as the withdrawal of the social 
security measures and pay cuts in the 2013 budget, the Troika’s fifth review noted that 
implementation of the program was solid, but also cautioned against too much optimism 
because of economic challenges Portugal was likely to face in the next couple of years. 
And, while acknowledging large revenue shortfalls and a “subdued growth outlook,” the 
Troika rewarded Portugal’s effort in fulfilling its economic adjustment program by easing 
deficit targets for 2012 from 4.5 percent of GDP to 5 percent and the 2013 target from 3 
percent to 4.5 percent. This essentially extended the timeline to meet the deficit target of 
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3 percent by one year.107 The Troika also acknowledged that given the difficulties in the 
Portuguese economy there would need to be “additional consolidation efforts” to meet 
the revised targets, indicating there would be difficult times ahead.108 
October brought continued pressure on Portugal’s government but also saw one 
bright spot. Portugal exchanged €3.75bn worth of government bonds that were due in 
2013 for longer-term debt. This exchange reduced a €9.7bn bond redemption due in 
September 2013 by about 39 percent to €5.98bn and pushed back some of the payment 
until October 2015. However, external and internal pressures were continuing to mount 
as the economy was expected to contract by 3 percent in 2012 and an additional 1 percent 
in 2013. Finance Minister Vítor Gaspar acknowledged that meeting the revised deficit 
target of 5 percent would be very difficult without additional measures. The details of the 
2013 budget were revealed by Vítor Gaspar in early October as he announced that more 
than 80 percent of the budget reduction plan would be achieved through increased 
revenue. There would be an additional tax of 4 percent on earnings in 2013 to replace the 
pay cuts that were overruled by the Constitutional Court, sending average tax rates from 
9.8 percent to 13.2 percent, and corporate taxes would also be raised.109   
The reversals on the 2013 budget by the Passos Coelho government led to 
warnings from Moody’s and Fitch ratings agencies as well as the IMF in its quarterly 
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review. Moody’s noted that Portugal might need to extend its current program beyond 
2014 as the backlash against austerity and a weak economy could delay Portugal’s re-
entry into bond markets. Fitch also issued a statement saying it expected Portugal to need 
another Troika program before it could return to bond markets. Both argued that the 
additional measures Portugal would need to meet its revised targets were much larger 
than previously thought and Moody’s worried that backing down in the face of protests 
would only embolden opponents of reform. Despite these warnings, Vítor Gaspar was 
emphatic in his disagreement, telling parliament that Portugal would exit the program in 
2014.110 At the end of October, the IMF also warned that Portugal would face tough 
choices to strike a balance between closing the fiscal gap while “minimizing strains on 
employment and output” as “social and political resistance to adjustment has 
heightened.”111 
The tax hike and continuous austerity began to show cracks in the political fabric 
as Portugal’s President, Anibal Cavaco Silva (PSD) and former President, Jorge Sampaio 
(PS) both spoke out against the social costs of continuing such harsh austerity measures. 
Cavaco Silva posted on his official Facebook page that Portugal should not meet its 
deficit targets “at any cost,” and during an interview on Portuguese television, Sampaio 
urged for political consensus to renegotiate the bailout agreement.112 
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 In mid-November, before passing the 2013 budget, Angela Merkel visited Lisbon 
to offer support for the government, the budget, and the new austerity measures that were 
designed to help Portugal meet its obligations under the agreement. Passos Coelho was 
under increased pressure from domestic groups and opposition parties to renegotiate the 
agreement as critics argued excessive austerity was strangling growth prospects. 
Resistance to the 2013 budget led to protests of Merkel on her visit to Lisbon.113 There 
was also another general strike on November 14 to voice opposition to the 2013 budget. 
The general strike was led by CGTP and the details will be discussed in the next section. 
The 2013 budget received parliamentary approval at the end of November, but without 
the support of opposition parties. Despite the objections from the opposition, Prime 
Minister Pedro Passos Coelho continued to support the austerity measures while 
disagreeing with those who opposed such harsh measures and wanted Portugal’s 
conditions eased. In an interview with the Financial Times, Passos Coelho explained that 
he believed the implementation of austerity and bringing the country’s finances back into 
order was what would save the welfare state as he expressed his belief that excessive debt 
is the welfare state’s true threat. He also denied that the waves of social protest and 
strikes that had occurred since the bailout were a signal that society was opposed to more 
austerity, citing a poll from the Portuguese pollsters Pitagórica, that claimed 63.5 percent 
of respondents thought Portugal should remain in the European-IMF program.114   
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 With the passage of the 2013 budget and increasing social unrest, the end of 2012 
continued to be rocky for Portugal as the sixth review from the European Commission 
warned that low growth and political divisions had put Portugal at risk of missing their 
deficit target, which was adjusted in October by the EU and IMF to be more lenient. 
Having to switch from the increased social security contributions from employees to tax 
increases has resulted in less revenue as taxes are more sensitive to downturns in the 
economy.115 Additionally, the effectiveness of the tax increases that were supposed to 
increase revenue was questioned by economists, tax professionals, and the opposition 
party as tax revenue had fallen significantly below its targets for 2012.116 With Portugal 
entering its third year of austerity, a deepening recession, increasing social unrest, and 
unemployment rates of nearly 16 percent, Portugal was entering 2013 with significant 
uncertainty about its ability to adhere to its adjustment program.   
Social Responses Q3 and Q4 2012 
 The beginning of the summer in Portugal continued many on the same trends 
from the Troika period that began a little over a year before, with constant low-levels of 
protest, with an occasional larger protest. However, September 2012 would mark a big 
shift in social resistance to the Troika and the government as the announcement of new 
austerity measures in the 2013 budget proposal led to a significant movement in 
Portugal’s experience with its Troika program. The austerity measures included raising 
worker contributions to social security while simultaneously lowering social security 
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contributions from employers. This move was seen by many as the biggest mistake of the 
government during the Troika program, led to the largest protests during the Troika 
program (2011-14), and forced the government to withdraw the measures. Further, this 
moment would be marked by many as the time when the government lost its credibility 
with the public. The Portuguese were no longer willing to give the government the 
benefit of the doubt regarding the program and political as well as social divisions started 
to become more apparent.  
 As the summer began, Portugal saw many of the same trends described above, 
such as partial public transportation strikes, small protests against the Prime Minister and 
the Troika, as well as some new protests concerning the liberalization of professions. 
Public transportation workers continued to protest the new labor law that slashed their 
overtime and holiday pay in half by staging partial strikes with an occasional 24-hour 
strike. Many of these strikes had a middling level of participation, while some of the 24-
hour strikes, which were usually staged around holidays, had participation upwards of 90 
percent. In early July, about one thousand taxi-drivers came to Lisbon from all over 
Portugal to protest the liberalization of the taxi profession. The main complaint was the 
government changing the law that had given taxis and ambulances the exclusive rights to 
transport non-emergency patients, which could now be done by private individuals.117 In 
mid-July doctors staged a strike that had 95% participation – roughly 2000 participants - 
from doctors in various medical unions across the country. Most doctors did not work 
and protested in white coats outside the Ministry of Health. Doctors were protesting 
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changes to the ministry of health. They argued that changes to the National Health 
Service would erode the structure and symbolic status of their professions. The 
government wanted to hire 2000 more doctors, which would diminish the earnings of 
current doctors and increase the competition that doctors face.118 This two-day protest 
sent the doctors unions and the health ministry back to the negotiating table throughout 
the summer months. 
 The remainder of July and August were relatively quiet for protests and strikes 
throughout Portugal. There were still occasional public transportation strikes and the 
dock workers at ports around Portugal started intermittent strikes against a change in the 
labor law affecting dockers. In Porto, 150 workers (40 percent of workers) from the Porto 
Society of Public Transport (STCP) held a strike at the end of July to protest the 
government’s strategic transport plan, which they said would result in private carriers, 
disregards the labor rights in the company agreement, and reduces the supply of transport 
to the population.119 Dock workers around Portugal held a 24-hour strike that paralyzed 
many of the ports around the country. The strike was criticized by the Portuguese Council 
of Shippers. This began what would be one of many periodic strikes the dock workers 
                                                 
118 Andrea Cunha Freitas and Mariana Oliveira, “Adesão à greve dos médicos reforçada no segundo dia, 
dizem sindicatos,” Público, July 12, 2012, https://www.publico.pt/2012/07/12/sociedade/noticia/adesao-a-
greve-dos-medicos-reforcada-no-segundo-dia-dizem-sindicatos-1554585; Andrea Cunha Freita, “Médicos 
defenderam SNS com "a maior greve de sempre,"” Público, July 12, 2012, 
https://www.publico.pt/2012/07/12/jornal/medicos-defenderam-sns-com-a-maior-greve-de-sempre-
24886247.   
119 Público and Lusa, “Trabalhadores da STCP cumprem dia de greve contra “morte lenta” da empresa,” 
Público, July 27, 2012, https://www.publico.pt/2012/07/27/economia/noticia/trabalhadores-da-stcp-
cumprem-dia-de-greve-contra-morte-lenta-da-empresa-1556555; Marisa Soares, “Sindicatos dizem que 





would hold until the end of December, when they withdrew their strikes in order to come 
back to the negotiating table.120  
 Social responses to austerity in Portugal would experience a watershed moment in 
September of 2012. As discussed in the previous section, 2012 had been a difficult year 
for Portugal’s ability to meet its deficit targets, leading to the Troika relaxing the targets 
Portugal had to meet. In order to make up some of the ground lost because of a decrease 
in tax receipts, a recession in Europe, and a deeper than expected recession in Portugal, 
the Prime Minister included new austerity measures in early September. The most 
controversial was the changes to the Social Security Contributions (TSU). Raising the 
contributions from workers and lowering contributions for employers led to an instant 
backlash on Facebook and other social media platforms as it was seen as directly taking 
from workers to benefit business owners. This led to the “Fuck the Troika” movement 
(Que se lixe a Troika! Queremos as nossas vidas! – Fuck the Troika! We want our lives!), 
which had no affiliation with traditional unions. This movement organized a protest on 
September 15 and hundreds of thousands of Portuguese took to the streets in over 40 
cities to protest the 2013 budget and the proposed changes to TSU contributions. Over 
one hundred thousand in Porto and more than that in Lisbon. Despite no official numbers, 
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there were estimates that 500,000 people took to the streets.121 Público claimed it was the 
largest protest ever in Portugal’s democracy as television described the demonstrations as 
the largest since April 25, 1974 – the Carnation Revolution that started the transition of 
Portugal from dictatorship to democracy.122  
 The public pressure put on the government regarding changes to TSU 
contributions was so significant at this point that the government recognized it needed to 
change and ultimately led to the government withdrawing the proposed measures. This 
was the only time outside of Constitutional Court rulings that the government changed its 
policies because of societal pressure. As one former minister from the CDS put it, “As a 
government we understood that that manifestation (protests against changing the TSU) 
was not a regular strike from CGTP. It was something completely different. So, we were 
able to understand it and pull back the measure.”123 
 Throughout the rest of September there continued to be various strikes and 
protests, but these largely adhered to previous patterns of relatively low participation and 
short or partial strikes, with a few exceptions. However, there was an important change in 
the tone of the protests following the September 15 mass demonstration. While many of 
the protests the first year of the program were against specific legislation or 
precariousness of work, following the September 15 protests, there was much more 
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pronounced call for not only a change in policy, but for the government to resign. This 
was seen in events organized by the “Fuck the Troika” movement as well as CGTP.  
 Galp Energia held a three-day strike to protest workers only receiving a 1 percent 
pay increase while management received more than 30 percent.124 The unions claimed 
that over 90 percent of workers participated, but the participation rate according to the 
company was 8.6 percent.125 Port workers began a five-week strike period because of 
changes to the labor law. The strikes were planned to occur intermittently despite a new 
agreement between UGT and the government. Critics say the UGT agreement was 
negotiated by unions representing less than 20 percent of the port workers. Those 
affiliated with the Fuck the Troika movement also continued to organize protests through 
social media, but they tended to be very small. For example, on September 21 there were 
a number of protests around the country but estimates put participation at between 12 and 
200 people in roughly seven places around the country.126 Lisbon Metro workers held a 
two-day partial strike in late September that had 100 percent adherence and lasted from 
5am until 10am on both days.127   
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 There were two protests that attracted more significant numbers of participants. 
First, a protest outside Belem Palace during the Council of State meeting drew anywhere 
from a few thousand to 20,000 (organizer’s estimate). The goal of the protest was the 
resignation of the government and for the MOU to be discarded.128 CGTP held a rally at 
the end of September that just under 100,000 people attended. This rally was specifically 
to protest austerity and the Troika and to continue protests in the run up to the 
presentation of the 2013 budget in mid-October.129  
 October continued many of the same trends as before with partial strikes and 
small protests, but there were more moderately sized protests that included a few 
thousand protesters, but not reaching into the tens or hundreds of thousands as witnessed 
in September. Transportation strikes were carried out in the beginning of the month as 
workers continued to oppose cuts in holiday and overtime pay. The urban services of 
Comboios de Portugal in Lisbon and Porto held a four-day strike from October 1 – 4 
where workers would strike for the first two hours of their shifts.130 On October 4, Lisbon 
Metro held a strike from 5am until 10am with 100 percent adherence, while bus drivers in 
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Lisbon held a 24-hour strike.131 Later in the month there was a partial strike of drivers for 
Metro Sul do Tejo for four days. Strikes were also beginning to happen in other sectors as 
Lusa News Agency began a 4-day strike in mid-October to protest 30 percent budget cuts 
for 2013 and Público workers went on strike against the collective dismissal of 48 
workers.132 
 The most contentious strike continued to be dock and port workers, who began a 
five-week period of stoppages in September to protest changes in the labor contracts for 
dock workers. This included working only from 5pm until midnight. By the end of the 
month the strike was beginning to have a significant and negative effect on exports, 
leading the Minister of the Economy, Álvaro Santos Pereira to comment that the situation 
at the ports was unsustainable.133  
 There were a number of protests in October that garnered media attention. Yet, 
despite a rising level of anger and frustration among the Portuguese, October protests 
continued the trend of many small to medium size protests as the size of protests ranged 
between a few dozen to a few thousand people. Large protests, such as those seen in 
September did not occur and violence remained minimal. Examples of October protests 
include a few hundred protesters gathering outside parliament to protest the government’s 
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austerity policies in early October and dozens of students meeting in Lisbon to demand 
the government reinstate their school passes for reduced fees on public transportation in 
mid-October.134 3,500 pharmacists also marched through the streets angry that drug 
prices had been lowered, forcing many to close up their shops.135 On October 13, CGTP 
organized a march against unemployment as part of a day of protests across Portugal. The 
biggest event was a cultural festival featuring music and artists which was organized by 
“Fuck the Troika” and held in Lisbon. No official numbers were given, but Público noted 
that thousands attended. Attendees had disparate motivations for going, ranging from 
protests against austerity, the Troika, and “runaway capitalism” to those wanting to 
protect culture and the arts.136  
 Protests against the government and the 2013 budget continued in the second half 
of October. In mid-October “thousands” protested outside parliament and demanded the 
government resign.137 Another protest saw roughly 2,000 military personnel protest the 
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budget and delays in promotion138 and CGTP-led rally outside parliament that attracted 
“thousands” as the 2013 budget was being voted on. Protesters attempted to surround 
parliament, but there were not enough protesters.139 The movement to protect parishes 
continued as there were several small protests around Portugal to protest the extinction of 
parishes. Several dozen to a few hundred protesters participated and voiced their 
opposition to the extinction of parishes.140  
 As October gave way to November, strike and protest activity increased in 
frequency and many of the strikes continued the previous trends of regularized actions 
with a low-level of intensity. Examples of strike activity that adhered to previous patterns 
included: a partial strike by Comboios de Portugal on November 1 in their continuing 
protest against the government’s reduction in overtime and holiday pay;141 an afternoon 
“general strike” by employees of Caixa Geral Depósitos group workers;142 a partial 
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shutdown of Portugal’s central and southern ports;143 dock workers extending their partial 
strike;144 and an indefinite partial strike (striking from 5 pm to 9 am on all working days 
and for 24 hours on weekends and holidays) of the Foreign and Border Service Research 
and Inspection Career Union.145 There was also a threatened strike from the air traffic 
controllers, but after government concessions regarding pay cuts, holiday pay, and 
overtime pay, the strike was called off.146   
 There were also several smaller protests throughout the month following earlier 
trends. These included a protest against the Troika and the government at the 
inauguration of a statue in Barcelos;147 Students at the University of Coimbra padlocked 
the door to the library in protest of budget cuts to universities;148 Hundreds of students 
gathered outside parliament to protest cuts to education;149 roughly 50 workers of the 
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Lusa News Agency protested outside Passos Coelho’s official residence against budget 
cuts to the news agency;150 200 winegrowers protested outside parliament for more 
government support;151 and Portuguese dock workers were joined by dock workers from 
eight other European countries to protest Portugal’s new port labor law, which the PSD, 
PS, and CDS-PP all voted for.152 There were also protests against German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, as she came to Lisbon prior to the parliamentary vote on the 2013 
budget. Most of these protests were carried out by the far-left parties and “Fuck the 
Troika” but the protests were not that big.153 The “Fuck the Troika” movement put black 
cloths over major memorials and statues to protest the Troika’s policies and to indicate 
that Merkel doesn’t rule Portugal.154 There were also protests from about a thousand 
firefighters demanding higher pay155 and about 5,000 police officers from around 
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Portugal requesting changes to the 2013 budget.156 
 Even with the strikes and protests mentioned above, the most significant event in 
November was a CGTP-led general strike. CGTP called for the general strike back in 
October, but UGT did not endorse the strike or officially participate. However, 23 of the 
49 unions in the UGT organization declared their intention to participate in the strike.157 
Despite UGT not formally participating, the general strike was large and caused major 
disruptions. Buses, trains, and airplanes were largely shut down, over 200 schools were 
closed, and nurses also went on strike. Many small businesses and shopkeepers also went 
on strike and even some major business leaders close to the government were urging 
Passos Coelho to ease the burden of austerity and get the targets relaxed. The Financial 
Times noted that the diversity of participants differentiated this strike from others and 
also indicated that the previous consensus in favor of Portugal fulfilling the program was 
becoming fragile.158 
 As the end of 2012 approached, the social responses to the government and its 
policies were more in line with social action prior to September. There were a number of 
transportation sector strikes with workers continuing to protest cuts in holiday and 
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overtime pay. These included a 24-hour strike on December 1,159 another on December 
8,160 and a third on Christmas Day.161 The dock workers continued their ongoing strike by 
extending their strike period twice during December. They extended their strike through 
January 7 and then again through January 14. Towards the end of December, the dock 
workers agreed to call off their strike in order to focus on reaching a collective bargaining 
agreement, ending their months-long series of partial strikes that affected imports and 
exports around Portugal.162 There were also small demonstrations similar to previous 
periods, such as a CGTP-led protest asking the Portuguese President, Cavaco Silva to 
veto the 2013 budget163 and 400 art students marched in Porto to protest the rule changes 
to access higher education.164 The National Platform against the Extinction of Parishes 
(PNCEF) continued to voice their objections to the extinction of parishes by presenting 
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an alternative bill to parliament,165 asking Cavaco Silva to veto the parish 
restructuring/extinction bill, and holding small demonstrations against the planned parish 
extinctions.166 
 To summarize the social responses in the second half of 2012, it was one of the 
most important periods when examining responses to Portugal’s Troika program and 
especially its austerity policies. While previous trends of a constant low-level of protests 
and strikes continued, the September 15 protests were different from any prior protests 
and dealt the government a huge blow in terms of public confidence in the Troika 
program and the government itself. As one former advisor to the Prime Minister said, 
“That (the social security tax debacle) is when people began to think, (the Troika 
program) doesn’t make sense…that was the biggest policy blunder of them all.”167 After 
this point, the public was less willing to go along with the new measures the government 
would need to enact to continue to hit the program targets.  
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q1 2013 
 There continued to be little good news at the beginning of 2013 as the legality of 
the 2013 budget came into question once again, economic reforms were not producing 
results, the government’s credibility continued to be in doubt, and questions about a 
possible second bailout continued. Despite earning praise for its dedication to the Troika 
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program, Portugal continued to face difficult economic conditions that furthered the 
political stalemate between the government and the opposition parties. Even with the 
challenges facing the Portuguese government, bond yields continued to decrease as 
Portugal returned to long-term debt markets and Portugal had made some progress with 
its current account deficit.  
 In January, President Cavaco Silva asked the constitutional court to review the 
constitutionality of specific austerity measures passed in November of the previous year. 
Cavaco Silva was concerned about whether cuts to public sector pay and state pensions, 
and the “solidarity tax” on pensions above €1,350 per month were constitutional.168 This 
move was supported by UGT and the Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP). 
Unions were worried that the burdens of austerity were not being shared in a fair way 
across society and CIP was concerned that austerity was depressing demand.169 Despite 
this potential blow to the government, Portugal was again praised by the IMF in the sixth 
quarterly review by the Troika, stating that Portugal’s “policy and reform effort has been 
impressive” and that the program was making considerable progress, leading to bond 
yields falling, which was a positive step for Portugal regaining market access later in the 
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year.170 Although the Troika praised the Portuguese government’s effort they continued 
to note that there were risks in the short and medium term. Portugal needed to continue 
its structural reforms to ensure the competitiveness of its tradable sector, prevent 
backsliding with the labor and judicial reforms already passed, and ensure the burden of 
further fiscal adjustments were shared across society.171 Later in January, Portugal raised 
and extra €2.5bn in the bond market in a “syndicated tap,” which added to an existing 
€6bn bond maturing in 2017.172 This also sent Portugal’s 10-year bond yields down to 
just over six percent, their lowest levels since 2010.173  
 Portugal received some more positive news moving into February as it posted an 
increase in exports and its current account deficit continued to fall. After a decrease in 
exports towards the end of 2012, Portugal’s exports grew at 5.8 percent in 2012, with 
more than a 20 percent increase of exports outside of Europe. While the fall in its current 
account deficit from 10.9 percent of GDP in 2009 to a projected 2.5 percent in 2012 was 
welcome news,174 the IMF could not firmly answer whether the drop was because of real, 
structural changes to the Portuguese economy or whether it was cyclical. Exports were 
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increasing and imports decreasing, but the IMF tempered some of the optimism by 
warning that some of the decrease in imports was due to a decrease in domestic demand 
in Portugal.175  
 While there was some good news at the beginning of 2013, it could not be denied 
that austerity continued to take a heavy toll on the economy, society, and the political 
climate. The EU forecast estimates for 2013 revealed that Portuguese real GDP was 
expected to decrease by 1.9 percent, as opposed to the previously projected 1 percent, and 
unemployment was to peak at 17.3 percent in 2013.176 The government was even more 
pessimistic in its assessment of the economy. In March, the government released 
projections that the economy would shrink by 2.3 percent in 2013 and unemployment 
would reach 19 percent by the end of the year.177 The opposition, including the PS also 
began to voice its displeasure more forcefully. In mid-February, the PS opposition leader 
António José Seguro (PS) sent a letter to the Troika arguing that Portugal (and the PS) 
wanted to meet their obligations under the MOU, but not at the expense of ripping society 
apart. He argued for more time to consolidate public accounts and debt repayment, lower 
interest rates, and a postponement of interest payments. Without some easing of the 
conditions, Seguro argued, the program would fail as it would be rejected by Portuguese 
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voters.178 While this was a sharp criticism, it was not a full rejection of the program and 
its objectives as was witnessed in Greece. Seguro did not disagree with the goals of the 
program, as he maintained that there must be fiscal discipline and structural reform in 
Portugal, but a rethinking of the program’s design would be needed.  
 Portugal’s economic situation continued to worsen as spring approached, but the 
conclusions from the Troika’s seventh review of the Portuguese program were mixed. 
The bad news was that the government announced that it expected the Portuguese 
economy to fall deeper into recession in 2013 as it released projections that the economy 
would shrink by 2.3 percent in 2013, which is more than twice the previous estimate. 
Slowing exports were partly to blame for the deeper than expected slowdown, as export 
growth had slowed to 0.8 percent. Adding to Portugal’s economic problems, the 
projections for unemployment were increased to 19 percent by the end of 2013 and were 
expected to be above 17 percent through 2017.  
 On the positive side, the Troika released a statement saying Portugal’s program 
implementation was broadly on track, despite the background of difficult economic 
conditions. Portugal had met its 2012 deficit targets, the financial sector had been 
safeguarded, and there was progress with structural reforms. The Troika also noted that 
Portugal was continuing to exceed expectations with its external adjustment. And, 
because of Portugal’s commitment to implementing the program and a deeper than 
                                                 




expected recession,179 the Troika granted Portugal’s request to adjust fiscal deficit targets 
again. Portugal’s fiscal target for 2013 were revised from 4.5 to 5.5 percent of GDP, 2014 
from 2.5 to 4 percent of GDP, and 2015 from 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP.180  
 The announcement from the government and Troika that the targets needed 
adjusted, unemployment would be higher, and the recession would be deeper led to 
increased criticism from opposition parties, trade unions, small business owners, and 
employer groups. The PS argued the need for an extension was evidence that the 
government had failed while the Confederation of Portuguese Industry would have 
preferred for the extension of deficit targets to have been two years instead of one. CGTP 
was frank in stating that, “Another year will not solve the problem.”181  
 Portugal’s situation in the first quarter of 2013 was complicated as the 
government remained steadfast in its application of the MOU despite a worsening 
economy, very high unemployment, and increasing criticism from the opposition in 
parliament as well as unions and the business confederations. There were also concerns 
that some of the austerity measures passed in November were unconstitutional, leading to 
a challenge in the Constitutional Court. Despite these difficulties Portuguese bond yields 
remained just over 6 percent throughout the first quarter. Even with the continued 
recession, pessimistic forecasts, revised deficit targets, and increasing resistance to the 
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program, the Troika remained positive about Portugal’s dedication to the program.  
Social Responses Q1 2013 
 The first quarter of 2013 continued the second phase of the Portuguese response, 
which began in September 2012 and included increased protest and strike activity. The 
first quarter of 2013 saw the most protests of any quarter during Portugal’s Troika 
program up to that point. There was a total of 74 protests in the first quarter with 15 
protests with more than 500 participants, including a protest in mid-February with tens of 
thousands of participants involving 24 cities and another in March involving hundreds of 
thousands and taking place in 20 cities. Labor unrest also remained elevated as partial 
strikes occurred with regular frequency and transportation disruptions were more 
frequent, continuing the trends from 2012. While there are no quarterly statistics given on 
Portuguese labor disputes, there were two notably large strikes in the first quarter of 
2013, one being a 24-hour transportation strike in Porto and the other being a five-day 
transportation strike taking place all over Portugal.  
 While there were 15 large protests in Q1 2013, three protests stand out as 
significant. First, there was a teacher protest in late-January due to potential cuts and 
changes to schools, including potentially dismissing 50,000 teachers. This demonstration 
brought an estimated 40,000 teachers to the streets in protest.182 The increased protest 
activity continued in February there was a 24-city protest against the government and its 
austerity policies that was promoted by CGTP. While exact numbers were not given, 
                                                 





there were about 10,000 protesters in Porto and “thousands” more in Lisbon and across 
Portugal.183 The largest protests in the first quarter occurred in early March on the heels 
of a huge tax increase and when the Troika was in Lisbon for its quarterly review. 
Hundreds of thousands of people turned out in Lisbon and across many cities in Portugal 
to voice their anger at the government, austerity, and the Troika. By this point the trust of 
the government had been lost by many as austerity was really taking a toll on the 
economic and social life of the Portuguese.184  
 Labor disputes and strikes continued their trends from 2012 with many partial 
strikes, especially in the transportation sector, and many smaller strikes by workers in 
industries such as health care and shipyard workers. However, there were two notable 
strike actions that were beyond the smaller and partial strikes witnessed quite regularly. 
The first was a 24-hour strike by Society of Transport Collective of Porto (STCP), which 
had 100 percent adherence by workers and led to all buses being stopped for the day. The 
strike was called to protest the government not honoring the contract that workers from 
STCP had negotiated with the company.185 The second major industrial action that took 
place in Q1 of 2013 also involved the transportation sector but took place in multiple 
cities in Portugal and across five days in early March. The primary companies 
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responsible for the strike were CP and STCP and worker participation in the strike was 
high. Workers were continuing their protests of low wages, reduction of overtime 
payments, privatization, and complaints that the agreements and collective contracts had 
not been adhered to. The strike led to many bus and train routes being cancelled around 
the country and disrupted travel in cities.186 Ultimately the week of strikes culminated 
with about 1,000 people marching to parliament in Lisbon.187  
  The first quarter of 2013 saw the continuation of increased social mobilizations 
that began in September 2012 as the number of protests increased and strike activity 
remained higher than in previous quarters. Portugal was in the middle of the second 
phase of its social response to the Troika program, which was marked by increased 
protest and strike activity. The increase in protest activity was primarily due to the two 
large, nation-wide protests that saw many thousands in the streets across Portugal. These 
two events alone accounted for 44 of the 74 protests and had the highest numbers of 
participation. There was also the continuation of frequent partial and smaller strikes as 
well as two larger strike events by the transportation sector that caused significant 
disruptions.  
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q2 2013 
 During the second quarter of 2013 pressure on the Passos Coelho government 
continued to build as the opposition in parliament grew bolder, the Constitutional Court 
struck down austerity measures for the second year in a row, and a high level minister 
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resigned due to scandal. These pressures increased throughout the second quarter and 
brought back speculation that Portugal could need a second bailout.  
 The second quarter of 2013 began with a no confidence motion led by the PS, 
which was defeated by a vote of 131 to 97. Despite its easy defeat, it signaled an 
increasingly confrontational period with the main opposition party.188 The following day 
Miguel Relvas, the Deputy Minister and Parliamentary Affairs, resigned from his 
position due to a scandal about fraudulently receiving an academic degree. The next day 
the Constitutional Court ruled that four parts of the government’s austerity package from 
the 2013 budget were unconstitutional. This was the second consecutive year that parts of 
the budget had been ruled unconstitutional and prompted the opposition to call for Prime 
Minister Passos Coelho’s resignation once again. The four measures that were rejected 
amounted to about 20 percent of the austerity measures planned for 2013 and included 
cuts to state pensions and public sector pay as well as cuts to sickness and unemployment 
benefits. They also included a “solidarity” tax surcharge and a cut of 50 percent in 
overtime rates for public sector workers.189 The court’s rejection of the austerity 
measures forced Prime Minister Passos Coelho to announce that he would make further 
cuts to the state spending to keep Portugal on course with its bailout program. At the end 
of April Passos Coelho announced cuts totaling €6bn over the next four years, including 
further cuts to health, education, and social security.190  
                                                 
188 Peter Wise, “Portugal market jitters over instability,” Financial Times, April 3, 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/87fed8c6-9c4f-11e2-ba3c-00144feabdc0. 
189 Peter Wise, “Portugal court rules against austerity,” Financial Times, April 5, 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/3a4aaed2-9e36-11e2-9ccc-00144feabdc0. 
190 Peter Wise, “Portugal announces plan to prolong austerity beyond bailout,” Financial Times, April 30, 
2013, https://www.ft.com/content/ecbe7c0c-b1c7-11e2-b324-00144feabdc0. 
369 
 Portugal had also been in talks with the Troika for some time to extend the 
maturities on its bailout loans from the EU, which, in mid-April, was granted to both 
Portugal and Ireland. Both countries received an extension of seven years on loans from 
the EU. This was a big win for both countries, but especially for Portugal. The day before 
the decision to extend the maturities was agreed to, a paper from the Troika leaked that 
cast serious doubt on Portugal's ability to avoid a second bailout as even with the 
extension financing needs in the years following its program were expected to be much 
higher than before the crisis.191  The doubts about Portugal extended beyond the Troika 
as even former Prime Minister Mario Soares said that Portugal would not be able to pay 
its debts and the only solution was not to pay.192 These doubts would continue to plague 
Portugal throughout the second quarter of 2013 as bond yields would reach 6.6 percent in 
mid-June.193 
 On the heels of Passos Coelho’s announcement of new austerity measures 
Portugal had a positive development as it issued new bonds for the first time since taking 
the bailout in 2011. The issue was for €3bn of ten-year bonds yields at 5.7 percent, which 
saw demand of more than three times the offer.194 Meanwhile there was an impending 
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lawsuit from JP Morgan and Banco Santander against Portuguese state-owned companies 
after two months of failed talks to renegotiate derivative contracts.195 The Portuguese 
banking sector was also running low on capital, putting in doubt their ability to meet their 
capital requirements.196  
 While the second quarter of 2013 saw Portugal’s first bond auction since entering 
its Troika program and an extension of maturities on EU loans, it was a very difficult 
period for the government. Friction between the government and the opposition 
increased, the Constitutional Court struck down more austerity measures, bond yields 
continued to rise, and a high-level minister resigned due to scandal. Yet, the government 
remained dedicated to the program in the face of mounting external and internal pressure.  
Social Responses Q2 2013 
  The second quarter of 2013 brought Portugal to the cusp of the second phase of 
resistance to the Troika program as the government had lost most of its credibility, 
austerity was not producing economic growth, and many wanted change. In Q2 of 2013 
there were a total of 94 protests with 11 protests of 500 or more participants. This is an 
increase from the first quarter in total protests, but not in large protests. Many of the 
previous trends continued with a good number of smaller protests and a significant 
number of protests against the government, austerity, or the Troika. Of the 94 total 
protests, 77 fell in this category as frustration with the program continued to increase and 
calls for the government to resign were close to reaching their peak. Of these 77 protests, 
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58 occurred on two days in June. Outside of protests against the government, austerity, or 
the Troika, workers’ rights was the next most common reason to protest. There were six 
protests of this type, including larger protests on May Day. There was also a notable 
protest in April by farmers against budget cuts and tax increases that drew 3000 
participants. Strike activity began rather slowly during this quarter as transportation 
unions in Lisbon and Porto both attempted to work out deals with their respective 
companies. Prison guards held strikes in April and May and there was a major dispute 
between teachers and the government in June. The largest event concerning labor was 
undoubtedly the general strike at the end of June, which both UGT and CGTP both 
participated.  
 The most notable events in Q2 2013 all happened in June. On June 1, there were 
anti-austerity protests all over Europe and 18 cities in Portugal held protests. While there 
were many cities that held demonstrations, the numbers were disappointing for Fuck the 
Troika!, which organized the protests. Newspapers reported that the protests brought a 
few thousand people together across the country197 and there were only 1000 protesters in 
Porto.198 However, a poll was released at the same time showing that 57 percent of 
Portuguese wanted the government to resign.199 The second major event involved a 
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significant dispute between the government and Ministry of Education with the teachers 
that divided Portugal, the political parties, teachers, parents, and students. The dispute 
was over pay cuts, increased hours, and a new “mobility regime” that would force 
teachers to take positions in other districts or resign if school districts were merged.200 
Teachers went on strike on the day of national 12th grade exams, leading to more than 
one-fifth of 12th graders missing their exams.201 The last major event was the general 
strike, which was not only called by the two main labor unions, but the four main 
Portuguese industrial associations said they understood why the strike was happening and 
were critical of the government for Portugal’s high unemployment as well as large falls in 
investment and production.202 The numbers for participation were not officially released, 
but UGT said adherence to the strike was over 50 percent.203 In addition to workers 
striking, there were more than 50 separate demonstrations held on the day of the strike.  
 Altogether, the end of June (and into the first week of July) represented the last 
major push of social resistance to the government, Troika, and austerity measures. 
Unions, public employees, and business confederations were largely united in their 
opposition to many of austerity policies endured over the past two years, wanted change, 
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and saw that the government had lost much of its credibility. The main factor 
differentiating these groups was that the political opposition and labor union CGTP were 
pushing hard for the government to resign while the business groups and UGT wanted a 
change in policy away from austerity and towards growth-oriented policies.  
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q3 2013 
 The third quarter of 2013 was the most contentious for the PSD/CDS coalition 
and a time where the Portuguese Troika program nearly fell apart. Numerous events came 
together to produce significant doubts about the viability of the government and 
Portugal’s ability to fulfill the terms of its Troika agreement, leading investors and ratings 
agencies to speculate Portugal would need a second bailout.  
The beginning of July would be a defining moment for the PSD/CDS coalition, 
and Portugal’s Troika program. Vitor Gaspar, Portugal’s Finance Minister, resigned on 
July 1 citing a loss of public support for the austerity program, which was due to a greater 
fall in domestic demand and lower tax revenues than he had expected as well as 
Portugal’s failure to hit its fiscal deficit targets.204 Gaspar’s resignation was a huge blow 
to the government, but the next day, the foreign minister Paulo Portas, the leader of CDS, 
also resigned due to a disagreement with the prime minister over Vitor Gaspar’s 
replacement, Maria Luis Albuquerque. These resignations had many believing that it was 
the end of the government and that Portugal might need a second bailout. The financial 
damage amounted quickly as Portugal’s stock market fell sharply and its 10-year bond 
                                                 




yields rose from 6.4 percent on July 1 to touching 8 percent briefly on July 3.205 
However, Prime Minister Passos Coelho refused to resign despite many calls for 
him to do so, and he also refused to accept the resignation of Paulo Portas. Instead, 
Passos Coelho met with his coalition partners and reshuffled his cabinet. Maria Luis 
Albuquerque remained on as the finance minister, but Paulo Portas was promoted to 
Deputy Prime Minister, specifically tasked with managing the €78bn bailout program. 
Passos Coelho also promoted António Pires de Lima, a senior CDS politician, to Minister 
of the Economy, replacing Álvaro Santos Pereira. The reshuffling of the cabinet did not 
alter the goal of meeting Portugal’s fiscal targets and exiting the austerity program but led 
to a change in rhetoric from Passos Coelho. He stated that this would start a new phase of 
the program focused on increased economic growth and lowering unemployment, which 
departed from his earlier promises of ‘going beyond’ the Troika.206 
Less than a week later the president, Anibal Cavaco Silva called for a deal 
between the ruling coalition the Socialist Party that would hold new elections at the time 
Portugal was scheduled to exit the bailout program, sparking fears from investors that 
they did not intend to continue making the changes mandated by the bailout program.207 
The comments by the president prompted further talks between the PSD, PS, and CDS in 
search of a grand bargain over finding ways to renegotiate the terms of the bailout to 
make the austerity measures less harsh. However, these talks broke down with most of 
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the Socialists proposals being rejected. The end result was an agreement from the three 
main political parties where they guaranteed to finish the bailout program and keep 
deficits in check for the medium term.208  
 August didn’t offer much relief for the Portuguese government as political turmoil 
and uncertainty continued despite Portugal’s first quarter of economic growth in more 
than two years. Portugal signaled that it would go to their international lenders to get 
permission to lighten the austerity measures in order to prevent more political chaos.209 
The new treasury chief, Joaquim Pais Jorge, resigned over allegations that he attempted 
to sell derivative contracts to the Portuguese government that would have taken public 
debt off the official books in 2005.210 The one piece of positive news occurred in mid-
August as it was revealed that for the first time in ten quarters, the Portuguese economy 
grew, at a rate of 1.1 percent. This marked the emergence from the deepest recession in 
over forty years.211 August ended as Portugal’s Constitutional Court struck down a 
measure that would have allowed employers to fire workers who could not be retrained or 
placed in a new job within twelve months, citing it violates the guarantee of secure 
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In September Portugal entered a new round of talks with the Troika to try and 
ease their fiscal targets but faced strong opposition from EU officials. This was one of the 
sticking points earlier in the year when the Troika agreed to relax Portugal’s fiscal 
targets. Portugal still wanted their target for 2014 to be 4.5 percent, but the Troika held 
firm at 4 percent with José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission President, among 
others suggesting that trying to renegotiate the rates again would send a negative signal to 
markets about Portugal’s commitment to its bailout program.213 Portuguese bond yields 
also took a hit with the government wanting to revise its deficit targets. Although 
Portuguese 10-year bond yields had fallen from their peak of just over 8 percent, they 
were still hovering over 7 percent, and S&P issued a warning that Portugal’s debt rating 
could be downgraded because of the possibility Portugal fails to hit its fiscal targets. At 
this point in the program there were not only serious doubts that Portugal would hit its 
deficit targets, but a lot of speculation that it would need a second bailout.214 September 
ended with Portuguese voters punishing the Social Democrats and CDS in local elections 
for their harsh austerity budgets over the previous two years as the PS notched its largest 
local election victory ever. Despite the election setback and the many events of Q3 2013 
that cast doubt on Portugal’s government and its commitment to its Troika Program, 
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Passos Coelho promised to move forward with the planned austerity measures to ensure 
Portugal complied with the terms of its Troika bailout.215  
Social Responses Q3 2013 
 After a very contentious and protest filled second quarter of 2013 that culminated 
with a general strike, the third quarter was very quiet in comparison. There were only 26 
total protests with zero large protests. Strike activity also largely disappeared, with few 
exceptions, such as nurses and prison guards. Whereas the second quarter gave many 
opponents of the government hope that its end may be near, the survival of the 
government coalition following the resignations of Vitor Gaspar and Paulo Portas 
appeared to temporarily subdue those calling for the government to resign.  
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q4 2013 
 On the heels of the Portuguese government surviving its summer crisis and 
avoiding a potential catastrophe, some of the external pressures on Portugal began to ease 
in Q4 of 2013 as bond yields and unemployment both fell, and Portugal successfully 
issued a bond swap. Yet, doubts remained about Portugal’s ability to exit the program as 
well as continued speculation it would need a second bailout. Lisbon’s fiscal position 
required it to pass another harsh austerity budget, the Troika rejected a request to ease 
deficit targets, the IMF warned Portugal that it was far from out of the woods, and the 
Constitutional Court again ruled against some of the government’s austerity measures. In 
the face of these challenges, and with some good news to work with, the Portuguese 
government moved forward to exit its Troika program in May of 2014.  
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In early October, as the Troika returned to Lisbon for its quarterly review, 
Portugal attempted to have its deficit target for 2014 revised from 4 percent to 4.5 
percent, but this request was rejected by the Troika out of fear it would signal a lack of 
commitment to the program. However, other than this rejection, the combined eight/ninth 
review of Portugal’s program was mostly positive. The Troika noted that the program 
was still on track and the deficit target of 5.5 percent for 2013 was within reach. It was 
also noted that unemployment had fallen from a high of 17.6 percent in Q1 2013 to 16.5 
percent in August and its projections for economic growth were revised upward from a 
contraction of 2.3 percent in 2014 to a contraction of 1.8 percent and expected growth of 
0.8 percent in 2015. The review did warn that further rulings against austerity from the 
Constitutional Court could make accessing the bond market at the end of Portugal’s 
Troika program more difficult.216 The government also revealed its budget for 2014 in 
mid-October and passed it in late November. This was one of the toughest austerity 
budgets to date as it included cuts to civil servants’ pay, pensions over €600 per month, 
raising the retirement age to 66, and the loss of three holidays. There were also tax 
increases on things like diesel vehicles, alcohol, and tobacco as the government was 
expected to reduce the budget deficit from 5.5% to 4%.217 
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The Portuguese Constitutional Court ruled twice on austerity measures during Q4 
2013. The first ruling, in late November, said that extending the work week from 35 to 40 
hours per week was legal, upholding one of the key reforms from the government.218 The 
second ruling, in mid-December, ruled that the planned cuts of ten percent from pensions 
over €600 per month was unconstitutional. This ruling was hailed by the opposition and 
left the government scrambling to find an additional €388 million in savings. Despite this 
setback, both the government and the Troika were confident about Portugal’s ability to 
find savings elsewhere.219  
In December, Portugal successfully swapped €6.6bn in government bonds for 
debt that matured three years later. This successful swap indicated to many that Portugal 
was moving closer to being able to leave its bailout program even as the IMF warned of 
years of slow growth and structural changes that could take as long as ten to fifteen years 
to complete.220 Despite the IMF’s warning and questions throughout the end of 2013 
about whether Portugal would need a second bailout, 2013 ended on a positive note with 
the bond swap and falling bond yields. There was still pressure on Portugal, but it was 
edging closer to exiting the program and economic data were beginning turn around. 
Social Responses Q4 2013 
After a very quiet third quarter of 2013 for protests and strikes, the fourth quarter 
would see a marked increase in activity as there were a total of 80 protests with ten of 
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them having more than 500 participants. 25 of the protests were against the 
government/Troika/Austerity while 22 protests were related to education and the ongoing 
conflict between the government and teachers as well as students. There were also 14 
protests directly related to the budget including one protests of more than 50,000 people. 
Strike activity also increase significantly, especially in the transportation sector. For the 
third year in a row, there was also a civil servant strike in November, which affected 
health care, education, courts, and municipalities. As the last budget while in the Troika 
program was to be introduced and passed in Q4, this was the last opportunity for groups 
opposed to the government and the Troika to try and effect change. Given these dynamics 
it is not surprising that the number of protests and strikes was elevated during this time.  
One of the most significant protests occurred in Porto in mid-October as 50,000 
people held a slow-moving parade across the Infante Bridge demanding the resignation of 
the government and early elections. Protesters were bused in from all over Portugal for 
the event, which was led by CGTP.221 The second very large protest was organized by 
Fuck the Troika! to protest the 2014 budget. These protests were planned in 14 cities 
around Portugal, but the turnout was disappointing as only 20,000 protesters participated 
in Lisbon with only 2,000 participants in Porto and 50 in Viseu.222 The final truly large-
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scale protest was held by police and security workers outside parliament in late-
November to protest the 2014 budget, which was set to cut many of their wages. It was 
estimated that 12,000 police and security professionals participated in the protest, which 
was the sector’s largest ever.223 While there were other protests that involved 500 or more 
participants, they never reached the scale of these three protests. For example, around 
2,000 people gathered in Celorico da Beira in mid-October and sang a popular protest 
song to object to the closure of public services around Portugal.224  
Strike activity was also increased from the previous quarter as many workers were 
upset with the 2014 budget and some with existing working conditions. The 
transportation sector held the most strikes (19), with an additional seven partial strikes. 
Nurses, garbage collectors, and Foreign & Border Service agents also staged multi-day 
strikes, protesting working conditions and/or the 2014 budget. For the third year in a row, 
civil servants held a strike in November. The strike had participation from CGTP and 
UGT unions and affected many sectors including education, social security, finance 
offices, health care, courts, and municipalities.225 While unions reported that participation 
in the strike was over 50 percent, with between 70 and 100 percent for garbage collectors 
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and between 50 and 100 percent in hospitals and schools,226 the government figures 
showed only a 23 percent participation rate.227 
Q4 of 2013 saw an increase in the number of protests and strikes as compared to 
Q3, but major disruptions as seen since September 2012 were largely avoided. The large 
protests targeted either the Troika/government/austerity or the 2014 budget, but the hype 
of the protests did not match the participation (i.e. “Fuck the Troika” protests in late-
October). The fact that the end of 2013 was when parliament voted on the 2014 budget 
gave many who were upset or opposed to the government and its austerity plans an 
opportunity to voice their displeasure, as was seen with a number of protests and strikes 
specifically aimed at measures from the budget. However, once the budget was passed, 
there was little recourse outside of Constitutional Court rulings that could have much 
impact.  
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q1 2014 
 On the heels of Ireland’s successful exit from their Troika program in December, 
external pressures on Portugal began to recede considerably as positive economic news 
sent interest rates on bond yields down, economic growth had returned in the latter part of 
2013, and increased exports helped Portugal post its first current account surplus in 
twenty years.228 Unemployment was still high, but beginning to decline and Q1 of 2014 
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would be much less stressful for the government than the previous three years as there 
was even talk of a ‘clean exit’ from the program.  
Investors were beginning to look more favorably towards the Eurozone periphery 
in January as Portugal issued €3.2bn in five-year debt at 4.657 percent and orders 
exceeded €11bn. This was another syndicated tap of an existing bond set to mature in 
2019 and covered nearly half of Portugal’s financing needs of €7.1bn for 2014. This 
successful bond auction led many who worried Portugal might need a second bailout to 
believe Portugal would exit the program, but with a precautionary line of credit that 
Ireland rejected.229 After the successful debt auction in January and looking to take 
advantage of falling bond yields, Portugal followed Ireland’s lead by announcing it 
would build up a cash cushion for 2015 as the end of its Troika bailout approached.230  
The economic situation continued to improve as S&P praised the government’s 
dedication to the program and removed Portugal from “CreditWatch,” which specifies 
that a country has a higher probability of a downgrade. However, the PS’s rejection of the 
prime minister’s “memorandum of confidence,” which was a proposal for a new fiscal 
pact that would have entailed more cuts through 2015 and limits on public expenditure 
through 2017 led to some speculation that a future PS government could reverse some of 
the reforms made during the Troika era.231 Portugal’s bonds continued to be in demand 
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despite government debt over 120% and the failure to reach agreement on the 
“memorandum of confidence” as bond yields dropped below five percent in January and 
Portugal recorded a current account surplus for the first time in over twenty years.232 
With the fall in bond yields, Portuguese officials began to openly discuss a clean exit 
from its program, with no precautionary credit line. Markets had begun to warm to 
Portugal as it had strong export growth over the past four years and the finance ministry 
announced in late January that it would reduce its fiscal deficit for 2013 to at least 5 
percent of GDP.233  
Positive economic news continued to appear throughout Q1 of 2014 as Portugal 
successfully issued €3bn in 10-year bonds at 5.112 percent, with demand reaching 
€9.8bn. It was also reported that exports accounted for 41 percent of GDP (as opposed to 
28 percent in 2008) as Portugal was climbing up the value chain in sectors such as luxury 
footwear, electronics, and car manufacturing. Portugal was also seeing the beginning of a 
boom in tourism.234 These positive economic developments contributed to falling interest 
rates on Portuguese bonds as 10-year bonds fell below four percent in late-March.235 The 
positive developments in the economy regarding exports, trade, fiscal deficits, and 
tourism all helped to lower Portuguese bond yields and create a newfound confidence in 
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the country’s recovery as its exit from its Troika program approached.  
Social Responses Q1 2014 
 Social responses in Q1 of 2014 were more subdued in terms of protest activity, 
but strike activity accelerated from the previous quarter. Protests were still largely 
organized by CGTP and there were no massive protests with the numbers seen in 
previous quarters. There was a total of 32 protests in the first quarter of 2014 and 12 
protests had 500 or more participants, with the largest protest involving 20,000 security 
services officers in early March. The main targets of the protests were the 
government/Troika, working conditions/pay, and education policies. These three targets 
of protest accounted for 28 of the 32 total protests with 13 targeting the 
government/Troika. While strike activity increased from Q4 2013, most of the strikes 
were partial strikes with very few 24-hour strikes that were truly disruptive to daily life. 
The government was far from popular with a significant portion of the population, but at 
this point in the program many felt that there was little that could be accomplished by 
protesting and many of the Portuguese abstained.  
 The major protests during Q1 2014 targeted either the Troika/government or 
working conditions and pay. The largest single protest involved around 20,000 security 
personnel ranging from police officers and prison guards to those in the military. The 
reasons for protest were also specific to each job and varied from cuts in pay to lack of 
personnel and difficult working conditions.236 These protests were also some of the 
tensest at any time during Portugal’s Troika program because it put security personnel 
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against security personnel and nearly erupted into violence. One former advisor to Pedro 
Passos Coelho noted in an interview that this was the worst demonstration during the 
Troika program because there were police defending parliament against other police 
officers and the radical unions were trying to convince the protesting police to invade 
parliament. Fortunately, there was only pushing and shoving between the two sides and 
major violence was avoided.  
 The other two significant protests were led by CGTP, one on “national fight day” 
in early February that brought “thousands” to the streets of Lisbon, Coimbra, Porto, and 
Funchal.237 The other significant protests occurred when the Troika was in Lisbon for its 
quarterly review at the end of February. CGTP led marches in Lisbon, Porto, and Leiria 
with “thousands” of people participating in Lisbon and Porto.238 Both of these protests 
had multiple cities participate and the message was to fight austerity, fight for workers’ 
rights, demand the government resign, and kick the Troika out of Portugal for good.239 
 Strikes came in many shapes, sizes, and durations as activity intensified from the 
fourth quarter of 2013. In a similar pattern to previous quarters with many strikes, 
transportation strikes were the most common, despite nearly all of the strikes being 
                                                 
237 Público and Lusa, “Europeias devem ser "cartão vermelho" ao Governo, diz Arménio Carlos,” Publico, 
February 1, 2014, https://www.publico.pt/2014/02/01/politica/noticia/lider-da-cgtp-pede-mais-apoio-para-
desempregados-1621998. 
238 Ana Cristina Pereira and Melissa Lopes, “Um protesto de trabalhadores que já é quase uma oração,” 
Publico, February 27, 2014, https://www.publico.pt/2014/02/27/sociedade/noticia/um-protesto-que-ja-e-
quase-uma-oraca-1626522. 
239 Público, “CGTP desfila em Lisboa e apela aos portugueses para que lutem contra a austeridade”, 
Publico, February 27, 2014, https://www.publico.pt/2014/02/27/economia/noticia/cgtp-desfila-em-lisboa-e-
apela-aos-portugueses-para-que-lutem-contra-a-austeridade-1626509; Público and Lusa, “Europeias devem 





partial or only involving overtime. Of the 60 strike actions taken by the transportation 
sector, only one held by CP, CP-Carga, and Refer, lasted for 24-hours.240 In total, there 
were six strikes that were not partial throughout the entire first quarter of 2014.241 Many 
sectors participated in partial strikes that lasted multiple days, including nurses working 
the 24-hour health lines, garbage collectors, air traffic controllers, and dockers.  
 In the first quarter of 2014 there was a significant decrease in protest activity and 
the size of the major protests, but an increase in strike activity. However, the 
overwhelming majority of the strikes were partial and not very disruptive to daily life in 
Portugal. Even with the decrease in protests, the Troika and government were the favorite 
targets of the protesters as their austerity policies continued to be unpopular with 
significant portions of the population. A number of other protests targeted working 
conditions and pay cuts that were passed in the 2014 budget, but as stated above, there 
was a big drop-off in both the number of protests and the size of the larger protests. 
External Pressures and Governmental Responses Q2 2014 
 As the end of Portugal’s Troika program approached, the pressures on the 
government continued to wane. Similar to Ireland, the biggest question was whether or 
not Portugal would access a precautionary line of credit in case of a change in 
circumstances. However, as bond yields fell, Portugal had another successful bond 
offering and marched its way to an early exit from its program without the precautionary 
line of credit.  
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In a similar fashion to Ireland, bond yields continued to fall as Portugal came 
closer to exiting its program and in April, Portugal raised €750m in an auction of 10-year 
bonds at the rate of 3.57 percent. The fall in bond yields indicates how far Portugal had 
come as it was much lower than the 7.5 percent bond yields seen only nine months earlier 
and significantly lower than its highest bond yield of 17.39 percent in 2012.242 Even with 
the positive market sentiment, many wondered whether Portugal would opt for a 
precautionary credit line, which would protect against a change in circumstances and 
allow Portugal to access the ECB’s OMT program.  
At the end of April, Pedro Passos Coelho announced that Portugal would follow 
Ireland and make a clean exit from its Troika program. Opinions from European leaders 
were mixed as the Troika urged Portugal to consider taking the line of credit, but others 
such as the German government, were pushing Portugal to opt for a clean exit.243 Aiding 
in the decision of a clean exit was the fact that Portugal had built up a cash buffer of 
€15.6bn, which could cover its deficit for the remainder of 2014 and all of 2015. This 
allowed Portugal to not only make a clean exit from its program, but to exit the program 
early and without accessing the last €2.5bn tranche of program financing,244 which was 
quite a feat given that many were predicting a second program at the end of 2013.  
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Portugal made a clean exit from its Troika program in mid-May 2014 after three 
difficult years and significant social strife. However, the dedication to the program, 
reforms implemented and some positive economic news toward the end of the program 
swayed market sentiment towards Portugal as they had re-entered debt markets, made a 
clean exit from the program, and had enough cash on hand to not have to access the final 
€2.5bn tranche of program financing. Many considered Ireland to be the first success 
story of Europe’s bailed out countries and the Troika could now add Portugal to that list.  
Social Responses Q2 2014 
 As Portugal’s Troika program neared its end there were more protests than the 
first quarter of 2014 as significant holidays approached on the calendar. The majority 
(40) of the protests occurred on May 1 to celebrate Labor Day which pushed the official 
numbers of protests higher than Q1 2014. Overall, there were 54 protests from the 
beginning of April until mid-May, when Portugal exited its program. There were a total 
of five protests with more than 500 participants. Strike activity decreased significantly 
from the first quarter with the exception of an ongoing prison guard strike on all 
weekends and holidays. Some waste collection services held multi-day strikes and there 
was one 24-hour transportation strike that had very poor adherence.  
 The largest of the protests during Q2 of 2014 occurred on April 25 during the 
celebration of the Carnation Revolution in 1974. The largest of the demonstrations in 
Portugal occurred in Lisbon as roughly 50,000 people participated in the traditional 
parade through downtown. While this is usually a celebration, April 25 had been used as 
a protest against the government and the Troika since 2012 and in 2014 many used it as 
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an opportunity to call on the government to resign.245 Labor Day (May 1) was also a day 
of significant protest as 40 cities held demonstrations.246 Many of the demonstrations 
were used to protest the government, its austerity policies, and to fight for workers’ 
rights. The two largest demonstrations occurred in Lisbon and Porto, but Lisbon’s 
demonstration was significantly larger as this is where CGTP held its parade.247   
 Other significant protests during Q2 2014 included 5,000 farmers protesting in 
front of Parliament in early April and 10,000 pensioners in Lisbon with another 5,000 in 
several cities around Portugal protesting cuts to pensions. The farmers were protesting 
against a new tax law that required all farmers with commercial activity to register with 
the state, invoice all commercial activity, and pay into social security.248 Pensioners, 
meanwhile protested in mid-April against cuts to their pensions, while also demanding 
better access to health care and a voice in social concertation.249 Outside of the protests 
documented above, protests were smaller ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred and 
included protests against the government, cuts to education, and urbanization of rural 
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 Unlike the protest activity during Q2 2014, strike activity saw a significant 
decline with most strikes being partial and only three 24-hour strikes, one of which had 
very poor participation. The most significant strike was the ongoing strike of prison 
guards, who were holding overnight strikes on all weekends and holidays. This resulted 
in 21 days of strikes through early May. Prison guards were demanding the entire 
Directorate-General for Reintegration and Prison Services (DGRSP) resign due to a lack 
of trust between the organization and the prison guard unions.250 Garbage collectors held 
multiple strikes. First, they held a four-day strike in Sintra in early April to protest the 
company’s integration into another municipality-owned business. These were partial 
strikes that lasted from 11:00pm through 6:00am.251 Garbage collectors in the nine 
municipalities on the Setúbal peninsula went on strike twice in late April and early May 
for 24-hours to protest the privatization of their company.252 The 24-hour transportation 
strike called by CP and Refer had very poor participation as 88 percent of daytime routes 
were completed. A total of 25 trains were cancelled in the overnight hours while no 
intercity trains and only three of 114 planned suburban routes were cancelled.253  
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 As the end of the Troika program approached, there was an increase in the 
number of protests in Portugal, which can largely be attributed to the anniversary of the 
Carnation Revolution and May Day occurring in Q2 of 2014. Strike activity was 
significantly less than in Q1 of 2014 with most strikes occurring on a partial basis and 
addressing sector specific concerns as opposed to a general protest against the 
government or austerity. Despite some good economic news and increased confidence 
from markets in the first half of 2014 the government had lost its credibility with many in 
Portugal and opponents of the government and Troika used traditional holidays to 
continue to voice their displeasure. 
Conclusion 
 This section traced responses to the Portuguese Troika program from June 2011 
through its conclusion in May of 2014. It has shown that the responses to the Portuguese 
program developed in roughly three phases after May 2011. During all three phases, the 
government remained committed to implementing the program and hitting their fiscal and 
structural reform targets, despite increasing tension within Portugal. The initial phase, 
from May 2011 through mid-September 2012, was characterized by very low levels of 
political and social resistance to the program. This included no real political opposition, 
many low-level protests, and a few strikes, including two general strikes with 
disappointing participation. The second phase, from mid-September 2012 through early 
July 2013, saw a major escalation of resistance from the public and elites as there was the 
largest public demonstrations since the Carnation Revolution in 1974. However, the 
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escalation was provoked not by general rising opposition to austerity, but by a very 
specific and catastrophic mistake by the government; a change to social security tax 
contributions that would have required workers to contribute more and businesses to 
contribute less. This not only led to more demonstrations and strikes, but more opposition 
from the PS, and the government nearly collapsed in the summer of 2013. The third and 
final phase began shortly after the government nearly collapsed as protest and strike 
activity remained elevated above levels in the initial phase, but below the intensity and 
frequency of the second phase. Protests and strikes continued, but attendance was usually 
disappointing, and the frequency of these events diminished as Portugal came closer to 
exiting the program. The PS also continued to argue for a renegotiation and adjustment of 
the program but not its full rejection, and Portugal exited the program without a backstop 
and without receiving their final €2.5bn tranche from the Troika. 
 The following section is the analysis of the Portuguese response. The evidence 
suggests that Portugal’s national identity as the “good student” best explains the response 
from Portuguese leaders and the public. This is most evident in three ways. First, there 
were constant references to the “good student” narrative or to ideas and phrases 
associated with it. These references came from across the political spectrum, with those 
on the far-left using the “good student” as a criticism and others referring to the content 
of the identity as opposed to direct references. Second and similar to Ireland, a strong 
rejection of the program by political and social actors appeared to be off the table. Third, 
Portuguese elites worked diligently to try and differentiate themselves from the “bad 
student” in Greece and show that Portugal was actually much more like Ireland.  
394 
Analysis of the Portuguese Case 
 Three major features of Portugal’s response to the crisis comprise the evidence for 
the importance of identity. First, there were constant references to the “good student” 
narrative, or to ideas and phrases related to it. It was common for the far-left opposition 
to criticize the government directly for being the good student, more Troika than the 
Troika, or to accuse them of implementing authoritarian or neoliberal economic 
measures. For those in power, these references came in the form of references to the 
content of the identity, and not a straight-forward admission that they were acting as a 
“good student” (as it is a somewhat insulting label, implying one is a “goody-goody”). 
Second, both in terms of responses from societal actors and those of party and 
government leaders, options relating to a strong rejection of the program overall seemed 
to be off the table. Protest was slow to develop and when it did flare up, it was either 
because it connected with other international events or grievances (not just Portuguese 
reactions to austerity), or due to objections to specific policies or the particular way in 
which the program was administered. While there was criticism from mainstream parties 
and organizations, such as the PS, UGT, and CIP, the criticism was specific, the groups 
remained committed to fulfilling the MOU, and they always stopped short of rejecting the 
program in its entirety. Third, Portuguese elites consistently worked to differentiate 
themselves from Greece and connect Portugal to Ireland. They made a concerted effort to 
distinguish themselves from the “bad students” in Athens not only in terms of their 
economic situation, but more importantly as a country that is a responsible, mature, 
European democracy. This account shows that in a very complicated debt crisis, only an 
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explanation that emphasizes national identity can account for these features of the 
Portuguese response.  
This doesn’t mean that national identity is the only factor at work, but the 
comparative timing, focus, and severity of the Portuguese response to its Troika program 
can only be explained by recognizing the role of national identity. Other factors certainly 
played roles as well. Pressure from bond markets was very real, and there was significant 
concern from those interviewed about regaining access to bond markets. The Portuguese 
were desperate to regain the confidence of bond markets and the disaster in Greece 
certainly created incentives for Portugal to behave differently, which it did. Nonetheless, 
it makes little sense to see bond market pressure as determinate, since the Greeks faced 
the same set of incentives from the bond market and did not change their behavior. If 
Portugal was only responding to bond market pressure, the incentives to be the “good 
student” and implement the program of austerity and neoliberal structural reforms would 
be strong. However, Portugal, like Greece, does not have a strong liberal economic 
tradition, and the general expectation is that societies lacking a strong liberal tradition 
would strongly resist the types of reforms the Troika was asking Portugal to implement. 
Therefore, for Portugal not to revolt, the Portuguese would have to be willing or eager to 
be the “good student” to implement harsh austerity and neoliberal structural reforms 
imposed on them from external institutions. 
 Additionally, institutional barriers allowed resistance to its Troika program to 
manifest. This was most notable in the four Constitutional Court rulings against various 
austerity measures. However, the role of institutions is secondary in terms of resistance to 
the program because institutions themselves cannot actively resist policies. Yet, 
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institutions can determine whether specific policies are legally available and which 
policies cannot be implemented. For example, the government could not cut the 13th and 
14th month bonuses from only public sector workers as it would create an unfair burden 
on the public sector. The government ended up massively raising taxes to meet its targets 
because these measures were allowed by the Portuguese Constitution. This instance helps 
illustrate the role of institutions as they played a role in determining which specific 
measures could be pursued but were not serving as active resistance to the program in the 
same way as those choosing to protest or strike.   
The economic ideas held by those in government must also be acknowledged, but 
this explanation has trouble explaining some aspects of Portugal’s response. It has been 
noted254 that Portugal had a pro-liberalization and relatively pro-austerity government 
during its Troika program. They argue that the motivations of some of those in 
government to implement the Troika program with such eagerness reflected their pre-
established desire to reform the Portuguese economy in a more liberal direction. While 
this is accurate and should not be ignored, it is also important to note that Portuguese 
voters voted for this openly pro-liberalization and pro-austerity government during a 
crisis and to lead them through the Troika program. The fact that they were working to 
implement an externally-imposed mandate did not appear to delegitimize them. And, 
given the lack of outright opposition to the program overall, especially during the first 16 
months of the program, it appears that for Portugal, the external imposition legitimized 
the neoliberal reforms that those in the liberal wing of the PSD had wanted before. While 
some of the evidence in this analysis can be read as dedicated neoliberals pushing an 
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agenda, there is also ample evidence that the “good student” was very prevalent 
throughout Portugal’s Troika program. 
Portuguese National Identity – From Atlanticist Empire to the Good Student 
The Portuguese identity cultivated by the Estado Novo defined Portugal as an 
independent maritime power with an Atlantic destiny, combined with an emphasis on 
Portugal’s colonies and former empire. This identity was anti-European, anti-modern, 
and conservative in nature. Portugal under Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s rule255 was a 
traditional, conservative regime where the state dominated most aspects of society and 
was checked only by groups such as the Catholic Church and the army.256 Many 
Portuguese scholars agree that Salazar’s vision for Portugal was one that looked to the 
past, not the future, and the belief that Portugal should not be contaminated by the 
progress of the modern world was central.257 
The ‘backwardness’ of the Estado Novo was also evident in Portugal’s foreign 
policy as Salazar refused to decolonize and hesitated to embrace new international 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN), which they did not join until 1955. 
According to Costa Pinto and Teixeira (2004) Salazar was particularly skeptical of any 
European projects for economic or political integration. Salazar was quoted as saying 
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(Other than NATO258) “nothing else in Europe has any real political importance for us: 
we are more interested in Angola and Mozambique, and even Brazil…Our Atlantic 
character imposes limits on our collaboration with Europe.”259  
Portugal joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which had some 
economic advantages as it gave Portugal access to some European markets. This move 
was purely economic as Salazar was extremely skeptical that it would lead to further 
political integration.260 This economic move towards Europe had positive effects on 
Portugal’s economy but the timing coincided with Portugal’s colonial war, which started 
in 1961, consuming many state resources. Despite the vast use of resources, the colonial 
war effort was redoubled under Marcelo Caetano, who took over for Salazar in 1968. 
Increased trade led to an increase in economic growth, resulting in more available money 
for the regime to prolong the war. 
However, as the colonial war continued and deeper economic ties with Europe 
were forged, two factions formed within the regime, one a liberal, pro-European group 
and the other referred to as the ‘Africanists,’ which disagreed on the direction Portugal 
should take.261 As Salazar’s vision for Portugal began to be challenged, and Portugal 
started to move closer to Europe through trade, how the Portuguese saw their place in the 
world became increasingly contested and eventually fractured. This fracture helped lead 
to the military coup in 1974 as a group of mid-level military officials overthrew the 
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existing regime and opening the door for Portugal to embrace democracy.  
Following the Carnation Revolution in April of 1974 Portugal experienced two 
years of increased political volatility and uncertainty as the direction of the post-Estado 
Novo regime was still in doubt. In the wake of a failed takeover by elements on the far 
left including the Communist Party (PCP) and parts of the Armed Forces Movement 
(MFA), Portugal’s leaders moved toward democracy and deeper integration with Europe. 
Portugal’s integration with Europe was purposeful and goal-oriented as the new political 
elites envisioned a Portugal that was completely divorced from the previous regime and 
more closely tied to Europe. The goals at the heart of what would become Portugal’s 
“good student” identity included providing domestic stability and consolidating 
Portuguese democracy as well as modernizing the country to be more like its European 
neighbors. Europe was considered by many Portuguese to be wealthier and more modern 
in comparison to Portugal, and the new political leaders aspired to seen in the same light 
as other European countries, as a modern, Western, European democracy.262 Thus, the 
goals attached to the “good student” identity informed the preferences of the political 
leaders following the revolutionary period.  
As mentioned above, two of the main objectives of the turn toward Europe were 
to help to consolidate the new Portuguese democracy and to receive assistance from the 
EC that would help Portugal modernize.263 Both of these were accomplished and the 
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consolidation of democracy also acted as an insurance policy against a reversion to 
authoritarianism or a move toward Soviet style-socialism.264 Mário Soares, the first Prime 
Minister of Portugal following the revolution, is quoted, saying, “the application for 
membership that now follows…represents the realization of an ambition deeply felt by 
the Portuguese people. An ambition we have to realize with determination and by 
working hard, with reference to the essential democratic principles and 
values…European integration is a great national project, beaconing and giving meaning 
to our revolutionary experience.”265 Freitas do Amaral, who was deputy for the CDS-
party, also said, “from the Portuguese point of view, we think it is Europe — democratic 
Europe — in which our country can and should find the institutional, geographical and 
cultural framework, in which our new historical destiny has to strike root and 
develop.”266 The role that the goals of domestic stability and consolidating democracy 
had on Portuguese national identity is well summarized by Schukkink and Niemann, 
saying, “dominant discursive patterns explicitly linked a new Portuguese national identity 
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to the European project, which, in its turn, is equated with openness and democratic 
values.”267 In other words, Portuguese national identity was inextricably linked to Europe 
and the vision of Portugal as a modern, Western, European country.  
The consolidation of Portugal’s democracy gained momentum after talks to join 
the European Economic Community began in 1979, as all main political parties with the 
exception of the Communist Party favored European integration. In the mid-1970s the 
CDS branded themselves as “convinced pro-European” and the PSD favored integration 
but proceeded more cautiously than the other two parties. One of the slogans of the PS 
during the 1976 campaign was “A Europa Connosco” or Europe with us, indicating the 
party’s commitment to the European turn.268 While there was some disagreement on the 
specifics of EU integration, the consensus among political elites persisted and 
strengthened throughout the 1980s. The more cautious pro-European PSD became one of 
the biggest proponents of EU integration in 1985 with the election of Aníbal Cavaco 
Silva, who gained an overall majority in parliament and strengthened the leadership of 
the PSD.269 Also, the PCP, which had always been against further integration with the 
EU, stopped calling for Portugal to withdraw from the EEC.270  
The modernization of the country was the other core goal of the new democratic 
leaders. Portugal was considerably behind other European countries in terms of its 
economic development when initially joining the EEC, which was one of the primary 
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barriers to their accession into the EEC. In fact, Portugal held the following undesirable 
positions in comparison to the other EEC countries: lowest income, lowest industrial 
productivity, highest percentage of people earning a living from agriculture, highest 
illiteracy rate, lowest welfare coverage, highest infant mortality, and lowest life 
expectancy.271 Joining the EEC meant substantial funds would come to Portugal to close 
this gap. Portugal made significant progress in catching up in the 1980s and most of the 
1990s, as its economy grew rapidly, with much of the credit due to the funds it received 
from the EU. This progress led to Portugal losing the label of an ‘under-developed 
country’ in 1990.272 
The economic boom Portugal experienced in the 1990s brought a new feeling to 
Portugal as people experienced the marvels of modernization. EC aid had led to 
investment in infrastructure and public works projects that helped move the country from 
practically third-world status to a developed country. The citizens of Portugal associated 
the progress made during this time with being a part of the EU and Eurobarometer polls 
demonstrate the positive feelings felt toward Brussels. Support for the EU topped out in 
1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and with the exception of an economic 
downturn in 1992-93 support remained roughly over 60 percent273 throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s.274 Also, the Portuguese experienced a significant jump in national 
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pride (+37%) between 1990 -1999 as the economy boomed, inflation was low, Aníbal 
Cavaco Silva became the President of the EC in 1992, Portugal qualified as one of the 
first eleven countries to meet the convergence criteria for the Eurozone, and Portugal 
hosted the 1998 World Expo.275 Furthermore, opposition to EU integration in the 1990s 
was difficult to find except on the fringes of the political right and left as “such broad 
political consensus had not been witnessed since the establishment of the constitutional 
monarchy in the 1820s.”276  
The 1990s was also the period when Portugal made reforms to meet the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria, the Amsterdam Treaty, and the convergence criteria for the 
adoption of the euro. In order to meet the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty 
requirements, Portugal revised its constitution twice.277 This is a difficult task as it 
requires a two-thirds majority vote in parliament. Portugal successfully revised its 
constitution to accommodate both the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties.  It was also in 
the first half of the 1990s, when Jacques Delors first made the comment about Portugal 
being the “good student.” Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD), Portuguese Prime Minister from 
1986-1995, was extremely proud of this label and it has become part of his legacy as 
Prime Minister. In 2010, Silva, who was also the President of Portugal from 2006 until 
2016, gave a speech recalling the 1990s when Portugal was considered the “good 
student” of the EU, and how others in the EU did not currently view Portugal in the same 
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positive light. He argued Portugal needed change course to show that they still were the 
“good student.”278  
Throughout the 2000s Portuguese continued to support deeper European 
integration and attitudes remained generally favorable towards Europe. However, the 
good feelings with the EU and the prosperity of the 1990s would not last. Despite 
cultivating the “good student” image since their accession in the EU and meeting the 
convergence criteria for the single currency, much of the economic growth and 
transformation of Portugal had been cosmetic. Many of the funds were used for fancy 
projects that made politicians and political parties look good electorally but did not help 
Portugal make many of the needed adjustments to labor, education, productivity and 
competitiveness that would be needed to keep the economy growing.279 Unlike the other 
countries that have been hit hard by the European Debt Crisis, there was no boom period 
for Portugal directly prior the onset of the crisis. The “lost decade” that preceded their 
debt crisis was characterized by very low rates of economic growth as macroeconomic 
performance was miserable in the 2000s.280 GDP per capita averaged 0.6% growth per 
year from 2000-2007 resulting in total growth throughout this period of 4.3 percent.281 
                                                 
278 Hugo Filipe Coelho, “Cavaco lembra que foi o “bom aluno,” Diário de Notícias, June 13, 2010, 
https://www.dn.pt/portugal/cavaco-lembra-que-foi-o-bom-aluno-1591925.html.  
279 Hatton, The Portuguese: A Modern History. 
280 Glatzer, "Welfare State Growth and the Current Crisis in Portugal: Social Spending and its Challenges," 
Institute of European Studies: University of California Berkeley, March 18, 2012, 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4702x2jm.; Lourtie, “Understanding Portugal in the Context of the Euro 
Crisis.” Peterson Institute for International Economics and Bruegel, Chantilly, France, 2011; Ricardo Reis, 
"The Portuguese Slump and Crash and the Euro Crisis." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 
2013: 143-193. 
281 Reis, "The Portuguese Slump and Crash and the Euro Crisis." 
 
405 
The growth rate of GDP in Portugal was less than half of that of its primary trading 
partners during the 2000s and unemployment also rose to 8.9 percent in 2007 from a low 
of around four percent in the late 1990s. This increase in unemployment occurred as most 
of Europe was experiencing increasing unemployment.282  
Despite its enthusiasm for enlargement and further integration, the stagnation of 
the 2000s led many in Portugal to believe that the modernization project had stalled, and 
big changes would be needed if Portugal was going to live up to its goal of becoming a 
fully modern, Western European democracy on par with its neighbors. Some of these 
changes had begun under Socrates leadership, but they were moving slowly and not 
producing the desired results. Thus, when the crisis hit and the Troika was called for help, 
many Portuguese saw this as an opportunity to implement many of the reforms already 
being discussed. However, the need for a bailout was seen as a national shame as all of 
Portugal’s efforts to be a ‘core’ EU country seemed to vanish in an instant as this placed 
Portugal squarely in the PIIGS category.283 The remained of this chapter will detail the 
ways in which the “good student” aspect of Portuguese national identity can be seen 
influencing Portuguese responses to its Troika program. 
The Good Student 
As discussed above, Portugal’s embrace of democracy and Europe and its 
rejection of dictatorship and empire after April of 1974 were historic moments for the 
country, but many Portuguese still felt that they had not done enough to truly live up to 
the standards of being a modern, Western, European democracy. Their Troika program 
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was an opportunity to move Portugal in that direction. The “good student” mentality has 
been regularly evoked in Portugal since joining the EEC in 1986 and its influence on 
Portuguese decision making can be seen in the Portuguese response to its Troika 
program. Throughout the program there were many references to the “good student” 
identity, especially from the opposition, who frequently accused the government of 
behaving as if they needed to be a “good student”, but there were also references from the 
majority itself. For those who traditionally opposed Portugal being in the EU and the 
euro, and who opposed the Troika program, criticizing the government for being the 
“good student” or being “more Troika than the Troika” was common. While those on the 
far-left were more inclined to directly refer to the “good student” by name, some of the 
criticism was also couched in terms of “neoliberal” or authoritarian economic measures. 
Because the “good student” metaphor is generally seen as somewhat insulting (someone 
who is a goody-two-shoes and always following the rules), the government itself was 
reluctant to use this somewhat pejorative language. However, one can still see the same 
theme in many of their remarks. 
The opposition’s references to the “good student” identity were more explicit than 
many references from those in the government. The three main parties (PS, PSD, and 
CDS) had been criticized for many years of being the “good student” and doing what 
Europe wanted them to do as opposed to what they felt was a better path for Portugal. 
This included some opposition politicians as well as trade unionists and economists that 
took issue with the program. For example, when asked about the government going 
further than the Troika, one former MP from the Left Bloc (BE) said:  
The government accepted, and they would, they had the logic, you know, the 
neoliberal logic of these authoritarian choices is to prove that we are very 
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competent and that we really want to apply what you are imposing, so we are a 
good student and very, very good.284 
One economist who was critical of the Troika program discussed the good student 
directly:  
The good student mentality has been very pervasive in Portugal until recently. 
Until the crisis, the EU was seen as the source of good. Only a source of good for 
Portugal. And the need to impress, the need to comply with the rules is something 
that is very much Portuguese. And it was very present in…the need to comply 
with rules if you know that people are watching. For instance, in Italy you don’t 
have this. Not even in Spain. Spain and Italy are totally different. They have a 
high level of disregard in their relation with the power structure. They challenge 
the power structure. In Portugal, maybe because of 48 year of dictatorship and the 
lack of any recent civil war, there is a general sense of compliance.285 
The references from those in the government generally came in the form of the 
content of the identity, and not a straight-forward admission that they were acting as a 
good student. However, there were some direct references to the “good student” from 
those who were in the government, indicating its prevalence in the minds of policy 
makers. Other references from the government about the “good student” included how 
the program would help Portugal achieve its ambition of being more like its European 
neighbors as a fully modern, Western European democracy. There were also individuals 
saying things like the program is very difficult, but it was what we had to do for our own 
good, along with some element of self-blame and being a burden on Europe.286 Many 
also felt there was a responsibility to the European project to act as a responsible member 
of the European Union. The reasons differed, with some discussing how Portugal’s 
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economic future and the future of the euro would be threatened if Portugal failed to 
deliver, while others recalled Europe’s role in helping Portugal consolidate its 
democracy, but most who were interviewed agreed that they felt some sense of 
responsibility to Europe and the European Union.  
With the negative connotations of the “good student,” there were few direct 
references to Portugal acting as the “good student” by leaders from the government. 
However, there were still references to the identity, indicating that it was well-known and 
deeply engrained. For example, when asked if there was pressure to impress the rest of 
Europe or signal that Portugal was fully on board with its Troika program, one former 
Secretary of State responded:  
The good pupil. Yes, to be pointed example, sometimes, I believe that after the 
second quarterly of 2013, even the German minister of finance pointed us as a 
good example, you know.…The bad example, Greece and the good example, it 
was Portugal.287 
Other references dismissed the notion that Portugal was being the “good student.” For 
example, when asked about whether there was a sense of responsibility to the EU and the 
euro, one member of the ESAME team discussed their surprise at the lack of anti-EU 
sentiment in Portugal and how the economic problems were the fault of both Portugal and 
the structure of the euro. However, they finished by saying:  
But we didn’t get the sense that we were doing this to be good members of the 
European Union. I don’t think it was that. To be like the good student of the 
EU.288  
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What makes this quote noteworthy is that the interviewee is well-aware of Portugal’s 
reputation as the “good student,” and in a follow-up interview, the interviewee makes a 
comparison to a bad student earning a good grade that surprises their teachers and 
parents, saying: 
So, imagine that you are a very bad student in high school, and you suddenly 
come up with an A. I mean, you are surprising positively your parents, and you 
are showing that you are more mature, that you didn’t blame the teacher, you 
didn’t blame the high school. You understood why you had a bad mark in the 
beginning of the trimester but now you improved.289 
Even after denying they were acting as the “good student” they referenced transforming 
from a bad student to a good student that surprises its teachers and parents (Europe and 
the IMF). This not only suggests the presence of the “good student” identity but also 
includes an element of self-blame and maturing to become more like their European 
peers. Both of these themes were discussed by other interviewees and are explored in 
depth below.  
 The notion that Portugal had not lived up to the standards of being a modern, 
Western European democracy was also prevalent in many interviews. As one former 
minister who was interviewed said, “We joined the euro, but we didn’t fulfill, not the 
nominal, but the real, the substantial criteria.”290 After winning the election, Passos 
Coelho told Portuguese television, “We know that we are something of a burden on our 
Europe partners from a financial point of view and we don’t want to be a burden a day or 
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second longer than is necessary.”291 This not only illustrates failing to live up to the 
standards Portugal envisioned for itself as a Europe country, but included an element of 
self-blame as Passos Coelho felt Portugal was a burden on the other countries in Europe. 
Many interviewees expressed similar sentiments, where the program was a chance for 
Portugal to become more like its Europe neighbors in being a fully modern, democratic, 
Western Europe country.  
One former advisor to Pedro Passos Coelho commented on the speech the former 
Prime Minister gave upon leaving the Troika program in May of 2014:  
In 1974 we had a revolution here in Portugal to have a democracy. It was difficult 
but we got it. And what is that democracy for the Portuguese people? To live in a 
European society, that’s what we want. A regime of freedom, of equality, living 
next to our neighbors with the levels of prosperity of Europe. A NATO partner 
and all that. A Western country. That was why we did the program. There was no 
other reason. The stakes were as high as that.292 
When asked about what it would mean for Portugal to successfully implement the Troika 
program, they highlighted how Portugal had the goals quoted above, but also how 
Portugal needed Europe to make them happen: 
So, I see Portugal keeping the promise it has made to itself in the revolution. We 
do not want to have a communist dictatorship here. We don’t want to have an 
empire, a conservative authoritarian regime here. We want to be like the other 
Europeans. And probably we are not strong enough to do that on our own terms. 
We need to be anchored here with these guys. And that’s what we have to do.293 
They continued, in one of the most revealing quotes of all the interviews: 
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That we are doing what we have to do to be what we want to be. Not a failed 
country. What we want to be, 85 percent of the population wants to be a European 
country. So, we have to do certain things to be that European country. In the 
extreme circumstances this is what we have to do. Do we still want it? Yes or no? 
Yeah, alright so let’s do it. It was something we did in the name of an idea of 
society that we want to be.294   
When asked the former Prime Minister’s speech exiting the program and about 
Portugal’s vision of being a modern, Western European democracy, one former member 
of ESAME said: 
I think in those few years where we were disciplined, where we did what needed 
to be done, where we showed that we were able to restore somehow our 
credibility by a very kind of compliant kind of attitude. And the fact that the 
Portuguese citizen did not go to the streets like they did in Spain and in Greece 
and destroy things. Where there wasn’t a lot of violence. Where, you know, we 
talked about that, where social unrest was actually very limited and where you 
actually are able to graduate and leave the program after three years when 
everyone said it would be impossible in the beginning. I think that is a 
demonstration of a modern country, and kind of a moderate country, and a 
country that actually shows to investors that, ok you might have doubts about our 
country, but you now have an historical data point where you actually saw that the 
expectations, and we talked about that, were that we would go the way of Greece 
and actually we surprised, in a positive sense, we surprised everyone. So, imagine 
that you are a very bad student in high school and you suddenly come up with an 
A. I mean, you are surprising positively your parents, and you are showing that 
you are more mature, that you didn’t blame the teacher, you didn’t blame the high 
school. You understood why you had a bad mark in the beginning of the trimester 
but now you improved. So, I’m being a bit simplistic, but I think that’s probably 
what was behind his speech, at least that’s my opinion. I think that the fact that 
Portugal was able to maintain a level of support and that owned up to its own 
problems and not just gave into the basic instinct of the knee-jerk reaction of just 
blaming Brussels and was able to in three years graduate from the program and 
have a clean exit, I think yes, that’s the show of democratic maturity.295 
When asked about the former Prime Minister’s speech and his references to this crisis 
being an opportunity for Portugal to become a fully modern and European country, one 
                                                 
294 Interview with a former advisor to Pedro Passos Coelho, Lisbon, Portugal, May 3, 2018. 
295 Interview with former ESAME team member, Lisbon, Portugal, May 15, 2018. 
 
412 
former minister remarked, “No, clearly not up to the standard. We’ve always felt 
European. Something that we have insisted a lot was that we are European. We’ve always 
been.”296 They continued, discussing Portugal’s role and value in the EU as well as its 
place in the larger, globalized world, which emphasizes another key aspect of Portuguese 
identity, respect for its maritime past and its positive relationships with its former 
colonies: 
We also made some mistakes when deciding to join the European Union because 
we have neglected all of the other relationships that we had. We are an Atlantic 
nation and we have very old and established relationships with basically all 
continents. For years we have sort of turned our back on all of those other 
relationships and focused merely on Europe. And in Europe we are not only 
among the poorest but also, we are in the periphery of where the decision-making 
takes place. But if you look at the world in a global perspective, we are not 
peripheral at all. Actually, geographically, we are quite in the middle and 
diplomatically and economically we could benefit from that position, so that was 
also something that we insisted a lot. Let’s continue to be Europeans because 
that’s what we feel. That’s what we are. Let’s be very committed to this 
participation in the European Union but let’s add value to ourselves and also to 
the European Union by also cherishing these other relationships. And making 
Europe realize that it is a benefit for the 28 of them, it is an advantage that some 
within the club has these privileged relationships.297 
An emphasis on being a good member of the European community was also a 
major component of the “good student” identity and this was something that was ever-
present on the minds of those interviewed, cutting across party lines, except the far-left. 
This also came out when asked about whether there was a sense of responsibility to the 
euro and the European project to successfully implement the program. Almost all 
interviewees acknowledged, often with pride, the overwhelmingly pro-Europe attitude 
among the Portuguese and agreed that there was a sense of responsibility to Europe to 
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ensure the program was done successfully. However, their reasoning differed. Some 
argued the sense of responsibility was to ensure that Portugal’s economic future, the 
future of the euro, and the European project were not threatened while others recalled 
Europe’s role in helping Portugal consolidate its democracy. When asked about a sense 
of responsibility to the European project, one former minister said:  
Sure, sure. If the Portuguese program wasn’t successful, maybe it would be 
difficult to present a third package for Greece for instance. We are able to deal 
with Greece mainly because most part of the people are convinced that Greece is 
a unique case, a single case. No one believes the possibility to deal successfully 
with Greece, but maybe because of the union it is affordable to deal with Greece. 
But if Greece is not a unique case. If the standard is people that don’t fit in the 
euro, then you start to think if it is possible to redefine the perimeter of the euro. 
And maybe the old conversation to return to the beginning of the process and to 
have two speeds or three speeds for Europe can be manageable, politically 
speaking.298  
Others agreed that there was a sense of responsibility but referenced Portugal’s past and 
the importance of Europe in helping Portugal consolidate its democracy after the 
revolution, how Portugal is a very pro-Europe country, or both. One representative from 
the Bank of Portugal said:  
I think it is impossible to say what role it played, but I think it played a strong 
role, yeah. So, this idea that we are engaged in the European project is very much 
rooted in everyone’s minds, not only the politicians. In everyone’s minds in 
society. So, we are clearly a pro-Europe country. Have always been. Even in the 
trough of the adjustment program we continued to be completely pro, not only 
Europe but also the Europe area projects. So, the monetary union. We have a 
strong pro, let’s say, further integration. All of the debates that you see are on a 
deepening of the monetary union, a deepening of European integration. So, we are 
this, our tradition, our history points us towards, let’s say, being open to the other, 
being open to foreigners, and that’s our culture. So, I think that part of the success 
of the program was indeed this idea that we are all working together. So, we did 
not have this discourse or this interpretation that we were being led to the 
dungeons by foreigners which wanted the worst for us. No, we always thought 
that this was, let’s say, a shared, a shared program. And of course, the strong 
ownership that the government gave to the program also helped in this sense. It 
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was part of it. But, part of it was also a reflection of the feeling of society. So, 
society really felt that it was important not only for let’s say, Portuguese reasons, 
unrelated, but also taking into account thinking that this was the way to proceed in 
the rules, within the rules of function of the European Union. So, I think that was 
a very strong part of it.299 
When asked about whether there was a sense of responsibility to Europe, a former 
economic advisor to the PS Sócrates government also recalled the role of Europe helping 
Portugal consolidate its democracy as well as the large support the EU has in Portugal, 
saying:  
Yes, there was because the currency was in trouble back then. Because it was in 
trouble… And I think some of the, yeah, no, to the European project, yes but at 
the same time if you see, for instance, the Portuguese people, we are very 
enthusiastic about the euro. We still are… In all the polls that we have now about 
Europe, the Portuguese are always in front in terms of acceptance and enthusiasm 
about European process… Last week we had the latest poll from them, from the 
European, it’s a European institution that does this and we were again in the front, 
in the first place of the euro acceptance… Beginning of last week or so. I saw it in 
the paper. And there we were again, sixty something percent of Portuguese accept 
Europe and you know they are; they favor further integration and everything.300 
One former Secretary of State discussed the economic difficulties Portugal would face if 
forced out of the euro along with the importance of Europe for Portuguese democracy, 
saying:  
I think there was always a clear consciousness that if Portugal would be put out of 
the euro and European Union it would be rather difficult for the country. Because 
in the end, our history since the revolution has been mostly determined by this 
closeness to Europe. I mean, in the end, we started stabilizing the political 
situation in Portugal with that proximity to Europe. Even before entering into the 
European Union, but mostly when Mario Soares started imposing a break in the 
Communists attempts to take over. It was mostly under the objective of becoming 
a part of the European Union.301 
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They continued:  
So, it was clear that we had mostly that responsibility to avoid that. You can also 
say that if you didn’t, so, it would be also the European project that could be put 
in question because with some countries getting out, but I don’t think that was so 
important. I mean, from the Portuguese point of view, staying within was really 
critical.302 
Portugal’s role in the EU and as a European nation was even expressed by a former 
official from UGT, although they acknowledged some disagreement with European 
policies. They said:  
I think that for the Portuguese people, we accept the European Union without 
barriers, without frontiers. And for that reason, we are in European Union. All the 
policies are directly linked to the European policies. That is normal for people. 
For example, the free situation of workers, the free situation of people, free 
movement of people, this thing that we don’t want protectionist measures in the 
European Union, but we want, we need to question policies because we had a 
(inaudible) country with some social problems, namely in education and training 
and so on. But, really, we are a European people, a European country.303 
This section has demonstrated that the “good student” was very prominent on the minds 
of many people in Portugal during its Troika program as the way the crisis was viewed 
passed through this lens and references to various aspects of the “good student” identity.  
Off the Table 
 Another kind of evidence of the “good student” identity shaping the Portuguese 
response can be seen in the kinds of options that societal and political actors considered 
over time. This is very notable when examining the response from the public, 
government and its opposition, and actions by labor unions. The result was a delayed 
public response characterized by fewer and smaller protests and strikes in the first 16 
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months of the program, delayed and ineffective resistance from opposition parties, and a 
government that was extremely dedicated to implementing and in some cases exceeding 
the programs requirements. 
 The most striking of the responses to the Troika program, indicating the presence 
of the “good student,” was the initial lack of resistance to the program from the public. 
Unlike Greece, where there were large protests, riots, and violence immediately after the 
government signed the MOU, and Ireland where 50,000 people almost immediately took 
to the streets of Dublin in Protest, Portugal was nearly silent in the immediate aftermath 
of the signing of its MOU. There were threats of social action from CGTP and others, 
such as civil servants, but most protests were small and sporadic until October, a full five 
months after signing the MOU. When there were large protests and strikes, they were 
largely aimed at specific policies and not at rejecting the entire Troika program, or they 
were led by far-left organizations making the protests or strikes appear to be more 
political than an expression of the true feelings of the Portuguese public.  
The fact that many of the protests were led by CGTP is important because of the 
attitude many in the mainstream political parties and public take towards CGTP. CGTP is 
affiliated with PCP and BE, which were the two political parties on the far-left that 
rejected the Troika program and only received 13.1 percent of the popular vote in the 
election in May of 2011. Not only is CGTP closely aligned with the far-left parties, but 
they have never agreed to any social concertation agreements. Because of their lack of 
engagement in the social concertation process, actions taken by CGTP and its affiliate 
unions carried less weight than those taken by UGT, which regularly participates in social 
concertation, and protests that developed more organically from society. While the 
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protests and strikes from CGTP could not be ignored, many interviewees played down 
CGTP’s influence. One former minister from CDS summarizes this view well: 
With very tough measures we knew that we were going to have, we had, the 
number of strikes that we had was very amazing. But at the same time, I think that 
we were always able to try to feel what those were. Some of them were very 
political. We know there is a very strong liaison between the Communist Party 
and CGTP, so lots of them were political…we knew that we were going to have 
strikes from CGTP. They are democratic, I’m not questioning that. But we know 
they were politically orientated. It’s completely different with what happened 
with the manifestation regarding the TSU, the social contributions.304  
Another former Secretary of State highlighted the difference between the two labor 
unions:  
As UGT used to say, we made strikes with all governments, but we also make 
agreements with all governments. That’s the main difference between the two 
trade unions. One has communist inspirations, so the fight of classes is their main 
goal. The other, they made strikes, but in order to agree. So, that’s the difference 
between UGT and CGTP.305 
In the fourth quarter of 2011 there were two large days of protest in October, a 
large civil servants’ protest in mid-November, and a general strike in November 
involving both CGTP and UGT. The October 1 protest and November 12 civil servants’ 
strike/protests were large, but again led by CGTP and far-left groups, raising questions 
about how the majority of the Portuguese public viewed its crisis.  
When protests were large in the beginning of the program, it was because they 
went beyond anger about the domestic economic situation to mobilize people about 
international events and protests. The large protests on October 15 were part of a 
worldwide protest inspired by the “Occupy Wall Street” movement. Nearly 1,000 cities 
around the world participated in protesting inequality and corporate power. The 
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organizers in Portugal claimed there were 100,000 protesters in Lisbon and 25,000 in 
Porto. However, the Spanish Newspaper, El País, estimated only 30,000 participants in 
Lisbon and in Porto, and the police estimated that there were between 10,000 and 12,000 
protesters. While there were large numbers of protesters, the estimates by the organizers 
appear to be grossly exaggerated, indicating less resistance than the organizers claimed. 
Another point worth making is that the Portuguese protests were not happening for purely 
national reasons. There was a mixture of national and international motivations as some 
spoke out against the austerity measures specifically in Portugal while others viewed the 
protests as “the emergence of a global movement.”306 The fact that large numbers of 
protesters would come out for an international initiative while protests against more 
specific austerity measures in Portugal were far smaller also points to a general 
acceptance of the Troika program at this time.  
Even when there appeared to be widespread support for social actions, the actual 
events were disappointing for their leaders. The general strike on November 24 had the 
participation of CGPT and UGT, which has only happened periodically in Portuguese 
history since the revolution. Despite the joint effort, there were questions about its 
effectiveness as Público commented that it felt more like a civil service strike than a 
general strike.307 Yet, even if this had been solely a civil service strike, the government 
revealed that only 10.48 percent of the 43,592 workers in the Central Administration took 
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part in the strike,308 revealing that overwhelming numbers of government workers still 
showed up to work that day.  
Even with the cooperation between trade unions, there was disagreement on the 
purpose and goals of the general strike, indicating that many did not reject the entirety of 
the Troika program. CGTP used this as an opportunity to further protest the government 
and the Troika, but UGT was more strategic as the strike was used bring the government 
to the negotiating table and not an outright rejection of the whole Troika program. As one 
former UGT official said:  
UGT is the trade union of social dialogue with tripartite agreement. When we 
make strikes, it is to force the agreements, not strike to demonstrate we are 
against, no.309  
UGT’s motivation for participating in the general strike was not to reject all of the 
measures, but to force an agreement, which would happen in February 2012 and many 
interviewees credited this agreement with helping to keep the social peace. By keeping 
social peace, UGT, the Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP), and the government 
felt it could help the country fulfill its Troika program obligations. One former Secretary 
of State familiar with the Social Agreement discussed the role of UGT in signing the 
agreement:  
But, UGT said the country has signed an MOU in order to have the bailout, 
otherwise we came to bankruptcy. So, we have to respect the MOU, so we are 
doing our share, our part of the, so we are, when we have an agreement and it is a 
win-win situation. So, we have to lose something in order to reach the agreement 
and that’s historical from the part of, because the severance payments was more 
high in Portugal than they are, before than they are now. But nevertheless, UGT 
                                                 
308 Ana Rita Faria, “Adesão à greve na Administração Central é de 10,48%, diz Governo,” Público, 
November 24, 2011, https://www.publico.pt/2011/11/24/economia/noticia/adesao-a-greve-na-
administracao-central-e-de-1048-diz-governo-1522428. 
309 Interview with former Portuguese labor union official, Lisbon, Portugal, April 4, 2018. 
 
420 
signed it. So, from the workers perspective, they gave up something, they lost 
something, but nevertheless they do that in order to the country can fulfill their 
commitments. It was important.310 
Following the general strike in November the number and size of protests and 
strikes dropped dramatically. There were still some large events in the first 8 months of 
2012,311 but they were largely led by CGTP or other unions, and not occurring outside of 
trade union or political channels. CGTP attempted another general strike in March 
without UGT, but participation was weak, the private sector largely operated as normal, 
and the media branded it a failure.312  
Social responses to the Troika program continued to be rather subdued throughout 
much of 2012, even as the economic situation in Portugal continued to deteriorate. There 
were only 41 total protests in the first six months of 2012 and 47 up to September 15, 
when protest activity increased dramatically because of a monumental policy blunder by 
the government. Roughly one million Portuguese took to the streets to protest the 
government’s change to the social security tax contributions (TSU). Due to a 
Constitutional Court ruling in July 2012 that the three-year suspension of holiday and 
Christmas bonuses for public sector employees was unconstitutional, the government 
needed additional measures to meet its 4.5 percent deficit target with the Troika for 2012. 
The government proposed a change in Social Security contributions that would have 
lowered employers’ contributions from 23.75 percent to 18 percent and raised workers’ 
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contributions from 11 percent to 18 percent. Views about the proposed change to the 
Social Security contributions varied from those who thought it was a good policy that 
was communicated poorly to the public to others who viewed it as political suicide. One 
member of ESAME said: 
We presented, what in retrospect was a very foolish measure. It was called the 
18/18 measure which was a way of reducing the contribution of the employer to 
social security and increasing the contribution of the employee. We botched it 
completely in terms of communication. Other countries have done it and it makes 
sense theoretically. It was easy to present it as we were taking money from the 
employee to give it to the employer.313  
A former minister from CDS was much more critical, saying:  
In CDS, we referred to the TSU measure as the Nottingham Sheriff Measure. It 
was Robin Hood the other way around.314 
An economist from the Bank of Portugal referred to the measure as “political suicide.” 
They said: 
It was a way to respond to these pressures, in particular by the Germans to comply 
somehow with the program. And they came up with this crazy, this political 
suicide. It doesn’t make economic sense, doesn’t make any political sense. It was 
just crazy.315 
And the measure led to the largest protests since the Carnation Revolution in 1974 as it 
was interpreted as ‘kicking workers while they were down.’ This not only led to the 
government walking the measure back, but it marked a tipping point in resistance to the 
Portuguese Troika program. As a former adviser to the Prime Minister said:  
That is when people began to think, this doesn’t make sense. And people made 
the big argument against it, was an argument about unfairness…I told them this is 
going to be interpreted as a sheer, a pure transfer of income from labor to capital. 
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People are not going to take this well. It’s going to be bad. In the end it was 
useless. In the end it was interpreted that way. Workers could argue they were 
losing their jobs and wage cuts and then on top of that this was seen as giving 
more money to the owners. It didn’t make sense. I had to persuade the Prime 
Minister to pull back, and he did.316  
What the TSU debacle illustrates is that resistance to the Troika program 
generally was rather weak until the botched change to Social Security contributions. It 
wasn’t until the government made an egregious policy mistake that resistance to the 
program as a whole became more widespread and extended beyond the far left. The TSU 
debacle opened the door to more general opposition to the government, austerity, and the 
Troika, which can be seen in the increase of protests directly against the government, the 
Troika, and austerity beginning in the third quarter of 2012. In the first two quarters of 
2012 there were a total of seven protests that were specifically against the government, 
austerity, and the Troika, while there were 51 in the third quarter. These numbers would 
spike again in 2013 as there were 53 protests against the government, austerity, and the 
Troika in the first quarter and 77 in the second quarter. The government nearly collapsed 
in mid-2013, but after surviving the July crisis protests never reached the numbers seen 
from late 2012 through mid-2013. Additionally, many of the protests reverted to 
addressing specific measures or grievances and not an overall rejection of the government 
or the Troika.  
 The next way that the “good student” manifested during Portugal’s Troika 
program came in the responses from the mainstream political parties (PSD, CDS, and 
PS), where a rejection of the program was “off the table.” For the mainstream opposition 
(PS), public criticism of the program didn’t occur until February 2012, a full nine months 
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after entering the program. When the PS ramped up its criticism of the government and 
the program after the botched TSU measure in the fall of 2012, it still would not go as far 
as an outright rejection of the program, noting that they sought to fulfill its obligations to 
the Troika. The criticisms from the PS were specific to renegotiating aspects of the deal, 
especially the deficit targets and interest rates. This pattern was also similar for other 
mainstream institutions and organizations, such as CIP, which sought changes to the 
program as it progressed, but did not reject the program.  
While there were disagreements about some of the specifics, the strong consensus 
among PS, PSD, and CDS to implement the measures in the MOU separates Portugal 
from the other two bailout countries. In Greece, there was constant fighting amongst the 
political parties, with calls from politicians to kick the Troika out of Greece. In Ireland, 
despite a similar pledge to implement the MOU from the mainstream parties, both Fine 
Gael and Labour vowed to renegotiate parts of the agreement before and after taking 
office. One interviewee from the Portuguese Central Bank put it this way: 
I would say that there was a very broad-based agreement on the importance of the 
program being successfully implemented. Broad based agreement in terms of 
society. You can clearly see that even in the trough of the crisis, I still believe that 
there was, let’s say, a global ownership in terms of society on the importance of 
the program. So, I think the resistance was clearly, let’s say, ideologically 
guided.317 
The Portuguese consensus lasted until the botched effort to change the TSU in September 
of 2012. As one economic advisor to former Prime Minister José Sócrates said:  
In Portugal, it was, the thing was, you said that PSD and CDS accept because 
everybody was ready to do it. The Socialist Party went to elections to implement 
the program. We want to implement this program. We may discuss one or two 
measures, but basically the goals and the path, everybody was agreeing, and the 
general mood was accepting. And this was true from 2011 to 2013…Until that 
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moment, all public opinion, okay left guys, very far, they were always against. 
But they’re against everything…But the general public, Socialist Party, major 
opinion makers, they all agreed on the way. Again, maybe a bit to the left. Maybe 
a bit to the right, but the way was clearly, but that actually was clear for 
everybody. And it was with the TSU measure that this consensus about the 
program broke down.318 
Not until February 2012, nine months into the crisis, did any actors outside of the 
far left show any real signs of truly questioning the Troika program. Still, these criticisms 
had to do with specific elements or approaches the government was taking and were not a 
rejection of the overall program. These criticisms were also very carefully worded to 
indicate that Portugal should still meet its international obligations and fulfill the 
requirements of the MOU. Starting in early 2012, both the PS and CIP, among others, 
became more critical of the approach that the PSD-CDS government was taking. The 
focus of their criticism was on the fast pace of the fiscal consolidation, the quick 
deleveraging of the financial sector, and lack of attention to creating growth and jobs in 
the economy. António Seguro, the leader of PS, was quoted in February 2012 as saying 
that Portugal needed “at least another year” to meet fiscal targets and argued that the 
recession and record unemployment were straining Portugal’s social cohesion.319 In early 
2012 CIP argued that Portugal needed an extra €30bn to prevent economic collapse as the 
pace of deleveraging of banks was resulting in a lack of capital for Portuguese 
companies.320 These kinds of criticisms from mainstream sources were common through 
most of the program, but the tone changed after the September 2012 TSU debacle 
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damaged some of the credibility of the government and the Troika Program.  
The change in tone was evident as the PS began to use its criticism of the 
government and the Troika program to position itself for the next elections. In February 
2013, António Seguro sent a letter to the Troika arguing for more time to pay back loans, 
lower interest rates, and postponing interest rates. Yet, despite the harsh criticisms in the 
letter, Seguro maintained that he agreed with the goals of the program, including the 
structural reforms and fiscal discipline, but that the program could be designed 
differently.321 When Portugal had its deficit targets revised downward in early 2013 there 
were more criticisms from the PS, CIP, and the far-left, however the same pattern of 
renegotiating the program but remaining committed to the program persisted. The PS 
used the deficit target revision as a chance to argue the PSD/CDS government failed. 
Instead of abstaining from the vote on the 2013 budget, the PS voted against it. While not 
consequential it was a signal to voters that there were disagreements with the program. 
There was even a symbolic vote of no confidence put forth by the PS in April of 2013, 
but because the government had a comfortable majority it had no chance of passing. 
Considering the worsening economic situation in Portugal, the increased criticism was 
not entirely unexpected for an opposition party. As one interviewee from the European 
Commission to Portugal put it: 
We met (Seguro) at each of the reviews and I was also in those meetings and one 
could observe that they still had a strong ownership of the program because they 
had signed the program, but as the program proceeded, he was creating space 
between him and the program and becoming increasingly vocal that the program 
was not right, and something needed to change. He was creating more and more 
                                                 




distance between him and the program, which I find very logical for an opposition 
party to be honest with you.322  
CIP was pleased to get the revision in early 2013, but also voiced its concerns. They 
wanted a two-year extension of the timeline to get the deficit under three percent of GDP 
instead of one, which moved the three percent target to 2015. Again, the push from CIP 
was not to reject the program, but to revise it so Portugal could meet its obligations and 
create economic growth. As one representative from CIP said when asked about CIP 
supporting the fiscal consolidation and other concerns with the program:  
Well, it was part of the program. What we have criticized was the excessively 
violent pace of the reduction. Especially, well not in the beginning when the 
program was conceived, but it tended to be gradually more violent.323  
They continued: 
So, there were those two aspects: the pace of the consolidation and also the 
deleveraging that was too, combined those two elements created a deeper 
recession than was foreseen and asked for even more violent pace of 
consolidation.324 
The final manifestation of the “good student” as displayed through certain things 
being “off the table” was most visible by the government itself. Understanding that 
failing to implement the program would not just endanger the Portuguese and European 
economies but would add reputational costs that further damaged the “good student” 
image, the PSD/CDS government wanted to ensure that its European partners and 
financial markets knew they were fully committed to the program. This led to an intense 
dedication to the program that manifested in the government taking full ownership of the 
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program, the government’s desire to “go beyond the Troika” in terms of structural 
reforms, and the government putting the implementation of the Troika program ahead of 
electoral concerns.  
The Portuguese government had a strong consensus about its dedication to the 
Troika program from the start. As in all coalition governments there were disagreements 
about specific policies but whether Portugal would comply was not in question. Some 
interviewees stressed that from the beginning it was crucial for the government to take 
full ownership of the program. They noted how the Prime Minister emphasized that the 
program was theirs and not the Troika’s. As one member of ESAME325 said:  
The Prime Minister immediately decided from day zero that he would have full 
ownership of the program. This meant that at the first council of ministers he 
forbade the ministers from blaming the Troika.326  
This same sentiment was reiterated by another member of ESAME when asked if the 
Prime Minister forbade blaming the Troika. They said:  
Yeah, he said it a few times. Like, look this is our, and he said it to the Troika. He 
said it, look this is not your program. It’s our program. We are happy to count 
with your help moving forward. We count on you to help us with the experience 
you guys had, but it’s our program.327 
One interviewee from the Bank of Portugal discussed the government’s ownership of the 
program:  
There was consensus and ownership of the program, in particular by the 
government, and that is important. The government really made the program, let’s 
say, it’s program. So, there was a strong ownership of the thing. It was not 
dictated by the Troika. It was owned by the government and the government 
                                                 
325 This was the Estrutura de Acompanhamento dos Memorandos or the Memorandum Tracking Structure, 
which was in the Prime Minister’s office and handled all of the structural reforms for the Troika program 
and interfaced with the Troika on all non-budgetary aspects of the program. 
326 Interview with ESAME team member, Lisbon, Portugal, April 20, 2018. 
327 Interview with ESAME team member, Lisbon, Portugal, May 25, 2018. 
 
428 
defended the measures that were being implemented, so there was no 
scapegoat.328  
The talk of taking ownership of the program was also closely related to one of the 
most controversial elements of the Portuguese program, which was the notion that the 
government exceeded its mandate by “going beyond the Troika.” This all started when 
the Prime Minister said, “Portugal needs to return to creating a wave of confidence in the 
markets…I think we can surprise and go beyond the (bailout) agreement.”329 The next 
day Passos Coelho said, “We must be more ambitious in terms of privatisations, in public 
media for example. We need new rules for social security, education, and justice. We are 
very ambitious about these structural reforms, much more than what is laid out in the 
(bailout) agreement.”330 As one advisor to the Prime Minister revealed, this was an off 
the cuff statement and had been discussed beforehand. When asked about discussing 
“going beyond the Troika” before the Passos Coelho said it, the former advisor said, 
“Before the elections, yeah… I said, I understood his point. I said it was true. A lot of 
stuff that was not included in the program, the Troika program, was very, very important 
for reforming the country.”331 While the Prime Minister’s quotes were used against the 
government for political purposes, with the far-left and others claiming the government 
was “more Troika than the Troika,” this statement by the Prime Minister was revealing 
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for the ownership and dedication that the government displayed during Portugal’s Troika 
program.  
When asked about this notion of “going beyond” the Troika, members of the 
government were very consistent in their responses. Most interviewees noted that they 
wanted to be ambitious and do more than just “tick the box” of the Troika’s requirements 
for structural reforms and do meaningful reforms for Portugal that would transform its 
economy, positioning it to be more competitive and further integrated into the European 
and global markets. When asked about the former Prime Minister’s statements, one 
former minster said:  
In the sense that this is not just complying with the targets. We want to be 
ambitious. We want to make sure that we actually reform the country. So, it’s not 
just doing what they requested us to do, we wanted to do more than this because 
we are ambitious, we want to put the country in a different place so that we will 
not have this in the future…We really wanted to do more for our own sake, not 
just to have the box checked and the money flowing in. Going beyond meant 
being ambitious and that we are doing this for us, not the Troika. Not for them but 
for our own sake. We want to be in a better position. We want to sort of use this 
crisis, and being difficult as it is, to get at a place where the next crisis will not hit 
us as hard.332 
When asked about why there was the desire to “go beyond the Troika,” another former 
minister said:  
To do something more in structural terms. We launched more privatizations than 
was initially designed. In several domains we adopted new policies in structural 
terms that wasn’t presented by the Troika or the previous government. We 
thought it was important to give more room for the structural change.333 
They continued discussing the motivation for the government’s dedication to the 
program:  
                                                 
332 Interview with former Portuguese Minister, Lisbon, Portugal, April 18, 2018. 
333 Interview with former Portuguese Minister, Lisbon, Portugal, May 21, 2018. 
 
430 
To put the country on a safe road with no holes and no easy escapes for the 
structural change. That was the purpose, the meaning of the political willingness 
to accomplish the program and to face the opposition legacy and opposition stress 
coming from the financial stress, or the microeconomic entrepreneurs.334 
One former Secretary of State had a similar view, saying: 
It was really about, this is a difficult position, a difficult situation the country is in. 
We need to be brave and bold and not simply engage in a tick the box exercise. 
We really want to implement things properly so the country can finally get out of 
the hole it was in and start growing again. I think that was a really clear message 
that was supported by actions. It was not just words and vague statements. It was 
really about moving forward, even if that amounted to important costs in the 
present.335 
Another former Secretary of State added:  
Because there was some sentence said by the prime minister. It was we must go 
further than the Troika and sometimes the people remember that he said that we 
need to go further. Because Troika and MOU represented sacrifices. And we said 
that we must go further. You want to say that we don’t need that in, that 
represents us an opportunity to change our economy on a different direction. But 
people understand that we must make more sacrifices than those that are imposed 
to us.336 
Knowing the kinds of policies that were going to be implemented would be 
difficult and were not likely to be rewarded at the ballot box did not deter many in the 
government from remaining dedicated to the program. They saw, especially the structural 
reforms, as more important than winning the next election, which they technically did in 
2015 but could only form a minority government. As one former member of ESAME 
said:  
There was a famous quote of the PM that was very mis-comprehended that said I 
couldn’t give a damn to elections. What he was saying was, I’m doing what needs 
to be done even though I may have an electoral cost. People called him 
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undemocratic, but that was not the point. He knew and we all knew that we 
wouldn’t be re-elected.337 
Another former minister remarked:  
We never really thought we would win the next election after implementing the 
program, regardless of the rhetoric. When the former PM once said what would 
be translated into American like ‘fuck the elections.’ Basically, he said it and I 
think that most of the people thought he was saying it for electoral purposes and 
didn’t realize how honest he was being. He really meant it because he thought I’m 
not going to win an election after doing this. I have to do it right.338 
Another Minister remarked:  
Political costs were not important then. The most important thing was to reach the 
targets and complete the program. Regain access to the markets and go on. If 
possible, to winning the election, if not never mind… If you put the electoral 
results above all you cannot go further. You are always coming back, returning to 
the previous position.339 
A former CDS minister commented on entering government and implementing 
the MOU: 
To be honest we knew what they were getting into and we knew it would be very, 
very difficult times…But to be honest, we really understood that we had to go 
into government to do these very tough measures. That also happened in our 
history. In the 80’s as well. CDS had to go into a government as well with the 
IMF at the time, to really try to solve the problems that Portugal had. So, to be 
honest, probably, people (from the CDS) said it would be preferable if we stayed 
in parliament and just sign an agreement with PSD, but we stay out and we are in 
parliament. But to be honest, that would not give the depth, the real solid solution 
to Portugal and we understood that.340  
The dedication to the program was also noticed by those at the European Commission, 
with one interviewee saying:  
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I think there was a strong commitment from the Portuguese authorities to 
implement the program according to the agreed lines, yes. This was a bit of a 
thing. If it was a bit more Troika than the Troika…In some areas, there was some 
fine-tuning, some new issues that were added because the government 
themselves, they asked for it. I think it’s more in this sense that some say that yes, 
we were more ambitious, we want to do more than that. But I think they were 
very conscious about the challenge. They wanted to do it in the right period. They 
don’t, I think this was a very key objective for the previous government. To do 
that in the period. Not to have any subsequent program, to really have a clean exit. 
In that sense they were very committed to implementing.341 
Another interviewee from the European Commission added:  
Basically, there was political will and capacity to actually undertake these 
reforms. So, there was a bit, perhaps of over-enthusiasm in applying…all those 
measures. I mean there’s a famous sentence from the former Portuguese Prime 
Minister where he said, ‘we need to go beyond the Troika.’ But I think at the 
time, it’s true, you know, that the country, you know, needed to recover 
credibility. So, I don’t pass judgements actually.342 
Individuals from the Mission to Portugal from the European Commission noted 
Portugal’s commitment to the program, although they commented that it appeared to 
wane towards the end, saying:  
My view is that it was probably correct at the very beginning of the program. That 
the government was very committed to structural reforms. Also, to fiscal 
consolidation. But as we discussed before, ownership eroded a bit over time. In 
the beginning we kind of ran into open doors with all of the reforms. The 
Portuguese government said that’s great, let’s do it. Whereas later on in the 
program there was much more resistance.343 
The fact that the government put up more resistance over time does not mean that the 
government did not want or try to meet its commitments in the MOU. After the TSU 
debacle in late 2012, the government switched its strategy from implementing cuts to 
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reach deficit targets to increasing taxes. This was not preferred by the government or the 
Troika but was the best option the government felt it had after some measures had been 
struck down by the Constitutional Court and the large protests against the proposed 
changes to the TSU. Despite this change, the Troika was still demanding Portugal make 
cuts the government was unwilling to make, which is where much of the aforementioned 
resistance came from. 
 The commitment to the Troika program was also evident when the Constitutional 
Court would strike down legislation. The government did not necessarily agree with the 
decisions but respected them and would go back to the drawing board to find alternative 
measures to meet the Troika’s targets. As one member of ESAME said:  
The Prime Minister said he fully respects the decision, but he immediately gave 
the sign that was important to our creditors. That he was not going to use that as 
an excuse.344 
They continued: 
I think it was unsustainable to spend three years saying the Troika made me do it, 
the Troika made me do it. It’s kind of childish right? There were many people 
around (Passos Coelho) saying you are completely stupid. You should be blaming 
the Troika. When the Constitutional Court would strike down, he would say ok, 
this is a setback but rest assured that we will find an alternative measure and that 
would be proposed to the PM and the core team and it would go to the council of 
ministers, then it would go to the parliament.345  
Another minister added that the Constitutional Court rulings prevented them from going 
beyond the Troika to the extent they wished, but alternative measures had to be found, 
saying: 
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(We did not go) far enough because we had a relatively high number of setbacks. 
Namely, the rulings of the constitutional court. Those had forced us to try 
alternative solutions always ending up in increasing taxes because that’s 
apparently the only thing that doesn’t go against the constitution, oddly enough.346 
The dedication to the fiscal consolidation agreed to in the program was one of the 
reasons for the political crisis in 2013 where Paulo Portas initially resigned, and the 
government needed to be reshuffled to keep the coalition together. The CDS disagreed 
with replacing Vitor Gaspar with Maria Luis Albuquerque because they thought that it 
would continue the government’s focus on making cuts and the fiscal consolidation. CDS 
wanted to have more focus on economic growth and recovery after two difficult years. 
One former CDS minister said:  
We really felt that we should have two phases. One phase was delivering and 
doing what we had to do. And the second phase, rebuilding trust. Rebuilding 
economic growth, having more to distribute to people. And the June crisis was 
linked to something that we felt was not going from stage one to stage two, from 
phase one to phase two. When Vitor Gaspar decided to leave, the feeling was that 
Maria Luis, or who was going to be the substitute, would do the same that he did. 
Just being completely focused on fiscal aspects, not economic growth. And for us 
it would be crucial to get economic growth.347 
They added:  
The June (2013) crisis did not have to do with the Troika. It had to do with a 
political, internal option. Are we going to now really focus on the economy or just 
still focus on fiscal consolidation?348 
 There were many chances for the government to avoid taking ownership or blame 
others such as the Constitutional Court or the Troika for the difficulty of the program, but 
each time the government avoided excuses, remained committed to the program, and 
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pushed forward. On top of the government, the mainstream opposition and institutions 
that disagreed with parts of the program voiced their opinions and opposed certain 
measures but never to the extent that would derail the program as a whole. This broad-
based agreement across the political spectrum (excluding the far-left) and the delayed 
response in the public’s opposition displays the “good student” in action and helps 
separate Portugal from Ireland and Greece.  
Portugal is not Greece  
 The final way the “good student” manifested itself during the Troika period was 
the insistence from many that Portugal was not Greece and that they needed to do 
whatever they could to show that this was the case. The way the Greeks responded to 
their Troika program violated almost every principle of the “good student” identity and 
clearly set Greece as the “other,” and the model not to emulate. On the other hand, 
Ireland was a model to follow in the minds of the Portuguese. Ireland complied with its 
targets and reforms and maintained social peace as it made its way through its program. 
With Portugal being the third country to enter a bailout program, Portuguese 
policymakers used these two countries as choices that Portugal had to follow and outside 
of the far-left parties and the Communist affiliated labor union, CGTP, the Portuguese 
agreed that they were not Greece, and that Ireland was the model emulate. The theme of 
Portugal not being Greece and having to differentiate itself from Greece was very 
pronounced in the interviews conducted in Portugal. This theme was present whether 
talking to Ministers, Secretaries of State, advisors, economists, and even officials from 
the trade unions. One former minister said very bluntly, “That (differentiating Portugal 
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from Greece) was the most important thing.”349  
 Even before the Troika bailout was negotiated and agreed to, there were attempts 
to distance Portugal from Greece. The minority PS government made appeals to identity 
as Prime Minister José Sócrates said many times that Portugal was not Greece in an 
attempt to avoid a program altogether. This was not only in reference to the economic 
problems, but also in the type of country Portugal was. One former advisor to José 
Sócrates stated that the Sócrates government resisted requesting a program because, “it 
would be a situation where Portugal would suffer big reputational costs. Look at 
Argentina. They are still suffering the costs.”350 Not only were the Portuguese worried 
about being compared to Greece, but to the “serial defaulter” Argentina. These explicit 
comparisons to Greece would continue as the new government took office. 
From the beginning of the PSD/CDS coalition, an effort was made to differentiate 
Portugal from Greece and to follow the Irish path. As one former PSD minister put it:  
I would say they are the two extreme examples. We made a very, very, very big 
effort to get closer to Ireland and get separate and apart from Greece. For the 
international community, Ireland had sort of a hiccup, but they’re good. Their 
reputation wasn’t really that affected. It was not a reputational issue for them. 
They had a problem they solved it. Greece was the one that no one believed in, 
that was going to be a complete disaster. And Portugal was placed with Greece. 
You know, the southern countries, the lazy ones. All that prejudice comes up 
when these problems happen. So, we wanted to be perceived by others as closer to 
Ireland in the sense we had a problem, but we will recover. We’ll do what’s 
needed.351 
Another former PSD minister said:  
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We had one bad example and we all know which country it is. I don’t need to tell 
you. And people here were not liking it. (The Portuguese) were saying what’s 
going on. I don’t understand that country. They say they paid, and they say they 
would pay, and they don’t pay, then. So, it was a kind of pride. Let’s do it. Let’s 
get over it. Let’s get it over with. I would say so. I’d say people were thinking like 
that352 
The same minister continued:  
“It was very clear for us and we had very clear instructions that we cannot be 
associated with failing programs. So, we have to be associated with Ireland. So, 
that was very clear. This was coming from everybody. I can’t recall the prime 
minister saying it explicitly but everybody, it was very clear. We had discussions 
of it on the council of ministers and we have to associate us with Ireland, we have 
to associate us with Ireland. And I think we succeeded.353  
One former CDS minister added: 
We felt, at the beginning we felt a little bit like humpty dumpty. To which side of 
the wall are we going to fall. Outside of Portugal, when people look at us, will we 
be closer to Greece or will we be closer to Ireland? We had that question for 
ourselves…We always said, ‘we will have to be the next Ireland.’ We will have to 
follow Ireland. People will have to look at us, and being a humpty dumpty, we 
will have to fall to the Irish side of the wall, not to the Greek side of the wall.354 
The effort to create distance between Portugal and Greece was made not only in 
rhetoric, but in concrete action. With the disorganization of the program response in 
Greece, Portugal made a conscious effort to be as organized and prepared as possible. 
Once elected, the new Prime Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, immediately created a new 
department in the Prime Minister’s office, called ESAME (Estrutura de 
Acompanhamento dos Memorandos or the Memorandum Tracking Structure), headed by 
Carlos Moedas. This is similar to the Department of Expenditure and Reform (DPER) 
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created for similar purposes in Ireland. No such department was created in Greece or had 
been by mid-2018, which was emphasized by one of ESAME’s team members.355 
ESAME handled all of the structural reforms for the Troika program and interfaced with 
the Troika on all non-budgetary aspects of the program while the budgetary adjustment 
side of its program was handled by the Finance Minister, Vitor Gaspar, and his team.  
Portugal also took specific policy actions in an attempt to emphasize the contrast 
to Greece to the Troika and its European partners. When asked whether there were 
conversations within ESAME about differentiating Portugal from Greece, one member of 
Carlos Moedas’ team said:  
From the start. We always said we were not Greece and that was the key message 
that we wanted to show everybody. So, some of the measures that we took very 
early in the program, like the measure to cut public holidays. That was a measure 
to show we are not Greece. There we actually went beyond the Troika. Nobody 
asked us to cut public holidays.356  
Not only was this measure believed to be beneficial economically, but it was an explicitly 
political measure to signal Portugal’s commitment to its program. The same interviewee 
noted,  
It would be a wonderful measure to explain to our bailout partners, to the EU 
institutions, to the EU governments, that we mean business. So, it was a political 
measure in that sense.357  
He continued: 
Yeah, we’re serious. Whereas you had the Greeks saying ‘we’re not going to do 
this. You have to give us more money. You have to give us more time.’ Here you 
go, you’ve got the Portuguese saying ‘well you know what, it’s not in the 
program, but we will take seven days of extra work. And then you get the Prime 
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Minister saying we are going beyond the Troika. This is our program. We need to 
start with that.358 
However, creating space between Portugal and Greece was not easy or accomplished 
immediately. As another member of ESAME remarked:  
Carlos (Moedas) and Antonio (Vicente) went to London and New York to talk to 
investors and were practically laughed out of the room. They had zero credibility 
in the beginning, and everyone lumped them together with Greece. Some people 
in New York even confused cities in the two countries.359  
Knowing that the two countries were linked in the minds of investors as well as their 
European partners, Portugal developed a wholistic plan to create more separation 
between themselves and Greece. This involved regaining trust from its European partners 
and the Troika as well as regaining credibility with the market by presenting results. An 
advisor to Pedro Passos Coelho noted again that separating Portugal from Greece was 
crucial and part of the plan for doing this was to stay informed about what was happening 
in Greece. To do this, he had to scrutinize what was going on in Greece every day.  
I would go to all of the English language sources of information. I requested 
studies from Greek scholars on what was happening and then I would write a 
summary to the Prime Minister.360  
Another minister in the government explained the strategy in great detail.  
We had all the information about the Greek process of adjustment, and we know 
that it was failing. Before the disaster, the Greek disaster, had each review we 
could show to the officials and to the external markets that all the structural issues 
on the Portuguese program were not only on track but reachable. Before every 
review of the Greek government and the Greek program, it was important for 
Portugal to anticipate the results. So, when Greek slippage or deviation from the 
targets was recognized, the Portuguese could show its program was attaining its 
targets early. We decided to anticipate some of the structural targets in the 
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structural dimension of the program. Yes. We reached them faster and with more 
impact. For instance, the privatization programs that failed totally in Greece was a 
success in Portugal. Bringing almost double what was forecasted to public means. 
Privatizations and concessions in Portugal were estimated to be almost €5bn at the 
beginning of the program. They ended up being almost €10bn.361 
As indicated from the strategy above, not only did the Portuguese wish to separate 
Greece from themselves, but the government actively used the failures of the Greek 
government to comply with its Troika program to create this separation. However, 
Portugal not only complied with its agreed to targets, but exceeded some of the structural 
reforms. When asked about the mentality of going beyond the Troika, one former 
secretary of state immediately made the contrast with Greece, saying: 
Portugal did not want to go the path of Greece disputing the memorandum and 
trying to go back. It was really about, this is a difficult position, a difficult 
situation the country is in. We need to be brave and bold and not simply engage in 
a tick the box exercise. We really want to implement things properly so the 
country can finally get out of the hole it was in and start growing again. I think 
that was a really clear message that was supported by actions. It was not just 
words and vague statements.362 
Interviews also suggested that differentiating Portugal from Greece extended into 
areas of the program that were seen as needing adjusted and renegotiated. In the lead up 
to the 2012 budget both Portugal and the Troika knew that the fiscal targets were 
unreachable and needed adjusted. However, Portugal did not pressure the Troika to adjust 
the targets out of fear that asking for adjustments at the beginning of the program would 
be seen as similar to the Greek approach to their program. As a former PSD minister said: 
If we decided to put more pressure on the Troika, mainly in public terms. The 
consequence would be negative. That would be perceived by the markets like 
something near the Greek approach. We start. You are starting the program and 
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you begin to say, ‘well this is not possible.’ It is not accomplished by our best 
effort. So, please before we start the program, design another. Design another one. 
And please, don’t forget €78bn is not enough. Put in €20bn more on the 
envelope.’ So, what would you guess would happen if this approach was taken as 
the Portuguese official approach? It would have been a disaster.363  
The worries about being compared to Greece were confirmed in interviews with 
individuals in the European Commission’s mission to Portugal. Private Sector 
Involvement (PSI) was very popular with the far-left (CGTP, BE, PCP) as it was seen as 
an easy way to reduce the debt. However, the government knew it would not be as simple 
as many on the far-left argued. As one member of the European Commission’s mission to 
Portugal said:  
The government was very much aware that (PSI) is not as easy as people thought 
because (PSI) could jeopardize a swifter return to markets. The government was 
always very much aware of not wanting to be in the same boat as Greece.364 
Debt restructuring and PSI were always viewed as unacceptable by the government as it 
would not only lead others to perceive them as much more like Greece but to some it 
drew comparisons to Argentina. When asked if some of the debt should have been 
forgiven, one former minister remarked,  
If you don’t intend to borrow again, that’s fine. Look at Argentina. They never 
recovered from that debt restructuring. The Argentinian economy never really 
recovered.365  
The appeals being made, and framing, included comparisons to economic reality but also 
to identity and reputation. The argument was that if we want to be like them (Greece or 
Argentina) then debt restructuring is fine. But this was clearly not the aspiration of the 
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Portuguese and would have taken them dramatically away from their real aspiration of 
being a modern, developed, European democracy similar to its European neighbors.  
 Avoiding comparisons to Greece even bled into the decision making of the labor 
unions, especially UGT. UGT was one of the two main labor unions in Portugal, but the 
only one to participate and reach agreements with the other social partners. Even after 
taking part in a general strike in late 2011, UGT still felt it was very important to have a 
continuous social dialogue in order to influence measures in the MOU and future 
measures. This ultimately led to a social partnership agreement in early 2012. A former 
UGT official said: 
What we think, mainly in comparison with Greece. The Portuguese workers, they 
will lose if we have a confrontational policy and not a social dialogue policy. And 
we know very well what is the situation in Greece and the social confrontation, 
and the political confrontation in Greece. That is a reality. And for that reason, 
yes, we need to negotiate. We need to make an agreement to influence the labor 
law. We need to influence the political measures.366 
While the official was concerned about the material well-being of the union’s workers, 
Greece was again used as an example of what Portugal was not, and part of the 
motivation for participating in social dialogue as UGT followed the situation in Greece.  
 Finally, when Portugal was approaching the end of its program there was a strong 
desire to follow the path of Ireland and be seen in a similar fashion to the Irish. As a 
member of the European Commission’s mission to Portugal said:  
At the end of the program, the term ‘clean exit’ was created in Ireland. So, they 
were always looking at Dublin rather than at Athens to see the next steps and 
Greece was not really kind of a role model for them. But rather, showing, it was 
rather Dublin. They never wanted to be tied to Greece in what they’re doing.367 
                                                 
366 Interview with former Portuguese labor union official, Lisbon, Portugal, April 4, 2018. 
367 Interview with representative from the European Commission, Lisbon, Portugal, April 24, 2018. 
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That Portugal wanted to emulate Ireland in the way it exited its program was no secret, 
but many believed that Portugal would still need a precautionary line of credit to protect 
against market uncertainty. Because Ireland had exited their program before Portugal and 
without a backstop, this became a goal of the Portuguese as early as January 2014. Not 
only did Portugal not need a backstop, but it followed Ireland’s lead by building up 
enough cash reserves that it did not need the final €2.5bn tranche of funding from the 
program.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that only national identity can explain the specific 
features of the Portuguese response to its Troika program. Portugal faced many of the 
same external pressures of the other Troika countries, but the government and society 
responded differently than both Greece and Ireland. Whereas Greece broadly rebelled 
against their program and Ireland offered some initial political and social resistance 
before its situation calmed down, Portugal took a different track, influenced by its “good 
student” identity. They had a government that was extremely dedicated to implementing 
the MOU despite a very difficult program, a deeper recession than anticipated, and a 
number of setbacks from the Constitutional Court. Social and political responses 
developed in three phases, with the initial phase from May 2011 until September 2012 
being characterized by low levels of resistance. The second phase, from September 2012 
until early July 2013, saw much more resistance as protests, strikes, and political 
criticism all greatly increased. The third phase was from July 2013 through Portugal’s 
exit from its program and saw resistance from society and opposing political parties 
elevated above the first phase, but much less than the second phase of the program. The 
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evidence in this chapter illustrated three main ways the “good student” manifested during 
Portugal’s Troika program. First, there were constant references to the “good student” 
narrative as well as the content of that identity. Second, options relating to a strong 
rejection of the overall Troika program seemed to be off the table for many societal 
actors and the government. Despite increased criticism from the mainstream opposition 
(PS) about specific policies, it never veered from its commitment to the program. Even 
when societal resistance increased in the second phase of the program, it was initiated by 
a catastrophic policy blunder that was widely viewed as a major mistake. Finally, 
Portuguese elites were very deliberate in their attempts to distinguish themselves from the 
“bad student” in Athens both in terms of their economic situation and as a country that is 






The euro crisis period from 2010-2014, which was covered in this dissertation, 
was an extremely traumatic time for all of Europe but especially for Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal. All three countries needed external assistance to ensure their governments 
continued functioning and avoided default. All three were required to implement very 
difficult programs of austerity and structural reforms in return for financing from the 
Troika. Despite the similarities of their situations, they all responded differently: Greece 
experienced significant political and social resistance to its program as politicians failed 
to take ownership of the program, constantly fought with each other, and engaged in 
brinksmanship with the Troika. The Greeks also held huge protests and multiple strikes 
that frequently involved violence and property damage. Ultimately, Greece would need a 
second program. Irish voters ousted the government that agreed to the Troika program 
and notwithstanding some pre-election bluster, the new coalition executed Ireland’s 
program. There was minimal social and political resistance in Ireland and the Irish also 
exited their Troika program on time. The Portuguese elected strong advocates of the 
Troika program who were dedicated to implementing the Troika’s policies and even 
exceeded their requirements for structural reform. The social response increased after 
sixteen months of relatively low levels of protests and strikes, but the government 
maintained its commitment to the program and exited on schedule. 
The core of the argument in this dissertation is that national identity is crucial for 
understanding the variation in responses of each country to its Troika program. More 
specifically, I have argued that each country’s responses were shaped and influenced by 
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specific aspects of each country’s national identity, especially as each relates to Europe 
and the European Union. As was documented throughout, the national identities of 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal vary widely due to different histories and experiences, 
especially with European countries and the EU. Therefore, each country’s interpretation 
of its Troika program was structured by these shared experiences.  
Since the establishment of the modern Greek state in 1832 and continuing through 
their accession into the EEC and later the EU, Greece has sought to become a modern 
country at the core of Europe. However, many Greeks and some European countries have 
been hesitant about Greece’s inclusion in Europe. Greece’s journey to join Europe has 
been questioned by the Greeks themselves and at times hindered by other powerful 
countries, including some in Europe.1 However, outside interference created obstacles for 
these goals as foreigners meddled in domestic Greek affairs much more than the other 
two countries. Foreign countries meddling in Greek affairs was not uncommon since the 
founding of modern Greece.2  There are many examples of powerful European countries 
meddling in Greek politics since the modern state was formed in the early 19th century 
and this trend would continue throughout the 20th century. The Nazi occupation of 
Greece during WWII further solidified Greek skepticism of Western European countries 
and imprinted a deep anti-German sentiment onto Greek national identity. Further 
interventions by the US, UK, and USSR during the Greek Civil War only added to this 
suspicion of powerful foreign countries controlling Greece’s fate while the support from 
                                                 
1 Gallant, Modern Greece; Clogg, A Concise History of Greece; Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone 
Needs to Know. 
2 Gallant, Modern Greece; Clogg, A Concise History of Greece. 
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the US for the military junta engrained anti-Americanism further into the Greek 
character.3 After the collapse of the military junta, many Greeks viewed their failures as 
caused by foreign meddling, as any progress made appeared to be quelled by outside 
forces. Even as Greece sought closer ties with Europe starting in the 1970s the country 
was divided whether to pursue this course as some thought Greece would be left 
permanently on the periphery of Europe. Despite some excitement for European 
integration, there was always a sense of hesitation and even distrust towards the EU as 
well as the US.4 When Greece went to the Troika in early 2010, their unpopular policy 
recommendations were viewed as a threat to Greece as they were being imposed by the 
very countries that had previously held Greece back, especially Germany. These 
interpretations led many Greeks to reject the program and rebel against the Troika and its 
own government, who was implementing the policies. 
Ireland made economic growth and modernization a nation building project in the 
1950s. Its leaders looked to leave poor, anti-materialistic Ireland behind5 and this goal 
structured many of its policies throughout the second half of the 20th century. After 
periods of growth, severe recession, and reform, the dedication to economic growth 
began to payoff and the result was the Celtic Tiger in the 1990s and into the 2000s. The 
success and wealth generated by Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy imprinted onto Irish 
national identity a faith in markets and in its foreign direct investment based economic 
                                                 
3 Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know. 
4 Featherstone and Papadimitriou, Prime Ministers in Greece. 
5 Fanning, The Modern Quest for Ireland: The Battle of Ideas 1912-1986; Fanning, Irish Adventures in 
Nation Building; Lee, Ireland 1912-1985. 
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model. Ireland became one of the richest countries in the world on a per capita basis and 
also finally felt as if it finally belonged with its ‘core’ European partners.6 With the 
success of the Celtic Tiger economy, the faith in markets and Ireland’s economic model 
became a lens through which the Irish made sense of their economic and social 
conditions. Therefore, when Ireland asked for help from the Troika in late 2010, the faith 
they had in markets and their economic model led many to view their crisis as more of a 
storm to be weathered as they attempted to revive the Celtic Tiger. 
Post-revolution Portugal developed a new national identity that was driven by the 
goal of Portugal becoming a stable, modern, Western European democracy similar to its 
European neighbors. This was in contrast to the poor, imperialist, dictatorship it had been 
for the past 40 years. Most Portuguese agreed that the best way to be more like their 
European neighbors was to make a full turn towards Europe and pursue deeper European 
integration.7 The European turn manifested itself with Portugal internalizing the identity 
of the “good student” of Europe. Here, Portugal acted in ways that were consistent with 
what it viewed as behaviors appropriate for a ‘core’ European country and as a means of 
modernizing its country, consolidating its democracy, and reinforcing its “good student” 
identity.8 However, the Portuguese had never truly lived up to these aspirations as they 
lagged behind their European neighbors into the 2000s. Therefore, the Troika program in 
Portugal was viewed as an opportunity to continue to make changes to further integrate 
                                                 
6 Nitzsche, "From Periphery to Core (and Back)? Political, Journalistic, and Academic Perceptions of Celtic 
Tiger- and post-Celtic Tiger-Ireland." 
7 Schukkink and Niemann, "Portugal and the EU’s Eastern Enlargement: A logic of identity endorsement"; 
Ferreira-Pereira and Groom, "Conclusion."  
8 Costa Pinto and Teixeira, "From Atlantic Past to European Destiny: Portugal." 
449 
with Europe and become more like other European countries by strictly adhering to the 
Troika’s policies and even exceeding its demands for structural reforms. 
These interpretations structured the responses of each country, which aligned with 
the content of its national identity. And, instead of room for new ideas to influence 
policy, each country reverted to and reproduced central elements of these identities. 
Another key observation is that the identities interacted in real time, with Ireland and 
Portugal highlighting their differences from Greece, and Portugal actively striving to be 
more like Ireland. The interaction between identities further reinforced each country’s 
responses to their respective Troika programs.  
While this is a new interpretation of the responses from Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal to their respective Troika programs, it also provides an explanation that can 
account for the variation in responses in all three countries. Whereas many of the existing 
explanations that focus on the difficulty of each program, domestic institutions, or 
economic ideas are limited to explaining only one or two of the cases, national identity 
succeeds in explaining all three cases. This dissertation has also highlighted how national 
identities can interact in a crisis situation, and how the interaction of identities helped 
support each country’s responses. Additionally, and on a broader level, this dissertation 
offers a novel contribution to the literature because few studies have illustrated how 
national level identities have influenced large, sharply contested political processes. My 
work also suggests the plausibility of using national identity to explain outcomes in 
political economy and politics more generally. 
Finally, this dissertation has documented how historical interactions and 
relationships as well as the collective experiences of nations and nation-states can have a 
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profound impact on the economic goals, strategies, and decisions that countries set for 
themselves as well as the impact of these experiences and aspirations on decision making 
during a crisis. However, as documented throughout this dissertation, national identities 
are not static and the traumatic experiences of the Troika programs in Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal are bound to reverberate through each society in different ways. Ireland and 
Portugal both emerged from their Troika programs stronger and experienced periods of 
economic growth until the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Greece needed a total of 
three Troika programs before they could fully regain bond market access and rid 
themselves of the Troika. While it is unknown how the experience with the Troika will 
affect Greek, Irish, and Portuguese perceptions of themselves and their European 
neighbors moving forward, their different experiences may already be having an effect on 
perceptions of the EU in each country. In the most recent Eurobarometer survey, the 
Portuguese and Irish have the most favorable images of the EU with 76 percent (PT) and 
75 percent (IE) of their populations viewing the EU positively. On the other hand, only 
34 percent of Greeks view the EU positively.9 One can only guess, but if history is any 
indicator, the national identities of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal will continue exert 
considerable weight on their economic and political decisions moving forward. 
                                                 
9 European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 94 – Winter 2020-2021 – Public Opinion in the 
European Union,” europa.eu, April 2021, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2355.  
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